The"Magic"BackgFOund
of Pearl Harbor
VOLUME IV
< October 17, 1941— Dwcater ?, IS4I)
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND
OF
PEARL HARBOR
VOLUME IV
17, 1941— December 7,1941)
Storage
j> tat p 3a
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
„
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20102 (8-part sot; sold in sets only)
Stock No. O08-ODO-O0238-9
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV
Advent of the TO JO Cabinet and redoubling of Japanese Government's insistence upon
an early acceptance of its proposals.
Page
Outline of Volume IV
PART A Hull-Nomura Conversations (October 17, 1941 -November 20, 1941) 1
1. Ambassador Nomura Complains of Lack of Coordination Between Japanese Foreign Office and
Navy (October 18, 1941) 1
2. Tokyo Refuses Ambassador Nomura's Resignation (October 23, 1941) 2
3 . J apan ese Go vernm en t Dee I ares Pol ic ies of Ne w C abine t 2
4. Ambassador Nomura Reports British-German Peace Rumors 2
5. We lles-Wakasugi Conversation (October 24, 1941} 2
(a) Under Secretary Welles' Report 2
(b) Minister Wakasugi's Report 4
6. Tokyo Urges American Reply to Japanese Proposals 5
7. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Admiral Pratt (October 25, 1941) 5
8. Minister Wakasugi Reports on Status of Japanese -Am eric an Relations - 6
9. Ambassador Nomura Reveals American Attitude Toward Japan 7
10. Ambassador Grew's Report (October 25, 1941) 8
11. Grew-Togo Interview (October 30, 1941) 9
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report 9
(b) Foreign Minister Togo's Report 9
12. Tokyo Questions Nomura on American Proposal 10
13. New Japanese Cabinet Discusses Formulation of Policies 10
14. Ambassador Grew Learns Japanese Cabinet's Plans 11
15. Ambassador Grew Reports on Situation in Japan 11
16. Ambassador Kurusu Appointed Special Aid to Ambassador Nomura __ 12
16-A. Japan Plans to Attack Hawaii on December 7, 1941— (November 5-7, 1941) 12
17. Ambassador Grew Receives Japanese Informant 13
18. Japan's Attitude Toward Present Negotiations Made Known . 13
19. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Final Proposals _ 14
20. Ambassador Kurusu Leaves for Washington 14
21. Japan Seeks Agreement, with Britain and the Netherlands 15
22. Tokyo Receives English Translation of Proposals 15
23. Japan to Avoid Ratified Treaty with United States 15
24. Japanese Diet Accepts Cabinet's Counterproposals 16
25. Ambassador Nomura to Guard Secrecy of Conferences 16
26. Japanese Newspapers Publicize Tokyo's Proposals . 16
27. Japanese and American Newspapers Impair Diplomatic Negotiations 17
29. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 7, 1941) 17
(a) State Department's Report 17
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report _ — 19
30. Tokyo Re-emphasizes Policy of Self-Defense 20
31. Mr. Horiuchi Arranges for Undelayed Delivery of Telegrams 20
32. Foreign Ministry Bans Publication of Negotiations 21
33 . President Roose ve 1 1 Conf ers w ith N a val Le aders ( Nov em ber 7 , 1 94 1 ) 21
34. Japan Interested in Hull's Proposed Settlement of the China Affair 22
35. Japan Seeks Facts on American- British Attitude Toward Axis 22
36. Grew-Togo Conversation (November 10, 1941) 23
(a) Ambassador Grew's Report 23
(b) Foreign Minister Togo's Report 25
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
37. Ambassador Nomura Reveala America's Pessimistic Attitude Toward the Negotiations 26
38. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (November 10, 1941) . 27
(a) Secretary Hull's Report ... 27
(h) Ambassador Nomura's Report 29
39. Japanese-American Conversation (November 10, 1941) 31
40. Japan Doubts America's Awareness of the Critical Situation 31
41. The German Government Makes Demands on Japan 31
42. Foreign Minister Togo Confers with Ambassador Craigie (November 11, 1941). 32
43. Ambassador Nomura Seeks Clarification of Tripartite Pact Issues 33
44. The Chinese Ambassador Confers with President Roosevelt 33
45. Mr. Kase Calls on Ambassador Grew (November 12, 1941) . 33
46. Ambassador No, mira Seeks English Translation of Proposal B 35
47. Japanese Official Analyzes Roosevelt's Domestic and Foreign Strategy 35
48. Japanese Naval Activity Seen in the Mandates . 36
49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 12, 1941) _ 36
(a) State Department's Report 36
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 39
50. Ambassador Kurusu Reports on American Pessimism 41
51. Japan Revises Text of Proposal B 41
52. Foreign Minister Togo Questions American Interpretation of Proposals 41
53. Finance Official Nishiyama to Study Japanese -American Negotiations . . - 42
54. Japan Seeks Undelayed Chinese Peace Negotiations 42
55. Japanese-American Conversations (November 13, 1941) 42
(a) State Department's Report 42
(b) Minister Wakasugi's Report 43
56. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Summaries of the Conversations 44
57. Ambassador Nomura Warnsof America's Preparedness for War 44
58. C h in a Seeks Increased A id from the U n i ted Sta tes 45
59. Japanese Government Considers Negotiations in Final Stage 45
60. Ambassador Nomina Speculates on Results of Possible Diplomatic Breach 46
61. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Kurusu in New Duties 47
62. Hull-Nomura Conversation— (November 15, 1941) 47
(a) State Department's Report 47
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 50
63. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Interpretation of Japanese Proposals 52
64. Hull-Nomura Conversation-* November 17, 1941) 52
(a) State Department's Report 52
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 53
65. Roosevelt-Kurusu Conversation— (November 17, 1941) 54
(a) Secretary Hull's Report 54
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report ... 55
66. Ambassador Grew Warns United States of Unexpected Japanese Attack 57
67. Japanese Air Forces Move to Mandates 57
68. Hull-Nomura Conversation -(November 18, 1941) 58
(a) State Department's Report 58
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 61
69. Hull-Nomura Conversation— (November 19, 1941) 63
(a) State Department's Report 63
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 64
70. Japan Prepares for Breakdown of Diplomatic Relations 64
Japanese efforts to extort an agreement on a narrow and one-sided proposal.
Hull-Nomura Conversations (November 20, 1941— December 1, 1941)
71. Hull-Nomura Conversation— (November 20, 1941) 65
(a) State Department's Report 65
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 66
11
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
72. Hull-Kurusu Conversation— (November 21, 1941) 67
(a) Secretary Hull's Report 67
(b) Ambassador Kurusu's Report 68
73. Japanese Air and Surface Patrols Cover Shipping 68
74. Hull-Nomura Conversation- (November 22, 1941) 68
(a) State Department's Report 68
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 71
75. Japan Changes Agreement Deadline to November 29, 1941 72
76. Chief of Naval Operations Warns of Japanese Surprise Attack on Philippines 72
77. Ambassador Grew Discusses Japanese Proposals with Foreign Minister Togo 73
78. Ambassador Nomura Warns Against Inaccurate News Reporting 74
79. Foreign Minister Togo Questions Newspaper Interpretation of Proposals 74
80. Tokyo Wishes Agreement to Include Petroleum Exports 75
81. Japanese Ambassador Offer to Tokyo Final Suggestion for Peace 75
82. Tokyo Orders Reports on Negotiations to Be Made by Telephone 76
83. Secretary Hull Confers with Allied Representatives— (November 24, 1941) 76
84. Conference with Japanese Representatives Postponed by Secretary Hull 76
85. Hull-Nomura Conversation — (November 26, 1941) 77
(a) State Department's Report - 77
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 80
86. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Mr. Yamamoto the Outcome of the Conference 81
87. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Terminating the Present Negotiations 81
88. United States Occupies Dutch Guiana 82
89. American Armed Forces Prepare for War 82
90. Roosevelt- Nomura Conversation— (November 27, 1941) _ 83
(a) Secretary Hull's Report 83
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 84
91. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Yamamoto 85
92. Chief of Naval Operations Issues War Warning 86
93. Tokyo Notifies Embassies of Rupture in Japanese -American Negotiations 86
94. Ambassador Nomura Urges Open Break in Diplomatic Relations 86
95. United States Forces Await Japanese Attack 87
Final Phase
HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (December 1, 1941— December 7, 1941)
96. Tokyo Investigates President Roosevelt's Sudden Return to Washington 89
97. Ambassador Nomura Reports Unfavorable Reaction to Tojo's Speech 89
98. Hull-Nomura Conversation— (December 1, 1941) _ 89
(a) State Department's Report 89
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 91
99. Tokyo Prepares for Results of Diplomatic Break 92
100. Japan Safeguards Its Code and Cipher Systems 92
101. Japanese-American Conversation — (December 2, 1941) „ 92
(a) State Department's Report 92
(b) Japanese Embassy Report 93
102. Welles-Nomura Conversation— (December 2, 1941) 93
(a) State Department's Report 93
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 94
103. President Roosevelt Orders Reconnaissance of Forces Around Thailand 95
104. U.S. Navy Exchanges Information with British and Dutch 95
105. Japanese-Military Attache in Spain Reports on Japanese-American Negotiations 95
106. American Officers in Far East Destroy Codes 95
107. Hull-Nomura Conversation — (December 5, 1941) %
(a) State Department's Report 96
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 97
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
108. Japanese Military Attache Discounts Immediate Possibility of War with America 97
109. Japan Plans U) Consider Holland a Semi-Belligerent Country When at War with the United States 98
110. Japan to Send Formal Reply to American Proposals 98
111. Japan Seeks Information on Roosevelt Message . _ _ 98
112. President Roosevelt's Message to Emperor Hirohito (December 6, 1941) ___ 98
113. Hull-Nomura Conversation— (December 7, 1941) 99
(a) State Department's Report 99
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report 101
114. Tokyo Extends Appreciation to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu 101
1 15. Japanese Embassy Destroys Codes 101
116. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor— (December 7, 1941) 102
(a) Secretary Hull's Statement 102
(b) President Roosevelt's Message 102
117. The United States Declares War— (December 8, 1941) 102
118. American Forces Begin Unrestricted Warfare .. _ __. 103
1 19. Japan Spreads Anti-allied Propaganda in Allied Countries 103
120. Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor Surprises Turkish Foreign Minister 103
PART B JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DU'LOMATIC MESSAGES 105
(a) Reports from the United States 105
121. Consul Sato Reports United States Navy Day Ceremony 105
122. Ambassador Nomura Requests Information Concerning the Warspite _ 106
123. Tokyo Outlines the Type of Information Needed 106
124. Consul Identifies Warspite, Colorado and Saratoga at Bremerton 106
(b) Reports from Mexico 106
125. Japanese Naval Officials in Mexico Disapprove of Furnishing General Intelligence 106
(c) Reports from Central America 106
126. Intelligence Dispatches Outline United States Activities in Centra] America 106
(dl Reports from the Panama Canal 107
127. Minister Akiyama Reports Canal Military and Naval Activity 107
128. Naval Intelligence Reports Military Construction Work and Navy Patrols 107
129. Reports Enumerate Vessels Passing Through Canal 107
130. Japanese Minister Corrects Ident ification of Vessel - 108
131. Japanese Report Movement of the British Cruiser Liverpool . _ — 1 ■ 108
132. German Agents Correct Japanese Identification of British Cruiser 108
133. Intelligence Dispatches List Type, Nationality and Number of Ships Crossing Isthmus 108
134. United States Sets Up Defense Fortifications in Canal Zone 109
(e) Reports from South America 109
135. Agents Speculate Concerning Planes Flown to Bathurst 109
(II Reports from the Hawaiian Islands 110
136. Foreign Minister Togo Asks for Semi- Weekly Ship Movement Reports 110
137. American Experts, Allegedly en Route to Burma Road, Arrive in Hawaii 110
138. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Report of Vessels in "N" Area 110
139. Consul Kita Reports Regular Naval Maneuvers . — U0
140. Japanese Agents Observe American Defenses 111
141. Frequency of Ship Movement Reports Is Left to Discretion of Consul 111
142. Foreign Minister Togo Wires Instructions Regarding Japanese Communicat ions . _ 111
143. Japanese Continue to Watch Navy Maneuvers 111
144. Mr. Fujii Changes American Ship Maneuver Signals 112
145. Consul Wires Movement Report of Rarin and Wyoming 112
146. British Vessel Enters Honolulu Harbor on Decern ber4,1941 112
147. U.S. S. Lexington Departs Hawaii 113
148. Consul Kita Notifies Tokyo of Balloon Barrage Defenses 113
149. Last Intelligence Report Before Pearl Harbor Attack Lists Ships in Port 113
(g) Reports from the Philippine Islands 113
150. Consul Nihro Reports Movement of Philippine-Based Ships 113
151. Consul Nihro Obtains Information from Newspapers and Foreign Office Reports 114
iv
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
152. Brown Soldiers Puzzle Japanese Consul 115
153. Tokyo Directs Secretary Yuki To Investigate Philippine Defenses 1 15
154. Foreign Minister Togo Asks Confirmation of Report of November 1, 1941 115
155. Consul Nihro Wires Further Information on Military Installations at Manila 1 15
156. Twenty-three Ships Anchored at Manila on November 8, 1941 116
157. Japanese Consul Corrects Previous Estimate of Airplanes in Philippines . 116
158. Consul Gathers Information from Japanese Residents 116
159. Japanese Report Concerning Preparations on Cebu 117
160. Manila Identifies the British Ship Awatea . 117
161. Consul Nihro Reports Tense Feeling in Manila 118
162. Submarine Tender Enters Port 118
163. Inaccuracy of Japanese Intelligence Reports 118
164. Manila Notifies Tokyo of Scouting Patrols 119
165. Intelligence Report Lists Ships in Port on December 1. 1941 119
(h) Reports from Singapore , 119
166. Japanese Officials in Singapore Learn of Squadron Sailing . . 119
167. Tokyo Requests Information on Ships in Port 119
(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking 119
168. American Tankers en Route to Vladivostok 120
169. Russian Incidents _ 120
JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 121
17(1. Japanese Consul Considers Means of Evacuating Nationals 121
171. Consul Morishima Applies for Permit to Transfer American Mission Funds 121
172. Japanese Fear That Mr. Kasai's Lecture May Cause Embarrassment 121
173. Consul Originates Plan to Repay Nationals in Tokyo 121
174. Secretary Terasaki Suggests Delay of Orders for Official Harada - 121
175. Japanese Plan to Route Money to Vancouver Through Seattle 122
176. Sailing of Kikawa Maru Forces Secretary Matsui to Leave Japan Without Visa 122
177. Japanese Consul at Vladivostok Views Pessimistically the Adjustment of Japanese-
American Relations „ 122
178. Propaganda Regulations Will Apply to Neutral Countries, Japan Decrees . 122
179. Harada to Bring Wireless Apparatus on Hikawa Maru 122
ISO. Swiss Newspaper Reports Progress of Japanese- American Negotiations 123
181. Delay of Sailing Permit Will Cause Financial Loss, Japan Declares 123
182. Ambassador Inquires Concerning Return of Japanese Students 1 23
183. Ambassador Nomura Sends Part of Personal Luggage to Japan 123
184. Foreign Minister Togo Urges Salary Remittance Exchange for Foreign Correspondents 123
185. Japan Asks for Foreign Broadcast Suggest ions 124
186. American Embassy in Tokyo to Get Fuel 124
187. Tokyo Requests Officials to Bring Recording Apparatus _._ 124
188. Exchange of Diplomatic Expense Funds Gives Rise to Discussion 124
189. Minister Directs That Cargo Ships Return to Japan 125
190. Broadcast Wave Length Proves Unsatisfactory 125
191. Japan Learns of Alleged Source of News Leak 126
192. Ambassador Nomura Sends Representative to "America First" Meeting 126
193. Japanese Officials Plan to Organize and Finance New Committee 126
194. Tokyo Foresees Need of Survey of United States Economic System _ - 127
195. Ambassador Nomura Says American People Not Ready to Enter European War 127
196. Japan Asks Representations in Mail Examination 128
198. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Broadcast Reception 128
199. Tokyo Itemizes Diplomatic Expenditures of Officials in United States 128
200. Japan Reprimands Officials Concerning Dispatch Classification 128
201. Consul Muto Reports Further Investigation of Japanese Agents 129
202. Consul Muto Asks Confirmation of Salary as Employee of Japanese Newspaper 129
203. American Bank in Tokyo Receives no Instructions to Cooperate in Japanese Exchange Plan 129
204. Manchukuoan Officials Seize Baptist Missionaries in Harbin 129
v
: OF CONTENTS I
Page
205. Foreign Minister Outlines Policy in China in Event of United States War 129
206. Lima, Peru, Chosen for Gold Deposits for Emergency Use 130
207. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Emergency Destruction of Code Machines 130
208. United States Attempts to Separate Italy from Axis, Ambassador Nomura Reports 130
209. Japan Plans to Preserve Shanghai Public Peace When American Marines Evacuate 130
210. Tokyo Decides to Permit Remittances from America to Cultural Institutions 131
211. Tokyo Advises Ambassador Nomura of Plan of Evacuation _ 131
212. Japanese Officials in European Countries Warned of Critical Situation 131
213. Sha ngh ai Uni ted S et tlem e nt Cou n ci 1 Decid es Coo perati v e Prote ction Plan 131
214. Japanese Agents Report American Hospital Staffs To Be Evacuating Peking, China 132
215. Foreign Minister Directs Havana Consul in Regard to Emergency Fund 132
21G. Foreign Office Considers Scheduling Another Evacuation Vessel 132
217. J apan M a k es Prov isions for Fin ancing Sou th A meri can D iplomatic Estab 1 ishments 132
218. Consul Morishima Asks That the Tatsuta Maru Dock at New York _ 132
220. Japan Wires Washington Schedule of the Tatsuta Maru 133
221. Japan Decides to Close the Japanese Cultural Association 133
222. Bank Employees Receive Instructions to Evacuate With the Embassy Staff 133
223. Japan ese Offi ci a] List of Age n c ies Pr in tin g Ja pane se Propagand a 133
224. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Improvements in Broadcast Service 134
225. An Emergency Code System Becomes Effective 134
226. Ambassador Nomura is Asked to Request Permits for Entrance of Japanese from Hawaii __ 134
227. Japan Requests Manchukuo to Release American Missionaries . 135
228. Secretary Terasaki Requests Addresses of Foreigners Receiving American Newspapers 135
229. D i fficu 1 ties Ari se C oneerning E va cu ation of Dual N a tionali ty Holders 135
230 . J a p an [ ssues Klers C oncer ni ng Dispos i tion of Cod es and Cod e M ach i nes 135
231. Courier K osaka Ordered Back to Japan 135
232. Destruction of Code Machines Is Ordered in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila 135
233. Havana Office Directed to Destroy Codes 13b'
234. Officials Directed to Destroy Codes 136
235. Officials Directed to Retain Emergency Code System Also 136
236. Provisions Are Made for Evacuation of Diplomats 136
237. Japan Requests Permission to Change Schedule of Tatsuta Maru ... 136
238. Ambassador Nomura Urges Magnanimity in Paying Employees Remaining in United States 137
239. Stale Department Approves New Schedule for Tatsuta Maru 137
240. Ambassador Nomura Is Instructed to Explain Japanese Military Activity in French In do- Chin a 137
241. Manchukuoan Officials Decide to Release Americans 137
242. Japan Sends Funds for Returning of Families of Japanese Diplomatic Employees 138
243. American Embassy Requires No Permit for Taking Out Personal Belongings 138
244. Ambassador Kurusu Suggests United States Investigate Western Transportation Company 138
246. Mystery Dispatch or Coded Wire Sent to Rio de Janeiro 1 ,38
247. Iguchi Asks Permission to Delay Destruction of One Code Machine 138
248. Japanese Officials in Washington Learn That American Marines Will Evacuate Shanghai 138
249. Tokyo Orders Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, and Yamamoto to Return to Japan 139
250. Consul Morishima Requests Permission for Mr. Hikida to Return Home _ -, 139
251. Ambassador Nomura Requests Additional Expense Money — 139
252. Ambassador Kurusu Asks That Secretary Terasaki Remain in the United Stales 139
253. Japan Continues Making Evacuation Plans . 139
254. Tokyo Clarifies Code Machine Reference 140
255. Japan Issues Its Policy Regarding All ied Diplomatic Officials 140
256. Consul Nihro Desires Settlement of Akino's Fine 141
257. Consul Nihro Requests Competent Assistants 141
258. Tokyo Plans Utilization of Osaka Steamship Company Funds in Manila 141
259. Consul Nihro Destroys Useless Codes 141
(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations 143
260. Diplomatic Corps in Panama Acknowledges New Government . . _ . . . - - 143
261. Latin American Countries Deny "Veiled Intervention" by the United States 143
vi
THE L ' MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
262. Minister Akiyama Explains New Governments' Foreign Policy 143
263. Japanese Business Firms Ordered to Close on October 28, 1941 144
264. Uncooperative Course of New Government is Result of Fear, Minister Alleges „ 144
265. Panama Restricts Minister Akiyama's Contacts - 145
266. Japanese Minister Says the United States is Urging Panama to Take the Lead 145
267. Japan Sends Official Complaint to Panama _ _ 146
268. Minister Akiyama Suggests Retaliatory Measures 146
269. Japan Requests Immediate Reopening of Businesses 146
270. Radio Broadcast or Domei Service is Suggested to Publicize Panama's Action 147
271. Tokyo Foreign Office Protests to Panama Minister; Requests Formal Statement From Panama 147
272. Panama Cabinet Says Japanese Note is Phrased in Insulting Terms 147
273. Minister Akiyama Says Japanese Will Have Trouble Disposing of Large Stocks 147
274. Newspaper Article Originating in Japan Charges Panama with Inhuman Acts 148
275. Japanese Minister Reports Dismissal of Spanish Minister 148
276. Mexican Minister Incensed at Treatment of Japanese, Returns Home, Akiyama Declares 148
277. Mr. Izawa Negotiates for Reemployment of Japanese in Panama 148
278. Minister Akiyama Suggests Further Retaliatory Measures __ 149
279. Foreign Minister Togo Plans to Aid Nationals 149
280. Japanese Military Men are En Route to Homeland 149
281. Minister Suggests that Young Japanese Nationals be Attached to Central and Latin
American Legations - 149
282. Minister Akiyama Stresses Danger of Communication Stoppage 149
283. Japanese Nationals Urged to Evacuate to Latin American Countries 149
284. Arrangements Made for Tatsuta Maru to Dock at Balboa 150
285. Panamanian Minister Reports Arrival of Peruvian Minister in Washington 150
286. Japan Proposes Reparation for Treatment of Japan Nationals in Panama 150
287. Minister Akiyama Communicates With Buenos Aires and Tokyo Regarding Codes 151
288. Minister Akiyama Experiences Financial Annoyances 151
<c) Japanese-Hawaiian Relations 153
289. Consul in Honolulu Requests Funds Before Arrival of Tatsuta Maru . 153
290. Japanese Official Requested to Bring Money Back to Japan 153
291. Foreign Office Asks that he Kept Under Strict Surveillance 153
292. Tokyo Suggests Nationals be Assigned to Second Evacuation Vessel 153
293. Spec i a 1 Codes to be Reta ined as Long as S i tu a tion Permits 153
294. Japan Ponders Recall of Staff 153
(d) Japanese- Philippine Relations 155
295. Consul Nihro Advises Early Evacuation of Useful Nationals 155
296. Dnited States Making Preparations for War in Earnest, Consul Says 155
297. Payment of Fine for Manila Youth in Japan Creates Problem of Exchange 155
298. Consul Protests Opening of Diplomatic Mail Pouch 156
299. Japan to Investigate the Seizure of Mail 156
300. The Asama Maru Tentatively Scheduled to Arrive November 10, 1941 156
301. Japan Changes Arrival Date of the Asama Maru to November 19, 1941 157
302. Consul Nihro Reiterates Advice that Fares be Reduced 157
303. Consul Arranges Permit to Enter Manila as Vessel Sails from Homeland 157
304. Passenger and Freight Fees to Buy Supplies for the Asama Maru 157
305. Asama Maru to Evacuate Japanese Officials and Business Men 158
306. Japanese Legation Staff Obtains a Loan 158
(e) Japanese-Mexican Relations _ , 159
307. Vice Consul Kobayashi Transports Secret Documents to San Francisco _._ 159
308. Minister Miura Sends to Tokyo a Resume of Comments on Mexico's Position in the
Event of a Japanese- American War 159
309. Navy Department Retracts Alleged Statement by Secretary Knox of "Imminent Action
Within 24 Hours" 159
310. Minister Miura Plans to Return to Japan 159
311. System of Importing Rayon Undergoes a Change 160
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
312. Panama Incident Has No Noticeable Effect in Mexico 160
313. Mexican Newspapermen Return from Japan Via Vancouver and Cuba 161
314. Courier Inoma Dispatched to San Francisco 161
315. Mexican Reporter Returning from Japan Expresses His Gratitude for Hospitality Extended 161
316. Mexico Enforces Stricter Passport Policies 161
317. Minister Miura Gives His Opinion Regarding Oil Agreement Between United States and
Mexico 162
318. Agreement Signifies Desire for Mutual Understanding Between United States and Mexico 162
319. Minister Miura Request Traveling Expenses and Reservations on the Tatsuta Maru 163
320. Japanese Nationals Request Aid in Obtaining Reservations on Tatsuta Maru ._ 163
321. Minister Miura Asks that the Tatsuta Maru Load Freight at Manzanillo _ 163
322. Japanese Officials Use Mexico- Tokyo Diplomatic Channel for Intelligence Routing 163
323. Tokyo Sends Instructions by Courier Kosaka Regarding Japanese and
Manchurian Daily Broadcasts 163
324. Tokyo Wires Formal Authorization for Minister Miura's Return 164
325. Minister Miura Reports Impossible Reception of General Broadcast 164
326. Foreign Minister Togo Instructs Minister Miura to Arrange for Employment of
Japanese from Panama ....... . 164
327. Tokyo Orders Mexico to Limit Ex oenses and to Use "S" Code 164
328. Minister Miura Discusses with Panama the Employment of a New Staff Member 164
329. Tokyo Makes Plans for the Tatsuta Maru to Enter and Leave Port at Manzanillo 164
330. The Mexican Government Reopens Its Legation in China 165
331. Minister Miura Asks for Confirmation of Schedule of Tatsuta Maru 165
332. Tokyo Informs Minister Miura It Approves Taking American and Mexican Money to Japan 165
333. Japanese Minister in Mexico Informs Tokyo of Destruction of Ciphers and Code Machines 165
(f) Japanese-South American Relations 167
334. Columbia Refuses United States Overflight Requests 167
335. Japanese Naval Authorities Ship Transmitter Despite Protests of South American
Foreign Offices 167
3;i6. Mitsubishi Unable to Ship Supplies Aboard Toa Maru 167
337. German Representatives Reserve Cabins Aboard Toa Maru 167
338. Japanese Navy Promises to Stow Radio Transmitter 168
339. Brazil Begins Close Inspection of Japanese Exports and Imports - 168
340. Terukawa Maru to Stop at Callao 168
341. South American Countries Change to Code Machine November 7, 1941 169
342. Minister Yanai Advises Instigation of New Radio Code 169
343. Tokyo Urges That Maltreated Japanese in Panama Be Taken to South America 169
344. Minister Tomii Advises Adjust ment of Japanese American Relations to Give Japan More Time 170
345. Minister Koseki in Paraguay Burns Codes 170
346. New Code Words Issued November 29, 1941 170
347. Tokyo Lists Accomplishments of Pearl Harbor Day 170
(a) Argentina 170
348. Japan Attempts to Improve Trade With Argentina 171
349. Japan Undecided as to Sympathies of Argentina 171
(b) Brazil . . — 172
350. Japan Improves Communications Facilities to Brazil - 172
351. Courier Kosaka Leaves Rio de Janeiro for Washington 172
352. Japan Recognizes Strong United States Sympathies in Brazil 173
353. Japan Transfers Bank Funds 173
354. Ambassador Ishii Asks for Additional Funds 173
355. Ambassador Ishii Has Difficulty in Radio Reception 173
356. Japan Prepared for Crisis as Brazilan Army Supports America 174
357. Ambassador Ishii Requests Release of Secretary Kusano 174
358. Japan Sees United States Military Occupation of South America 174
359. Japan Issues Instructions for Burning Codes _- 175
(c) Chile . -
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
360. Minister Yamagata Suspects United States Machinations in Chile 175
361. Japan Limits Tour of Chilean Press 175
362. Japanese Watch Development of South American Sympathies in Face of War 176
363. Minister Yamagata Asks Chile to Take in Maltreated Japanese from Panama _ - ne
(d) Peru - „ 178
364. Minister Sakamoto Asks Permission to Confer with Ambassador Kurusu 178
365. Acting Minister Yodokawa Analyzes Peruvian Attitude 178
(g) Japanese-British Relations 181
366. Custom Question Forces Ambassador Tsurumi to Remain in Singapore 181
367. Ambassador Tsurumi Receives Permit for the Loading of Raw Cotton 181
368. Spanish Ambassador Reports Improvement of Conditions in Britain _ 181
369. Details of Unloading Scrap Iron Remain Unsettled 182
370. The Asama Maru Prepares to Evacuate Japanese Nationals from Brit ish-Controlled Ports 182
371. The Kito Maru Abandons Trip to Dairen 18*2
372. Japanese Officials in Singapore Continue Negotiations in Regard to the Frozen Accounts 183
373. Japanese and Canadian Officials Disagree Concerning the Purchasing Rate of Y10O 183
374. Mr. Wataru Assumes Post as Commercial Attache in Shanghai 183
375. Japan is Concerned Over the Attitude of Great Britain 183
376. Spanish Charge d'Affaires in Cairo Comments on the Situation in Egypt 184
377. Japanese Naval Reconnaissance Bomber Flies Over Hongkong 184
378. Ambassador Craigie and the Foreign Minister Culminate the Honma Incident 185
379. Japanese Foreign Minister is Concerned Over Family Remittance Permits 185
380. Canadian Army Troops are Sent to t he Orient — 185
381. Makinoof the Johol Rubber Plantation is Instructed to Return to Japan 185
382. Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq and Japan are Severed 186
383. Britain Removes from Office the Chief of Staff and His Assistant 186
384. The Boris Arrives in Seattle 186
385. Mr. Yoshizawa Seeks Funds for the Ottawa Legation 186
386. Mr. Kawakasi Negotiates for Funds for the Nisso Company in Vancouver 187
387. Foreign Minister Togo is Concerned Over the Remaining Japanese Residents in Singapore 187
388. Tokyo is Concerned Over British Code Material 188
389. The Premier of Burma Attempts to Attain an Independent Status for His Country 188
390. Hongkong Economic Condition is Becoming Critical 188
391. Tokyo is Concerned With Code and Cipher Systems 189
392. Japan Prepares for Hostilities - 189
(h) Japanese-German Relations - 191
393. Ambassador Oshima Asks to Resign 191
394. Japan Sees an Increase of Brit ish and American Aid to Russia 191
395. Exchange Broadcasts Become Acceptable to Japan and Germany 192
396. Progress of the Russo-German War (October. 1941) 192
(a) Report from Finland 192
(b) Report from Roumania 193
397. Tokyo Relays a Summary of Diplomatic Relations as Advanced by Germany . _ 193
398. Asama Maru Departure is Delayed Because of Unsuitable Routing 194
399. Axis Powers Reacclaim the Anti-Comintern Pact 195
399A. DoD Comment : Also includes Japanese Account of the SORGE Affair
400. Halting of American Shipping at Manila Impedes Japanese-German Trade 199
401. Progress of the Russo-German War (November, 1941) 199
402. Fresh Rumors of a Combined Europe Meeting Under Hitler Arise 202
403. Progress of the Russo-German War (November 13-14, 1941) 202
(a) Report from Finland 202
(b) Report from Berlin 203
(c) Report from Alexandrovsk _ 204
(d) Report from Bulgaria 204
404. Japanese Specialists Study German Industries 204
405. President Inonu Offers Turkey as a Mediator Between Germany and Russia 206
406. Axis Powers Bicker Over Vital Rubber Shipments 206
ix
Page
407. Ambassador Oshuna Says Axis Political Aim of the War is the Dismemberment of Russia 206
40S. Japanese Officials in Ankara, Helsinki, and Vienna Report German Activities to the
Home Office . 207
409. Germany Proposes Pinal Draft of the Germ an -Manchukuoan Economic Relations Pact 208
410. Ambassador Oshima Interviews Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop 208
411. Axis Powers Arrange for Simultaneous Declarations of War on the United States 209
412. Tripartite Powers Strengthen Their Positions in the Near East 213
413. Japan Attempts to Pacify Germany in Regard to Japanese-Russian Relations 213
(i) Japanese-Manchukuoan Relations 215
414. Japan is Concerned with Mongolian Uprisings _ 215
415. Manchukuoan Border Incidents Cause Increasing Concern in Tokyo 215
416. Ja pan is Concerned wi t h Commun ist Acti vi ties i n M a n c hu kuo an d Chin a 215
417. Japan and Russia Equally Unprepared for War Against Each Other, Minister at
Hsinking Declares - 216
418. Russia Thought to be Moving Border Troops to Western Frontier 216
419. Japan Questions Manchukuo's Motives in Cancelling Visas 216
420. Government Authorities Agree on Manchukuo's Policy in the Event of War 217
421 . Japan Ponders Disposition of Its Manchukuoan Army 217
422. Japan Asks Renewal of Five-Year Rights to Northern Sakhalin Coal and Oil 217
(j) Japanese-Italian Relations 219
423. Italy Urges Japan to Restrain United States from Participation in the War 219
424. Italy Disapproves Japan's Dissemination of British Propaganda . 219
425. Ambassador Horikiri Finds Count Ciano Uninformed on Japanese -American
Negotiations 219
426. Ambassador Horikiri Urges Japan to Publish More Italian Propaganda 219
427. Japan Desires Italian Reciprocity in Air Transportation to South America 220
428. Japanese Officials Discuss Trade Relations With Italy 220
429. Ando Rebukes Gayda for Attempting to Utilize Japan in Axis Machinations 220
430. Ambassador Horikiri Explains Italian Censorship of Japanese Mail 221
431. The Japanese Ambassador Reveals Revolutionary Plot in India 221
432. The Catholic Church at Rome Seeks to Forestall Breach in Japanese-American Relations 222
433. The Catholic Church Is Unmoved by Arabic Situation 222
434. Ambassador Horikiri Complains of Weaknesses in Japanese Radio Transmission to Rome 223
435. Ambassador Horikiri Obtains Information Concerning Italian Relations with Croatia,
France, and Russia 223
436. Ambassador Horikiri and Secretary Ando Confer with Mussolini and Count Ciano 224
437. Ambassador Horikiri Learns of Italian Position in Regard to the War with the United States 224
(k) Japanese- French Relations 225
438. Mr. Arnald Refuses to Make Military Expense Payment in Piastres 225
439. Japan Instructs Ambassador to Procure Export Permit by October 24, 1941 225
440 Japan Protests Movement of Troops into Unfortified Zone 225
441. Tokyo Plans to Land Planes in Indo-Chinese Waters 225
442. ForeignMinisterTogoAppliesPressureinShanghaibyLimitingExportations __ 225
443. Japan Threatens Action Unless French Agree to Payment of Military Expenses 226
444. Tokyo Decrees Further Export Restrictions to Combat Freezing of Assets 226
445 . Consul H ay ash i In vestiga tes Pro - Japanese Party Members 226
446. Special Committee Receives Codes 227
447. Tokyo Instructs Kato To Request Only Plane Landing Space .. 227
448. Hanoi Consul to Negotiate for Plane Landings Independently 227
449. Government Officials are Listed as Dangerous to Franco -Japanese Cooperation 227
450. Frenchman Intercedes in Behalf of Japan 228
451. Togo Plans to Send Emissary Group Despite Visa Procurement Difficulty _ 228
452. Japan Reiterates Threat to Secure Military Expenses 228
453. French Authorities Agree to Issue Visas for Entire Yoshizawa Group 229
454. France Accedes to Japan's Military Expense Payment Demand 229
455. French Indo-China Remits Occupation Expenses 229
456. Japanese Officials Arrive at Hanoi 230
x
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS {Continued)
Page
457. Japan Demands Payment in Full from French Indo-China 230
458. Tokyo Forwards New Code Machines for the Hanoi and Saigon Offices 230
459. French Indo-China Makes Payment in Philippine Dollars „ 230
460. Investigation Discredits Aid of Pro- Japanese Frenchman 230
461 . Foreign Minister Togo Out! ines Duties of Ambassador Yoshiza wa 231
462. Ambassador Kato Asks for Schedules of Yoshizawa Party Members 231
463. Tokyo Officials Demand Release of Shipment 232
464. Consul Ogawa to Sail on Chicago Maru 232
465. French Government Approves Rubber Shipment 232
466. Expansion of Japanese Army in French Indo-China Creates Difficulties 232
467. France Agrees to Provide Additional Supplies to Japan 233
468. Tokyo Releases New Broadcast Schedule for Far East 233
469. Vice- Minister Roshier Considers Movement of Japanese Troops 233
470. Secret Messages Withheld from Stan" Members are to be Headed hy "Gaisin" 233
471. Japan Vests Negotiating Authority in Ambassador Yoshizawa in French Indo-China 234
472. Japan Agrees to Transport Rubber for Germany as Far as Japan 234
473. German Official Says Germany and Japan Must Agree on Division of Indo-Chinese Rubber 234
474. Planning Committee Draws up Bill to Export Materials _._ 234
475. Japan Obtains Visas for Members of Yoshizawa Party 235
476. Japanese Suspect Decoux of Collaboration With Americans and English 235
477. Resignation of General Weygand is Considered to be German Victory 235
478. Japanese Insist on French Indo-China as Site for Negotiations 235
479. Tokyo Arranges Contract for Additional Rubber 236
480. Specialists are En Route to Bangkok Office 236
481. Minister Iwaturo Uchiyama Complains of Lack of Information Concerning Japanese-
United States Negotiations 236
482. Japanese Officials Told to Disregard French Attitude 236
483. Japan Encounters Difficulty in Securing Round-About Visas 237
484. French Accede to Japanese Demands Concerning Rubber Negotiations 237
485. Mr. Ogawa Suggested as Liaison Officer 237
486. Japan Promises Not to Increase Her Troops in Indo-China 237
487 . Mr. Yokoyamu in Hanoi Negotiates for Supplies 237
488. Japan Prepares to Invade French Concession in Shanghai 238
489. Tokyo Orders French to Cooperate in Efforts Against Sabotage 238
490. Japan Decrees Removal of British and American Consuls 238
491. Joint-DefenseofFrencblndo-ChinaProclaimed- 239
492. Japan Denies Change in Troop Disposition in French Indo-China 239
493. Darlan Declares that France will take a Neutral Stand 241
(1) Japanese-Chungking Relations 241
494. Tokyo is Informed of a British-American-Chinese Financial Conference 241
495. Rumors Reach Tokyo of Secret Chungking-Communist Agreement 242
496. Japanese Authorities Increasingly Suspicious of Chungking- American Activities _ 242
497. Hongkong Is Informed of Measures to be Taken in China in the Event of a Japanese- American War _ 243
(m) Japanese-Nanking Relations __ 243
498. NankingAppointsMinisterLi Fan g C o mm erci al Attache to Berlin 243
499. GermanDiplomatsDepartforNanking 243
500. Nanking Refuses to Comment on Tojo Cabinet 244
501. Occupied China Attempts to Stabilize Its Currency 244
502. Japan Distributes Newspapers to the Chinese 244
503. Ambassador Honda Plans Trip to Tokyo 244
504. The Vatican Reportedly Favors the Nanking Government 245
505. Administration Difficulties Arise in Shanghai . 245
506. Japan Concludes Agreement with the Shansi Army ... 246
507. President Wang Desires Collaboration with Chungking 246
508. Japan Initiates New System for the China Affairs Board 246
509 . Japan Proposes MethodsofControllingGhineseNationalsAboard 247
510. Japanese Apprehend Blue Shirt Terrorists 247
xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
511. Ambassador Oshima Urges Mr. Li Sheng-wu to Report to Berlin Immediately 247
512. Japan, Manchuria, and China Plan Exchange Broadcasts 247
513. Japan Plans to Confiscate Third Country Concessions in China 247
514. Japan Extends Its Control Over the Chinese 248
515. Japanese Leaders Outline Their War Policy in China 248
516. Japan Fights Espionage in Northern China - . 249
517. Nanking Outlines Method of Handling Enemy Nationals and Property 249
518. Japan Directs Nanking Not to Participate in the War _ _ _ 250
519. Tripartite Powers Secure Shortwave Broadcasting Unit in Shanghai 250
(n) Japanese- Netherlands East Indies Relations 251
520. Consul Genera) Ishizawa Arranges To Leave Batavia 251
521. Dutch Officials Become Suspicious of Japanese in the Indies 251
522. Japanese Trade and Shipping Problems (October 18-30, 1941) 252
523. Japanese Agents Secure Military Information Concerning the Indies 253
524. Dutch Governor-General Evinces No Alarm Over Impending Crisis 2,54
525. Tokyo Plans the Evacuation of Japanese Nationals 254
526. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Subsidy for Japanese Newspaper in Batavia 255
527. Communication Difficulties Arise in Batavia 255
528. Major Kuriya is Ordered to Return to Japan . 255
529. Dutch Authorities in Netherlands East Indies Prepare for War 256
530. Supittai Denounces Japanese Foreign Policy 256
531. Japan Orders Remaining Nationals to Return Immediately 256
532. Japanese Trade and Shipping Problems (November, 1941) 256
533. Netherlanders' Attitude Remains Anti-Japanese 258
534. Japanese Businesses Close in Preparation for Evacuation 258
535. Consul General Ishizawa Complains of Minor Problems 259
536. Netherlands East Indies Government Suppresses Japanese Agents . 259
537. Germany Requests That Its Nationals Be Evacuated by the Fuji Maru 260
538. Japan Prepares to Invade the East Indies . 260
539. Consul Ishizawa Orders Consulate Classified Material Burned _ 260
540. Japanese Foreign Office Declares the Netherlands a Quasi-Enemy Nation 261
(o) Japanese-Thaiese Relations , 263
541. Japanese Plan Invasion of Southern Thailand . _ 263
542. Intelligence Agent Reports Thaiese Troop Movement to Border . 263
543. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Funds, Supplies to Open Drug Concern 263
544. Japanese Officials Plan the Use of Indian Troops in Malaya 263
545. Foreign Minister Togo Proposes Set- Up of Short Wave Radio in Bangkok 264
546. Ambassador Tsubokami Asks Permission to Remain at Post Because of Difficult Situation . _ . 264
547. Tokyo Adds Army Man to Bangkok Legation Staff 264
548. Japanese Plan Establishment of Air Wireless Section . 265
549. British Cabinet Member Submits Proposals to Thailand 265
550. Major Aoyama Reports on Code, Espionage Work 265
551. Tokyo Forwards Instructions for Operation of Beacon Radio Set 265
552. Japan Continues Plans to Establish a Navy- Controlled Steamship Company ... 266
553. Japanese Amhassador Requests Ten Large Radios For Use in Thailand 266
554. Japanese Ambassador Asks for Restriction on Number of Japanese Merchants
Entering Thailand 266
555 . Rum or Disc loses T hat Britain Ask s Excl u si on of German Fifth Columnists 266
556. Japanese Government Has Difficulty in Securing Export Permit 266
557. Japan to Sell Gold to Thailand 267
558. Tokyo Attempts to Purchase Thaiese Rice „_ ( 267
559. Foreign Minister Plans to Send Money for Purchase of Radio Sets 267
560. Thaiese Official Considers Re-exportation of Armaments to British Possessions 267
561. Two Japanese Officials Receive Ill-Treatment . 267
562. Tokyo Informed Concerning British Forces in Malaya 268
563. Foreign Minister Togo Dispatches Official to Shanghai to Speed Plans for Bangkok
Drug Dispensary 268
xii
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
564. Japan Enlarges Bangkok Staff 268
565. Ambassador to Ask Nationals to Secure Rubber, Tin _ 269
566. .Japanese Ambassador Establishes Name, Stock Holders tor Shipping Concern 269
567. J a p anese Officia Is are Disa p poi n ted in Ad v an cem ent of ftoposal to Esta bl ish a C om m ission 269
568. Bangkok Papers Print Reports of Japanese Army Campaign in Burma 269
569. Disguised Army Experts to Be Sent to Thailand .__ _ 270
570. Intelligence Agents Report Discussion Bet ween Mr. Duff Cooper and Premier Pibul 270
571. Tokyo Sends 3,300 Yen to Purchase Radios 271
572. Japan Approves Plan to Purchase Rice Unobtrusively in Small Amounts
271
573. Japan Will Have Controlling Interest in New Shipping Concern 271
574. Japan Fears that Chinese and British Interests Are Buying Rubber 272
575. Japan Asks Investigation of Report that Prime Minister Pibul Desires to Resign 272
576. Gold Negotiations Do Not Permit Optimistic Outlook, Ambassador Says 272
577. Tokyo Cautions Regarding Operational Plans .. 272
578. Japanese Return Imperial Portrait to Homeland 272
579. InlelliKciiccRt'iKirtlnformsTokyoofPlannedChinese-ThaieseCooperatLon 272
580. Prime Minister Pibul Assures Ambassador That Thailand Desires to Cooperate Despite Difficulties 273
581. Japan Learns of Alleged British Proposal to Supply Thailand with Arms 273
582. British Minister Points to Thailand's Danger 273
583. Japan to Receive Less Rubber Due to Production Decrease 274
584. Supplies for Japanese -Owned Drug Dispensary are Sent From Shanghai 274
585. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Assistance for Five Newspapermen 274
586. Thailand Consortium Makes Written Proposal Regarding Liquidation of Japanese Gold „ 274
587. Foreign Minister Togo Sends Secret Fund to Bangkok Foreign Office 274
588. Bangkok Office Returns Code Machines to Japan 275
589. Ambassador Tsubokami Believes that Thailand Should be Led to Cooperate Voluntarily 275
590. New Pro-Japanese Party Advocates Collaboration with Japan 275
591. Prime Minister Pibul, Defense Minister Puromu Differ Concerning Thailand's Policy 275
592. Ambassador Requests Funds for Machinat ions - 276
593. Ambassador Recommends that Crew of Fishing Vessel Escape to Saigon District 276
594. Japan Agrees to 25,000,000 Baht Exchange of Gold 276
595. Japan Discovers Discrimination in Thaiese Censorship 276
596. Ambassador Advises that Railway be Completed Quickly 276
597. Foreign Minister Togo Asks that Additional Rubber he Secured - 276
598. Japan Plans to Investigate Raw Opium Market 277
599. Consul General Asada Carries Important Papers to Thailand 277
600. High Ranking Official Says Thailand Friendly to Japanese Army 277
601. Agreement Stipulates Continuance of Gold Exchange to March, 1942 ... 277
602. Ambassador Requests Additional Secret Fund 277
603. Ambassador Tsubokami Explains Objectives of Prime Minister Pibul's Speech 278
604. AmbassadorTsubokamiSuggeststhatThailandbePersuadedtoCooperate 278
605. Thaiese Government Officials Still Vote for Neutrality 278
606. Officials Originate Plan to Force Mr. Pibul to Declare His Position 279
607. Ambassador Sends List of Codes to be Destroyed - 279
608. Japanese Ambassador Suggests Counter- Propaganda Tactics 279
609. Foreign Minister Togo Remits Funds for Propaganda Purposes 279
610. Japanese Officials Set Up Secret Wireless Communicat ion Facilities 279
611. Nai Wanitto Believes Thailand Will Cooperate with Japan in Two or Three Days 279
612. Thailand Sends Official Reply to Financial Proposal 280
613. Propaganda, to be Disseminated in Thailand, is Sent to Japan 280
614. British and American Residents Evacuate Bangkok 280
615. Ambassador Informs Tokyo of Schedule of Batavia Maru 280
616. Japan to Issue Proclamation on December 8, 1941 280
617. Invasion of Thailand to be Announced by Separate Wire 281
618. Foreign Office Provides Ambassador with Varying Explanations in Case Occupation
is Peaceful or by Force 281
xiii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
619. Thailand Gives Right of Passage Through Territory to Japanese Army
620. Tokyo Announces Armies' Advance and Occupation of Bataan
Concluding page
xiv
OUTLINE OF VOLUME IV
Part A
Hull-Nomura Conversations (October 17, 1941 - December 7, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Reports
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Reports
PartB
Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages
(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from Mexico
(c) Reports from Central America
(d) Reports from the Panama Canal
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(g) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(h) Reports from Singapore
(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking
PartC
Japanese Diplomatic Activities Throughout the World
(a) Japanese-American Relations
(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations
(c) Japanese-Hawaiian Islands Relations
(d) Japanese-Philippine Islands Relations
(e) Japanese-Mexican Relations
(f) Japanese- South American Relations
(g) Japanese- British Relations
(h) Japanese-German Relations
(i) Japanese- Manchukuoan Relations
(j) Japanese- Italian Relations
(k) Japanese- French Relations
(I) Japanese-Chungking Relations
(m) Japanese-Nanking Relations
(n) Japanese-Dutch Relations
(o) Japanese-Thaiese Relations
xv
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
CHAPTER IV
PART A— HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
(October 17, 1941 - November 20, 1941 )
Advent of the Tojo Cabinet and Redoubling of Japanese Government's Insistence Upon an
Early Acceptance of Its Proposals. 1
t. Ambassador Nomura Complains of Lack of Coordination Between Japanese Foreign Office and
Navy (October 18, 1941)
Following the change of government in Japan, Ambassador Nomura on October 18, 1941,
offered his congratulations to the new Cabinet. At the same time, however, he pointed out
that throughout the term of the former Japanese Cabinet he had been unable to accomplish
anything through Japanese -American conversations. According to Ambassador Nomura,
certain things which had taken place in spite of his personal recommendations had forced
him to question his own value to a future Japanese government.
Since Minister Wakasugi and Mr. Iguchi were capable of handling negotiations,
Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to return to Japan in order to report
personally on the existing Japanese-American situation and to receive instructions regarding
future policies. 1 "
Two days later, on October 20, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that, since his appoint-
ment to the post in the United States, there had existed a complete lack of coordination
between the Japanese Navy Department and the Japanese Foreign Office."
Referring again to Japanese- American problems, Ambassador Nomura emphasized that,
although the United States might desire to avoid military action in the Pacific because it
was already faced with war on the Atlantic front, America would still refuse to renounce its
national policies even to effect a concilatkm. In Ambassador Nomura's opinion, China was
primarily responsible for the present attitude of the United States toward Japan. For that
reason, Ambassador Nomura had attempted to bring about a "modus vivendi" between
the two countries, leaving out the China question entirely. But Secretary Hull had insisted
that China was inseparably concerned with the stability of the Pacific. However, from a
conversation with Lord Halifax, Ambassador Nomura learned that Great. Britain agreed with
Japan that a "modus vivendi" should be worked out in order to avoid a crisis in the Far East.
At the conclusion of his report, Ambassador Nomura re-emphasized his ineffective position
as Ambassador from Japan possibly because of his lack of understanding of the principles of
the present Japanese government.' 1 In fact, Ambassador Nomura frankly stated that he should
have been asked to resign along with the members of the former Japanese Cabinet. In spite of
the encouragement of Secretary Hull and other American statesmen who trusted his sincerity,
Ambassador Nomura recognized that his lack of actual influence in Japan forced him to iead
a hypocritical existence as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. Although not anxious
"to flee from the field of battle", Ambassador Nomura urged his government to order his recall. 4
1 Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents— Papers Renting to the
Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, J93J-/WI in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, 1943, Volume 11, 343. Hereafter referred to as S.D. , II.
"Appendix IV, No. 1. Hereafter Appendix IV will be referred to as IV, 1.
2 IV, 2.
"Ibid,
4 IV,3.
1
2. Tokyo Refuses Ambassador Nomura's Resignation (October 23, 1941)
After considering Ambassador Nomura's report of the Japanese -American situation and
his request for a transfer of duty, on October 23, 1941 Tokyo asked that Ambassador Nomura
sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post. Assuring Ambassador Nomura that the
Japanese government was relying completely upon his judgement, Tokyo stated that the
policies of the Japanese government, determined by the outcome of these negotiations,
would be based upon the information which Ambassador Nomura forwarded. 5
3. Japanese Government Declares Policies of New Cabinet
Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese Embassy in Washington must be
kept well informed on any changes of policy made in Tokyo, the Foreign Office assured the
Japanese Ambassador that instructions had been unavoidably delayed because of the forma-
tion of a new Cabinet. 6 Tokyo assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that the new Cabinet
still retained the desire of the former Japanese government to adjust relations with the
United States on an equitable basis. Yet, Ambassador Nomura was told that the Japanese
government, having set forth its principles completely, could take no further action.
In order to emphasize Japan's desire that a format United States counter proposal to the
Japanese document of September 25, 1941 be submitted, the Japanese government urged
Ambassador Nomura to discuss this matter discreetly with American representatives. 7
4. Ambassador Nomura Reports British-German Peace Rumors
Realizing that the trend of events in Europe would affect the situation in the Pacific,
Ambassador Nomura kept his government informed on developments in the war between
Britain and Germany,
In the latter part of October, 1941 Ambassador Nomura was told that Germany was preparing
to offer Great Britain generous peace terms. Since the British public was apparently
satisfied with taking Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, and since Lloyd George appeared to be gaining
in popularity over Prime Minister Churchill, it was thought that Hitler's offer of peace might
be accepted. On the other hand, Ambassador Nomura believed that the English people would
continue to place their trust in Prime Minister Churchill and that President Roosevelt,
representing the United States government as a whole, would assist the British in with-
standing German movements.
Yet, Ambassador Nomura felt it necessary to point out that up until this time his
informant had believed in a German defeat while now he was convinced that Germany and
Great Britain were ready to arrive at a satisfactory peace. 9
5. Welles- Wakasugi Conversation (October 24, 1941)
a. Under Secretary Welles ' Report"
At his own request Mr. Wakasugi called upon Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on
October 24, 1941 to inform the United States government that the new Japanese Cabinet
desired to continue the informal conversations with a view to resuming friendly diplomatic
and economic relations.
Mr. Wakasugi then inquired whether the United States had any counter proposals to make
to those offered by Tokyo on September 25, 1941. In reply, Mr. Welles pointed out that during
S 1V,4.
B IV, 5.
'Ibid.
"IV, 6,
"/bid.
10 "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Welles", October 24, 1941, S.D. II, 692-697
2
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
the past seven or eight months the United States government had earnestly endeavored to
establish the basis for an equitable agreement between the two governments. However,
recent statements made by prominent authorities of the Japanese army and navy and other
parts of that government had created an atmosphere detrimental to the conclusion of such
an agreement. 11 The recent public statement made by an officer of the Japanese navy
declaring that the Japanese navy was "itching to fight 12 " had had an undesirable effect upon
the American navy. Furthermore, Mr. Welles continued, the tone of articles and editorials
appearing in Japanese newspapers created a serious obstacle to any satisfactory agreement
which might be arrived at during the informal conversations.
In an attempt to show that the attitude of the United States government was not wholly
conducive to peace, Minister Wakasugi stated that he had seen a statement by Secretary
Knox indicating that because war between Japan and the United States was inevitable 13 , the
United States navy was forced to remain on twenty-four hour duty. In correcting this inter-
pretation, Mr. Welles insisted that the statement attributed to Secretary Knox merely
implied that the situation was such that some incident might possibly occur and consequently
the United States navy must be prepared for an emergency. If the Japanese navy was willing
to announce that "it was itching to fight" with the United States, Mr. Welles pointed out,
the United States navy had to adopt precautionary measures. Although anxious to find a
successful outcome to the present conversations, Under Secretary Welles said, the United
States government must seriously consider the attitude of the Japanese press and public as a
whole.
In answering Minister Wakasugi's questions regarding American counter proposals to those
offered by Japan on September 25, 1941, Mr. Welles stated that both he and Secretary Hull
in previous conversations with Mr. Wakasugi had emphasized that the views of the United
States government had been completely clarified in the communication handed to the
Japanese government on June 21, 1941. Since another United States document was delivered
to the Japanese Embassy on October 2, 1941, Mr. Welles did not feel that any further counter
proposals would be forthcoming from his government. In fact, during the last conversation
between Mr. Hull and Minister Wakasugi, the American Secretary of State had impressed
upon the Japanese representative the benefits which Japan would derive from following those
economic principles already laid down by the American government in the documents
mentioned. Minister Wakasugi stated that he had transmitted the details of that conversa-
tion to his government but had received no opinions upon it from Tokyo.
As far back as April 1941, Minister Wakasugi declared, he had urged Ambassador Nomura
to find a practical, concrete basis for an agreement with the United States on any phase of the
situation affecting the Pacific, However, the interference of both American and Japanese
gentlemen, introducing certain peace formulas without any authority from either govern-
ment, had succeeded in complicating the situation. Since these unofficial, unauthorized
documents had created misunderstandings, Minister Wakasugi suggested that a fresh ap-
proach to the situation be made by having both governments submit entirely new
formulas, setting forth basic principles upon which to formulate peace. Mr. Welles stated
that all the officials of the United States government would be willing to contribute any
time and effort necessary to arrive at a satisfactory agreement.
"Ibid.
"Captain Hideo Hiraide, Director of the Naval Intelligence Section of Imperial Headquarters, Stated— "the
Imperial Navy is itching for action when needed,*' It is important to note here that the promotion of Premier Tojo to full
General (New York Times, October 19, 1:6). and the statement of Naval Minister Shimada that the Japanese navy was
ready for any situation, added to the existing martial atmosphere, (New York Times, October 20, 1941, 3:1, 3, 4.)
"The New York Times reported that Secretary Knox's statement that a Japanese-American war was inevitable
and the clash of the two countries only a few days ahead, was viewed in Japan as unfortunate. (October 25, 1941, 1:8).
3
From the standpoint of expediency, Mr. Welles felt it advisable to reach an agreement on
the economic principles first. Therefore he was anxious to illustrate to the new Japanese
Cabinet the practical advantages Japan would experience if Secretary Hull's economic
policies were adopted. Mr. Welles pointed out that the abolition of such trade barriers as
British Imperial preferences, Japan would be able to trade with Canada, Australia and
New Zealand without danger of discrimination.
Mr. Wakasugi agreed wholeheartedly, but he insisted that a lack of natural resources made
Japan the victim of economic aggression and encirclement. Under Secretary Welles returned
that Japan's modern history up to the year 1930, a time when its relationship with both
Great Britain and the United States was most friendly, showed Japan capable of becoming one
of the great powers of the world. Mr. Welles continued that only Hitler's propaganda about
the "have and have not nations" had caused Japan to adopt its aggressive policies. Disagreeing
with Mr. Welles' conclusions. Minister Wakasugi asserted that Japan had pursued its own
national determinations of policy regardless of Germany or Italy, and in spite of the liberal
tendencies of Japan's younger generation. Nevertheless, Mr. Welles replied, Japan had
allied iteelf officially and publicly with the Axis policies. Mr. Wakasugi made no comment,
but turned the conversation to the Japanese-Chinese situation. In order that every approach
be undertaken to settle this conflict. Minister Wakasugi suggested that Mr. Welles meet
with the Chinese Ambassador and any other Chinese officials to discuss the problems in a
purely unofficial manner. If President Roosevelt intended to mediate in the peace between
Japan and China, Minister Wakasugi believed it advantageous to ascertain the attitude of the
Chiang Kai-shek government. Since Under Secretary of State Welles did not feel authorized
to give even a personal and unofficial response without careful consideration, he promised
to discuss the suggestion in a future conversation with Mr. Wakasugi.
Although Minister Wakasugi made no reference to any plans for Ambassador Nomura's
departure, he specifically stated that the conversations between the two governments would
be resumed as soon as detailed instructions were forthcoming from Tokyo. After promising
to notify Secretary Welles of any further instructions from his government without delay.
Minister Wakasugi ended the conversation 14 .
b . Min ister Wa kasugi's Report
In compliance with Tokyo's instructions, Ambassador Nomura ordered Minister Wakasugi to
continue his informal conversations with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in a
friendly fashion 16 .
Throughout the hour-long conversation with Mr. Welles, Minister Wakasugi attempted to
explain that the new Japanese Cabinet, anxious for an immediate readjustment of relations,
saw no reason why negotiations should not be concluded without further delay since the
Japanese government had entirely clarified its principles. Minister Wakasugi then asked that
the United States make a counter proposal to the Japanese document of September 25, 1941.
Mr. Welles pointed out that the attitude of Japanese statesmen and newspapers was
provoking the breach of diplomatic relations, and cited the example of the naval spokesman
who said that "the Japanese navy is 'itching for action." 8 "
In reply, Minister Wakasugi referred to the criticisms of Japan that Senator Pepper had made
and to the speech of Secretary Knox, who was quoted as saying that a Japanese-American war
was only a few days off. To convince Minister Wakasugi that this speech was merely intended
as a morale-builder for the United States Navy, Mr. Welles said that Secretary Knox often
used exaggerated terras to achieve this purpose. Furthermore, Mr. Welles blamed the
11 "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, Welles", October 24, 1941, S.D. II, 692-697.
"IV, 7.
"TV, 8.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
newspapers for placing too much emphasis on certain passages of the speech, thereby
throwing the entire speech out of proportion.
In replying to Minister Wakasugi' s request for an American counter proposal to the Japanese
statement of September 25, 1941, Mr. Welles stated that the principles of his government
were clearly set forth in the United States proposal of June 21, 1941. However, Mr. Welles
felt that a solution could be effected if the wording of the American proposal of June 21,
1941 were adjusted to parallel that of the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941 17 .
Since the mere consideration of each paragraph of past proposals would only result in the
repetition of old arguments, Mr. Welles suggested that a general agreement be reached on the
three major problems by means of a new short-cut formula. First of all. Under Secretary of
State Welles continued, it would be necessary to work out some understanding with regard to
commerce. At this point in the conversation Mr. Welles asked if Minister Wakasugi had
transmitted Secretary Hull's proposal to his government. Minister Wakasugi assured Mr.
Welles that he had done so. Mr. Welles then touched on the possibility of adjusting the
United States and Japanese views toward the Tripartite Pact 18 .
Finally, when Mr. Welles turned the discussion to the China question' 9 , Minister
Wakasugi asked that United States authorities enumerate suggestions in the form of a proposal
and submit them to the Japanese representatives during the next conversation.
Next Minister Wakasugi mentioned the matter of the two Japanese tankers and three ships
of the NYK line. All arrangements for the sailing of these NYK vessels had been completed
by the Treasury Department. However, with regard to the matter of the tankers, Mr.
Welles said, the United States banking laws required strict investigation of all deposits.
In view of the fact that the money allotted to these ships had been transferred to an account
with the Yokohama Specie Bank and because of the United States' freezing order, it was
impossible to release the funds either in cash or draft form. In an effort to maintain some
degree of the former friendly Japanese-American trade relations, Mr, Welles promised that
the State Department would assist in transferring the money through an American bank.""
6, Tokyo Urges American Reply to Japanese Proposals
Anxious to receive the United States' reply to its proposals of September 25, 1941, the
Foreign Office in Tokyo urged Ambassador Nomura to attempt to ascertain the United States'
attitude through the continuation of the informal conversations. 21 The Japanese government
hoped that American views would be clarified during the Welles-Wakasugi talk on October
25, 1941".
In answering Ambassador Nomura's questions regarding a message sent by the Military
General Staff 2 ', the Japanese government stated that the General Staff was studying the results
of the Japanese- American negotiations in an attempt to establish a national basic policy 24 .
7. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Admiral Pratt (October 25, 1941 ) 2S
On October 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that on October 25 he had
spoken with Admiral Pratt concerning the Japanese-American situation. At that time
"rv,9.
"rv, io.
r3 Md.
*" IV, 11.
11 IV, 12.
"The State Department records no conversation between Under Secretary of State Welles and Minister Waka-
sugi on October 25, 1941.
"IV. 7.
"IV, 12.
"IV, 13.
5
Admiral Pratt had admitted to Ambassador Nomura that economic warfare produced results
as devastating as actual armed conflict.
In regard to open warfare between the two countries, however, Admiral Pratt expressed
the opinion that war would not be declared should Japan's aggression in the Far East
be limited to China. If Japan moved either northward or southward, Admiral Pratt warned,
war between the United States and Japan might be declared, although the final decision
would rest with President Roosevelt and Emperor Hirohito.
Agreeing that Secretary Knox's speech was unfortunate, Admiral Pratt stated that Japan
should be considered when any magazine articles or radio speeches were written. In an
attempt to give Ambassador Nomura a clear picture of the navy's attitude toward Japan,
Admiral Pratt said that the views of Admiral Stark, who was actually the Commander-in-
Chief of the Navy, and those of President Roosevelt coincided. Admiral Pratt continued
by saying that President Roosevelt sincerely desired to maintain the peace and stability
of the Pacific area, and that the views of Admiral Hart must be considered since he was a man
of strong influence.
Referring then to the European war. Admiral Pratt said that Mr. Harriman, recently sent to
Russia by the United States, had reported that Germany would be the victor in the German-
Russian war and that Stalin was not even in a position to discuss peace.
Italy's status in the European war was a little unstable, according to Admiral Pratt; he
did not feel that Italy could afford to seek a separate peace since it would put that country
in a position similar to that of France.
In concluding his talk with Ambassador Nomura, Admiral Pratt said that the Atlantic
should be saved for Great Britain and that Japan, in order to have a voice in the peace, should
maintain its naval strength and avoid impairing its might on the seas a *.
8. Minister Wakasugi Reports on Status of Japanese- American Relations
Since Japanese- American relations were approaching a crisis, Minister Wakasugi felt it
necessary to send Tokyo an informal report on the general attitude toward the Pacific
situation which he had observed through numerous conferences with American representa-
tives 27 . The basic policy of the United States, according to Minister Wakasugi, was the
desire to crush so-called "Hitlerism" throughout the world. In order to prevent the establish-
ment of this new order through the force of arms, the United States set up Great Britain and
China as a first line of national defense. Determined to plan for a long-term program of peace,
the United States instructed its government and people that no local agreements concerning
separate questions in the Pacific area could be drawn up with Japan. For that reason, Secretary
Hull insisted upon a general understanding covering the entire Pacific area.
During the conversation between Mr. Wakasugi and Mr. Welles on October 24, 1941, the
Under Secretary of State had made it clear that the United States would continue to advocate
absolute non-discrimination for Japan, the United States, Britain, China, Australia and the
Netherlands East Indies throughout the Pacific. Under this policy every nation offered to other
countries opportunities equal to those existing between itself and its colonies. To this state-
ment Minister Wakasugi replied that the United States presumed that Japan would develop
French Indo-Chinese and Thaiese areas in a monopolistic manner by means of military force.
For that reason, the United States insisted that all countries be given equal access to the
natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand.
Referring next to the effect of the China problem on Japanese -American relations, Minister
Wakasugi said that the United States would deal with it as only one phase of the "peace
in the Pacific" issue. Furthermore, Minister Wakasugi reminded Tokyo that Secretary Hull
l *lbid.
"IV, 14.
6
THE "MAGIC"
PEARL HARBOR
had once stated to former Ambassador Saito that the United States would never war with
Japan over China. On the other hand, China was relying solely upon the United States for
aid in carrying on its warfare with Japan. Mr. T. V. Soong and other Chinese officials were
negotiating with the Treasury Department to secure even greater financial assistance for
their country. In view of the fact that China was entirely dependent upon the United States,
it did not seem probable that the United States would cut off its aid to China.
Yet, in spite of the insistence of the United States to continue supplying China with the
means for continuing its warfare with Japan, Mr. Welles, on October 24, 1941, had assured
Minister Wakasugi that the United States would not be unreasonable in making demands
upon Japan. Although the implications of his statement were not entirely clear to Minister
Wakasugi, he felt that they could be interpreted as meaning that the United States would
not insist that Japan withdraw its troops from China immediately. Regardless of any
interpretation placed upon the statements made by American officials, however, it was
apparent that Japanese- American relations were at a breaking -point.
Although the United States insisted that it was anxious to adjust conditions between the
two countries, it was willing to effect an agreement only on the basis of its June 21 and October
22, 1941 proposals. Minister Wakasugi did not believe that the United States' informal con-
versations were means of gaining time, however, since American preparations in the event of
war were already completed. At the same time, Minister Wakasugi did not expect that any
further counter proposals would be forthcoming from the United States government nor that
any concessions would be made. If Japan were to insist upon an immediate settlement of
differences, Minister Wakasugi believed that all negotiations would be terminated. Therefore,
he suggested that the Japanese government continue the informal conversations in a
continued attempt to break down differences of opinion.
Minister Wakasugi asked that the new Japanese Cabinet inform him of its basic policies
as speedily as possible in order that he might know what attitude to take in future
conversations with American representatives. 28
9. Ambassador Nomura Reveals American Attitude Toward Japan
The same day, October 29, 1941, Ambassador Nomura sent a similar report to his govern-
ment, reporting on the general attitude seen throughout official circles regarding the present
situation with Japan. 29
Because the Middle West was populated by many Americans of German descent, this
section of the country opposed war with Germany but favored a Japanese -American war. In
reporting this condition to Mr. Kasai, Admiral Standley stated that Germany's propaganda
had been very effective. The Editor of the Army-Navy Journal, had also expressed the opinion
that German propaganda was largely responsible for the pro-German attitude of the Middle
Furthermore, Secretary Hull, speaking before Congress, pointed to the Tripartite Pact as
an instrument to be used against the United States. By cutting off United States' aid to
Great Britain, Germany hoped to push America's line of defense back to its shores.
Although desiring peace. Secretary Hull felt that the United States must not exhibit
weakness by consenting to the demands of the Axis powers. Secretary Hull felt that Tokyo,
as well as Berlin, would increase its demands unless the United States built up a strength
too powerful for either nation to face. Secretary Hull felt that Japan's attitude toward the
Tripartite Pact would be largely determined by the outcome of the German-Russian war.
™w, is.
7
In the report of Secretary Hull's speech, printed in the New York Times on October 28, 1941.
Secretary Hull was quoted as saying that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable".
Ambassador Nomura had further learned from one of his representatives that Assistant
Secretary of State, Breckenridge Long, had said that the United States would not be able to
arrive at any agreement before November 15 when the Japanese Diet would meet.
In reporting Britain's attitude toward the Japanese- American situation, Lord Halifax said
that although Great Britain would back the United States' policies in accordance with Prime
Minister Churchill's speech, the British hoped that Japan would give the Pacific problems
thorough study and arrive at a satisfactory answer. Lord Halifax declined to discuss British
or American embargo restrictions on Japan. 30
10. Ambassador Grew's Report (October 25, 1941 ) 31
On October 25, 1941 Ambassador Grew, reporting the details of a conversation with a reliable
Japanese informant, learned that while the Konoye Cabinet was in power, the Japanese
Emperor had called a conference of the leading members of the Privy Council and the
Japanese armed forces. When the representatives of the Japanese army and navy refused
to give a definite indication that they were prepared to pursue a peaceful policy in their rela-
tions with the United States, the Japanese Emperor, following the progressive policy of
his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, issued the unprecedented command that, the armed forces
obey his wishes. As a result of this action, a new Prime Minister in control of the army was
necessarily selected and General Tojo, on the army active list, was appointed to the position.
In spite of the recent anti- American attitude of the Japanese press, the informant insisted
that the present political leaders desired nothing more than an immediate adjustment of
relations with the United States. In an endeavor to conclude the present conversations
successfully, Mr. Togo, the new Foreign Minister, promised to resign his post if he failed
in attaining this goal.
Even though the principal difficulty between the United States and Japan was the question
of Japanese armed forces in China and French Indo-China, the Japanese informant fett that
the leaders of his government would be able to settle the problems satisfactorily if Japan
were not asked to remove all its troops immediately. For the first time in ten years, the in-
formant continued, the political organization in Japan presented an opportunity for re-
orientation of policy and action. "
In Ambassador Grew's own opinion, the Japanese leaders appeared willing to forsake
any expansionists' plans for a workable understanding with the United States. At the present
time, however, the Japanese press was commenting to a great extent on Secretary Knox's
remarks regarding the United States' conviction that Japan's policy of expansion would
eventually end in an unavoidable conflict with the United States. ,a
Ambassador Grew pointed to his remarks made in a telegram sent to Secretary Hull on
September 29, 1941 in which he stated that constructive results could be produced by a
meeting of the leaders of the two governments if an agreement were reached in the preliminary
discussions. At that time, Ambassador Grew believed that the United States would face a
greatly increased risk of war if it would not take the present opportunity of halting Japan's
aggressive program by continuing negotiations. Unless the United States placed a reason-
able amount of confidence in Prince Konoye's objective and, in this way, created a new
orientation in Japan which would eventually lead to an improvement in Japanese- American
relat ions, the initial force and impetus of these informal conversations would be entirely lost. 34
'"Ibid.
""Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 25, 1941, S.l). n. 697-698.
"Ibid
""Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 25, 1941 S.D. 0, 698-699.
""The Ambassador in Japan I Grew) to the Secretary of State". September 29, 1941. S.D. II, 648-650.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
If the Japanese Emperor were actually engaged in the formulation of Japan's policy, then
Ambassador Grew was convinced that General Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo would
probably produce more concrete concessions at future conversations. However, Ambassador
Grew assured the American State Department that he would initiate nothing in his conversa-
tions in Tokyo without instructions. 3 "
Ambassador Grew referred again to his telegram of September 29, 1941, stating that unless
the Japanese Emperor had taken his present active interest in the Japanese -American
conversations, unbridled anti-American feeling would undoubtedly have sprung up through-
out Japan, resulting in the formation of a military dictatorship lacking either the disposition
or temperament to avoid war with the United States. 36
11. Grew-Togo Interview (October 30, 1941)
a. Ambassador Grew's Report 37
At a reception for Mr. Shigenori Togo, the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Togo spoke
of the deterioration of relations between the United States and Japan, emphasizing his desire
to conclude quickly and successfully the informal conversations and requesting the continued
cooperation of Ambassador Grew.
Urging the United States to face certain realities related to the stationing of Japanese
armed forces in China, Mr. Togo pointed out that Russian troops were stationed in Outer
Mongolia and the soldiery of other nations were maintained in certain areas of China. After
assuring Foreign Minister Togo of his desire to cooperate, Ambassador Grew stated that the
main conversations must necessarily take place in Washington because of President
Roosevelt's active interest in them. Nevertheless, parallel discussions in Tokyo would
afford an opportunity for enlarging upon the views of the United States government, regarding
any changes of Japan's attitude.
In the past, Ambassador Grew said, he had made it a practice to keep the Japanese
Minister for Foreign Affairs well informed on the conversations in Washington as reported
directly to him by Secretary Hull. By way of example, Ambassador Grew then presented
Mr. Togo with a paraphrased report of Under Secretary of State Welles' conversation with
Minister Wakasugi on October 24, 1941. After Mr. Togo assured Ambassador Grew that he
wanted to be kept informed on all correspondence relating to these conversations, the
interview was ended.
Before leaving the Japanese office, Mr. Toshikazu Kase, who had acted as interpreter
during the reception, told Ambassador Grew that he had been appointed the new Chief
of the First Section of the American Bureau in the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Because of his
long and pleasant association with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew expressed his approval of
this appointment. 39
b . Foreign Min is t er Togo 's R eport 33
On November 2, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo sent Ambassador Nomura a report of his
reception for the Japanese diplomatic corps and his subsequent conversation with Ambassador
Grew on October 30, 1941.
During the discussion with Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Togo had stated that
during the six months of informal negotiations, Japanese-American relations had steadily
grown worse. In order to arrive at a workable understanding, Foreign Minister Togo urged
M "Memorandum of Comment by Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 25, 1941 , S, D. D, 698-699.
3(1 "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", September 29, 1941, S.D. II, 648-649.
■""Memorandum by the Ambassadoi in Japan (Grew)", October 30, 1941, S.D. D, 699-700.
SS IV, 16-17.
9
the United States to view the oriental situation more realistically. By way of example the
Japanese Foreign Minister pointed out that there were other countries besides Japan with
occupation forces stationed in China. Although Outer Mongolia was actually a part of Chinese
territory, Russia concentrated large forces there. Therefore, the Japanese government could
not understand why the United States did not appreciate Japan's attitude toward evacuating
its troops. Ambassador Grew stated that he would like to continue amicable parleys between his
country and Japan. 40
Foreign Minister Togo had already discussed the Utopian attitude of the United States
toward the Far Eastern situation with British Ambassador Craigie on October 26, 1941. At
that time, Foreign Minister Togo stated that the United States' policies were too theoretical
and offered small chance of settling Far Eastern problems. Insisting that the situation would
not permit further procrastination, Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador Craigie to
cooperate in improving Japanese- English- American relations in order to reestablish
and maintain world peace. 41
12, Tokyo Questions Nomura on American Proposal
Since the Japanese government was concerned with the relationship between the proposals
submitted by the United States and Japan, it questioned Ambassador Nomura on November
1, 1941 on the exchange of official text. Tokyo wished more complete information on those
sections of the United States proposal submitted on June 21, 1941 which referred to the
European war, non-discrimination in trade and peace between Japan and China. 42
According to a message which Ambassador Nomura had sent Tokyo in June 194 1 4 J , it
appeared that the United States government's views differed widely from those held by
Japan, and that the United States refused to understand Japan's right for self defense. Al-
though the new Japanese Cabinet did not want to bring up old issues, it nevertheless requested
more complete information concerning the exchange of official notes between the two
countries. 44
In reply, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had refused to relay the text of the American
proposals since the United States had not modified its demands or made any further
concessions and, therefore, the proposals issued by Japan and the United States differed
too greatly to effect any conciliation. 46
13. New Japanese Cabinet Discusses Formulation of Policies
Since the formation of the new Japanese Cabinet on October 17, 1941, meetings had been
held with the Imperial Headquarters in order to determine the policies of the new government,
On November 2, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo notified Ambassador Nomura that a final
decision on the fundamental policy to be adopted would be reached on November 5, 1941
at the meeting of the Japanese Diet. In view of the fact that Japan was about to make its last
effort to improve relations with the United States, Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador
Nomura to handle all the problems with extreme care, 46
The following day, Ambassador Nomura told the Japanese government that he would meet
with Secretary Hull in a few days and requested that he be advised of the Cabinet's decision
on policy before that time. If this were impossible, Ambassador Nomura asked that he be
instructed what points to emphasize when speaking with Secretary Hull. 47
19 iv. le.
"IV, 17.
"IV, 18.
"n, 78.
t4 IV, 18.
"IV, 19.
16 [V, 20.
"IV, 21.
10
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
14. Ambassador Grew Leans Japanese Cabinet's Plans 48
On November 3, 1941 Ambassador Grew was again visited by the same Japanese informant
who had called on him on October 25, 1941. During a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo,
the Japanese informant reported, he had learned that the Japanese Foreign Minister, Prime
Minister and the Minister of the Navy had determined upon the maximum commitments
which Japan could make in order to adjust its relations with the United States. This decision
was given to the Japanese Emperor by the Prime Minister on the afternoon of November
2, 1941 and since Foreign Minister Togo anticipated that Ambassador Grew would call within
a few days, it was expected that some conclusion would be reached before that time.
For the first time in many years the Japanese Foreign Minister had been able to assume certain
obligations with the entire approval of the Prime Minister and. consequently, of the War, Navy
and Home Ministries. Since the question of relations with the United States would necessarily
have to be clarified before the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941, the Japanese
informant believed that Foreign Minister Togo would request an interview with Ambassador
Grew not later than November 7, 1941. 49
15. Ambassador Grew Reports on Situation in Japan. 1
In a telegram to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles on November 3, 1941, Ambassa-
dor Grew reported the attitude of the Japanese newspapers, citing an article from the Tokyo
Nichi-Nichi which commented on a statement which the Japanese Embassy reportedly gave to
the New York Times regarding the end of the Japanese-American economic war, under the
banner headline " Empire Approaches Its Greatest Crisis." Both the article and the
accompanying editorial, according to Ambassador Grew, reflected the average Japanese
sentiment.
Referring to the various other reports which he had made during the past several months,
Ambassador Grew stated he had no substantial revisions to make upon any of them. However,
there were certain points that he desired Secretary of State Hull and Under Secretary Welles
to apply to future conversations with Japanese representatives. First of all, Ambassador
Grew did not believe it was possible for Japan to disassociate its war with China from that
being waged in Europe. Since political thought throughout Japan ranged from medieval to
liberal ideas, events beyond the Japanese Empire itself determined what body of principles
would predominate. For example, when the Germans were victorious in western Europe
during the past year, Japan turned pro-Axis; yet with Germany's failure to invade the British
Isles and its attack upon the Soviet Union came the conviction in Japan that the Tripartite
Alliance bad been a serious mistake of Japanese diplomats.
Nevertheless, if Japan's efforts to adjust relations with the United States and to conclude
the war with China failed, a stronger Axis alliance could still be effected. Apparently leading
American economists believed that the eventual exhaustion of Japan's economic resources
would end in the collapse of Japan's militaristic power. However, Ambassador Grew pointed
out that although the greater part of Japan's commerce, industrial production and natural
resources had been depleted as a result of America's economic war, Japan could avoid complete
collapse by forsaking the capitalistic system of economy. Therefore, Ambassador Grew
did not believe that the imposition of a trade embargo and blockade would necessarily avert
war in the Far East. 51
Ambassador Grew then referred to a telegram which he sent to the American State Depart-
ment on September 12, 1940 in which he had warned that the Japanese army saw an
,a " Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" November 3, 1941, S.D. II, 700, 701.
"Ibid.
5 °"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State"— November 3, 1941, S.D. II, p. 701-704,
"Ibid.
11
opportunity for expansion following German victories in Europe. As a result of policies
which the Japanese government adopted, Ambassador Grew had advised the strong attitude
subsequently adopted by the United States. However, while Japan was eventually forced
to seek conciliation with the United States, if it were not reached in time, Japanese national
temper and psychology would force it to risk hara-kiri rather than to yield to foreign economic
pressure. When attempting to avert war, therefore, Ambassador Grew urged that the fibre
and the temperament of the Japanese people themselves be kept in mind. Although stating
merely his own personal opinion, Ambassador Grew felt that the continued imposition of
drastic economic measures would, in the long run, be contrary to American national
interests since it meant the breakdown of diplomacy. Ambassador Grew assured the State
Department that he was not questioning the intentions or motives of the Roosevelt Administra-
tion, nor was he implying that the Department was pursuing an undeliberated diplomatic
policy. He agreed that there should be no compromise with the principles America had
laid down and, therefore, he dis not advocate any appeasement with Japan arrived at by
forsaking these fundamental principles. At the same time, however, Ambassador Grew was
certain that the methods of applying these basic principles were flexible. He particularly
wished to correct any misconception of Japan's unpreparedness for war. He urged that the
United States not underestimate Japan's obvious preparations to implement an alternate
program in the event the conversations for peace failed. From the bellicose tone of the
Japanese press and of several high officials it was obvious that Japan was capable of actions which
might render armed warfare with the United States unavoidable."
16. Ambassador Kurusu Appointed Special Aide to Ambassador Nomura""
After studying certain official papers in connection with his new position in the
Japanese Embassy in Washington, Mr. Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to
Germany, called on Ambassador Grew on November 4, 1941 before leaving for the United
States.
As an endeavor to aid in the successful conclusion of the conversations in Washington,
Mr. Kurusu was being sent by the new Japanese Cabinet as a special aide to Ambassador
Nomura. Mr. Kurusu told Ambassador Grew that he was taking with him Mr. Shiroji Yuki,
who was familiar with the developments in Washington as a result of his former position
as Chief of the First Section of the American Bureau in the Japanese Foreign Office. 54
16-A. Japan Plans to Attack Hawaii on December 7, 1941— (November 5-7, 1941 ) M "
Three weeks before Secretary Hull presented to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu his
note of November 26, 1941, which some American commentators have described as the
ultimatum which caused Japan to go to war, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-
Chief, Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, had issued orders that an advanced expedition-
ary force should attack Hawaii on December 8, 1941 (Japanese time) or December 7, 1941
(United States time). The plan of attack was issued on November 5, 1941, as Combined
Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 1, N1 and the date of Y Day was established in Combined
Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 2 of November 7, 1941. S4c
"Ibid.
""Memorandum by the Ambassador In Japan (Grew)", November 4, 1941, S.D. H, p. 704, 705.
""This information was not available until June 4, 1945 when the material recovered from the Japanese cruiser
Hachi was translated.
S4 *See Naval Operation Plans and Orders, 1941-1944, recovered from CA Huchi, Part VII, Combined Fleet Opera-
tion Orders, Orders and Serial, pp. 2, 44.
Ml op. cit., p. 55.
12
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
17. Ambassador Grew Receives Japanese Informant
At the request of Foreign Minister Togo, the leading Japanese informant again called on
Ambassador Grew. Since the Japanese Foreign Minister did not feel that he could speak
officially with the American Ambassador at this time, he had indirectly made the suggestion
that the United States government continue the Washington conferences since the Tojo
government had desired to extend the limits to which it would go in order to reach an
agreement with the United States.
Expressing then his own personal opinion on the matter, the Japanese informant stated
that since present conditions were having a calamitous effect upon Japan, his government
was compelled to accept the views of the United States. Ambassador Grew, however,
pointed to the violent tone of the Japanese press as seen in the editorial of the Japanese
Times and Advertiser on November 5, 1941 which was known to express the attitudes of the
Japanese Foreign Office. Another article appearing in the Nichi Nichi on November 6,
1941 accused the United States of talking like a harlot thereby complicating the adjustment
of relations between the two countries. The Japanese informant promised to draw Mr. Togo's
attention to the articles in question. Nevertheless, he insisted that too much attention
should not be paid to the Japanese newspapers nor should the United States treat the
Japanese people entirely as adults. Pointing out how the Germans had utilized this aspect
of Japanese psychology to their own advantage, the Japanese informant stated that
Japanese confidence could be gained easily by a friendly gesture or word. Irrespective of any
future developments, the Japanese informant before leaving Ambassador Grew, urged once
more that the informal conversations continue. 56
18. Japan's Attitude Toward Present Negotiations Made Known
By way of reply to Ambassador Nomura's request for information on the policies of the new
Japanese Cabinet, Tokyo informed the Japanese Ambassador on November 4, 1941 that as a
result of numerous conferences a counter proposal had been formulated and unanimously
approved by the government and the new military high command. On November 5, 1941
this counter proposal, together with other basic policies, would be approved by the
Japanese Diet.
Since domestic and foreign conditions made it necessary to conclude the present informal
conferences successfully without delay, Japan was ready to submit these new counter
proposals. However, these counter proposals would be the last the Japanese government
intended to submit. Should these fail to achieve the desired goal, all futher negotiations
would end. 57
Because the Japanese government was anxious to conclude the conferences with the
United States successfully, it had yielded to many of the demands of the United States,
while, on the other hand, refusing to appreciate the position of Japan, the United States
had made no concessions. As a result of this American attitude, the Japanese government
and public suspected the sincerity of the United States. At the present time the patience of
Japan was exhausted. If the existence and honor of Japan were threatened further, the
Japanese government would take measures to defend them. As a last effort to show its friendship
toward the United States, then, the Japanese government was submitting its proposals. 58
If the United States would only make a sincere attempt to establish peace in the Pacific,
the entire world situation would be greatly aided. Tokyo promised to inform Ambassador
Nomura immediately of the outcome of the meeting of the Japanese Diet in order that he
""Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", November 7, 1941. S.D. II, 705-706.
i6 /bid.
57 rv, 22.
i8 IV, 23.
L3
might confer with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. While Ambassador Nomura was dis-
cussing the problems with American representatives in Washington, Foreign Minister Togo
would hold a conference with Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. Foreign Minister Togo emphasized
that Ambassador Nomura must follow his instructions to the letter, giving no personal
interpretation to any of them. 59
19. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Final Proposals
On November 4, 1941, the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura the revised
final proposal in which Japan attempted to meet the demands of the United States govern-
ment. 60 Explicit instructions for Ambassador Nomura to follow in presenting these proposals
were inserted in this message. For example, Tokyo advised Ambassador Nomura that in any
formal negotiation reached between Japan and the United States, the government was anxious
to avoid incorporating guarantees of evacuating Japanese troops from French Indo- China
upon the conclusion of the Chinese Incident.
The Japanese government expressed the opinion that the United States would agree with
Japan's concessions regarding non-discrimination in commerce and the interpretation of
its obligations under the Tripartite Pact.* " However, the new Cabinet recognized that the
question of evacuation would continue to present an obstacle to peace. Since the United
States was opposed to Japanese troops in China, the Japanese government proposed to
shift its troops and officials to other occupied areas in order to dispel American suspicion.
Although Japan would call it "evacuation", it was actually impossible for the Japanese
government to recall its forces from China. Foreign Minister Togo asked that Ambassador
Nomura euphemize the stationing of Japanese troops in China by insisting that unlimited
occupation by no means meant perpetual occupation. Since Japan had been forced to make
tremendous sacrifices during its four years war with China, its internal situation prevented
Japan from making further concessions regarding the Chinese problem . 61
In the event that these new Japanese counter proposals did not meet with American
approval, the Japanese government had prepared a subsequent plan considered by Japan
as a last effort to prevent disaster in the Far East/ 2
20. Ambassador Kurusu Leaves for Washington
In order to assist Ambassador Nomura in presenting these new Japanese counter
proposals to the United States government, Japan sent Ambassador Kurusu to Washington.
Since the Japanese Cabinet had given him no additional instructions concerning his post, it
requested Ambassador Nomura to prepare him for the conferences with Secretary Hull
and President Roosevelt. Ambassador Kurusu's activities in the United States were to be
kept strictly secret. ^
On November 5, 1941 Ambassador Kurusu and Secretary Yuki left for Shanghai. 64 Tokyo
explained to Ambassador Nomura that these two representatives were being sent to Washington
immediately in an attempt to show the United States that Japan sincerely desired to bring
the present conferences to a successful conclusion. By giving Ambassador Nomura a clear
picture of Japan's internal situation, the new Japanese Cabinet hoped that he would be
more fully equipped to carry out Tokyo's instructions. 65
5 'rv, 24.
"For text handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on November 10, 1941 see S.D. II, 715-717.
"TV, 25-27.
61 IV, 28.
TV, 29. Ambassador Nomura did not present this alternate proposal to Secretary Hull until November 20, 1941.
See S.D. II, 775-776.
"IV, 30.
TV, 31.
65 IV, 32.
14
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
21. Japan Seeks Agreement with Britain and the Netherlands
Since Great Britain and the Netherlands had vast interests in the Far East, the Japanese
government realized that some understanding would have to be reached with these countries.
If an agreement were concluded with the United States alone, it could never be completely
carried out without the cooperation of Britain and the Netherlands.
On November 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo requested that Ambassador Nomura impress
American officials with this point. It was hoped that the United States would formulate an
understanding which Great Britain and the Netherlands government could sign. 88
Not quite certain of Tokyo's attitude in this matter, Ambassador Nomura asked for further
instructions on the following day. He wished to know whether Great Britain and the Nether-
lands East Indies were expected to sign an official document with Japan at the same time
that America did or if separate documents would be prepared for the British and the Dutch,
or if the four countries would exchange official documents. bT
22. Tokyo Receives English Translation of Proposals
In order to avoid discrepancies between the English text handed to Ambassador Grew by
Foreign Minister Togo and the one presented to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura.
Ambassador Nomura was sending the Foreign Ministry a complete translation of both
Japanese counter proposals. 68
At the same time he reminded the Foreign Minister that he had received instructions from
Japan ordering him to make no personal interpretations of Japan's latest counter proposals.
For that reason, Ambassador Nomura was taking the utmost care in dealing with these pro-
posals. 69
On November 5, 1941, Ambassador Nomura forwarded these English translations to Japan.
23. Japan To Avoid Ratified Treaty with United States
In order to avoid further delay in concluding peace negotiations, Tokyo wired Ambassador
Nomura on November 5, 1941 that it preferred to avoid drawing up any treaty with the
United States requiring the ratification of the Senate. The Japanese government believed
that the United States might adopt "an executive agreement" requiring only the approval
of President Roosevelt, Under present conditions, the Japanese government was convinced
that speed was an essential factor in the present negotiations."
Ambassador Nomura replied that the United States did not wish to place any agreement
with Japan before the Senate for the constitutional two-thirds majority approval. As Mr.
Hamilton and other American representatives had already stated, the United States govern-
ment wished to leave any understanding between the two countries within the presidential
jurisdiction.
In the proposal submitted by the United States on June 21, 1941, Ambassador Nomura
pointed out, Article I mentioned "a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a
joint declaration", and "mutual understanding and declaration of policy". However, it
might be difficult for the United States to keep an agreement with Japan secret because
of its domestic politics. 72
,M IV, 33.
"TV. 34.
" 8 IV, 35 -36.
"ibid,
"IV, 37-39.
11 IV, 40.
"IV, 41.
15
24. Japanese Diet Accepts Cabinet's Counter Proposals
At the Japanese Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941, the Japanese counter proposals
drawn up by the Foreign Ministry were approved. Therefore, Tokyo wired Ambassador
Nomura further instructions concerning their delivery to the American government.
The Foreign Ministry instructed Ambassador Nomura to submit proposal "A" for
discussion in spite of the fact that many of the terms in the last United States proposal had
not met with Tokyo's approval. If the United States objected too strongly to Proposal
"A", Ambassador Nomura was instructed to advise the Japanese Foreign Ministry and then,
subsequently, offer proposal "B" to the United States,
Because the situation had become so critical and no further delay could be tolerated,
the Japanese government informed Ambassador Nomura that it had made its final concession.
However, it warned Ambassador Nomura to avoid giving the United States the impression
that this proposal was actually Japan's ultimatum. 73
The Japanese government was certain that some agreement could be reached through
the efforts of its representatives, the Foreign Minister continued, since the problem of
self defense stemming from the Tripartite Treaty had been clarified to the United States'
satisfaction. American policies were set forth completely in the proposal of June 21, 1941 and
had been answered by the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941; and the new Japanese
Cabinet took it for granted that all further exchange of notes would be eliminated from the
negotiations. The Foreign Minister urged Ambassador Nomura to make it clear to the United
States that Japan wished to avoid the exchange of documents. 71
Although Foreign Minister Togo realized the difficulty of culminating negotiations
immediately, he urged Ambassador Nomura to complete all arrangements for the signing of
a mutual agreement by November 25, 1941.™
25. Ambassador Nomura to Guard Secrecy of Conferences
In reply to Tokyo's instructions, Ambassador Nomura informed the Japanese Ministery on
November 5, 1941 that he would continue his efforts to bring about a satisfactory under-
standing. Toward this end, he planned to make arrangements for meeting with President
Roosevelt in the near future.
In his own opinion, Ambassador Nomura felt that these conferences with President
Roosevelt and Secretary Hull should remain secret. However, if the Foreign Office desired
that they be considered as official interviews, Ambassador Nomura promised to announce
them to the public.™ The Japanese government agreed with Ambassador Nomura that the
present informal conversations should remain secret. If the newspapers of either country
were allowed to speculate on the questions discussed, at Ambassador Nomura's conferences
with President Roosevelt, the Foreign Ministery felt that the effectiveness of an informal
agreement would be impaired. In fact, the Japanese government urged that Ambassador
Nomura avoid publicity of any subsequent conferences with American officials. 77
26. Japanese Newspapers Publicize Tokyo's Proposals
In spite of the efforts of both governments to maintain the secrecy of these conferences,
on November 5, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that the United States news-
papers, through the Domei News Agency in Japan and the Times Advertiser, had learned
71 IV, 42.
"IV, 43.
"IV, 44.
76 IV. 45.
7 TV,46.
18
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
that November 15, 1941 was the Japanese "deadline" for the successful conclusion of
negotiations. In fact, these two newspaper syndicates, known to be the official press of the
Japanese government and the Foreign Office, respectively, stated their intention to list the
seven Japanese demands upon the United States.
Realizing that the Japanese government wished a favorable reception of its negotiations,
Ambassador Nomura believed that the publication of such statements in Japanese news-
papers would alienate American public opinion. Therefore, although appreciating the
seriousness of Japan's internal situation and the grave responsibility of Foreign Minister
Togo's position, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless urged that the Foreign Office censor the
material given to Tokyo newspapers. 79
27. Japanese and American Newspapers Impair Diplomatic Negotiations
In spite of censorship measures enforced by the Japanese Foreign Office, newspaper
speculation on the outcome of the Japanese- American conversations continued to impair
diplomatic negotiations. Even while Ambassador Kurusu was enroute to the United States
to supplement Ambassador Nomura's efforts for peace, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi was labeling
America's negotiations as a means of gaining time to complete military preparations against
Japan. 79
Conditions as reported by the New York Times, November 6, 1941 were so close to a crisis
that the United States Congress voted to remain in session indefinitely. 80
Apparently Washington newspapers did not place much faith in Mr. Kurusu' s appoint-
ment as advisor to Ambassador Nomura. In spite of Ambassador Nomura's efforts to curtail
unfavorable newspaper stories, he reported to Tokyo on November 6, 1941 that conjectures
on the effect of Mr. Kurusu's presence in Washington were being published constantly. 81
If these stories once reached the Japanese public, Ambassador Nomura feared that con-
ditions would become even more tense. In view of the Japanese internal situation, Ambassa-
dor Nomura urged that every precaution be taken to control the Japanese press and force
them to follow an editorial policy in keeping with the tone of Japanese-American conversa-
tions. 82
29. Hull- Nomura Conversation (November 7, 1941 )
a. State Department 's Report 34
Accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apart-
ment at his own request on November 7, 1941. Without permitting the Japanese Ambassador
to state the purpose of his call, Secretary Hull immediately brought up the question of the
three American missionaries interned by the Manchurian authorities at Harbin. Secretary
Hull declared that similar situations, together with the extremist policies voiced in the
Japanese press, made it difficult for the United States to continue normal diplomatic relations
with Japan. When reports of an ti- American activities were released in this country,
Secretary Hull stated, people questioned the advisability of improving relations with Japan.
Ambassador Nomura replied that until recently he had not received any instructions from
the new Japanese Cabinet. However, he now had the authority to resume the conversations.
After deliberating on the various proposals for peace, particularly on the American draft of
June 21, 1941, the new Japanese Cabinet had decided upon the maximum concessions it
1S IV,47.
™New York Times, November 6, 1941, 1 :4-8.
M New York Times, November 6, 1941, 6:3.
e, IV, 48.
"Ibid,
""Memorandum of a Conversation"— November 7, 1941, S.D, II, 706-709.
17
would make in order to alleviate the situation in the Far East. Referring to the three principal
questions upon which the respective views of the two countries had diverged, Ambassador
Nomura said that it would not be difficult to reconcile the views concerning Japan's obliga-
tions under the Tripartite Pact and non -discrimination in international commercial relations.
However, he was aware that some difficulties would arise out of Japan's desire to retain
certain troops in North China and Inner Mongolia.
In view of the grave situation which might arise if any misunderstandings or misinterpre-
tations of policies occurred at this time, Ambassador Nomura had asked for and received
from his government an experienced diplomat, namely Mr. Kurusu, the former Ambassador
to Germany. In view of Mr. Kurusu's Ambassadorial rank, Ambassador Nomura hoped that
President Roosevelt would speak with him. At this point in the conversation, Ambassador
Nomura handed Secretary Hull a document prepared by the Japanese government in con-
nection with its views on the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and French Indo-
China and the principle of non-discrimination. as
With regard to the Japanese forces stationed in China as a result of the Sino- Japanese
War, the Japanese government stated that it would be necessary to retain troops in specified
areas in North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island for a certain time after the restora-
tion of peace between Japan and China. As soon as general peace was restored, however, the
other forces would begin their withdrawal according to a separate agreement between Japan
and China and this withdrawal would be completed within two years after the peace treaty.
When an equitable basis was established in East Asia and the China affair settled, Japanese
forces would be recalled from French Indo-China and, in this way, the territorial sovereignty
of that country would be guaranteed.
With regard to the principle of commercial nondiscrimination, the Japanese government
agreed to the application of this principle throughout the Pacific area, including China.
It was understood at the same time, however, that the principle would be applied to the
entire world.
After reading the document. Secretary Hull asked concerning the proportion of Japanese
troops to be retained in the areas stated. In reply the Japanese Ambassador reminded
Secretary Hull that, under the Boxer Protocol, Japan had the right to station troops in the
Peiping and Tientsin areas. Since Soviet Russia maintained forces in Outer Mongolia,
Japan desired to station enough of its own troops in Inner Mongolia to balance those of
Russia. Without specifying the exact number of troops that Japan wished to retain in China,
Ambassador Nomura began to discuss the armed forces maintained by other countries in
China. He referred specifically to March 1927 when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek first
entered Shanghai. As a result of that action the British had requested Japan to take joint
action to prevent this measure. Yet, in spite of the fact that the Japanese had declined
to interfere in Chinese affairs, they soon after became the object of a bitter Chinese boycott
compaign. In discussing the Chinese question, Secretary Hull said that he had mentioned
these exploratory conversations to the Chinese Ambassador but had not acquainted him with
any of the points under discussion.
However, before entering into any formal negotiations with Japan, Secretary Hull remind-
ed Ambassador Nomura that the United States planned to negotiate with the Chinese.
British and Dutch. Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura whether Japan would launch
"Ibid.
"Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 7, 1941, S.D.
II, 709-710. For Japanese version of text sent to Ambassador Nomura on November 4. 1941 and decoded by American
cryptanalysts see IV, 25-28. It is well to note the explicit terms in which the Japanese government instructs Ambassa-
dor Nomura on the presentation of these proposals. For English translation of Japanese proposals sent to Tokyo by
Ambassador Nomura, see IV, 37-39.
18
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
on a true new order in the Far East and, in this way, gain its leadership in the Pacific if the
Chinese expressed an earnest desire to end the present war.
Referring again to the advantages derived by the United States from the renunciation of
its aggressive policies in the Latin American countries, Secretary Hull expressed the con-
viction that Japan would derive trade advantages from the adoption of a similar policy in
its relations with China. Secretary Hull hoped that some concrete agreement could be
worked out on the question of Japanese relations with the Axis powers. Secretary Hull pointed
out that the mere manifestation of the desire for peace might not be adequate if a new
government came into power in Japan.
In view of the urgency of the internal situation in Japan, Ambassador Nomura requested
that the American Department of State expedite the study of the document delivered on
this day. Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed an interview with President
Roosevelt, Stating that he would comply with the Ambassador's request, Secretary Hull then
asked whether this document was to be viewed in conjunction with the previous Japanese
documents which had been submitted. Replying in the affirmative, Ambassador Nomura
mentioned the United States' document of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese document of
September 25, 1941. Secretary Hull reminded him that the American document of
October 2, 1941 was to be included in this category."
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report
After first scheduling an appointment with Secretary Hull for Minister Wakasugi and
himself, 88 and after ascertaining the phraseology and interpretation of his government's
latest proposals, 88 Ambassador Nomura visited Secretary Hull secretly on November 7, 1941. s0
During the conversation with Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine, Ambassador Nomura
explained that he had been ordered to clarify his government's position to both President
Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in the hope of settling the various problems existing between
Japan and the United States. In reply Secretary Hull commented that the two political
factions at varying odds in the world today were threatening to throw all civilization into the
chaos of anarchism. Therefore, Secretary Hull urged that American and Japanese representa-
tives find a basis for maintaining peace in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura took this opportu-
nity to point out that agreements had been reached on two of the three outstanding Pacific
problems. In regard to the third, the stationing of troops in China, the Japanese government
was now prepared to make further concessions in order to meet the demands of the United
States, Because of the conciliatory attitude of his government, Ambassador Nomura
requested that the United States take a philosophical view toward the questions relating to
the Far East.
In view of" the critical domestic situation in Tokyo which had become more tense during
the six months of informal conversations with the United States, Japan was now prepared to
make the maximum number of possible concessions in order to bring the present negotiations
to a satisfactory close. After these introductory remarks Ambassador Nomura handed
Secretary Hull the Japanese government's counter proposal. 92
After reading this document Secretary Hull showed indications of being satisfied with
Japan's comments on America's desire for non-discrimination in commerce. However,
Secretary Hull refused to commit himself regarding Japan's proposal for the withdrawal of
troops, or toward Japan's attitude regarding the rights of self defense. 93 Nevertheless, the
"'"Memorandum of a Conversation'— Novemher 7, 1941, S.U. I, 706-709.
81 IV, 50.
"IV, 51.
'"IV, 52.
"IV, 53.
"IV, 54.
*TV, 52. 54.
19
American Secretary of State did ask what proportion of Japanese troops would be withdrawn
from China. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan was willing to withdraw the greater
number of its troops now stationed in China. Then the Japanese Ambassador went on to
emphasize Japan's attitude toward "the right of self-defense." After examining the Japanese
proposals more carefully, Secretary Hull said the United States government would be ready
to give Japan its reply."
At the same time, however, Secretary Hull continued, the United States representatives
would consider it necessary to discuss the methods for maintaining peace in the Pacific
with representatives of Great Britain, China and the Netherlands East Indies. From Secretary
Hull's remarks Ambassador Nomura concluded that. China had already been consulted regarding
the matters relating to the settlement of its affairs in the Far East. As if to prove Ambassador
Nomura's assumption Secretary Hull then inquired what Japan's attitude would be if the
United States arranged for conversations between "the person of highest influence and
integrity in China" with suitable Japanese representatives. Minister Wakasugi asked if the
United States would first determine whether China desired to resume friendly relations with
Japan, Since Secretary Hull claimed only to have thought of this suggestion during the day's
conversation, he declined to expound on the theory. However, he requested that Ambassador
Nomura and Minister Wakasugi relay this proposal to their government and ascertain its
attitude toward the matter. 95
During this conversation Secretary Hull brought up the incident arising out of the
imprisonment of American missionaries in Harbin. Reminding Ambassador Nomura that
three Japanese Naval officers had been allowed to return to Tokyo, Secretary Hull stated that
the United States government could not sympathize with Japan's unreasonable treatment of
American citizens. Insisting that this incident involved only Manchurian officials and not
the Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura, nevertheless, promised to refer the question
to Tokyo with the request that suitable steps be taken to release the missionaries in question. 96
30. Tokyo Re-emphasizes Policy of Self- Defense
After receiving Ambassador Nomura's report of his conversation with Secretary Hull,
Tokyo asked the Japanese Ambassador in Washington if he had explained in detail Japan's
views concerning the rights of self-defense. 97 Foreign Minister Togo reminded Ambassador
Nomura that he had elaborated on this Japanese policy in his earlier instructions concerning
the Japanese counter-proposals. If this message had not reached Ambassador Nomura in time,
Foreign Minister Togo requested that the Japanese Ambassador make certain to explain the
matter fully to the American representatives. 98
31. Mr. Horiuchi Arranges for Undelayed Delivery of Telegrams
In view of the urgency of the present American- Japanese negotiations Mr. Horiuchi,
telegraphic clerk of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, felt it necessary to make certain
provisions for the delivery of urgent telegraphic messages." On November 8, 1941 he
informed the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo that with a crisis so near at hand all instruc-
tions between Tokyo and Washington must be received without any delay. By way of emphasi-
zing his point Mr. Horiuchi reminded the Japanese Foreign office that at 9:56 p.m. on
November 5, 1941 he had sent Ambassador Nomura's message relating to the English translations
"IV, 54.
"IV, 55-56.
"IV, 57.
"IV, 58.
"Ibid.
"IV, 59.
•A)
of the Japanese counter proposals. It was presumed that this message reached Tokyo on
November 6, 1941. However, the Japanese reply did not arrive in Washington until 8:20
a.m. Washington time, on November 7, 1941. Since Ambassador Nomura's appointment, with
Secretary Hull was scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on November 7, 1941, the Japanese Embassy was
allowed only forty minutes in which to decode and revise the message. In view of the fact that
all officials connected with the telegraphic office remained on duty all night when expecting
an urgent message from Tokyo, Mr. Horiuchi requested that the Foreign Office send any reply
over the wires immediately regardless of the hour. Formerly, Mr. Horiuchi continued, the
telegraph company notified the Embassy whenever a "very urgent" telegram was received.
Since the Japanese Foreign Office had recently changed the word to "kinqu" the delivery
of many important messages had been delayed. In order to avoid this delay in the future,
Mr. Horiuchi asked that all important telegrams be captioned "very urgent", 1 ™
In replying to Mr. Horiuchi's request the telegraphic section of the Foreign Office in Tokyo
stated that in the future all messages headed by the words "kinqu" or "daiqu" were to be
given the same handling by the telegraphic companies as those marked "very urgent". By
way of explaining the delay in replying to Ambassador Nomura's message, Tokyo stated
that unfavorable atmospheric conditions had held up the dispatch until 1734 on November
7, 1941. 101
32. Foreign Ministry Bans Publication of Negotiations
Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura's request that secrecy be maintained throughout the
Japanese- American negotiations, 102 the Foreign Office stated that it would attempt to guide
public opinion by censoring unfavorable comments regarding the present conversations. 103
Furthermore, Tokyo promised that the contents of these negotiations would be kept from the
press and that any information regarding the time of the Japanese- American conversations
would be suppressed. Already the Japanese government had warned the Times that the
publication of any contents capable of exciting anti-Japanese feeling in the United States
would bring about dire consequences. While promising to curtail the activities of Japanese
newspapers in Tokyo, the Foreign Office took the opportunity of pointing out security breaks
in the newspapers throughout the United States. For example, the Domei office in Washing-
ton had already printed articles entirely out of keeping with Tokyo's policy of maintaining
a calm and patient attitude toward the American conversations. 104
To be more explicit Foreign Minister Togo referred to the Associated Press dispatch from
Manila which quoted Ambassador Kurusu as stating, "I am going to Washington but I have
no great hope for a successful conclusion to the negotiations, 105 " As a result of this
newspaper report, the American public, felt that no new compromise which Japan offered
would be able to meet the demands of the United States. 106
33. President Roosevelt Confers with Naval Leaders (November 7, 1941 )
On November 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported that on the previous day President
Roosevelt had conferred secretly with Secretary of the Navy Knox, Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Stark, and other American naval leaders. Although uncertain of the actual purpose
of the meeting, Ambassador Nomura surmised that President Roosevelt wished to discuss
""IV, 60.
**rV", 47.
I03 IV,61.
101 IV, 62; N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1941, 1:40.
"'Ibid.
21
the latest Japanese counter proposals and to formulate a method of withdrawing American
Marines from China. 107
34. Japan Interested in Secretary Hull's Proposed Settlement of the China Affair
After carefully considering Ambassador Nomura's report on his conversations with
Secretary Hull, the Japanese government exhibited great interest in Secretary Hull's
proposed settlement of the China affair. 1 "* In view of the fact that Secretary Hull had
suggested that a high ranking Chinese official discuss Far Eastern problems with the Japanese
representative, the Japanese government felt that the United States was now willing to permit
Japan and China to settle their differences directly and without American interference.
Naturally Tokyo expected that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would initiate the move for
peace. Recognizing Secretary Hull's suggestion as a great contribution toward Sino-Japanese
peace, Foreign Minister Togo urged Ambassador Nomura to secure more information on
America's concrete plans for carrying the suggestion into effect. 109
Foreign Minister Togo felt that the United States, as well as Japan, was fully aware of the
importance of the Chinese question on Far Eastern peace. If the United States actually
proposed to leave the settlement of peace terms up to the Japanese Chinese governments
themselves, then Tokyo felt the question of withdrawing its troops from China could be left
out of future negotiations with the United States. In this way not only could Japanese -Chinese
peace be effected without further American interference, but the relations between Japan
and the United States could be settled quickly and satisfactorily. Before going ahead with
Secretary Hull's proposal, however, the Japanese government felt it necessary to secure a
guarantee that the United States would not interfere with the peace terms established between
Japan and China. This guarantee would naturally include the cessation of any American
activities designed to aid Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his war upon Tokyo. Naturally
the Japanese government also expected that an agreement between Japan and the United
States for the settlement of their respective problems in the Pacific would be signed
without further delay. 110
If Ambassador Nomura determined that Secretary Hull's suggestion was a workable one,
then the Japanese Ambassador was to eliminate the stipulations regarding Japanese-Chinese
peace from proposal A submitted to the American government; instead that section of
proposal B, requesting that the United States refrain from any action detrimental to the
establishment of peace between Japan and China, should be substituted in its place.
In view of the fact that Foreign Minister Togo firmly believed the United States sincerely
wished to establish an agreement between its government and Japan, he felt that Secretary
Hull's proposal could be carried out. Nevertheless, the Japanese government insisted that
its negotiations with the United States be brought to a satisfactory conclusion even before
the Japanese-Chinese peace was concluded. Furthermore, Foreign Minister Togo re-
emphasized the fact that the United States must cease all aid to Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek during Japanese peace negotiations. 1 1 1
35. Japan Seeks Facts on American- British Attitude Toward Axis
In order to determine the true facts concerning the existing international situation, the
Japanese Vice- Chief of the General Staff on November 9, 1941 in a circular message to the
"TV, 63.
" 8 IV, 64.
""Ibid.
,1D JV, 65.
'"IV, 66.
22
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Embassies abroad requested any and all information regarding the British and American
attitude toward Japan and Germany. 112
In order to determine to what extent Japan could go before the two Allies would open
war on the Axis Powers, Tokyo asked for detailed information regarding American reciprocal
relations with Japan and Germany and the military, political and economic union between
the United States, Great Britain, China, Holland and Russia. Japan also wished to determine
the influence that it had upon America, Great Britain and these other countries, and to see
how greatly the Japanese- American negotiations had affected the international situation.
Since Japan was aware of the American and British increased defenses in the Pacific, Tokyo
asked for an evaluation of the present situation regarding the expansion of the island bases
scattered around the Pacific, the dispatch of additional American and British military
strength to the South Pacific and to the Aleutians, and, finally, the movements of American
and British troops in China, the southwest Pacific and in Japan. 112 "
36. Grew-Togo Conversation (November 10, 1941)
a. Ambassador Grew's Report 111
During a meeting on November 10, 1941 at which Mr. Togo, Ambassador Grew, Conselor
Dooman and Mr. Kase were present, the Japanese Foreign Minister referred to a conversa-
tion with the American Ambassador held on October 30, 1941 during which he had asserted
his desire to maintain friendly relations between the United States and Japan.
After carefully studying the documents which had been passed by the representatives of
the two countries thus far, Mr. Togo was more determined than ever to maintain peace in
the Pacific. Keeping in mind that the object of the present Japanese Cabinet was to establish
a "Greater East Asia", as its contribution to world peace, Mr. Togo's government had
formulated new proposals and sent them to Ambassador Nomura as the basis for negotiations
with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. At this point, Ambassador Grew emphasized
that the conversations taking place between the two governments were "only preliminary and
exploratory". While not wishing to press the point, Mr. Togo stated that he felt the time had
come for formal and official negotiations.
Then Mr. Togo thanked the American government through Ambassador Grew for the
assistance which it had given Mr. Kurusu in his journey from Tokyo to Washington to take
his place as advisor to Ambassador Nomura. Aware of Ambassador Grew's previous efforts
to re-establish friendly relations between Japan and the United States, Mr. Togo pledged his
cooperation toward finding a compatible solution. Nevertheless, after reviewing the documents
recording the conversations which had already taken place, Foreign Minister Togo believed
that the United States lacked an adequate appreciation of the Far Eastern situation. While
Secretary Hull was apparently aware, from his own statements, that Japan was a stabilizing
force in the Far East, the attitude of the United States government as a whole did not
support this fact. Foreign Minister Togo felt that the United States government must take into
consideration that Japan had been at war with China for four and a half years and this had
a strong bearing on the Pacific situation. 114 Foreign Minister Togo then recalled a conversation
between Secretary Hull and Minister Wakasugi on October 16, 1941 during which Secretary
Hull had remembered telling former Ambassador Saito that he recognized Japan as a
stabilizing force and was prepared to express such recognition in an official manner. 11 J
" J IV, 67. This message was not translated until February 3, 1945.
"'■/bid.
"'"Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)'* November 10, 1941, S.D. II, 710-714.
115 This statement attributed to Secretary Hull by Foreign Minister Togo is not recorded in Secretary Hull's
memorandum of the conversation— see S. D, II, 687-689.
23
Although the Japanese government had repeatedly attempted to approach the American
point of view during the past six months, Foreign Minister Togo did not believe that the
United States had attempted in. any way to study sympathetically Japan's position.
America was apparently unaware that the population of Japan had increased to approximately
100,000,000 and in order to support this increasing number of people it would be necessary
to secure more raw materials. In order to offset this growing situation, further delay in
arriving at a satisfactory conclusion to the present conversations could not be tolerated.
Foreign Minister Togo urged that the United States government adopt a statesmanlike
position by overcoming the major difficulties by the time the Japanese Diet met on
November 15, 1941. Foreign Minister Togo continued by saying that the new Cabinet had
arrived at the maximum number of concessions which Japan could make to the United
States government. 116 With this statement the Japanese Foreign Minister handed
Ambassador Grew the new Japanese proposals 117 and then commented upon them.
Although the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 were based largely on those of
the United States issued on June 21, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo recognized that it
contained many unsatisfactory clauses with regard to both text and substance. Nevertheless,
in order to expedite the present conversations, Foreign Minister Togo had used the Japanese
draft of September 25, 1941 as the basis for these which he was now handing to Ambassador
Grew. However, they contained certain modifications in order to meet the United States
proposals as set forth in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. 118
In regard to the attitudes of both governments toward the European War, it was Foreign
Minister Togo's understanding that the views expressed in the Japanese draft of September
25, 1941 were agreeable to both governments. In the matter of commercial discrimination
the Japanese government had expanded its concessions in these new proposals in order
to meet the requirements set down by the United States. Recognizing that the question of
Japanese troops in China remained the greatest obstacle to the successful conclusion of
the conversations, the Japanese government, in spite of grave domestic problems, had made
further concessions.
Since Japan realized that British interests in the Far East would be affected by the dis-
cussions between Japan and the United States, Foreign Minister Togo appreciated
Secretary Hull's desire to consult the British government. In fact, he hoped that the United
States would persuade the British government to conclude an agreement with Japan
along the same lines as the one being discussed between Japan and the United States.
At the conclusion of these observations on the new Japanese proposals. Foreign Minister
Togo again urged that Ambassador Grew continue his cooperation toward a speedy end to
the negotiations. Foreign Minister Togo felt that Tokyo should not merely duplicate the
conversations taking place in Washington but should supplement exchanges of information
already handled in the Washington conferences with the goal of expediting the progress
of peace.
Ambassador Grew did not feel that he had the authority to debate at the present time
the questions which would be discussed in Washington; however, he did raise three points
pertinent to those discussions. Ambassador Grew disagreed with the idea that the United
States government did not recognize the situation in the Far East. He felt that Ambassador
Nomura in Washington and the. Japanese Embassy as a whole had given the United States
a very clear picture of the problems there. Foreign Minister Togo's description of Japan as a
"stabilizing force in East Asia" was. Ambassador Grew stated, open to very wide interpretation.
"*S.D. n, 710-714.
111 See "Document handed by Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 7. 1941",
S,D. O, 709-710.
'"S.D. D, 710-714.
24
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
However, Ambassador Grew realized that Foreign Minister Togo's observation that Japan
must have access to necessary supplies penetrated to the very center of the problem.
Here Ambassador Grew took the opportunity to point out that Secretary Hull's peaceful
program visualized for Japan a free flow of trade and commerce and the opening of new
markets for its industries.
In reply, Foreign Minister Togo admitted that the Japanese Embassy had reported the
Far Eastern situation accurately to the American State Department, but he still doubted
whether the United States government appreciated its seriousness. By way of illustrating his
point, Foreign Minister Togo referred to the Russian troops stationed in Outer Mongolia,
recognized as part of China, and he remarked that no one had as yet objected to the presence
of these troops. In answering Ambassador Grew's comment on the "interpretation of
stabilizing force in East Asia", Foreign Minister Togo stated that it could be understood
from a purely common sense point of view. In regard to Ambassador Grew's statements on
the question of assuring raw materials to Japan, Foreign Minister Togo referred briefly
to the economic pressure applied by the United States which had menaced the national
existence of Japan to a far greater degree than the direct use of force. He warned of the possi-
bility of Japan's being forced to measures of self-defense in order to overcome the effects
of continued economic pressure. If the American government- realized that Japan would
collapse if forced to sacrifice the fruits of its protracted war with China, Foreign Minister
Togo believed that the United States would conclude the conversations successfully
without further delay.
Ambassador Grew pointed out that Japan could not hope to retain the fruits of aggression
and, at the same time, propose the rejection of aggression and force. However, Foreign
Minister Togo stated that Japan was not conducting an aggressive war with China. Then he
insisted that under the plea of self-defense, the American government had resorted to
measures far beyond those generally recognized by international law as defensive. Summing
up his opinions, Foreign Minister Togo stated that theoretical talks should end and that
conversations in the future should be pursued along realistic lines. 118 "
b. Foreign Minister Togo's Report 11 *
On November 10, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo met with Ambassador Grew and Counselor
Doom an in order to inform the American representatives that after a conference between
the Foreign Office and the military high command the Japanese government was now
prepared to submit its final proposals. After examining the results of the negotiations between
Japan and the United States so far, Foreign Minister Togo had come to the conclusion that
the United States did not have a workable understanding of the far Eastern situation. In
spite of the fact that Secretary Hull called Japan the stabilizing influence of the Pacific,
Foreign Minister Togo said it was obvious from his other remarks that he did not fully
appreciate Japan's actual status. Because the United States lacked this understanding it
had refused to make any concessions whatsoever during the six months' long conversations
with the Japanese representatives. Apparently the United States did not take into
consideration the fact that Japan's population of 100,000,000 people was ever increasing,
and it was necessary for them to obtain raw materials in order to maintain their existence.
Urging the United States government to take all these points into consideration in future
negotiations, Foreign Minister Togo stated emphatically that unless some change was evident
in America's attitude the Japanese people as a whole would be forced to doubt the sincerity
of the American government. 120
'"IV, 68-71.
,I0 IV, 68.
After these preliminary remarks Foreign Minister Togo handed Ambassador Grew the
English text of the final Japanese counter proposals. 1 21
In an attempt to clarify certain points contained in these proposals, Foreign Minister Togo
said that his government believed it had set forth its attitude toward the European war
fully in the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941. Therefore, it had seen no reason to
elaborate on that point further in these present proposals. In regard to the policy of non-
discrimination in commerce, Japan had made more liberal concessions in order to meet the
demands of the United States. As a final attempt to reach an understanding regarding the
important problem of Japanese troops in China the Japanese government had decided to
make further compromises. In view of the liberal concessions made them, Foreign Minister
Togo urged that the United States accept Japan's latest proposals and also induce Great
Britain to sign a similar agreement with Japan. Since he had no instructions from Washing-
ton, Ambassador Grew declined to pass his opinion on the Japanese proposals. However, he
did feel it necessary to point out to Foreign Minister Togo that the United States government
had a very clear picture of the Oriental situation since he himself had submitted detailed
reports. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew felt that the present negotiations were aimed at
supplying Japan all the materials necessary to maintain an advantageous position in the
Far East. 1 -' 2
While expressing his appreciation of Ambassador Crew's cooperation. Foreign Minister
Togo refuted the Ambassador's insistance that the present negotiations were designed to
grant Japan a larger market for purchasing raw materials by pointing out that America's
freezing regulations had placed such strong economic pressure on Japan that the Japanese
people themselves were beginning to feel the need for effecting even stronger measures for
self-defense. From the attitude of the United States toward China, Foreign Minister Togo
continued, it was obvious that the American government wished to ignore the sacrifices that
the Japanese people had been forced to make during the four and one-half years of warfare. In
view of that fact, it would be suicidal for Japan to make such liberal concessions to China
as the United States government desired. At this point in the conversation Consulor
Dooman interrupted Foreign Minister Togo to state that the United States could never accept
the results of aggression. Foreign Minister Togo replied that the Japanese government had
never considered its war with China one of aggression. Any military action taken by Japan
in the Far East, he continued, had been merely in the interest of self-defense. Although not
wishing to argue this point further, Foreign Minister Togo insisted that the United States had
been wrongfully magnifying Japan's moves in the Pacific. 123
From the conversation Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the United States still
considered that its negotiations with Japan were in the preliminary stage. Ambassador Grew
had continually referred to them merely as "conversations". Foreign Minister Togo had
stressed that by this time the conversations were well within the realm of "negotiations".
Ambassador Grew was apparently satisfied with this term. 124
37. Ambassador Nomura Reveals America's Pessimistic Attitude Toward the Negotiations
From informal discussions with various American officials Ambassador Nomura came to
the conclusion that America regarded its present negotiations with Japan in a pessimistic
light.
On November 10, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent a summary of the remarks of these
Americans to the Foreign Office in Tokyo. 125 As one example of America's attitude Ambassa-
111 IV, 25-28.
122 IV, 69.
'"IV, 70.
* IV, 71.
'"IV, 72.
26
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
dor Nomura pointed to a conversation between Frederick Moore, legal advisor to the Japanese
Embassy in Washington, and Senator Thomas of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. Moore had reported to Ambassador Nomura that the United States was prepared to fight
if Japan made another invasion in the South Pacific. Not only was the American navy
ready for action, but psychologically, the American people were expecting a war.
On the previous evening a member of President Roosevelt's Cabinet had discussed
the question of Japanese- American relations with Ambassador Nomura. In view of his
friendship with the Japanese Ambassador, this unnamed Cabinet member stated frankly
that the United States government was expecting another aggressive move on the part of
Japan in the Far East within a few days. Because of this information neither President
Roosevelt nor the United States government, as a whole, believed that Ambassador Kurusu's
arrival in the United States would be able to improve the present situation. In an attempt
to offset this feeling Ambassador Nomura had explained that the Japanese people were forced
to take some action because of the American freezing negotiations. Nevertheless, anxious
to avoid a war with the United States, Japan desired an immediate agreement. Ambassador
Nomura's remarks, however, failed to convince the American Cabinet member. 1
With the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst papers, Ambassador Nomura reported
American newspapers and magazines held the opinion that the American people were more
eager for war with Japan than with Germany. Ambassador Nomura firmly believed that the
British government was using this American attitude to its own advantage by initiating
negotiations for joint Anglo-American action in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura reminded
his government that at the present time Britain was forced to divert some of its fleet to the
Pacific. Even in the event that President Roosevelt and other American statesmen did not
desire to replace the British fleet in the Far East with American warships, Ambassador
Nomura had it on good authority that the United States could not stop its aid to Britain
since by this time it had become a question of saving American "face," Ambassador Nomura
concluded his report by stating that he was to confer with President Roosevelt and would submit
a more detailed statement on the results of the conversation. "
38. Roosevelt- Nomura Conversation (November 10, li>41 )
a. Secretary Hull's Report 1 ™
Accompanied by Minister Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull on November 10, 1941. After a few preliminary remarks, Ambassador
Nomura read the following communication from the Japanese government. He recalled to
the American representatives' minds that on September 25, 1941 the Japanese government
made its last proposals. From the observations of the American State Department seen
in the answering document of October 2, 1941, the Japanese government had determined that
the present difficulties arose from three major points: (1) the application of the principle
of non-discrimination in international commercial relations; (2) the attitude of the two
governments toward the European War; (3) the question of the stationing and withdrawing
of Japanese forces.
Ambassador Nomura stated that, in regard to the principle of non-discrimination, the
Japanese government had now decided to agree to its application in all the Pacific areas
including China, provided that the principle was similarly applied to the rest of the world.
Since Secretary Hull had repeatedly stated that it was his long-cherished desire to apply
the non-discriminatory principle to the whole world, Ambassador Nomura felt that the
United States government would be gratified at Japan's statement.
l "Ibid.
'"rv, 7.3.
27
On the second question regarding the European war, the Japanese government had
proposed on September 25, 1941 that both governments be guided in their conduct by
considerations of preservation and sell-defense. However, Ambassador Nomura had been in-
structed to inquire whether the United States would give assurance that it had no intention
of interpreting "preservation and self-defense" too liberally. On the basis of reciprocity, the
Japanese government was willing to give similar reassurances. In the Japanese proposals of
September 25, 1941 it was stated that "in case the United States should participate in the
European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation
of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy and would likewise determine
what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said
interpretation". Under the present circumstances, Japan could not make any further
concessions in this matter for, unless there was mutual trust and confidence between Japan
and the United States, a thousand words would not be a satisfactory assurance. m °
However, in regard to the stationing and withdrawal of Japanese forces, the government
in Tokyo had decided to submit further guarantees. Japanese forces would be retained in
specified areas of North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island for a certain required time
after the restoration of a Japanese- Chinese peace. The withdrawal of forces from the other
parts of occupied China would be accomplished within two years after the establishment
of peace and order. Ambassador Nomura emphasized, however, that the Japanese government
had made a great many more concessions along these lines than previously. He hoped that
the United States government would agree that the complete and immediate withdrawal
of Japanese forces from all of China was impracticable at the present time. The recall of
forces from French Indo-China would follow the firm establishment of equitable peace in
East Asia by the settlement of the China affair.
After completing his observations on the concessions made by the new Japanese government,
Ambassador Nomura read a statement which he had prepared. As viewed from the Japanese
standpoint, Ambassador Nomura said, the United States government had shown little
signs of reciprocating the concessions forwarded by Japan in an endeavor to terminate
the six months of informal conversations successfully. Ambassador Nomura declared that
for this reason certain factions in Japan viewed the true intentions of the United States
government with skepticism. Japanese public opinion viewed the freezing of Japanese assets
as economic warfare insomuch as it cut them off from the supply of materials vital to their
industries. From reports of the growing intensity of the situation, Ambassador Nomura
concluded that an amicable and satisfactory understanding must be arrived at without
any unnecessary loss of time. In an effort to surmount the present difficulties, the Japa-
nese government had submitted these new proposals. Ambassador Nomura was of the firm
opinion that if some understanding were reached by the two countries, the psychological
effect upon the Japanese people would be extremely favorable. 138 *
Ambassador Nomura then stated that Ambassador Kurusu had been sent to assist him in
the present conversations and that parallel conversations would take place in Tokyo between
Foreign Minister Togo and Ambassador Grew. Attempting to forestall any misinterpretations
of the statements he had made, Ambassador Nomura asked that President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull forgive his transgression from the terminology of trained diplomats since
his main objective was the establishment of peace.
In speaking of the present commercial policy which was unfavorable toward Japan,
Ambassador Nomura mentioned the sea conference which had taken place between
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. He complained that when Japan went
n «"lbid.
""ibid.
28
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
into Shantung, they were allowed to remain only some six years, at the end
of which time they were forced to move out their troops.
As a means of establishing a basis for peace, stability and order in the Pacific area and, in
the time to come, throughout the world, President Roosevelt said he believed it essential to
lay practical emphasis on the sound philosophy of human welfare and that the exploratory
conversations would achieve favorable results as the American government would expedite
the conversations in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese government. However,
President Roosevelt desired that Japan demonstrate its intention of pursuing a peaceful
course instead of the aggressive one which it had been following up to the present time. Then
President Roosevelt declared that during the age through which the world was passing, it
was necessary to look one hundred years in the future. He referred to the extra-territorial
costs and the unusual conditions which had been existing throughout China in the past thirty
years and he stated that the Chinese government had gone through a new experience. Referring
to Ambassador Nomura's statements regarding the Shantung problem, President Roosevelt
pointed out that it had taken three years to dispose of that question while the Japanese-
American conversations had consumed only six months.
Ambassador Nomura then dwelled briefly on the problem of getting the Japanese troops out
of China by degrees, insisting that there would be neither annexation nor indemnity in doing so.
As the interview drew to a close, nothing was said about the time for the next conversation,
however, Ambassador Nomura reminded President Roosevelt that Ambassador Kurusu was
expected about Saturday, November 15, 1941, and although he had nothing new to add to the
present discussion, Ambassador Nomura stated that Mr. Kurusu would assist him in future
conversations. President Roosevelt assured the Japanese Ambassador that he expected to
confer with Mr. Kurusu. 129
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report
At a conference with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull held in a private room in the
White House in order to avoid newspaper publicity, Ambassador Nomura explained to the
American representatives Japan's final concessions toward peace. 1 ! °
Ambassador Nomura began by saying that he had been unable to speak with Secretary
Hull for almost three weeks, 1 ' 11 and ever since the resignation of Prince Konoye's Cabinet
Ambassador Nomura had been hoping for an interview with President Roosevelt. Since the
informal conversations had been in progress for almost six months the Japanese government
at this time hoped for a quick settlement of all the Far Eastern problems. However, as the
negotiations dragged on without any apparent progress, the Japanese people had become
impatient. In view of the fact that the United States had refused to make any concessions
equal to those made by Japan, the Japanese people were doubting America's sincerity. At
the present time Japan's domestic situation was serious because the Japanese people
were unable to obtain the supply of materials necessary to their industry. Here Ambassador
Nomura stated that an economic blockade was as harmful to a country as a shooting war.
Nevertheless, anxious to maintain peace in the Pacific, the Japanese government had con-
tinued the conversations with the United States representatives. 1 ^
As a final effort in obtaining its objective, the Japanese government had made a maximum
number of concessions in its proposal to the United States. 133
In response to these remarks President Roosevelt stated that the United States government
also had as its main objective the establishment of peace in the Pacific based on the spirit
1S0 IV, 74-76.
**' Note Ambassador Nomura's conversation with Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941 .
132 rV, 76.
133 IV, 77.
of fair play. Agreeing with the desire of the Japanese government to continue peace parleys,
President Roosevelt said that the United States had two objectives in mind: one, the prevention
of war and, two, the maintenance of a lasting peace.
Since the Japanese government appreciated the seriousness of the situation at this time.
Ambassador Nomura continued, Ambassador Kurusu was being sent to the Embassy in
Washington.
Ambassador Nomura then resumed his explanation of the latest Japanese counter
proposals. He stated that these present proposals were based on the former Japanese proposals
of September 25, 1941 and modified to meet the demands of the American government
expressed in the United States proposals of October 2, 1941 as well as the opinions of Secre-
tary Hull and Under Secretary Welles in subsequent conversations. In regard to the applica-
tion of the non-discriminatory commercial policy in the entire Pacific area, Ambassador
Nomura pointed out that his government had guaranteed the extension of this policy
even to China. In view of the fact that Secretary Hull had continually spoken of his desire
to see this commercial policy in practice throughout the world, the Japanese government
was certain that its guarantees would meet with the approval of the United States. The
attitude of the Japanese government toward the European war, as it had previously stated
in its proposal of September 25, 1941. would be based on the need for "protection and self-
defense." However, Japan expected to receive a guarantee that the United States would
not interpret these terms in too broad a sense. Unless, however, both governments placed
unreserved confidence in each other, Ambassador Nomura said, no guarantee would be
satisfactory. 135
In clarifying the third and most important issue between the two governments Ambassador
Nomura stated that Japan was now prepared to establish the localities in China where it
would be necessary to retain its troops, and also to guarantee the period of occupation.
Although realizing that the United States desired to have Japanese forces withdrawn
immediately, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that it would be impossible to effect such a
move at the present time. However, he urged the United States to consider Japan's
concessions in the light of actual circumstances. Ambassador Nomura concluded his
remarks by submitting Japan's proposal regarding its troops in French In do-China. After
Ambassador Nomura had finished, President Roosevelt said that the whole world had fallen
into a state of confusion because of the militaristic policies of certain countries. In an
attempt to return to normalcy, the United States government has sought the establishment
of peace and order in the Pacific. With that goal in mind President Roosevelt himself had
assisted in the preliminary conversations in order to find a basis for such peace. Before
going any further, however, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to receive a definite guarantee
that the Japanese government intended to cease its aggression and adopt a peaceful course
in the Far East. 136
In an attempt to abolish the economic limitations to which Japan referred, President
Roosevelt continued, he had conferred with Prime Minister Churchill on the issue of non-
discrimination. Both countries' main objection to Germany was the fact that it followed a
policy contrary to that idea while both Great Britain and the United States wished to apply
the principle of non-discrimination to the entire world. Referring to the administration of
President Taft when the United States had resorted to a policy of force in Cuba, President
Roosevelt pointed out that America's relations with the Latin American countries had been
highly favorable. Once the United States had adopted a new and peaceful policy, relations
131 IV, 75.
las IV, 77.
""IV, 78.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
with those countries had improved. At this point Ambassador Nomura reminded President
Roosevelt that America's economic pressure was now causing the anti- American attitude
throughout Japan. President Roosevelt continued his remarks by stating that it was
necessary to find a modus uiuendi before a satisfactory conciliation could be worked out
between the two countries. Ambassador Nomura interpreted this statement to mean that
President Roosevelt desired a provisional agreement. As the conference drew to a close,
President Roosevelt asked whether Ambassador Kurusu k was bringing additional Japanese
proposals from Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura replied that Mr. Kurusu's only reason for
coming was to act as an assistant to the Japanese Ambassador. Since President Roosevelt
was leaving for Warm Springs, Georgia, on November 15, 1941 to attend a Thanksgiving
celebration there, he hoped for the opportunity of conversing with Ambassador Kurusu
before his departure, 137
39. Japanese- American Conversation (November 10, 194 1 ) iaa
Because of an interruption, Ambassador Nomura had failed to make two points clear to
Secretary Hull during the conversation earlier that morning. Therefore, Minister
Wakasugi called upon Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine to make an appointment for Ambassador
Nomura to see Secretary Hull either on the evening of November 10, 1941 or in the morning
of November 11.
The first of the points to be discussed in the next conversation related to Japan's desire to
reach some successful agreement before the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941.
The second point was in connection with Secretary Hull's statement made on November 7,
1941 proposing the development of a new relationship between Japan and China by means
of mutual pledges of conciliation and friendship.
Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese government was extremely interested in Secretary
Hull's proposals and desired that he elaborate on them further. Mr. Ballantine promised
to speak with Secretary Hull and relay his message to Minister Wakasugi. 139
40. Japan Doubts America's Awareness of the Critical Situation
From the fact that little progress had been made in the informal conversations, Foreign
Minister Togo concluded that the United States did not appreciate how critical the situation
in the Far East actually was. 14 " In order to emphasize this fact Foreign Minister Togo
urged Ambassador Nomura to speak to Secretary Hull and other American representatives
in order to give them a clear picture of Japanese-American relations. As Foreign Minister
Togo had stated in previous messages to the Japanese Ambassador, a settlement of some
kind must be reached before November 25, 1941. The Japanese Parliament would begin
its session on November 15, 1941 and before its meeting was concluded it would be
necessary that Japan have on hand at least a tentative agreement with the United States. 141
41. The German Government Makes Demands on Japan
As Tokyo had informed Ambassador Nomura over a month ago the German government
was demanding that Japan force the United States to cease its action against the Axis powers.
Unless some definite measures were taken, Berlin warned, the German government would be
137 IV, 79.
"""Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, November 10, 1941, S.D. II. 719.
139 Ibid.
""It should be noted that the JVeii' York Times announced the approach of a diplomatic crisis (November 11, 1941,
1:13}, warning the American public that the Japanese were expected to strike in earlv December {November 12, 1941,
7:1,4).
IV, 80.
31
forced to convoke the Tripartite Pact, thus ending any negotiations between Japan and the
United States. 142
Since the time of that first message from Berlin, the Japanese government had received
two additional demands from the German government. However, Foreign Minister Togo had
attempted to convince the German Ambassador on November 6, 1941 that Japan would be
more likely to convince the United States that it should cease action against Germany after
Japanese- American negotiations had been brought to a successful conclusion. 14 "
42. Foreign Minister Togo Confers with Ambassador Craigie (November 11, 1941 )
Although Ambassador Craigie had called upon Foreign Minister Togo to discuss other busi-
ness, the representative of the two countries turned the conversation to the subject of Japa-
nese-American negotiations. Ambassador Craigie stated that, the British government was not
aware of the full details of those conversations under way in Washington. However, since the
success of those negotiations would affect British interests in the Far East, the English govern-
ment was naturally interested in their success. Once the United States and Japan had reached
an agreement on the basic principles for peace and the two countries weTe ready for real nego-
tiations, Great Britain wished to enter into an agreement with both the United States and
Japan. 1 "
In reply Foreign Minister Togo stated that the matters under discussion between his gov-
ernment and the United States greatly affected England. It was the Japanese government's
desire that Great Britain enter into an agreement with both the United States and Japan at
an appropriate time. Although not fully informed on the progress already made during these
informal conversations, Ambassador Craigie said he assumed negotiations were still in the
preliminary stages. By way of refuting this assumption Foreign Minister Togo pointed out
that the Japanese had already handed the United States government its final proposal in an
effort to bring the negotiations to a speedy close. 145 At this point in the conversation Foreign
Minister Togo took the opportunity to refer to a speech made by Prime Minister Churchill in
which he issued a warning to Japan. 146 Since the British Prime Minister had stated in the
same speech that he knew nothing of the developments of the Japanese-American negotiations,
Foreign Minister Togo suggested that in the future British statesmen find a basis for their
remarks and not issue unfounded threats capable of forming a breach in Japanese- British
diplomacy.
Turning the conversation back to the latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Togo said
that if the United States found them in accord with its own basic principles, an agreement
could be reached within ten days. If, on the other hand, the United States refused to accept
Japan's terms, all negotiations would cease. In view of the fact that there were factions within
Japan itself working against the re-establishment of Japanese- American and Japanese-British
relations, Foreign Minister Togo felt it necessary to conclude an understanding without delay.
Since the Japanese government had made the maximum concessions to date, only the atti-
tude of Great Britain and the United States would stand in the way of peace. From Ambassa-
dor Craigie's general attitude Foreign Minister Togo concluded that the British representative
" a ffl, 277.
'"IV, 81.
'"IV, 82.
M Ibid.
146 At the luncheon of the Lord Mayor of London on November 10, 1941, the Prime Minister Churchill stated that
Great Britain would declare war on Japan immediately if war broke out between the United States and Japan, New
York Times, November 11, 1941, 1:1, 2. The Japanese press replied to Prime Minister Churchill's speech by saying it
was "an outrageous but crafty British plot to involve the United States in a war in the Pacific for the protection of British
interests."
32
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
understood for the first time how critical the situation actually was. Ambassador Craigie
promised to report the details of his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister to the
British government immediately. When reporting this conversation to Ambassador Nomura
on November 11, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo pointed out that the United States government
still considered the negotiations in the preliminary stage, and it was necessary that Ambas-
sador Nomura correct this opinion. 14 '
43. Ambassador Nomura Seeks Clarification of Tripartite Pact Issues
On November 11, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent a message to the Japanese Foreign Office
requesting clarification of certain details involving the Tripartite Fact. Ambassador Nomura
asked whether Foreign Minister Togo in his conversation with Ambassador Grew has em-
phasized the point that the Japanese government assumed the United States agreed with
Japan's definition of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact as set forth in the Japanese pro-
posal of September 25, 1941. Actually, however, Ambassador Nomura reminded the Foreign
Minister that the United States' oral statement of October 2, 1941 indicated that America did
not agree with this Japanese interpretation. During Minister Wakasugi's conversations with
Under Secretary of States Welles it was merely noted that "the United States also gave indi-
cations that adjustments in this matter may be a possibility." Although both the United
States and Japanese representatives were exchanging notes in spite of the fact that no definite
decision had been made with regard to the Tripartite Pact issues, Ambassador Nomura wished
44. The Chinese Ambassador Confers with President Roosevelt
Ambassador Nomura reported on November 11, 1941 that the Chinese Ambassador to the
United States had called on President Roosevelt on the previous day. Since the interview had
lasted only two minutes, the purpose of the Chinese Ambassador's visit was probably to hand
the American President a written document. Although unable to determine the contents of
this document, Ambassador Nomura had passed on the scant information he had obtained
to his government hoping that it might be of some value to them. 143
45. Mr. Kase Calls on Ambassador Grew (November 12, 1941)
At the request of Foreign Minister Togo, Mr. Kase called on Ambassador Grew on November
12, 1941. lb " Mr. Kase explained to Ambassador Grew that although Mr. Togo could not speak
with complete freedom on certain subjects to the American representative, he nevertheless
desired to give the United States a complete understanding of how the present situation af-
fected the Japanese government. From the latest reports of Ambassador Nomura's conver-
sations with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, Mr. Togo was deeply concerned about
America's inadequate appreciation of the urgency of the situation.
Since the Japanese government had made the greatest possible concessions to the United
States, Foreign Minister Togo considered official negotiations between Japan and the United
States to be in their final stage. When Prime Minister Konoye's government had been in
power, it had conducted the conversations with the support of the entire country but since no
tangible progress had been made, Japanese public opinion regarded the United States' delay
as a means of concealing preparations underway for the complete encirclement of Japan.
Therefore, the present Japanese Cabinet had undertaken the task of reaching an agreement
with the United States against much opposition and if any appreciable delay were encoun-
'"IV, 82.
MB IV, 83.
'"IV, 84.
33
tered, a very critical state of affairs would result. Not only would Mr. Togo"s official position be
imperiled, but his very life would be at stake. Nevertheless, Mr. Kase added that Foreign Min-
ister Togo had the courage to continue his attempts for the re -establishment of friendly rela-
tions between Japan and the United States fully aware of the consequences of failure.
Ambassador Grew remarked that Mr. Kase's observations were generally the same as those
expressed by former Foreign Minister Toyoda and Prime Minister Konoye during former con-
versations. Mr. Kase insisted that there was considerable difference between the present
situation and the previous one and again he emphasized the vital importance of concluding
present negotiations successfully. 181
At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Grew read Secretary Hull's report of the in-
terview with Ambassador Nomura on November 7, 1941. 1S1! After reading the report, Mr. Kase
stated that Ambassador Nomura's details on the conversation were very similar.
Mr. Kase said that Foreign Minister Toyoda was especially interested in Secretary Hull's
suggestion that the Chinese government might be willing to express a desire to seek peaceful
cooperation with Japan. Since that suggestion was generally linked with the whole adjust-
ment of the Pacific problem, Ambassador Grew felt that it would come under the cognizance
of Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull.
Next, Mr. Kase inquired whether Ambassador Grew had received an account of the conver-
sation between President. Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura held on November 10, 1941.
Replying that there was probably little difference between that conversation and the one be-
tween the Japanese Ambassador and Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941, Ambassador Grew
said that the American State Department had failed to send him that report as yet. Mr. Kase
said that the conversations were entirely different in tone.
Ambassador Grew then handed Mr. Kase a copy of his report dealing with the interview
with Foreign Minister Togo on November 10, 1941. After reading it over, Mr. Kase stated that
the report was inaccurate in one sense since Mr. Togo had never stated that "he did not wish
to press the point" regarding the transference of the informal conversations into "official nego-
tiations". Although he did not contradict Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew, in his report to the
American State Department, pointed out that Counselor Dooman's notes taken during the
conversation, revealed that Mr. Togo had actually made such a statement in Japanese. 153
From this conversation with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew (in his personal comments for-
warded to the State Department) noted that considerable doubt had been east on the alleged
message received from Foreign Minister Togo through the prominent Japanese informant on
November 7, 1941. 1N In this message Foreign Minister Togo had supposedly said that although
he could not express himself with unrestrained freedom, he nevertheless, wished to make a
suggestion. He said that the Tojo government had decided upon the maximum concessions
that it would be willing to make in order to meet the desires of the United States. However,
even if these concessions were regarded as inadequate by the United States, the Japanese
government believed that the Washington conferences should continue. 155 However, after
talking with Mr. Kase, Ambassador Grew was convinced that the message received through
the Japanese informant was misleading. Even at the time of its delivery, Ambassador Grew
had been somewhat surprised at its contents, yet he bad no grounds on which to question its
accuracy. Although it appeared obvious even now that the Japanese government would prefer
a continuation of the informal conversations to a complete breakdown of negotiations, never-
theless, Ambassador Grew appreciated the dangerous situation which would result if these
,s 'Ibid.
""See "Memorandum of a Conversation"— November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 706-709.
113 S.D. n, 719-722.
""'Memorandum of Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew I "—November 12, 1941, S.D. U, 722.
'""Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)"— November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 705.
34
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
conversations dragged on and produced no definite progress. While realizing that Japan must
take the initiative in these conversations, Ambassador Grew did not feel authorized to say
whether the Japanese proposals of November 7, 1941 constituted the maximum number of
concessions that it would be willing to make. 166
46. Ambassador Nomura Seeks English Translation of Proposal B
In view of the fact that Japanese-American relations had not progressed as a result of the
Japanese proposals, it was evident that Ambassador Nomura would have to present the United
States government with the alternate proposal B. In order that there might be no misunder-
standing arising with the presentation of this proposal, Ambassador Nomura requested that
Tokyo send him an English translation of this proposal immediately. 181
47. Japanese Official Analyzes Roosevelt's Domestic and Foreign Strategy
On November 12, 1941 a Japanese intelligence official in Washington sent Tokyo a report
on the Roosevelt administration's method of dealing with the Japanese -American situation. 168
In an effort to aid in the defeat of Germany President Roosevelt had inaugurated military,
economic, and industrial measures which would eventually lead America into complete war.
By assisting Great Britain it had already entered the conflict on the high seas. While the United
States army was not yet equipped to fight a war with Germany on land, for the present, at
least, the United States navy could engage German warships on the high seas. Nevertheless,
in spite of the fact that President Roosevelt had almost dictatorial powers in regard to Con-
gress and the military officials, the American people were not in complete sympathy with his
policies. For example, on November 10, 1941 the Times Herald had stated that Roosevelt was
as much a dictator as Hitler or Stalin. Furthermore, the America First Committee was secretly
working to impeach President Roosevelt. On October 30, 1941 at Madison Square Garden 8,000
members of the America First Committee gathered as a demonstration against the foreign
policies of the present United States government. 1580
In Washington a former American Ambassador demanded that President Roosevelt be
forced to resign his position as President by means of a referendum. He even went so far as to
state that President Roosevelt might easily die during this disastrous period in the nation's
history. This statement drew great applause from the audience. Apparently, the Japanese
intelligence official went on to say, the move to impeach President Roosevelt was wide-spread
and was initiated by many varying factions. An editorial in the Times Herald on November
4, 1941 warned that it would be impossible for Congress to impeach President Roosevelt because
of the whip he held over the army and navy. Nevertheless, the editorial in this and other papers
did mention the possibility of President Roosevelt's being impeached at some time, and
the Japanese intelligence official believed this to be extremely significant.
As an indication that the American people were not entirely behind President Roosevelt's
aid to Britain, the Japanese official cited the occurrence in Detroit when Ambassador Halifax
was pelted with eggs. The American public as a whole had begun to view the prospect of war
in its unprecedented aspects and after the sinking of the Reuben James the country received
a great shock. Although President Roosevelt took advantage of this sinking to declare an un-
limited national emergency, in his speech on October 27, 1941 he did not stress foreign ques-
tions but placed his emphasis almost entirely upon America's internal problems. 169
1S6 S.U 11,722.
I6 TV, 85.
IS8 IV, 86
1SS TV, 87, DoD comment, name v
35
During the past few months even the attitude of Congress toward Roosevelt had been af-
fected by public opinion. In spite of the fact that the Senate had approved the entrance of
armed merchantmen into war zones, the actual victory was only by the small margin of fifty
to thirty-seven. It was obvious then, that the people of the United States feared the German
war machine. In general the American people believed that the Japanese were exhausted
from their four years of war with China, and that, if war took place between Japan and the
United States, Japan would quickly be defeated. If war were declared upon Japan, President
Roosevelt could declare an unlimited emergency, disperse the America First Committee, and
crush all opposition to his administration. The Japanese official believed that in time, Presi-
dent Roosevelt, using the Japanese as a tool, could even prepare the American people for a war
with Germany, Japan's ally.
Viewed from any aspect a Japanese-American war, according to the Japanese intelligence
official, would be disastrous to Japan. Germany at the present time was anxious to conclude
peace with England and should American aid to the British be slowed down Germany might
possibly be able to accomplish this plan. It was doubtful whether Germany would let Japan
stand in its way if the end of the war were in sight. 180
In warning his government of the dangers of a war with the United States the Japanese intel-
ligence official pointed out still further that the present Japanese-American relations were
heading both countries toward armed conflict. In view of that fact the Japanese official sug-
gested that his government devise some temporary understanding with the United States in
order to alleviate the economic pressure upon the Japanese people and to allow conditions in
the Pacific to return to some semblance of normalcy. Reminding his government that Presi-
dent Roosevelt had taken an active interest in the European war when Germany invaded the
Netherlands, the Japanese official pointed out that President Roosevelt would inevitably
enter the war against the Nazis and would declare war on the German government rather than
the Japanese. Japan could then hope to obtain a complete and satisfactory agreement with
the American government. 161
48. Japanese Naval Activity Seen in the Mandates
In spite of the warnings of Japanese officials in the United States to curtail operations in
the Pacific that might lead to war with America, the Japanese government continued prepar-
ations for future aggression.
On November 12, 1941 American traffic analysts disclosed that during the month of October
new call signs had appeared in Mandate traffic indicating a decided increase in Japanese
forces there. In fact, the Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit and Saipan were being included in
dispatches which would not affect them under ordinary circumstances. Apparently several
new units were even being added to the Sixth Base Force in the Jaluit area. 162
49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 12, 1941)
a. State Department's Report™*
Since he had made an appointment on November 10, 1941 for another conversation with
Mr. Hull, Ambassador Nomura, accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, called at the apartment of
the American Secretary of State on November 12, 1941. Before beginning the conversation,
Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura a statement which he had prepared in response
,60 IV, 88.
""IV, 89.
' S2 rv, 90.
"""Memorandum of a Conversation"— November 12, 1941. S.D. IT, 722-726, Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine.
36
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
to a request from Minister Wakasugi for a further elaboration of Secretary Hull's views on the
development of a true friendship between Japan and China. 164
In Secretary Hull's oral statement reference was made to Ambassador Nomura's request
for an amplification of the suggestion made on November 7, 1941 for the mutual exchange of
pledges of cooperation between Japan and China. 1 * 6 Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese
representatives that he had made this suggestion after Ambassador Nomura had pointed out
that if Japanese troops were removed from all areas of China, the Japanese people would have
no tangible gains from their four years of heavy sacrifice. Since Europe was threatened with
anarchy, Secretary Hull believed that Japan held in its power the unique opportunity for en-
hancing its national prestige by moral force. If the Chinese government were able to cooperate
with Japan along peaceful and beneficial lines and Japan found it possible to reciprocate in a
policy of mutual conciliation, the Japanese government would be making a contribution to-
ward arresting the destructive forces that now menaced civilization. 166 In this way Japan
would assume leadership in a peaceful world.
What Secretary Hull envisioned in his suggestion was the practical application of basic
principles directed toward the preservation of social and economic order by means of which all
nations of the world would be able to collaborate peacefully, unthreatened by aggrandizement
or discrimination of any kind. Such a policy would provide for liberalization of trade while, at
the same time, affording access to, and development of, natural resources for the benefit of all
peoples. At this critical moment in world history, the adoption of such a plan by the Japanese
government would be attributed to its far-sighted statesmanship. 167
After reading Ambassador Nomura this oral statement, Secretary Hull then said that in
order to avoid any misunderstanding with regard to the concessions already agreed upon by
the Japanese government, and in order to ascertain whether the new Japanese Ministry was
willing to retain the former proposals, he had drawn up a statement on this subject. In this
second oral statement handed to Ambassador Nomura concerned with the former Japanese
concessions, the United States government reminded Japan that the documents handed to
the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 by Ambassador Nomura asserted that
"Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world
" Because of this attitude the Japanese government at that time thanked the United
States for the invitation to conduct negotiations with the goal of establishing a workable un-
derstanding. In order to attain a united effort toward the peaceful settlement of the entire
Pacific situation, the Japanese government stated that it was willing to make certain sacrifices.
Denying any intention of threatening other countries by the stationing of its troops in Indo-
China, the Japanese government stated that it "is prepared to withdraw its troops from French
Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia".
This same pledge of its peaceful intentions was made applicable to Thailand at the same
time. 188
In this document Japan made specific reference to the Soviet Union by declaring that as
long as Russia remained faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty by menacing
neither Japan or Manchukuo, the Japanese government would maintain friendly relations
l "Ibid
'""Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)"— November 12, 1941,
S.D. n, 726-727. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura and decoded by
American cryptanalysts see IV, 97-99.
"'Ibid.
'"Ibid.
"""Oral Statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)"— November 12,
1941, S.D. II 727-729. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura and decoded by
American cryptanalysts see IV, 93-96.
37
with that country. "In a word, the Japanese government has no intention of using, without
provocation, military force against any neighboring nation. 1 ' Since Japan was in accordance
with the practical application of the principles set forth by the United States government, it
had insisted that it desired to continue the informal discussions in order to work out a progres-
sive program by peaceful methods.
Since a new Cabinet had come into office in Japan, the United States government asked
assurance that the position of the Japanese government had not, changed in regard to the mat-
ters stated. When the United States had handed its last document to Japan on October 2, 1941 .
it had pointed out the difficulty in understanding Japan's apparent need for qualifying cer-
tain statements of policy. The United States government had in mind such phrases as:
"As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and does not menace
Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty—' 7
"Without provocation—"
"Without any justifiable reason — "
In answer, Minister Wakasugi on October 13, 1941, had stated that those qualifications were
the result of unfortunate phraseology and the Japanese government was willing to omit them.
The United States government asked whether the new Japanese Cabinet confirmed Minister
Wakasugi's statement.
In attempting to avoid any misunderstanding, Secretary Hull pointed out that the United
States government had not directed any of the foregoing observations at the new proposals
submitted by Ambassador Nomura on November 7 and November 10, 1941. The United States
government also assured Japan that it had no desire to delay negotiations and that it would
expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese government. 169
After receiving these documents, Ambassador Nomura emphasized that the Japanese govern-
ment wished to expedite the settlement of any problems with the United States before the
impending session of the Japanese Diet because further delay would increase the difficult in-
ternal situation in Japan. He requested that some agreement be reached within a week or ten
days. Assuring the Japanese Ambassador that the United States government was working as
rapidly as possible to reach a decision on the Japanese proposals handed to President Roose-
velt on November 10, 1941, Secretary Hull commented that some discussion with the Chinese
government might be had as soon as a good basis in the exploratory conversations were reached.
At the same time, however, certain of Japan's points regarding commercial policies had not
been clarified sufficiently. Secretary Hull asked if the Japanese government intended to have
Great Britain and other countries come to some sort of an agreement on commercial equality.
Next, Secretary Hull referred to the difficulty arising from Japan's adherence to the Tri-
partite Pact. Replying that Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact were limited, Am-
bassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull that Great Britain had remained neutral in the
war between Japan and Russia despite the existing Anglo- Japanese alliance. Even if the
United States were to understand the attitude of the present Japanese Cabinet toward the
Axis Powers, however, Secretary Hull remarked, there was always the possibility of another
government's coming into power in Japan. In view of this possibility and in consideration of
the growing distress of conquered European peoples, Secretary Hull declared that it was nec-
essary to prepare for a postwar program, one in which Japan should play a constructive part
by uniting with peaceful forces in opposition to Hitler in order to avert further disaster. Ambas-
sador Nomura insisted that as time went on Japan would be less affected by Axis ties just as
the Anglo- Japanese alliance had died after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. If the
proposed agreements were put to a practical application, Ambassador Nomura felt that Japan
would not be forced to gain access to materials and markets by aggressive means. Secretary
in lbid.
38
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Hull agreed that the Tripartite Pact would not be a problem; that Japan and the United States
could work out their agreement along other lines. ll>9 °
In speaking of the Japanese-Chinese situation, Secretary Hull, in reply to Ambassador
Nomura's question about the United States intercession in the matter, stated that when mat-
ters got beyond an exploratory stage, the United States would wish to talk over the subject with
the Chinese, British and Dutch and then re-discuss the matter with Japan. Commenting on
the two documents handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull which both Am-
bassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi had just read, the Japanese Minister asked whether
the United States would bring Japan and China together for a mutual exchange of peaceful
pledges. Not wishing to commit himself, Secretary Hull said that the main problem was to
dispose of basic matters relating to the provisions for a peace settlement; the questions of
procedure could be easily settled. Because of some preconception that Secretary Hull's sugges-
tion about a Japanese-Chinese peace contained more than appeared at first glance, the Japa-
nese representatives kept going over these points during the conversation.
Taking up the Japanese concessions discussed in the second document of the United States
government, Minister Wakasugi pointed out that America referred to the Japanese statement
of August 28, 1941. The Japanese government wished to use its document of September 25, 1941
as a basis for any discussions. In an attempt to clarify an obvious misunderstanding on the
part of the United States government, Minister Wakasugi stated that in the conversation
with Under Secretary of State Welles, referred to in the United States' document, he had been
alluding to phrases used in the proposals of September 25, 1941. In doing so, he had merely
stated that there might have been some unfortunate phraseology in translation which could
be improved after comparison with the original Japanese text. Secretary Hull thanked the
Japanese Minister for calling his attention to this misunderstanding. 1 * 91 '
By w> of answering Ambassador Nomura's question regarding the continuation of United
States .id to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during Japanese-Chinese peace negotiations,
Secretary Hull stated that ways would be found for safeguarding the rights of all countries con-
cerned by some agreement. Secretary Hull did not agree with Ambassador Nomura that the
negotiations for peace would drag on for an interminable period. However, Ambassador Nomura
commented that if an agreement between Japan and the United States failed on the question
of Japan's retention of troops in China, then the Chinese government would hold the key to
future relations between Japan and the United States and this might eventually result in war.
Whether the United States interceded in the Chinese Affair or not, Secretary Hull insisted,
the settlement would naturally be in harmony with the proposed Pacific settlement as a whole.
At the same time, however, he took the opportunity to point out to the Japanese representatives
that their retention of troops in China was inconsistent with one of the basic principles, name-
ly interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Although he did not offer anything defi-
nite on this point, Ambassador Nomura disclaimed any desire on the part of Japan to retain
its troops in China permanently.
As the conversation drew to a close, Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura and
Minister Wakasugi that the United States government was giving careful consideration to the
latest Japanese proposals and it was hoped that some definite statement could be made con-
cerning them on November 14, 1941. 170
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report 171
After his conversation with President Roosevelt on November 10, 1941, Ambassador Nomura
had made an appointment to discuss the Pacific problems with Secretary Hull. Although
,69 "S.D. n, 722-726.
""■Ibid.
nu Ibld.
m lV,91.
39
November 11, 1941 waa the Armistice holiday Secretary Hull promised to study the Japanese
proposal with other American representatives and discuss the results of this conversation with
Ambassador Nomura on November 12, 1941.
At 3:00 p.m. on November 12, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi met with
Secretary Hull and Mr. Ballantine. 1 ™ As a reply to the Japanese counter proposals Secretary
Hull handed Ambassador Nomura two oral statements. 173 Secretary Hull requested that Am-
bassador Nomura ascertain the attitude of the new Japanese Cabinet toward each of these
statements. Since the second of these oral statements concerned a proposal for peace between
Japan and China, the representatives of both countries discussed the China affair in detail.
Although a more definite proposal would not be forthcoming from the American government
for two days Secretary Hull stated that if the basic principles applied to the Pacific, such as
non-discrimination in commerce, could be similarly applied to China, a complete settlement
of Far Eastern affairs could be effected. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that if the Chinese
question continued to play a key role in Japanese-American negotiations, the desired under-
standing would be delayed. Secretary Hull merely replied vaguely that if the general Pacific
principles were applied to China as well as to the other countries of the Far Eastern Pacific an
immediate understanding would be possible. After speaking with representatives of England
and the Netherlands, Secretary Hull had come to the conclusion that those two governments
might sign an agreement with Japan similar to that worked out between Japan and the United
States. However, Secretary Hull stated that he had not yet spoken to the Chinese representa-
tives about this matter. 171 At this point in the conversation Mr. Ballantine pointed out that it
had been stated in the American proposal of June 21, 1941, that the United States would not
allow Japan to inflict upon other countries conditions conflicting with America's basic prin-
ciples. Anxious to get more definite details regarding Secretary Hull's proposal for Japanese-
Chinese peace Minister Wakasugi asked whether the United States intended to secure a peace
guarantee from China and then transmit it to Japan, or whether the three countries would
meet together in a conference. Minister Wakasugi also wished to know at what stage in the
Japanese- American negotiations the United States would secure this peace pledge from
China. To all these questions Secretary Hull avoided giving a definite reply. However, he
intimated his intention to mediate between Japan and China in order to obtain the desired
peace. Furthermore, the American Secretary of State appeared confident that once Japanese-
American negotiations were in their final stages the problem regarding Japanese- Chinese
peace could be settled without any difficulty. 1 "
In an attempt to make the American representative understand Japan's position in regard
to the stationing of troops in China, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that under his govern-
ment's new proposal the troops would be removed within a specified time. Although Secretary
Hull replied that the stationing of Japanese troops in China constituted interference in the
affairs of other nations; nevertheless, he seemed satisfied with Ambassador Nomura's expla-
nation on this point.
The conversation then turned to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Secretary
Hull stated frankly that his government did not understand why Japan persisted in regarding
the Tripartite Pact as a defensive measure when Hitler was carrying out a brutal offensive
against the small nations of Europe. Once the European war was over, Secretary Hull said,
the United States would have to take charge of the people throughout that hemisphere. If
some understanding could be worked out now between Japan and the United States and a
similar one between Japan, England and the Netherlands, the stability of the Pacific would
175 IV, 92.
m S.D. II, 727-729; IV. 93-99.
n, IV, 92. See IV, 84 which reports an interview between the Chinese Ambassador and President Rjxisevelt.
'"IV, 100,
40
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
be insured, and Japan would be given an opportunity to cooperate in the establishment of the
European peace. Minister Wakasugi denied that the Tripartite Pact constituted a threat to
any peace plan. In proving his point he reminded Secretary Hull that the Japanese-British
alliance was in effect throughout the Russo-Japanese War and was later nullified at the Wash-
ington conference. Minister Wakasugi insisted that the situation changed with the circum-
stances. 176 Furthermore, Minister Wakasugi said, Japan would not be forced to adopt aggressive
policies if it could secure petroleum and other necessary raw materials from the United States
and the Netherlands East Indies by normal trade measures. Since the Japanese government
actually wished to apply the nondiscriminatory policy to all its commercial transactions,
Minister Wakasugi believed that the United States would be willing to adopt Japan's latest
proposals. In reply Secretary Hull agreed that the situation was extremely critical at this
time. Nevertheless, he maintained that the problems which had accumulated over a period
of ten years could not be settled over night. Minister Wakasugi reminded Secretary Hull that
some agreement should be reached before the Japanese Diet convened in Tokyo on November
25, 1941.
As a result of the discussion Ambassador Nomura concluded that the United States was con-
tinuing to study the three major problems existing between its government and Japan as well
as the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941. Since Ambassador Nomura was not satisfied
with the American attitude toward the conversations, however, he instructed Minister Waka-
sugi to confer with Secretary Hull and reemphasize the need for an immediate decision. 1,7
50. Ambassador Kumsti Reports on American Pessimism
While en route to the United States by clipper, Ambassador Kurusu reported meeting Mr.
Hozuituk, a member of the Cooper party, who had recently gone on a Far Eastern tour. While
conversing with this man Ambassador Kurusu learned that the Cooper party felt Ambassador
Kurusu's mission was a lost cause since Japanese-American negotiations would never culmi-
nate in a successful peace settlement. In reporting this attitude to Tokyo on November 13, 1941,
Ambassador Kurusu asked whether the American public was influenced in any way by the
pessimistic point of view of the Cooper party. Ambassador Kurusu felt that it might be of
some value to learn the actual influence that this party had in the United States. 178
5 1 . Japan Revises Text of Proposal B
On November 13, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura instructions
for changing certain phrases in Proposal B. In its revised form Section I of the addendum was
to read: "As required upon having a joint agreement assuredly established between Japan and
China or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promis-
ing to evacuate her troops dispatched to French Indo-China at present." 178
52. Foreign Minister Togo Questions American Interpretation of Proposals
On November 13, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo sent Ambassador Nomura a message ques-
tioning America's interpretation of certain phases of the Japanese proposals. 180 For example,
Foreign Minister Togo stated that Ambassador Grew had shown him a digest of the Japanese
Ambassador's conversation with Secretary Hull on November 7, 1941. In Ambassador Grew's
report Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura directly for a "concrete statement of Japan's
"TV, ioi-
'"IV, 102.
'"IV, 103.
" S IV, 104, 29. (Note that the English translation of this section of the Proposal B mentioned in 104 differs from
that found in 29.)
1M IV, 105.
41
relations with the Axis powers." Since Ambassador Nomura had made no mention of this
phrase in his message to Tokyo regarding the conversation with Secretary Hull, Foreign Min-
ister Togo asked tor a more complete report on it. Prom the attitude of the United States to-
ward the present negotiations it was apparent that the American government still thought of
the conversations as being in their preliminary stages. On November 12, 1941, Foreign Min-
ister Togo stated that he had mentioned this to Ambassador Grew, warning him that the
seriousness of the situation forced both countries to consider these negotiations as final. For-
eign Minister Togo asked Ambassador Nomura to press Secretary Hull with this point. The
Japanese Foreign Minister warned Ambassador Nomura that Ambassador Grew had shown
him the report of the Hull- Nomura conversations only through his own personal courtesy,
therefore he warned Ambassador Nomura not to make any mention of it to American repre-
sentatives in Washington. 181
53. Finance Official Nishiyama to Study Japanese- American Negotiations
Possibly because of the effect of American economic and commercial results upon Japan,
on November 12, 1941, Finance Official Nishiyama was ordered to study all matters relating
to the Japanese- American negotiations, Mr. Okinobu Kikaya, the Japanese Finance Minister,
eivdently convinced that these negotiations were the focal point of the recent international
situation was to confirm his instructions to Mr. Nishiyama in a later message. 182
54. Japan Seeks Undelayed Chinese Peace Negotiations
In commenting upon the report of the conversation between Secretary Hull, Ambassador
Nomura and Minister Wakasugi, the Japanese Foreign Office reminded its representatives in
Washington that Japan was interested in Secretary Hull's Chinese peace proposal only insofar
as it could simplify the settlement of that. Pacific problem. The Japanese government had no
desire to carry on prolonged conversations related to it. In regard to the possible materiabza-
tion of Secretary Hull's peace plan, Tokyo reminded Minister Wakasugi in particular that it
would be opposed to a conference conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the
United States and China. 183
55. Japanese- American Conversations (November 13, 1941)
a. State Department 's Report 18 *
At his own request Minister Wakasugi called to see Mr. Ballantine on November 13, 1941.
Recalling President Roosevelt's desire to see Mr. Kurusu upon his arrival, Minister Wakasugi
informed the American representative that Ambassador Kurusu would arrive in Washington
on Saturday afternoon, November 15, 1941.
Minister Wakasugi then turned the conversation to the United States' misunderstanding of
a statement he had made to Under Secretary of State Welles on October 13, 1941. The United
States had referred to Minister Wakasugi's remark in the oral statement handed Ambassador
Nomura on November 12, 1941. Attempting to clear up completely this misunderstanding,
Minister Wakasugi said that he had declared to Mr. Welles, that "there may have been some
unfortunate phraseology in the English translation of our instructions, as we are not very sure
of our English. If there are such phrases the wording might be adjusted." When making this
remark Minister Wakasugi said that he had been referring to the Japanese document of Sep-
tember 25, 1941, and not to that delivered on August 28, 1941.
lBI IV. 106.
1M IV, 107.
'""Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialed by Joseph W. Ballentine— November 13, 1941, S.D. II, 729-731.
42
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND
Impressing upon Mr. Ballantine the desperate situation current in Japan, Minister Waka-
sugi urged that some concrete understanding be reached between the two governments before
the Japanese Parliament convened on Saturday, November 15, 1941. It was Minister Waka-
sugi's understanding that the United States government would give a reply to the Japanese
proposals of November 7 and November 10, 1941, on the following day. In correcting Minister
Wakasugi, Mr. Ballantine pointed out that Secretary Hull had said he only hoped that some
statement might be forthcoming on that day. Re-emphasizing that the Japanese government
wanted to avoid any further interchange of comment on the proposals submitted. Minister
Wakasugi said that he hoped Secretary Hull would have a clear-cut answer to the Japanese
proposals of November 7 and November 10, 1941, and that the United States would say defi-
nitely whether its proposal of June 21, 1941, was to be the final one handed to the Japanese
government. Mr. Ballantine pointed out the need for a further clarification of these latest
Japanese proposals, however, since Secretary Hull had already stated that he did not under-
stand Japan's attitude on the commercial policy. Attempting to clear up this point, Minister
Wakasugi declared that the Japanese government desired that the principle of non-discrimi-
nation, as applied to China, be applied by the United States and Japan to commercial dealings
with the rest of the world. Mr. Ballantine felt that this point was important enough to be
brought out clearly and authoritatively.
Minister Wakasugi next brought up the problem of arriving at formal negotiations. Through-
out all the United States' documents it had been noted that America believed the two govern-
ments were still in the stage of exploratory discussions. Since the Japanese government had
given the United States its latest proposals through Ambassador Nomura it believed that it
had entered into formal negotiations. However, Mr, Ballantine insisted that until the United
States government discussed the problems with China and the other governments con-
cerned, no formal state of negotiations could be reached with the Japanese. Not wishing to
argue any of these points with Mr. Ballantine, Mr. Wakasugi merely asked that they be re-
ferred to Secretary Hull. 185
b . Minis ter Wakamgi '$ R ep or t 1 s *
At a meeting with Mr. Ballantine on November 13, 1941, Minister Wakasugi began the con-
versation by pointing out that the previous day's discussions leading to no settlement had
fallen short of Japanese expectations. In view of the tense situation existing within Japan
itself the Japanese public was viewing the Japanese- American negotiations with impatience.
Reminding Mr. Ballantine that the session of the Japanese Diet would convene in Tokyo on the
following day, Minister Wakasugi warned that some satisfactory understanding must be
reached without any further delay. Any discussions of general attitudes on the possible out-
look must be dropped from further conversations in order to eliminate all hinderance to a
satisfactory agreement. At the present time, Mr. Wakasugi stated, the Japanese government
wished definite answers regarding certain points. He requested that the United States make
it known that it intended to accept the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941, as clarified
by the further Japanese proposals of November 7 and November 10, 1941. If these proposals
were not accepted the Japanese government would like an American counter proposal clearly
indicating the revisions desired. Minister Wakasugi pointed out that many factions in Japan
believed that the United States, in refusing to make any changes in its proposal of June 21,
1941, was merely stalling for time. In reply to these remarks Mr. Ballantine pointed out that
the United States, aware of the critical condition, had called a meeting of American repre-
sentatives to discuss the Japanese proposals of November 11, 1941, in spite of the fact that it
was the Armistice holiday. Not wishing to quibble over mere details, however, Mr. Ballantine
'"■Ibid.
"TV, 108.
43
brought, up several points with regard to the Japanese proposals that the United States wished
clarified. First of all, Mr. Ballantine stated, Japan, in accepting the plan of commercial non-
discrimination in the Pacific, had requested that the same treatment be applied to the entire
world. The United States wished to know if this sweeping proposal was to include those na-
tions now at war. Stating that this and other terms in the Japanese proposals were designed to
bring about an agreement between Japan and the United States, Minister Wakasugi pointed
out that the agreement was not designed for every country in the world. Therefore, it appeared
obvious that Japan only wished that its present government and that of the United States
apply the basic principle of non- discriminatory treatment to its own commercial dealings
with other countries. 1860
Minister Wakasugi then discussed the difference of opinion regarding the stage of present
conversations. On the one hand, the Japanese Minister pointed out, the United States re-
garded the discussions as merely exploratory, while Japan considered them to be actual nego-
tiations. In reply Mr. Ballantine referred to a statement made by Secretary Hull in which he
said that once the conversations reached the stage of negotiations Great Britain and the
Netherlands would be asked to participate. Disregarding Mr. Ballantine's explanation Minis-
ter Wakasugi insisted that talks between the duly recognized ambassador of one country and
the President and Secretary of State of another had always constituted a diplomatic negoti-
ation. Therefore, Mr. Wakasugi requested that Secretary Hull be informed that Japan was
treating the present proceedings as part of final negotiations.
Minister Wakasugi 's report to Tokyo on November 13, 1941, contained an explanation of
Ambassador Nomura's interview with President Roosevelt. The Japanese Minister stated that
the primary purpose of the interview was to submit the latest Japanese proposals; therefore,
a discussion of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact did not take place. Other than a
remark by Minister Wakasugi expressing the hope that the United States would not insist
upon enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense, neither representative discussed the prob-
lem further. Minister Wakasugi insisted that Secretary Hull had never requested a "concrete
statement" concerning Japan's relations with the Axis powers. In fact, Minister Wakasugi had
even asked Mr. Ballantine if there were any other points to be discussed and Mr. Ballantine had
replied there were none. If Secretary Hull's report showed that he had asked this question
regarding the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Ballantine was certain that some mistake had been made.
Naturally, however, Mr. Wakasugi pointed out, the United States was attempting to get some
assurance from Japan regarding its duties under the terms of the pact. 188 *
56. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Summaries of the Conversations
In order to receive an immediate report of any conversations taking place between the Amer-
ican and Japanese representatives Foreign Minister Togo requested that Ambassador Nomura
wire the Foreign Office brief summaries without any delay. More complete details could then
be wired later at the convenience of the Japanese Ambassador. 187
57. Ambassador Nomura Warns of America's Preparedness for War
On November 14, 1941, Ambassador Nomura wired the Japanese Foreign Office a complete
resume of America's attitude toward a war with Japan. Although Ambassador Nomura was
convinced that in the end the negotiations would be concluded successfully, he warned his
government that the United States intended to stop any further Japanese moves in the Pacific
whether they be northward or southward. 188 Already using every economic wear.
1S6 ° ibid.
""rv, toe,
™rv, no.
44
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Japanese aggression, Ambassador Nomura felt that the United States was now preparing for
actual war. Rather than yield its fundamental political policy regarding the Pacific area the
United States, Ambassador Nomura felt, would join up with the other countries interested in
the Far East, The United States government had no intention of repeating the failure of the
Munich conference. Since the German victories were decreasing as Russian resistance per-
sisted, Ambassador Nomura felt that the possibility of a separate peace between Germany
and England was small, and that this would have a bad effect upon Japanese -American rela-
tions. Furthermore, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the increase in American aid to China.
If the Chinese problem continued to remain the stumbling block in Japanese- American nego-
tiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that the United States might well take advantage of the
situation to declare war on Japan. 188 "
Another primary factor influencing the attitude of the United States toward Japan was the
Tripartite Pact. Recently the American newspapers had pointed to the close alliance between
Japan and the Axis, warning that Japan would be willing at any time to stab the United States
in the back. If Japan then, continued its aggression in the south Pacific, even though that
aggression be necessary for the maintenance of Japan's national life, Ambassador Nomura
felt that England, the United States and Russia would attack. The countries of Central and
South America, dependent upon the United States for their economic existence, would also
join sides against Japan. Recognizing the fact that Japan believed America's forces to be con-
centrated in the Atlantic, Ambassador Nomura stated that its activities there were confined
to convoy duty and that at any moment the United States could transfer the main strength
of its fleet to the Pacific lfiEi
Previously Ambassador Nomura had felt that once the United States entered an ocean war
in the Atlantic it would be ready for a compromise in the Pacific. Lately, however, when Great
Britain had transferred its forces to the Indian Ocean the United States had changed its atti-
tude so that at the present time it was ready to participate in a naval war in the Pacific.
Recognizing the critical situation existing within Japan, Ambassador Nomura, nevertheless,
asked that the Japanese government and people be more patient toward the negotiations with
the United States. He felt that it was necessary for Japan to view the entire world situation
rather than its own internal conditions. 190
58. China Seeks Increased Aid from the United States
Mr. Iguchi learned that the Chinese Ambassador to the United States had submitted a plea
for intensive aid to China in the event Japan attacked the Burma Road. According to this
report the United States government rejected China's request. However, Mr. T. V. Soong,
refusing to let the matter rest, at the present time was attempting to interest Secretary Hull
and President Roosevelt in the plan for increased aid in China's war against Japan. 191
59. Japanese Government Considers Negotiations in Final Stage
For a number of months the Japanese government had been instructing Ambassador Nomura
to conduct his conversations with the representatives of the American government along the
lines of final negotiations. Nevertheless, the American State Department had continued to
speak of these meetings between leaders of both governments as merely preliminary discus-
sions.
On November 15, 1941, Tokyo instructed Ambassador Nomura to continue his attempts to
impress upon the United States the fact that Japan was considering these negotiations as
"""Ibid.
ls "rv, in.
m IV,112.
19 'IV, 113,
final. Although Foreign Minister Togo admitted that the former Japanese Cabinet had con-
sidered the conversations merely preliminary and was working toward a meeting of the Japa-
nese Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, the present government desired to terminate
satisfactorily the talks by an official agreement. Foreign Minister Togo realized that the United
States officials might claim that Japan had never mentioned the changed status of the con-
versations; however, he felt that the United States government must nevertheless recognize
the fact that the negotiations were in their final stage and that some conclusion must be reached
before the Japanese Diet met on November 15, 1941. 191
60. Ambassador Nomura Speculates on Results of Possible Diplomatic Breach
In the event that these negotiations could not be terminated in the manner desired by the
Japanese government. Ambassador Nomura stated on November 15, 1941, that Japanese-
American relations would break down completely. To be prepared for the inevitable effects
of such a breach Ambassador Nomura, in a message to his government, offered certain sugges-
tions for the disposition of the consular offices and the evacuation of Japanese officials. Even
if diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States were not entirely severed a
situation similar to that now existing between Germany and the United States would arise.
Under these circumstances it would be necessary to close the Japanese Consulates and recall
the Japanese Ambassador. l9S
Since Embassy duties would be limited only to a few pressing matters, the staff would
necessarily be gTeatly reduced. One of two secretaries, Foreign Service Attaches Fujiyama
and Inagawa and one clerk would be sent back to Japan. However, members of the intelli-
gence staff, such as Secretary Terasaki and Clerk Yamamoto, would be transferred to South
America together with certain so-called student attaches. After employees who had been
engaged locally were dismissed, other Japanese officials would either be sent to South Amer-
ica or returned to Japan in evacuee ships.
Since the disposition of the various Japanese officials and nationals in the United States was
of the utmost importance, Ambassador Nomura offered certain suggestions concerning their
possible evacuation. As was the case when United States-German relations were severed,
personnel of the Japanese and American consulates would probably be evacuated by mutual
consent. While this evacuation was taking place Ambassador Nomura foresaw numerous
requests from businessmen and other Japanese nationals to return home. In consideration of
this Ambassador Nomura urged that a sufficient number of ships be sent to take care of the
large number of requests for permission to return to Japan. If American diplomatic relations
broke off completely another plan for evacuating Japanese officials would have to be evolved.
Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan and the United States would be willing to guarantee
the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate members. Arrangements would be made regard-
ing the costs of the evacuation vessels, the type of markers to be used and the methods of
communication to be employed. For example, the two countries might agree to send the other
officials to some halfway point such as Hawaii, the Aleutian Islands or French Tahiti aboard
ships of his own nation. At the assigned meeting place an exchange of consulate officials
could then be effected. Some arrangements might be attempted regarding an exchange of
Japanese nationals residing in the United States for Americans at present in Japan. However,
in view of the difference in numbers, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that such a plan
would meet with the approval of the United States. There was little doubt that Japanese resi-
dents of military age would be retained in the United States. Before the complete evacuation
m lV, 114.
m TV, U5.
,M IV,116.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
of its officials Japan would have to decide on a neutral nation entrusted with protecting Japa-
nese national property and Japanese national rights in the United States. Negotiations with
the country decided upon would probably be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic repre-
sentatives of that country at the same time that plans were being made by the Japanese Am-
bassador or Minister with the capital of the neutral country concerned. Ambassador Nomura
apparently did not place too much confidence in neutral nations, however, since he warned
Tokyo that it would be extremely precarious to depend upon neutral ships in evacuating Japa-
nese nationals should war between Japan and the United States be declared. The now neutral
countries might take sides. 195
61. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Kurusu in New Duties
Since Ambassador Kurusu was arriving in Washington on November 15, 1941, Foreign Min-
ister Togo sent him a message expressing the gratitude of the entire Japanese government for
the work which he was about to undertake. Recognizing the fact that Ambassador Kurusu had
a difficult position/ 1 '* 1 Foreign Minister Togo told the representative that the success or failure
of his mission might determine the fate of the entire Japanese nation. After first arriving at
some understanding with Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Togo said, Ambassador
Kurusu should cooperate in bringing the present negotiations to an immediate settlement.
In view of the fact that a crisis was approaching largely because of the many delays caused by
the laxity of the United States government, Foreign Minister Togo urged that Ambassador
Kurusu allow no subsidiary problems to further complicate Japanese- American relations.
Foreign Minister Togo explained to Ambassador Kurusu that Ambassador Nomura had
not yet presented proposal B to the United States. If the present condition was not alleviated
within a short time, however, Foreign Minister Togo instructed Ambassador Nomura to sub-
mit this alternate proposal to American representatives. 1 "
a. State Department's Report
By an appointment made at his own request Ambassador Nomura with Minister Wakasugi
called at Secretary Hull's apartment on November 15, 1941. Immediately upon the Japanese
Ambassador's arrival, Secretary Hull spoke of the Japanese proposal regarding commercial
policy which had been presented on November 7 and November 10, 1941. 188
Secretary Hull then handed Ambassador Nomura an oral statement regarding America's
views on this economic policy. 200 This oral statement referred to the Japanese government's
proposal in which it was stated that Japan "recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in
internal commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the
understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire
world as well." The United States government assumed that Japan did not expect America
to be responsible for discriminatory practices in areas outside of its jurisdiction, for such an
arrangement could be fulfilled only with the consent of all the other governments of the world.
In those areas in which the United States government was economically concerned, however,
m IV, 115.
I9fi Apparently this move by the Japanese government was considered a possible change of the diplomatic staff in
Washington, but, when interviewed, Mr. Kurusu denied that he was going to succeed Mr. Nomura as Ambassador
tothe United States. (New York Times, November 15, 1941, 5:1.)
,97 IV, 117.
"""Memorandum of a Conversation" — November 15, 1941. S.D. U, 731-734.
'"Ibid.
J "°"Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November t5,
1941", S.D. II, 734-736. See IV. 121-126 for text as sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on November 15, 1941.
47
the principle of unconditional and n on -discriminatory treatment had been the cornerstone of
commercial policy. Since World War I the United States had embodied this non-discrimina-
tory principle in every commercial treaty which it had concluded. In the twenty-two agree-
ments made since 1934 the United States government had reduced duties on more than a
thousand classifications of American tariff in order to achieve an extensive program of fair
commercial agreements. Only in two cases had the United States withheld trade agreement
concessions and this was in an effort to induce the countries concerned to abandon discrimi-
natory practices. Furthermore, on every appropriate occasion the United States had sought
the progressive elimination of preferences and discriminations by other countries of the world.
Not only did the United States conclude non-discriminatory agreements for its own benefit
but had sought similar concessions for other countries. As a part of its general policy of com-
mercial fairness in international trade the United States had insisted upon the extension of
concessions to all countries concerned in any trade agreement which the United States made.
By the reduction of trade barriers the United States hoped to make its national contribution
to a world trade in which all nations would benefit.
If Japan were to cooperate in favoring the policy of n on -discrimination as the United States
had, then it would achieve its goal in the commercial field. The United States did not see any
need of Japan's incorporating the phrase "on the understanding that the principle in question
is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well" in its commercial proposal.
The United States asked that this proviso be omitted.
In order to manifest a tentative commercial agreement applying the principle of non-dis-
crimination to both Japanese and American international relations, the United States had
drawn up a declaration of economic policy. Before entering into any negotiations based on
this policy, however, the United States wished to make it clear that the points involved would
have to be discussed with the British and other interested governments. ' m< " > In this joint decla-
ration by the United States and Japan on economic practices, under the term "general policy",
both governments were to agree to cooperate in reducing trade barriers and eliminating from
international commercial relations all forms of discrimination.™ 1 By acquiring commodities
necessary for the safety and development of their economies through peaceful trade processes,
both countries would create secure conditions of international trade and investment. In order
to make an appropriate contribution toward the creation of such an ideal trade setup, the
United States and Japan should seek the establishment of non-discriminatory economic
relations in the Pacific area.
With regard to "the United States -Japanese relationship", both governments should agree
to negotiate for a reciprocal trade agreement aimed at restoring commercial, financial and
economic relations to a normal basis. While both governments should permit the export of
commodities to the other for the purpose of security or self-defense, it was understood that any
restrictions imposed would be in the spirit of friendly relations. By way of applying this
"policy in the Pacific area" the governments of the United States and Japan should guarantee
equal commercial treatment to the Chinese under conditions no less favorable than the treat-
ment accorded to any third country. In order that economic, financial and monetary affairs
be restored to China, the United States and Japan were to suggest that the Chinese govern-
ment inaugurate a comprehensive program of economic development, using any foreign as-
sistance that might be deemed necessary. Any relations between the United States and Japan
and other countries of the Pacific area were to be governed by the same basic principles of
commercial fair play and equal opportunity. MU
1M 'Ibid.
"'"Draft document handed by t.he Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)" November 15,
1941. S.D. II, 736-737. See IV, 127-130 for text assent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on November 15, 1941,
'"'Ibid.
48
THE "
OF PEARL
After handing both of these documents to Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull emphasized
once more the advantages that Japan would gain from participating in the peaceful program
envisaged by the United States government. 202 Without first referring it to his government
Ambassador Nomura did not feel authorized to make any comment. However, Minister Waka-
sugi asked if this proposal constituted America's answer to Japan's proposal regarding non-
discrimination in international commercial relations, and Secretary Hull replied in the affirm-
Minister Wakasugi then asked for America's stand regarding Japan's relations in the Tri-
partite Pact and the question of stationing Japanese troops in China.
Ambassador Nomura then pointed out that the Japanese government considered that the
present conversations were not merely exploratory but were designed to arrive at formal nego-
tiations. Requesting that Minister Wakasugi take accurate notes on what he was about to say,
Secretary Hull replied that the United States government could not go beyond exploratory
conversations until it had determined the attitude of Great Britain, China and the Nether-
lands. Furthermore, until some satisfactory conclusions resulted from the informal conversa-
tions, the United States government could not speak with those countries. Ambassador Nom-
ura made no comment. Notwithstanding the fact that he and Ambassador Nomura had
reached some settlement as a result of the American proposals of June 21, 1941, Secretary
Hull continued, the answering Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941, had narrowed down
the agreement. When Ambassador Nomura insisted that the question of peace in the entire
Pacific are was covered in the preamble of the draft of the Japanese proposals of September
25, 1941, Secretary Hull pointed out that the concessions must be contained in the body of the
document rather than in the preamble.
Then Secretary Hull, referring to Foreign Minister Togo's conversation with Ambassador
Grew on November 10, 1941, during which the Japanese Foreign Minister indicated that Japan
was anxious to conclude a simultaneous agreement with the British, pointed out the incon-
sistency between those instructions and the ones which Ambassador Nomura was being asked
to carry out in Washington. In view of these inconsistencies Secretary Hull felt that the United
States could not answer Japan's proposals without first determining whether it intended to
adopt with sincerity a peaceful course. After Ambassador Nomura had insisted that Japan
desired peace in the Pacific and that it would interpret its obligations under any alliance inde-
pendently, Secretary Hull asked whether the Japanese government would automatically
abandon the Tripartite Pact if it entered into an agreement with the United States. Minister
Wakasugi asked if the United States wanted Japan to denounce the Tripartite Pact. Ambas-
sador Nomura understood, however, that the Secretary meant the Tripartite Pact to become
a dead letter. Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura's interpretation of his remark. Secretary
Hull pointed out how inconsistent it would be for Japan to enter into a peace agreement with
the United States while adhering to a fighting alliance with Germany. Not only would it be
difficult to explain Japan's actions to the British and Dutch people but the American public
would reject such an agreement. Although Ambassador Nomura felt that the American public
of State said plainly that it would cause so much turmoil throughout the country that he
might well be lynched.
By way of emphasizing his statements. Secretary Hull commented on the large Japanese
armies in Manchuria facing Russian armies in Siberia in spite of the existing neutrality pact
between Russia and Japan. What the United States desired, Secretary Hull continued, was
a clear-cut, unequivocal agreement which would promote mutual trust by denouncing mili-
tary expansion. In the event that the United States should be forced to go to war with Germany
as a measure of self- defense, Secretary Hull felt that Japan would not continue its professed
M1 S.D. II, 731-734.
ative.
4$
peaceful course, nor would Secretary Hull believe that Japan's connection with the Tripartite
Pact, would disappear if an agreement were reached between Japan and the United States.
Only after Japan had given the United States a specific guarantee that the Tripartite Pact
would be considered a dead letter could Secretary Hull begin formal peace negotiations with
Japan.
Ambassador Nomura insisted that the policies of the present Japanese government differed
in no way from those of the previous Japanese government in spite of the fact that the Prime
Minister was a military man. Secretary Hull then stated that the United States did not feel
it should receive ultimatums from Japan since the United States had been pursuing a peace-
ful course throughout the conversations, while the Japanese government had been the one to
resort to aggression.
In concluding the conference Secretary Hull said that when the problem of non-discrimi-
nation and that of Japan's place in the Tripartite Pact were settled Japanese and American
representatives could sit down like brothers and find some solution to the question of stationing
Japanese troops in China. ara *
b. Ambassador Nomura 's Report
Although originally scheduled for November 14, 1941, Ambassador Kurusu's interview with
Secretary Hull was postponed until 9:00 a.m. on November 15, 1941, at the request of the
American State Department, SM
At the scheduled time Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Wakasugi met with Secretary Hull
and Mr. Ballantine for an interview lasting about an hour and a half, 204 Secretary Hull opened
the conversation by presenting Ambassador Nomura with two American proposals dealing
with the commercial problem. 205 Attempting to impress Ambassador Nomura with America's
desire to see non-discrimination in trade throughout the world Secretary Hull stated that by
its trade agreements with twenty-two nations tariffs had been reduced on approximately
1,200 articles. At the time of the economic conference in London Secretary Hull had urged
that the policy of non- discrimination in commerce be adopted, but Germany and other coun-
tries were so strongly opposed to it that the measure was never carried into effect. While
desiring to see this policy put into effect throughout the world the United States government
wished to call to Japan's attention the fact that it could not guarantee the effectiveness of this
policy out of the sphere of its own jurisdiction. Therefore, Secretary Hull stated, the American
government wished Japan to modify its condition which stated that Japan would apply the
practice of non -discrimination in commerce to the Pacific area only if it were applied to the
rest of the world.
At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull handed Ambassador Nomura the second of
the United States' written proposals. Mr, Wakasugi then asked Secretary Hull if this should
be considered the American counter -proposal to the Japanese proposals dealing with the three
major problems in the discussion. After Secretary Hull replied that the American proposals
could be applied to a much wider range, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan would give it
careful consider at i on
Following the instructions of his government Ambassador Nomura then brought up the prob-
lem connected with the interpretation of the present conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated
that in view of the fact that official proposals had been handed to Japan by both President
Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, the Japanese government considered these talks in the
S03 1V, 118.
20, iV, 119.
^IV, 119-120.
'""Ibid.
50
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL
realm of actual negotiations. Reminding Ambassador Nomura that Foreign Minister Togo
himself had told Ambassador Grew that Japan desired to have Great Britain, the Netherlands,
and other countries participate in the final negotiations, Secretary Hull stated that until the
time when all those countries engaged in the negotiations they would be considered by the
United States as merely preliminary and exploratory. Only after the Japanese and American
representatives had found a basis for a suitable agreement, Secretary Hull continued, could
Great Britain and the Netherlands be asked to participate in the final and actual treaty with
Japan. Speaking from a practical viewpoint as well, Secretary Hull said the open and frank
exchange of opinions between American and Japanese representatives would be hindered if
the present talks were considered strictly official. M6 '
Leaving that question for the present Secretary Hull then discussed the political stabiliza-
tion of the Pacific area. In the United States' proposal of June 21, 1941, Secretary Hull stated
that it was made known that America intended to enforce the application of any Pacific prin-
ciples to all the areas of the Far East. However, Japan apparently intended to apply those
principles only to the territories of the southwest Pacific. Not only by the nature of its state-
ments concerning the application of these Pacific peace principles, but also by its connections
with the Axis countries under the Tripartite Pact had Japan caused the United States to doubt
the sincerity of its peace proposals. Therefore, Secretary Hull asked that the present Japanese
government state its approval of the peaceful policy contained in the former Japanese state-
ment of August 28, 1941. Ambassador Nomura replied that the latest Japanese proposal had
set forth Japan's desire for peace, and therefore no further explanation was necessary in this
respect. Furthermore, although the words "southwestern Pacific" appeared in the main text of
the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941, the Japanese government in the preface to this
proposal had clearly stated its desire to establish and maintain peace throughout the entire
Pacific area. Secretary Hull insisted that the statement must appear in the main body of the
text and not merely in the preface.
In repeating his doubts regarding Japanese sincerity Secretary Hull stated that Japan could
never uphold a military alliance with Germany and a peaceful understanding with the United
States at the same time. In fact, if the United States were to conclude an agreement with
Japan while Japan retained its allegiance to the Axis powers the American public would
"howl with laughter." Although Secretary Hull attempted to point out the incongruity of a
military alliance with Germany and a peaceful alliance with the United States, Great Britain
and the Netherlands, Ambassador Nomura continued to insist that the Tripartite Alliance
would not conflict with that drawn up between Japan and the United S tates since both agree-
ments would have peace for their main objective.
Pointing to the Japanese- Russian Neutrality Pact as an example of armed peace, Secretary
Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that Japanese and Russian troops still faced one another
across their national boundaries. The American Secretary of State did not desire to sign a
similarly ineffective peace agreement with Japan.
After listening to Secretary Hull's statements. Minister Wakasugi asked if the United
States expected Japan to withdraw from the Tripartite Alliance. Secretary Hull answered
that the United States expected the Tripartite Pact to become a "dead letter" if an under-
standing were signed between Japan and the United States. Minister Wakasugi then asked if
these latest Americam proposals were a reply to Japan's proposal regarding the rights of self-
defense. In answering this question directly Secretary Hull stated that the United States
wished definite assurance that the present Japanese government desired to follow a peaceful
policy throughout the entire Pacific area and wished a reply to the United States' proposal
regarding a joint statement of a Japanese-American economic policy.
"'Ibid.
51
In concluding the interview Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese government would
be very disappointed with Secretary Hull's attitude. Arrangements were made for another
conference on the following day.
Summarizing the day's conversation Ambassador Nomura stated that the United States had
clarified its attitude toward the trade question; however, the two countries still differed on the
interpretations given to other principles. Not only did the United States doubt Japan's sin-
cerity but it viewed Japan's attitude toward the Chinese situation with suspicion. 20Sc
63. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Interpretation of Japanese Proposals
Since certain phrases in the various Japanese proposals had been viewed with suspicion
by American statesmen, Tokyo wished to clarify their meaning to the satisfaction of the United
States government. On November 16, 1941, in instructions to Ambassador Nomura the Japa-
nese government emphasized that any so-called modifications of its concessions were only
those which any independent country might be forced to make under similar circumstances,
and that they were in no way intended to limit the extent or establishment of peace in the
Pacific.* 06
Such expressions as "without provocation" and, in relation to the Russian question, the
statement "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Russian-Japanese Neutrality
Treaty", both appearing in the Japanese proposal of August 28, 1941, were to be interpreted
literally. In using the term "without justifiable reason" in the proposal of September 6, 1941,
the Japanese government had wished to protect itself in view of the threatening results of the
Russo- German war. When pointing out these facts to the American State Department, the
Japanese Foreign Office requested Ambassador Nomura to include an assurance that the
present Japanese Cabinet would uphold the concessions made in the former Cabinet's pro-
posals of August 28 and September 25, 1941. 2ue °In fact, the present government was even willing
to delete the word "southwestern" from Article Six of the September 25, 1941, proposals in an
endeavor to prove to the United States that Japan wished to apply the principles of peace to
the entire Pacific area, 207
However, Tokyo insisted that Ambassador Nomura impress upon the United States the fact
that Japan would not consider itself bound by any of these concessions unless the present
Japanese- American negotiations ended in agreement. 208
64. Hull- Nomura Conversation (November 17, 1941)
a. State Department's Report 10 *
In order to present Mr. Kurusu to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Nomura called on Mr.
Hull on November 17, 1941. After exchanging introductions, Secretary Hull complimented Mr.
Kurusu on his diplomatic manner of handling relations with the American public since com-
ing to this country. Secretary Hull also spoke highly of Ambassador Nomura.
Turning the conversation then to the Japanese-American situation, Secretary Hull stated
that the short-sighted nationalistic diplomacy which had developed in Europe and the United
States after World War I was responsible for the present world difficulties. In order to bring
about peace and offset the Nazi force which was now crushing 200,000,000 people in Europe,
Secretary Hull wished that Japan and the United States would employ far-sighted statesman-
ship by adopting peaceful policies.
m IV, 131.
—Mi
m IV, 132.
m IV, 131.
"""Memorandum of a Conversation" -November 7, 1941, S.D. II, 738-739.
52
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Because the new Japanese Prime Minister was a military man, Mr. Kurusu felt that the
American people thought General Tojo would view the situation with a warlike attitude. In
fact, when General Tojo had planned his Cabinet he invited Mr. Kurusu to take an important
position but Mr. Kurusu had declined because he believed that General Tojo would probably
discontinue the conversations with the United States. Yet, after discussing the methods of ex-
ecuting Japan's national policy with General Tojo, Ambassador Kurusu had become fully
assured of the new Prime Minister's desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the United
States. In fact, when Mr. Kurusu had discussed his present mission to the United States with
General Tojo, he had noted that the Prime Minister was optimistic in regard to settling the
differences between Japan and the United States. Naturally, the withdrawal of Japanese
troops from China would present the greatest difficulty. However, General Tojo believed that
the difficulties in respect to non-discrimination and the European war could be easily elimi-
nated. Since Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu were to meet President Roosevelt, the
conversation drew to a close.
First of all, however, Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull two oral statements rela-
ting to:- (1) Japan's peaceful intentions, and (2) the narrowing down of the proposed under-
standing. 210
In this first Japanese oral statement reference was made to Secretary Hull's document
handed to Ambassador Nomura on November 12, 1941. 211 The Japanese government wished
to point out that the phrases quoted by Secretary Hull in his oral statement of November 12,
1941, had been embodied in the Japanese proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941.
The present Japanese government had no objection to committing themselves to carrying out
he concessions expressed therein. In doing so, however, it was understood that the present
negotiations would be successfully concluded between Japan and the United States. If such a
successful conclusion were not reached, the Japanese government would not be bound by any
of the commitments which it had made in these and previous proposals. Wherever phrases
used by the Japanese government apparently modified its peaceful intentions, Japan pointed
out that its purpose was only to express qualifications which were absolutely necessary and
were in no way intended to limit the peaceful aims of the Japanese government. 313
In the phrases connected with Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia a detailed stipulation
was necessary in view of the Japanese- Soviet Neutrality Pact and its relation to the war be-
tween Germany and Russia. 213
In the second oral statement Ambassador Nomura stated that, since Japan had no objec-
tion to applying the principle of political stabilization to the entire Pacific, it was willing to
eliminate the word "southwestern" from its proposals of September 25, 1941. 214
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report*™
Accompanied by Ambassador Kurusu Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull at half
past ten on November 17, 1941. Secretary Hull began the conversation by saying that the rea-
son for the present world situation was the lack of able statesmen following World War I. Am-
bassador Kurusu agreed that the United States and Japan must take over the grave responsi-
bility of re-establishing peace. Before such a goal could be attained, Ambassador Kurusu
'"•ibid.
!,1 "Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 12,
1941", S.D. H, 727-729.
sli "Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 17,
1941", S.D. n, 739-740. See the instructions sent to Ambassador Nomura by Tokyo on November 16, 1941, IV, 131.
21 'See IV, 132.
"'"Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary State"— November 17, 1941,
S.D. U, 740.
lls n, 133.
53
continued, the two countries must settle their own problem by engaging in concrete negotiations.
For that purpose Ambassador Kurusu had come to the United States at the insistence of
Prime Minister Tojo and Foreign Minister Togo. Hoepful of an immediate settlement of the
three major problems now existing between Japan and the United States, Prime Minister Tojo
felt that an agreement could be reached regarding commercial equality and Japan's obliga-
tions under the Tripartite Pact. However, the Japanese representatives recognized the fact
that the evacuation of troops from French Indo-China would remain the major obstacle to a
peace settlement. 215 "
Before ending the conversation Ambassador Nomura presented Secretary Hull with Tokyo's
reply to the United States oral statement of November 12, 1941. Ambassador Nomura then
notified Secretary Hull, as Tokyo had instructed him, that the Japanese government was
willing to delete the word "southwestern" from Article six of the Japanese proposal of Septem-
ber 25, 1941, thus making any peace agreement applicable to the entire Pacific area. 216
65. Rousevelt-Kiirusu Conversation {November 17, 1941 )
a. Secretary Hull 's Report ' 2ri
After concluding the conversation between Ambassador Nomura, Mr. Kurusu and Mr. Hull,
the three men proceeded to the White House where President Roosevelt welcomed Mr. Kurusu
to this country.
After the usual exchange of courtesies and formalities. President Roosevelt brought up the
differences of opinion existing between the two countries. He then made clear the desire of the
United States to avoid war and he accepted the statement of the Japanese Ambassador that
Japan was equally desirous of bringing about a fair and peaceful settlement of the Pacific ques-
tion. Throughout the conversation Ambassador Nomura insisted that the situation must be
adjusted immediately due to the urgency of the situation.
In answering Ambassador Kurusu's attempts to explain the Tripartite Pact. Secretary Hull
made it clear that Japan could not conclude a successful agreement with the United States
regarding the Pacific area while retaining its allegiance to the Tripartite Pact. Not only would
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull be denounced by the American people if an agree-
ment under those conditions were drawn up, but the countries of the world would redouble
their efforts against Japanese aggression. Because Hitler had started upon an official course
of invasion the United States had been forced to spend billions of dollars in self-defense.
Therefore, the American public could not understand Japan's attitude, and political difficul-
ties in connection with Japan's relations with Germany were difficult to overcome. 217 "
In emphasizing the United States' defensive measures, President Roosevelt reminded Mr.
Kurusu that some time ago he had proclaimed a zone around the Western Hemisphere which
extended from 300 to 1,100 miles out into the sea. Secretary Hull then told Ambassador
Nomura that the conversations had been formulated along the lines of genuine friendliness
and, therefore, there was no reason for either country to attempt to bluff the other. Here Presi-
dent Roosevelt emphasized the United States' position and, at the same time, exposed the
sophistry of Japan's in relation to its alliance with Germany.
Pointing out that Germany had not yet requested Japan to fight, Ambassador Kurusu said
that Japan was serving a desirable purpose while maintaining peace. Secretary Hull interpreted
this remark to mean that Japan was diverting the British and American navies and air forces to
the Pacific. Secretary Hull then told Mr. Kurusu that the United States was on the defensive in
the present Pacific situation because Japan had been the only aggressor. In fact, it was generally
n *°Ibi.d.
""TV, 134.
"'"Memorandum by the Secretary of State"— November 17, 1941, S.D. II, 740-743
'"'Ibid.
54
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
believed in the United States, Secretary Hull said, that the Japanese New Order in Greater
East Asia was similar to Hitler's program in Europe since it was designed to dominate politically,
economically and socially, by military force, all the areas within its range. Although Mr. Kurusu
attempted to defend the stationing of Japanese troops in China, President Roosevelt stated that
the question should be worked out in a fair way after considering all the circumstances and rela-
tive merits involved.
When the other Pacific questions had been satisfactorily settled, President Roosevelt be-
lieved the United States would aid Japan and China bo that they might begin adjustments
for peace. However, Mr. Kurusu insisted it would be difficult to bring all the Japanese troops
out of China at once. Then Mr. Kurusu reminded Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt that
the United States had insisted that the Japanese leave Shantung during World War I. How-
ever, Secretary Hull answered Mr. Kurusu that the United States, in opposing the seizure of
new territory by any country, had at the same time declined to take a dollar of compensation
or a foot of territory for itself. The United States had always believed that if countries con-
tinued to fight for territory modern methods of warfare would cause the utter destruction of all
countries. Since Mr. Kurusu pleaded that he had forgotten much of the technical side of com-
mercial policy, he did not wish to discuss the recent American proposal regarding cora-
,,-.,„,,,. till!
merce.
President Roosevelt continued by referring to the destructive nature of armaments and also
emphasized that from the long term point of view the differences between Japan and the
United States should not be regarded as serious. Nothing new had been brought out by either
Ambassador Nomura or Mr. Kurusu at this conversation. Both President Roosevelt and Mr.
Kurusu seemed to agree that the present situation must be solved. However, President Roose-
velt frequently parried the remarks of Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, particularly in
relation to the three major points of difference.
With the understanding that Secretary Hull would meet the Japanese representatives the
following morning, the meeting drew to a close. 218
b. Am bassador Nomura 's Report^ 19
After concluding the conversation with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and Ambassa-
dor Kurusu accompanied the American Secretary of State to an interview with President
Roosevelt. Ambassador Kurusu repeated what he had already said to Secretary Hull regard-
ing the sincere interest of the present Japanese Cabinet in concluding negotiations with the
United States. Since President Roosevelt was an experienced statesman, Ambassador Kurusu
felt that he would appreciate the attitude of the Japanese people after four years of war with
China. Speaking from personal observation, Ambassador Kurusu stated that the situation in
Hongkong, Manila and other islands in that area was so strained that an uprising might occur
at any moment. Therefore, from the Japanese viewpoint, a solution to the Pacific problem
must be effected without further delay. Even now with the Japanese- American conversations
dragging on endlessly Japan stood a smaller chance of being able to defend itself both militarily
and economically from other powers. Prime Minister Tojo was optimistic regarding the settle-
ment of all the Japanese- American problems with the exception of the evacuation of Japa-
nese troops from French Indo-China. M0
Quoting former Secretary of State Bryan, President Roosevelt replied to this last comment:
"There is no last word between friends." 221 Remarking that other so-called non- aggression pacts
""/bid.
"TV, 135-138.
M °IV, 135.
i21 IV. 136.
55
were now useless, President Roosevelt insisted that only by the establishment of a general
understanding between the United States and Japan could the international situation be
saved. Ambassador Kurusu agreed with President Roosevelt's statement. In his opinion the
adjustment of the Japanese and American attitudes toward the Tripartite Pact and of the
claims of both countries regarding the settlement of the China Incident would have to be ef-
fected before such an understanding could be realized. Speaking first of the Tripartite Agree-
ment, Ambassador Kurusu insisted that his government was bound to that pact by virtue of
its honor as a great power. In view of this consideration Ambassador Kurusu could not believe
that the United States would urge Japan to violate the terms of this alliance. This should be
particularly true, Ambassador Kurusu said, in view of the fact that the object of the Tripartite
Pact was the prevention of future war and the maintenance of peace. While anxious to coordi-
nate the two views on this problem in order to bring about a settlement, Ambassador Kurusu,
nevertheless, insisted that Japan would not consider a proposal which did not have a practi-
cal application.
Turning the conversation for the moment to the China problem, President Roosevelt said
that the United States was not attempting to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan
and China. If such a word existed in diplomatic parlance, he would state that the United States
was merely acting as an "introducer." 221 "
Ambassador Kurusu then referred to Japan's obligation under the terms of the Tripartite
Pact. 222 The Japanese representative had received the impression that the United States be-
lieved Japan was merely acting as Germany's tool. In fact, it appeared to be the general opin-
ion in America that Japan would wait until the United States was deeply involved in the
Atlantic war and then make a stab in the Pacific. In order to correct this misapprehension Am-
bassador Kurusu stated that Japan would decide its obligations under the Tripartite Pact inde-
pendently of any country. Furthermore, Ambassador Kurusu continued, any great under-
standing arrived at by the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific would overshadow
the Tripartite Pact.
Secretary Hull interrupted at this point to say that the United States could not wait until
Germany had conquered England and attacked the United States with the British fleet from
some point in South America before beginning to make some preparations for its self-defense.
Secretary Hull did not understand why Japan could not grasp America's need to protect itself
against aggression. In supporting Secretary Hull's statement President Roosevelt said that in
his recent speech he had described German subversive activities in Central and South America,
basing his remarks on authentic information from German government circles.
In reply Ambassador Kurusu assured President Roosevelt that since Japan included Central
and South America in the category of the Pacific it would never be a party to disrupting the
peace of those countries. Since Japan had continually made concessions towards the estab-
lishment of a just peace in the Pacific principally by promising to withdraw its troops from
French Indo- China on the establishment of that peace, Ambassador Kurusu did not under-
stand why President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull felt that the United States public would
object to an agreement with Japan simply on the grounds of the existence of the Tripartite
Pact.
Ambassador Kurusu felt that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China should be
enough proof that Japan intended to uphold the guarantee made to the United States. What-
ever the means Ambassador Kurusu was convinced that an immediate settlement of the prob-
lems under discussion by Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull should be reached. Secre-
tary Hull then replied that both he and Ambassador Nomura had carried on the conversations
"•'Ibid.
222 IV, 137.
56
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
for so long that they had lost the ability to make any new points. Therefore, he welcomed Am-
Stating that he would be in Washington until November 24, 1941, President Roosevelt offered
to discuss further any of the matters with Secretary Hull and with both Japanese Ambassadors
before that time. m °
Ambassador Kurusu and Ambassador Nomura scheduled a conference with Secretary Hull
for 10:00 a.m. on November 18, 1941. 223
66. Ambassador Grew Warns United States Against Unexpected Japanese Attack 224
Referring to a previous telegram sent on November 3, 1941, wherein Ambassador Grew had
warned that "action by Japan, which might render unavoidable an armed conflict with the
United States, might come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness", 225 the American Am-
bassador in Tokyo emphasized the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military
actions in the Pacific. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew warned his government not to depend
too much upon a prior warning given by the Embassy staff since Japan was able to obtain
effective control over both primary and secondary military information. Since only a few
Americans remained in Japan and they were concentrated mostly in Tokyo, Yokohama and
Kobe, Japan would be able to exploit every possible tactical advantage, mainly surprise and
initiative. With American and foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters, Japan could send
out its troop transports in any direction undetected. According to available indications, Japa-
nese troop concentrations were reported in Manchuria and Formosa and new operations seemed
imminent in either the southwest Pacific, Siberia, or in both areas.
Ambassador Grew warned that every precaution should be taken to guard against a Japanese
surprise move. Since the Embassy's field of naval and military observation was negligible, the
United States could not depend upon the ability of the American Embassy in Tokyo to forward
any warning in sufficient time. 226
67. Japanese Air Forces Move to Mandates
As Ambassador Grew had stated, Japanese military and naval activities in the Pacific gave
definite indications of a surprise attack in that area. On the alert to learn at which point such
a move would originate and in what direction it would travel, American traffic analysts
watched Japanese tactical communications closely. 227
By November 18, 1941, the movements of Japanese air groups and air forces formerly asso-
ciated with the China Sea area were predominantly towards the Mandates. The Commander of
Air Squadron 24 and the Commander of the Yokohama Air Group were in the vicinity of Wotje
and maintained close contact with the Commander of the Combined Air Force. Units that
included the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet (formerly the First Air
Fleet) were en route to the Mandates. In fact, the frequent changes in location of the Air group
commanders between Saipan, Truk, Jaluit and Wotje produced considerable confusion on all
Mandate circuits.
After careful observation of these units, American traffic analysts were of the opinion that
the First, Second, Third and Fifth Fleets were ready to move into the Mandates with sub-
marine forces and combined air forces of the Combined Fleet. 22, °
m IV, 138.
224 " Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State"— November 17, 1941, S.D. II, 743-744.
'""Ambassador in Japan ( Grew) to the Secretary of State"— November 3, 1941, S.D. II, 704.
"Void.
227 IV, 139.
m °lbid.
68. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 18, 1941 )
a. State Department's Report 2 ' 1 *
On November 18, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at tbe State Depart-
ment to converse with Secretary Hull. Secretary Hull immediately turned the conversation
toward a discussion of Japan's relations with the Axis, Emphasizing the point that Japan
could not make an agreement with the United States while continuing its alliance with
Germany, Secretary Hull pointed out that the American people were convinced that Hitler
would eventually invade the Far East. By way of illustration, Secretary Hull reminded the
Japanese representatives that after concluding an anti-Comintern Pact with Japan
Germany had entered into a non- aggression pact with Russia and in time had reneged
even on that pact. In view of this, any agreement between Japan and the United States
which did not make the peaceful purposes of both nations self-evident would only result
in a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments.
Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu that the United States
was contributing to the establishment of law and order throughout the Far East by granting
the Philippines their independence in 1946 and by withdrawing American Marines from
China. In the application of a non-discriminatory policy throughout the world, Secretary
Hull continued, the United States government was even now urging the British Empire to
reduce its discriminatory practices. To the United States it seemed obvious that the only
controlling influence which a country could have over an area was one gained through
fair play and not achieved by the sword.
In the renunciation of forceful and aggressive measures, Secretary Hull commented, the
United States had stopped using gunboats and armed forces in South America. Thus, it
had achieved satisfactory relationships through the pursuit of peaceful policies. Inasmuch
as the United States' basic principles were formulated on the principle of peace, Secretary
Hull said, the United States could not. condone Japan's attitude toward Axis aggression as
seen through the telegrams of congratulation sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when some
atrocity occurred. 2Mo In answer to these accusations Ambassador Nomura reminded
Secretary Hull that in spite of their diverging courses the United States and Russia were
aligned at the present time. Ambassador Nomura also stated that Japan was not in a
position to be so magnanimous in extending substantial lend-lease aid to other countries
as the United States had done in South America and abroad. However, because Japan was
now in a serious predicament, Ambassador Nomura said that Japan was particularly anx-
ious to conclude some agreement with the United States.
At this point in the conversation Mr, Kurusu interposed by stating that his five years'
experience as Director of the Commercial Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office had made
him thoroughly familiar with Japan's commercial policy. It was due largely to the
British Empire's preferences, Mr. Kurusu said, that Japan had been forced to join with the
Axis. Mr. Kurusu reminded Secretary Hull that Japan was far more dependent upon
foreign trade than the United States. In view of the fact that the present commercial
situation was abnormal, Mr. Kurusu believed that the two governments should attempt
some solution, possibly the use of tbe exchange control system which had developed in
Japanese-occupied China. While in time Japan might be in a position to adopt a more
liberal commercial policy, Mr. Kurusu insisted that some way must be found to ameliorate
the present situation. Secretary Hull believed that the United States and Japan should
come to some agreement in principle on a commercial policy. Although making no direct
reply, Mr. Kurusu stated that after the United States occupied the Philippines it had
313 "Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialed by Joseph Ballantine-November 18, 1941, S.D, D, 744-750.
58
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
aligned itself with the European concert of nations, thereby sacrificing its former course
of idealism pursued in the Far East.
Returning to the problem of the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kurusu said that some satisfactory
agreement could probably be reached even though Japan could not abrogate its agreement
with Germany. However, Secretary Hull felt that a definite program of peace must be begun
immediately in order to obtain the confidence of peace-minded people and, at the same
time, effect a constructive program designed to offset the forces of aggression. When Mr.
Kurusu asked if Secretary Hull could suggest a concrete formula for Japan's future
relations with the Axis powers. Secretary Hull stated that Japan must work out this matter
on its own but, he re-emphasized, the problem must be settled in order to conclude a
convincing and workable relationship between Japan and the United States. Japan's
obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull added, would be inconsistent with the
obligations it would undertake by an agreement with the United States. w
If Japan were not able to adopt a clear-cut position with regard to commercial policy, its
course in China, and relations to the European War, Secretary Hull felt that the Japanese
government was unable to control its politicians. Maintaining that it was important, first,
to arrest a further deterioration of relations between the two countries before overcoming
existing difficulties, Ambassador Nomura said that big ships cannot be turned around too
quickly. They have to be eased around slowly and gradually. Refusing to change on his
attitude, Secretary Hull replied that neither of the countries could promote peace so long
as they were aligned in any way with an aggressive power such as Germany. Nevertheless,
Mr. Kurusu insisted, if some settlement could be reached now, it would promote an atmo-
sphere conducive to discussing fundamental problems; if not, the continuation of America's
freezing regulations would cause such impatience in Japan that Japan would feel it was
forced to fight while it still could. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Japan had not
entered into an alliance with Germany to be a "cat's paw" but because it felt isolated and
encircled by European powers. Secretary Hull did not believe that the American public
would accept this explanation of Japan's policies.
Referring briefly to the Chinese situation, Secretary Hull asked if Japan could guarantee
Chinese sovereignty, territorial integrity and right to commercial equality. Ambassador
Nomura replied that Japan could guarantee such protection to China. Although he had
made this last point clear to Ambassador Nomura in previous conversations, Secretary
Hull desired to re-emphasize its importance to Mr. Kurusu. 228 "
Secretary Hull then referred to statements made by Japanese representatives which
indicated that the Japanese government considered the present conversations as negotia-
tions rather than merely exploratory discussions. Since the British and Chinese governments
had a rightful interest in the problems of the Far East. Secretary Hull told Mr. Kurusu that
he would have to discuss negotiations with these two governments but that he could not do
so at the present time because no real basis had been reached for formal negotiations.
Secretary Hull refused to state specifically, as Mr. Kurusu requested, just what the
concerns of these governments were in the Pacific. Mr. Kurusu felt that, if the United
States did have to discuss the problems with the British and Chinese, Japanese and
American relations might well be at the mercy of Britain and China and in time the
situation might get out of control. Secretary Hull merely commented that the declaration of
programs offeree by Japan's leaders only added to the present difficulty.
Referring back to the questions connected with the Chinese situation, Secretary Hull asked
Ambassador Nomura how many soldiers Japan would retain in China. Ambassador
59
Nomura replied that ninety per cent would be withdrawn. Although he did not reply directly
to Secretary Hull's question on how long the remaining ten per cent would be stationed in
China, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan was permitted to retain troops in the Peiping
and Tientsin areas under the Boxer Protocol. Pointing to the long list of grievances suffered
by Americans from the actions of Japanese forces in China, Secretary Hull stated that the
stationing of any Japanese troops in China was an obstacle to peace. In view of the fact
that the United States had been lenient in overlooking these grievances, Secretary Hull
believed that the Japanese government should make an extra effort to abolish them. 228 ''
If the Japanese people could rid themselves of the desire for war and invasion. Secretary
Hull said, Japan could begin almost immediately to produce materials needed by peaceful
countries. Reminding Secretary Hull of the strength of the United States, Ambassador
Nomura replied by saying that America would first have to give some indication of aid to
Japan. However, Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese Ambassador that the United
States was not the one to have resorted to force. In addition, Japanese armed forces in
China had been particularly destructive. Moreover, Secretary Hull continued, the American
people were convinced that Germany and Japan proposed to divide the world between them.
In answering Mr. Kurusu's accusation that the United States had held up the conclusion
of a peaceful program by delaying the conversations, Secretary Hull pointed out that he
had readily agreed to converse with the Japanese Ambassador at any time. It was Japan's
move into French Indo-Chin a in July 1941 that had first interrupted these conversations and
forced the United States to enforce such economic restrictions as discontinuing the
shipment of petroleum products to Japan.
Secretary Hull then stated that Japan itself must decide on the method it would use
to withdraw troops from China, to adopt a satisfactory commercial policy, and to determine
its obligations under the Tripartite Agreement. Recognizing the suspicion with which the
United States viewed Japan's motives, Ambassador Nomura assured Secretary Hull that
Japan sincerely desired to settle the China affair despite the fact that Japan felt it necessary
to retain a certain number of troops in China for the time being. As soon as a just Pacific
settlement could be reached, Mr. Kurusu said that Japan would withdraw its troops even
from French Indo-China. 22 "'
Secretary Hull then inquired as to what extent Japan would be able to adopt peaceful
policies in the event that the United States relaxed its freezing regulations to some degree.
While hoping for a realization of the high ideals on which the conversations had been
founded, Ambassador Nomura stated that both the United States and Japan had maintained
a relatively unyielding attitude toward the Chinese situation. After Secretary Hull had
commented on the grave responsibility which Japan had to create conditions conducive
to peace, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Japan withdraw its troops from southern
French Indo-China, thereby re-establishing the status quo in the Pacific which had existed
before July. Since this Japanese move had originally caused the United States' freezing
regulations to be put into effort, Ambassador Nomura felt that the freezing measures would
be rescinded upon the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Realizing that it would be difficult
to have the United States remove the embargo upon Japan unless it had definite proof that
Japan had definitely renounced its purposes of conquest, Secretary Hull asked what
guarantee could be given that the Japanese troops withdrawn from French Indo-China would
not be used in an aggressive movement upon another area.
When Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese were sincerely tired of fighting,
Secretary Hull replied that he would inquire concerning the
toward this suggestion offered by the Japanese Ambassador.
nM Ibid
''"Ibid.
60
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
As the conference drew to a close, Ambassador Nomura stated that his government was
studying the questions of commercial policy involved in the United States' proposal of
November 15, 1941. In answer to a question by Ambassador Nomura relating to the
application of this commercial policy, Secretary Hull stated that, although the program
could not be put into full operation before the end of the Japanese -Chinese War, complete
agreement on principles involved should be reached immediately. Ambassador Nomura
then said that he would convey the results of this conversation to his government and
communicate any messages to Secretary Hull through Mr. Ball ant ine. 229
b. Ambassador Nomura '$ Report 230
At 10:30 a.m. on November 18, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on
Secretary Hull. Throughout the conversation, which lasted for approximately three hours,
Secretary Hull placed the main emphasis upon Japan's obligations under the Tripartite
Pact. Stating that he had foreseen the devastating effects of Hitler's activities in Europe,
Secretary Hull insisted that the German war machine would eventually extend even to
the Far East.
Unless the Japanese cooperated with the United States in stopping Hitler's aggression,
not only would Japan fall under the power of Hitler, but diplomatic relations with the
United States would be difficult to adjust. Since peace was the basic national policy of the
United States, the American government could not understand Japan's attitude toward
the Tripartite Pact. Until Japan severed allegiance with Germany, therefore, no effective
agreement could be drawn up between Japan and the United States.
Secretary Hull stated that some American extremists insisted that the United States had
become Hitler's partner because America had maintained a conciliatory attitude toward
Japan. Furthermore, Secretary Hull stated, the United States did not wish to conclude
a peace agreement such as the one now existing between Japan and Soviet Russia; notwith-
standing the Japanese-Russian peace agreement enormous forces of the two countries
faced each other across their borders.
At this point Ambassador Kurusu insisted that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite
Pact. Secretary Hull replied that, while the United States was not actually demanding that
Japan break off with Germany, it still could not understand how Japan could maintain
the status quo of its relationship to the Tripartite Pact while seeking a peace agreement with
the United States. Nor did Secretary Hull agree with Ambassador Kurusu that the Tripartite
Pact was merely a peaceful agreement designed for the purpose of Japanese self-defense. 230 "
When Secretary Hull asked for definite proof that Japan did not intend to use its obligations
under the Tripartite Pact to further its own aggressive desires, Ambassador Nomura replied
that such proof could not be given within the limited time that remained before concluding
a successful agreement. However, Ambassador Nomura suggested that if Japan show its
peaceful intentions by withdrawing troops from southern French Indo-China the United
States would in turn be expected to rescind its freezing measures. This suggestion did not meet
with Secretary Hull's approval. Instead Secretary Hull said that Japan must first prove its
peaceful intentions and then the United States, after conferring with the British government,
would decide upon rescinding the present freezing measures. 230 '
From this conversation with Secretary Hull Ambassador Nomura concluded that the
problems connected with China were playing a small part in Japanese-American negotiations
12i lbid.
™IV, 140-14L
61
at the present time. Apparently Secretary Hull was mainly interested in readjusting the
economic situation of the world after the conclusion of the present war. 231
In view of the fact that the United States was mainly concerned with the policy of non-
discrimination in commerce. Ambassador Nomura suggested that Japan delete that phrase
in the Japanese proposals which stated that Japan would apply the principle of non-
discrimination to China once this same principle was applied to the entire world. Unless an
agreement were reached on this commercial policy immediately. Ambassador Nomura felt
it would be useless to submit proposal B to the American representatives. 23 Ia
Speaking about this commercial question to Secretary Hull during the conversation,
Ambassador Nomura urged that the United States agree to rescind its freezing measures
after the Japanese evacuation of southern French Indo-China. 232 If such a settlement could
be made, Ambassador Nomura continued, there would be no need for any of the countries
in the Pacific to increase their military strength by sending warships to Singapore or
increasing fortifications throughout the Philippines. Refusing to concede this point,
Secretary Hull merely reiterated his former statement that Japan must first prove its
peaceful aims. If the leaders of the Japanese government proved their peaceful intentions,
then, Secretary Hull stated, the United States government would get in touch with Great
Britain and the Netherlands for a conference on relevant questions. 232 "
Referring to the China question, Secretary Hull again questioned the right of Japan to
station its troops in that country. 233 If some agreement could be reached on this proposal.
Secretary Hull promised to get in touch with representatives of the British, the Netherlands,
and the Chinese governments for a discussion of the matter.
Secretary Hull then asked if the Japanese government had any reply to make to the
United States proposals of November 15, 1941. Ambassador Kurusu answered that the
economic positions of Japan and the United States were entirely different. While the United
States had an advantageous commercial position, Japan was not so fortunate; therefore, the
problems relating to commerce required more study. 233 " When the economic system in
Japan had been disrupted by the American freezing order, Ambassador Kurusu continued,
Japanese international affairs had been thrown into a great upheaval. On the same principle,
if the Japanese- controlled exchange in northern China were suddenly abolished, as the
United States suggested, the economy of 100,000,000 Chinese people would be imperiled.
While admitting this fact Secretary Hull insisted that the principle of equality of treatment
in commerce could nevertheless be applied to postwar economic reconstruction. Throughout
his diplomatic career, Secretary Hull continued, he had fought against the preferential
system of the British Empire which had resulted from the Ottawa Conference. As a result
of his efforts it seemed probable that Great Britain would abolish many of its traditions.
Secretary Hull was anxious to see the same discriminatory policies abolished in Japanese and
American commercial dealings. 23 *
Summarizing the major points of this conversation Ambassador Nomura informed his
government that the United States was at present primarily interested in Japan's obligations
under the Tripartite Pact rather than the Japanese occupation of China. This change
apparently had come about as a result of America's increased interest in the Atlantic war.
Therefore, Ambassador Nomura felt that a compromise could be reached on matters
pertaining to the Chinese questions and commercial problems, and he suggested that
"'IV, 142.
""Ibid.
m rv, 143.
""/bid.
144.
™'Md.
"MV, 145.
62
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Japanese representatives attempt to reach a practical settlement regarding the acquisition
of goods and the cancellation of the freezing issues before submitting proposal B to the
United States government. 235
Furthermore, in regard to the commercial policy Ambassador Nomura requested the
present Japanese cabinet, to submit a statement which contained no provisional notes. In
this way Ambassador Nomura hoped to offset the suspicion already aroused in the minds
of American officials. Already, Ambassador Nomura reminded his government, the United
States had stated that it would put no faith in mere promises unless they were carried out
immediately. Ambassador Nomura suggested, therefore, that Japan be ready to withdraw
its troops immediately upon receiving word that the United States was rescinding its freezing
order and making the necessary materials available to Japanese merchants.
Ambassador Nomura concluded his report by stating that he would confer with Secretary
Hull again on November 20, 1941. * x
69. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 19, 1941)
a. State Department's Report 237
On November 19, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at Secretary Hull's
apartment to continue the discussion that had taken place on the previous day. Although
Ambassador Nomura had reported yesterday's conversation to his government, no instructions
regarding any suggestions made during the meeting had as yet been forwarded to Washing-
ton. Both Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, however, were satisfied with the interview
that Secretary Hull had given the American press regarding the contents of the previous
day's conversation.
Secretary Hull then asked Ambassador Nomura his opinion of the present situation.
Ambassador Nomura replied that he believed, as he had said in yesterday's conversation,
that if the Japanese should move their troops out of southern French Indo-China the
United States should rescind its freezing measure, since it was this action of the Japanese
government that first provoked the economic restriction. Ambassador Nomura agreed with
Secretary Hull that if such action were taken by both governments the conversations should
continue. Secretary Hull recognized the fact that such a measure might give the Japanese
leaders time to organize public opinion in favor of a peaceful policy. In view of the bad
effect that America's freezing regulations had on the Japanese economic system, Ambassador
Nomura made it clear that Japan desired a quick settlement, although he agreed with
Secretary Hull that the conversations should continue in any event, in order to arrive at a
mutual agreement on all important points upon which the views of both governments had
diverged.
Ambassador Nomura emphasized that Japan's views in regard to both the Tripartite Pact
and the desire to maintain peace in the Pacific had been clearly set forth in the Japanese
statement of September 25, 1941. After Ambassador Nomura had stated that Japan was
committed to carry out its obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull suggested
that Japan let the Russian forces in the Far East and the British forces at Singapore return
to Europe. 237a
When Secretary Hull began to discuss the injurious effect that Hitlers aggression had
upon the whole world, the Japanese representatives discussed the German-Russian War.
Impressed with the strength of the Stalin government and the stubbornness of Russian
135 IV, 146.
23S IV, 147.
Memorandum of a Conversation' '-lmt.aled bv Joseph W. Bal lan tine- November 19, 1941, S.Sk U, 751-753.
™°tbid.
63
defense, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu both expressed the view that a Russian
defeat would not take place in the near future. Ambassador Nomura saw little prospect either
of Germany's launching a successful invasion upon the English coast.
Secretary Hull took this opportunity to point out that Germany, if' unable to conquer
Stalin or invade England, would probably be left with only the hostility of the millions in
Europe as the result of its conquest by force. When Ambassador Nomura referred once more
to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese
Ambassador that his country was equally bound by a neutrality pact with Russia.
Ambassador Nomura replied briefly that Japan would be equally faithful to both alliances.
However, Ambassador Nomura admitted that the Tripartite Pact had brought nothing but
American resentment upon Japan, Mr. Kurusu was also pessimistic of Japan's position in the
Far East, 238 if another Brest-Litovsk 239 occurred and Japan were faced with a combined
Russo- German advance on the Pacific.
Urging the Japanese representatives to look to the future, Secretary Hull stated that
Japan could stabilize the world by establishing a progressive program of peace in the Pacific.
Ambassador Nomura, feeling that the United States would be very strong after World War II
was over, nevertheless said the United States would only impair its strength if American
forces were sent to Africa to engage in the war at the present time. When the discussion of
Hitler's aggression throughout Europe continued, Secretary Hull spoke of Germany's
efforts to gain control of the seas, and he emphasized that the United States would prevent
that from happening by any means at its disposal. When Secretary Hull stated that the
Japanese should tell Hitler to be reasonable, Mr. Kurusu interrupted with the remark that
Chancellor Hitler would undoubtedly be willing to enter into peace negotiations. However,
Secretary Hull replied that he had only been speaking figuratively, because the United
States would demand the complete abandonment of Hitler's program of conquest.
The conference drew to a close with Secretary Hull emphasizing that the United States
would stand firm on its basic principles. 240
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report
There is no Japanese message pertaining to this conversation available.
70. Japan Prepares for Breakdown of Diplomatic Relations
In spite of Japan's apparent optimism with regard to these informal conversations, Tokyo
took every precaution to safeguard its codes and important documents in the event that
diplomatic relations with America, Britain and Russia were severed. On November 19,
1941, Tokyo sent to its embassies throughout the world a simple code (consisting of a few
weather terms) to be inserted, if need arose, in Japanese news broadcasts as a warning
that an international emergency had struck. Embassy officials would then destroy all code
papers. 2 " This was the famous "Winds" code which was to be used in the event that
relations between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Great Britain were severed.
Though the code was used before the unexpected Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor it did
not reveal that relations with the United States were deteriorating, since it mentioned only
England. A special appendix outlines the available information concerning the "Winds"
and "Stop" codes.
-/bid.
253 Treaty of Peace between Germany and Russia. March 3. 1918,
2, °S.D. U, 751-753.
24I IV, 148-149.
64
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(November 20, 1941 - December 1, 1941)
PART A— HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
Japanese Efforts to Extort an Agreement on a Narrow and One-Sided Proposal 242
71. Hull- Nomura Conversation (November 20, 1941)
a. State Department's Report 2 * 2 "
On November 20, 1941, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at the State Depart-
ment to offer a proposal amplifying Ambassador Nomura's suggestion that the Japanese
troops be moved from the southern part of French Indo- China in order that the United
States government might rescind its freezing regulations. 243 Under the terms of the new
proposal both governments would guarantee that no advance would be made in southeastern
Asia or the South Pacific except in the northern part of French Indo-China, to which
Japanese troops from the southern part of that territory would be moved upon the conclusion
of the present arrangement. As soon as peace was restored between Japan and China, or an
equitable peace was established in the Pacific area, Japan would withdraw its troops from
all of French Indo-China.
With a view to restoring their commercial relations, Japan and the United States would
cooperate in acquiring necessary goods and commodities from the Netherlands East Indies,
and reinstate trade conditions which had prevailed prior to the freezing of assets. Further-
more, the United States would supply Japan with a required quantity of oil. In addition,
the United States would refrain from any actions prejudical to the restoration of peace between
Japan and China. "
Promising to examine the proposal later, Secretary Hull said that he would like to make a
few comments on the Japanese proposal in its present form." 5 At any moment, Secretary
Hull insisted, Japan could end what it chose to call encirclement and decide upon an albout
peaceful course. Furthermore, Secretary Hull felt that the Japanese government should
direct its people to follow such a peaceful course. In reply, Mr. Kurusu offered the suggestion
that the United States help develop Japanese public opinion by adopting the proposal
which the Japanese government had just offered. This proposal, Ambassador Nomura
interposed, would show Japan's peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Thailand as
well as French Indo-China.
Secretary Hull then asked Ambassador Nomura to consider the American people's
reaction should the United States discontinue aid to Great Britain. Then he pointed out that
the purposes underlying United States aid to China paralleled those underlying aid to
2 " Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents— Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States-^Japan, 1931-1941 in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1943, Volume II, 366. Hereafter referred to as S.D., II.
^"""Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine— November 20, 1941, S.D. H, 753-755.
* li Ibid
241 Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of Stat*— November 20, 1941,
S.D. II, 755-756. Part of this draft proposal was sent to Ambassador Nomura from Tokyo on November 4, 1941. See IV,
29. The other items in this proposal were sent to Ambassador Nomura with instructions concerning its delivery on
November 14 and November 15, 1941. Note certain changes made in the text in spite of the fact that Tokyo sent
Ambassador Nomura both the Japanese and English texts of the proposals, 150-153.
65
Great Britain. What was needed at the present time, Secretary Hull insisted, was the mani-
festation by Japan of a sincere desire to pursue a peaceful course since the American
people, basing their opinion on the Nazi-like slogans of "a new order in East Asia" and
"a coprosperity sphere", believed that the partnership of Germany and Japan was aimed at
controlling the world.
After four years of fighting with China, Ambassador Nomura explained, the Japanese
government was forced to use the slogans quoted by Secretary Hull in order to urge the people
toward victory. Yet it had been clearly demonstrated from the proposals already presented
to the United States government, the Japanese Ambassador continued, that the Japanese
government was eager to reach an immediate settlement with China. Secretary Hull stated
that the United States government was anxious to help in this matter. However, when Mr.
Kurusu stated that Japan had never pledged itself to a policy of expansion, Secretary Hull
made the comment that the Chinese people might have an answer to that point.
Since the United States wished to avoid a repetition in East Asia of the "new order" which
Hitler was attempting to establish in Europe by military control, Secretary Hull pointed
out that Japan must abrogate its alliance with Germany. Waving aside Mr. Kurusu's
arguments that Japan could not eradicate its obligations under the Tripartite Pact,
Secretary Hull pointed out that Japan had not been so concerned over its obligations under
the Nine Power Treaty signed with Great Britain and the United States, Mr. Kurusu
answered vaguely that the Nine Power Treaty was twenty years old and outmoded. Not
wishing to argue this point, Secretary Hull turned back to the Chinese question and
emphasized the tremendous injury caused by Japan in the Pacific. He pointed out that the
methods adopted by the Japanese military leaders in the war with China were similar to
those used by Hitler. Although agreeing with Ambassador Nomura that the situation in the
Far East was of the utmost urgency, Secretary Hull insisted that it was still the duty of Japa-
nese statesmen to alleviate the situation in Japan.
Mr. Kurusu then asked if American aid to China would be discontinued at the beginning
of Japanese -Chinese peace negotiations. Declining to comment on this point, Secretary Hull
instead complimented Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on the marked change in
the attitude of the Japanese people and press toward America during the past two days.
Secretary Hull was convinced that if such a change for the better could be effected in such a
short time Japanese statesmen could accomplish much more in a longer period. 2 ""
b. Am bassador Nomura 's Report 246
Although November 20, 1941 was Thanksgiving Day Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador
Kurusu met with Secretary Hull to discuss the program of Japanese-American relations.
At the very beginning of the discussion Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull a copy
of Japanese Proposal B, according to instructions from Tokyo. After glancing over the items
in the proposal Secretary Hull commented on that section which requested the United
States to cease aid to the Chinese once Japanese-Chinese peace discussions had commenced.
As long as the fears emanating from the Tripartite Alliance continued in this country,
Secretary Hull stated, the United States could not cease aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek. While on one hand the United States was aiding Great Britain in order to offset
German aggression, it was aiding China to offset the same type of aggression in the Far East.
Throughout Japan and Manchukuo American businesses had been subjected to harsh
treatment by the Japanese; therefore, at this time the American people doubted Japan's
sincere desire for peace." 1
M 'lbid.
" 6 IV, 154-155.
"'/bid.
66
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Reminding Secretary Hull that President Roosevelt himself had offered to mediate in the
Japanese- Chinese peace, Ambassador Kurusu insisted that such peace conferences could
never take place while American aid to Chiang Kai-shek continued. Secretary Hull replied
that President Roosevelt had presupposed that the Japanese would make a definite state-
ment of their peaceful policies. In the past, influential Japanese statesmen had officially
advocated the militaristic expansion of Chancellor Hitler; therefore, if the tension between
Japan and the United States was to be relaxed, the Japanese government must openly
state its desires to follow a course set down by the United States government. Secretary Hull
believed that both he and the Japanese Ambassador had within their power the destiny of
both countries, and even of the human race. In an effort to find a basis for peace negotiations,
Secretary Hull promised to study the latest Japanese proposal sympathetically. 2Jfl
Since the editorial comments in Japanese newspapers had improved during the past
two or three days, Secretary Hull felt that, if once guided, Japanese public opinion could
become favorable toward the present Japanese- American conversations. Therefore, in his
message to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested that Foreign Minister Togo exercise
continuous control over the Japanese press. 249
Ambassador Nomura felt that the American State Department would be ready to
express some opinion on Japan's suggestion for a general agreement to alleviate the condi-
tion in the southwestern Pacific within a few days. Before the meeting drew to a close,
another interview was scheduled for 8:00 p.m. on November 22, 1941."°
72. Hull-Kurusu Conversation (November 21, 1941 )
a. Secretary Hull's Report 261
Calling at Secretary Hull's apartment on November 21, 1941, Mr. Kurusu handed the
American Secretary of State a draft letter which he offered by way of clarifying Japan's
obligations under the Tripartite Pact. 252
In this letter Mr. Kurusu stated that he was surprised to learn that the American people
misunderstood Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Since Mr. Kurusu, as Japa-
nese Ambassador to Germany, had signed this treaty with the Berlin government, he
felt qualified to clear up any false impressions. First of all, Mr. Kurusu pointed out that the
alliance with Germany did not infringe upon Japan's right to act as an independent state.
Although it had assumed certain obligations, Japan was not bound by the interpretation
given to those obligations by either of the other contracting parties. Anxious for peace,
the Japanese government would project Japan into war only as the ultimate, inescapable
necessity for the maintenance of its security and the preservation of national life against
active injustice. Mr. Kurusu asked that Secretary Hull feel free to publish the contents after
complete understanding had been reached by the two governments. 263
After glancing over this letter, Secretary Hull told Mr. Kurusu that he did not feel it
would be of any particular help. Since Mr. Kurusu had nothing more to offer on the subject
of peaceful settlement between Japan and the United States, the interview was ended. 264
" B rv, 156.
**rV, 157.
™IV, 158.
251 "Memorandum by the Secretary of State"- November 21, 1941, S.D. If, 756.
1M Ibid,
!i3 "Draft Letter Handed by Mr. Kurusu to the Secretary of State on November 21, 1941", S.D. II, 7,56-757.
2ii S.D. II, 756.
b. Ambassador Kurusu's Report
In order to arrange tor the interview to take place on November 22, 1941, Secretary Hull met
with Ambassador Kurusu on the previous day. Apparently Secretary Hull was in accord
with Ambassador Kurusu's suggestion that the joint peace agreement between the United
States and Japan gradually overrule Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Because
Viscount Isii and Eigo Fukai had fought for free commerce together with Secretary Hull at
the economic conference in London, the American Secretary of State was sympathetic
toward Japan's economic leadership in the Far East.
As long as Japan gained leadership in the Pacific without resorting to aggression, Ambassa-
dor Kurusu did not feel that the United States would interfere in the activities of that area.
In fact, Secretary Hull openly stated that he would like to see the re-establishment of that
era subsequent to the Russo-Japanese War when Japan and the United States had influenced
the affairs of the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively. Before achieving such
a goal Japan must assure the United States that its alliance with Germany was not an obstacle
to peace. Since the present situation was undoubtedly critical Ambassador Kurusu felt that
Proposal B, submitted to Secretary Hull on the previous day, would have a great bearing
on peace negotiations. Ambassador Kurusu expected an answer to proposal B from Secretary
Hull on Monday, November 24, 1941.""
73, Japanese Air and Surface Patrols Cover Shipping
On November 21, 1941 the [U.S.] Chief of Naval Operations informed fleet commanders
that reliable reports indicated that Japanese air and surface craft were patrolling shipping
routes from the United States to Australasia, with special emphasis apparently being placed
on the Gilbert and Ellice Islands area.
In order to coordinate these operations, the Japanese East Indies fishing fleet had been
divided into three units to cover Bathurst Island, Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres
Strait. Equipped with long-range radio sets with which to contact their base at Palau, units
of this fleet were apparently scheduled to operate around Dutch New Guinea. 266
74. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 22, 1941)
a. State Department 's Report™
By appointment made at the request of Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador
and Mr. Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on November 22, 1941. Secretary Hull began the
conversation by telling Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu that he had spoken with
representatives of the other governments concerned in the affairs of the Pacific in order to
determine if there could be a relaxation of the freezing orders enacted against Japan. As a
result, it had been decided by these other governments that if Japan could give evidence
of its peaceful intentions, the questions of the Pacific could be settled satisfactorily. However,
the representatives of those other governments had the same misgivings which Secretary
Hull himself had experienced during his conversations with Ambassador Nomura.
Secretary Hull then reminded Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese government
had been talking of peace during last July even while its troops moved into Indo- China.
Even though the oil being shipped to Japan during the months prior to the Indo-China
invasion was not being used for normal civilian consumption, Secretary Hull, in spite
of severe public criticism, had induced his government to continue oil exports to Japan.
a55 IV, 159.
166 rv, 160.
"'"Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine— November 22, 1941— S.D. II. 757-762.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Now, in November, with the American statesmen and American press backing a peaceful
policy, the Japanese statesmen and press continued to adopt a warlike tone. Since
Secretary Hull had pointed out several times that Japan would gain commercially from
adopting a peaceful policy, he could not understand why Japanese statesmen did not
cooperate with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu in preaching peace.
Secretary Hull said that the United States government had reached no decision regarding
the Japanese proposals. Nevertheless, the United States was seriously considering the
release of a certain quantity of oil to Japan for civilian requirements. If only Japan could
make more definite assertions regarding its peaceful intentions, Secretary Hull felt that he
would be able to sway the sympathies of the Senators and other persons in this country
toward Japan, After Secretary Hull had finished, Mr. Kurusu stated that the special session
of the Japanese Diet had shown the Japanese people to be severely affected by four years
of war, and it had also shown clearly the effects of the United States freezing measures upon
the Japanese people. In reply to Secretary Hull's question regarding the attitude of the
Japanese army, Mr. Kurusu assured the American Secretary of State that the Army had
acceded to Ambassador Nomura's suggestion regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops
from southern French Indo-China. In spite of this encouraging sign, however, Mr. Kurusu
pointed out, the situation would approach an explosive point unless immediate and
ameliorating action took place. 257 '
Since the world was in such a state of confusion because of the present war, Secretary
Hull encouraged the Japanese statesmen to come out and say definitely that Japan wanted
peace, as the United States had done so many times. Ambassador Nomura answered that
there was not the slightest doubt of Japan's desire for peace, yet he admitted that it would
be difficult to declare publicly that Japan was seeking conciliation. By way of example,
Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull of the agitation in Japan which followed
the peace settlement with Russia in 1905. In spite of Ambassador Nomura's explanations,
Secretary Hull still felt that Japanese statesmen would approach the question of peace with
Teal appreciation of the situation, in order to induce the other powers in the Pacific to reach
a trade arrangement with Japan. If Japan continued such aggressive moves as it had
already begun in French Indo-China, Secretary Hull continued, other nations would
continue their program of armament and the peaceful endeavors of Ambassador Nomura
would be in vain.
If Japan would be satisfied with the gradual relaxation of export restrictions, Secretary
Hull revealed, both the United States and other countries would be willing to supply Japan
with a moderate amount of necessary goods, increasing that amount in proportion to Japan's
demonstration of its peaceful intentions. Not satisfied with the trade concessions which
Secretary Hull promised, Mr. Kurusu insisted that immediate and complete relief was
necessary. Secretary Hull's only comment was that, if the Japanese government needed all
that had been asked for, probably nothing could save it, Furthermore, Secretary Hull felt
that Japan expected the United States to do all the work in bringing about peace. 26 ™
When Mr. Kurusu asked for a further clarification of Secretary Hull's ideas on the trade
situation, Secretary Hull replied that during his conversation with representatives of the
other governments he had discovered that an arrangement could be effected between
Japan and these countries, if Japan would only commit itself to peace. However, if Japan
insisted on modifying and qualifying declarations of its peaceful statements, these other
nations would not be interested.
""•Ibid.
69
Secretary Hull then asked it' a recent proposal handed to him by Ambassador Nomura
was intended as a temporary measure to organize public opinion in Japan in order that the
conversations might continue with the purpose of concluding a more comprehensive agree-
ment. When Mr, Kurusu replied in the affirmative, Secretary Hull stated that Japan was
making the situation more difficult for the countries that were willing to release a certain
amount of exports to Japan, for if Japan retained any troops in northern Indo-China,
regardless of their location, they would constitute a threat to neighboring countries. For
example, Secretary Hull said, almost over -night Japan would be able to move its troops
from northern Indo-China to any point it desired, while the British would be unable to move
even one more ship from Singapore.
Answering that Japan would bring its troops out of French Indo-China completely when
the China affair had been settled, Ambassador Nomura said that at the present time Japan
needed troops in northern Indo-China in order to carry on its war with China. However, it
would take many days to move these Japanese troops from northern Indo-China. Secretary
Hull, however, insisted that uneasiness would prevail as long as Japanese troops remained
in any area of French Indo-China. Furthermore, Secretary Hull felt that Japan expected
the United States to complete all the arrangements toward the settlement of the China
question. Refuting this statement, Mr. Kurusu pointed out that the Japanese Foreign
Minister, in a conversation with Ambassador Grew, had accused the United States of
precisely the same thing. 2671
In emphasizing the fact that it was the Japanese who first diverged from the course of
law and order, Secretary Hull said that the Japanese had moved into French Indo-China in
July. Secretary Hull waved aside Mr. Kurusu's explanation that Japan had been forced into
taking such action because of commercial encirclement by saying that as far back as 1934
he had warned Ambassador Saito that Japan was planning an over-lordship in East Asia,
and that such militarism would eventually plunge the world into another war. At that same
time Secretary Hull had attempted to discourage Hitler from adopting aggressive tactics.
In answer to Ambassador Nomura's comment that American moral support had enabled
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to hold out this long, Secretary Hull said that a major
portion of our fleet was kept in the Pacific to aid China. However, if Japan could only
cooperate by doing a few small peaceful things to tide over the situation, a peaceful
movement could begin within thirty or forty days. Ambassador Nomura maintained that
the psychological effect of a quick settlement would be of the greatest value to Japan.
Although obviously discouraged at Japan's attitude, Secretary Hull still insisted that peace
would become infectious if only the movement were begun, but if the China affair were
injected into the present proposals, Secretary Hull felt that a dangerous obstacle would be
set up. This obstacle, Secretary Hull believed, might even prevent the United States from
mediating between Japan and China." 71 *
After a conclusive discussion on the true situation in Indo-China, Ambassador Nomura
referred to Japan's desire for a quick settlement of the Pacific problems. He asked that
America state exactly what points of the Japanese proposals it could and could not accept.
By way of reply, Secretary Hull urged that the Japanese government spend more time in
preaching the doctrines of peace. Then he said that possibly by Monday, November 24,
1941, after a conference with the representatives of the other governments concerning the
points that had been brought out in the day's conversation, he would have something
definite to say about the Japanese proposals.
Ambassador Nomura assured Secretary Hull that the Japanese government had no desire
to press him for an immediate reply and agreed that Monday would be satisfactory for an
answer to be forthcoming from the United States government,
'"'Ibid.
7U
THE -MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Just before the conversation ended Secretary Hull referred to a general and comprehensive
program involving the collaboration of other countries which he hoped to talk over with
Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Nomura said that Japan hoped for a bilateral agreement
with the United States under which other interested powers could subsequently arrive at a
mutual agreement with Japan. 2SS
b. Am bassador Nomura 's Report iM
Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull and Mr.
Ballantine on November 22, 1941. Secretary Hull began the conversations by stating that
he had conferred earlier in the day with the Ambassadors and Ministers of Great Britain,
Australia and the Netherlands in order to obtain their opinion on the latest Japanese
proposals. As a result of this conversation these representatives concluded that once Japan
gave a sincere indication of its desire for peace, trade relations could be re-established between
Japan and these various countries. However, these same representatives noted that
Japanese politicians and newspapers seemed to be directly opposed to the peaceful course
which the Japanese government claimed to desire.
Giving an example of their reasons for doubting Japan's sincerity, these same diplomats
pointed out to Secretary Hull that Japanese petroleum imports had risen just prior to the
freezing order effected by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. In fact, the
petroleum intake was so great that it was obviously being stored hy the navy and not
consumed in civilian businesses. In view of such action the diplomats of these countries wished
to lift the embargo on exports to Japan only gradually. Before any definite decision could
be made in regard to resuming trade with Japan, however, these representatives wished to
refer the Japanese proposals to their home governments.
In order to offset this suspicion regarding Japan's actual motives, Secretary Hull proposed
that the Japanese government make a clear-cut statement of its desire for peace. Mr.
Ballantine added that such a statement would be more beneficial than the present
propagandistic reports sent out by Tokyo for foreign consumption. Mr. Ballantine continued
that the duty of every politician was to strive for peace. Anxious to determine the attitude
of the United States toward the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Nomura requested that the
British, Australian, and Dutch opinions be laid aside for the time being. Replying to this
request, Secretary Hull discussed the Japanese proposals paragraph by paragraph, but
actually, according to Ambassador Nomura, his comments were completely evasive.
Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the United States, Great Britain,
Australia and the Netherlands were sincerely desirous of avoiding a crisis in the south
Pacific.
Secretary Hull himself admitted that these countries wished to control the situation in the
Far East so that they might be able to transfer their fighting forces to other areas. In view
of this situation Secretary Hull felt that the assurances given by Japan in its proposals were an
insufficient guarantee.
Attempting to refute Secretary Hull's remarks, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the
Japanese troops concentrated in the northern part of French Indo-China were directed at
Yunan, the lifeline of Chungking and not. at the southwest Pacific. However, Secretary Hull
insisted that a quick turnabout in the situation must take place before the United States
or the other countries concerned in the Pacific could answer the present Japanese proposals.
Once this changed had taken place, Secretary Hull stated, trade with Japan could be re-
sumed rapidly"*
""Ibid.
M t$i 161.
""-Ibid.
71
Referring next to the proposed Japanese- Chinese peace negotiations, Secretary Hull
stated that United States' aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would not cease before a
complete understanding had been reached. If the United States were to stop this aid,
Secretary Hull continued, then this government could not be considered a fair and neutral
party, and therefore, could not mediate in the Japanese- Chinese peace. Furthermore,
Secretary Hull felt that the so-called American aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was
largely over-publicized. Secretary Hull concluded his discussion of the China affair by stating
that it was not yet time for President Roosevelt to suggest the commencement of peace nego-
tiations with China.
In spite of certain disagreements which had been uncovered during the present conversa-
tions, Ambassador Kurusu felt that on Monday the United States would submit some sort
of counter proposal suggesting a joint plan for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific
by the United States and Japan. After a preliminary agreement had been arrived at by these
two countries Ambassador Kurusu was convinced that it would be submitted to Great
Britain, Australia and the Netherlands for approval. If this took place it was quite possible
that Japan's objections to any change could be voted down by the four allies. Ambassador
Kurusu insisted that Japan would not accept any proposals unless they met with its complete
approval. 259 *
75. Japan Changes Agreement Deadline to November 29, 1941
Possibly in the hope that the United States would, as Secretary Hull had stated, submit
a counter proposal on November 24, 1941, 260 which would increase the possibility of a
successful conclusion of the present negotiations, Japan agreed to change the deadline for a
Japanese- American agreement from November 25 to November 29, 1941, Tokyo time. 261
However, in notifying Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu of of this change in
date, the Foreign Office stressed the fact that, by that time, an agreement must not only be
signed with the Unitd States, but, by the exchange of pertinent diplomatic notes, some
similar understanding must be concluded with Great Britain and the Netherlands.
Since November 29, 1941 was the final and absolute date which Tokyo had set for the
settlement of its international problems, Foreign Minister Togo urged that both Ambassa-
dors in Washington increase their efforts to bring about peace without relaxing Japan's
fundamental demands. If Japan's aims were not accomplished by this date Foreign
Minister Togo warned "that things are automatically going to happen ". a6s
76. Chief of Naval Operations Warns of Japanese Surprise Attack on Philippines
The United States Navy was not unaware that "things are automatically going to happen",
as Foreign Minister Togo had warned on November 22, 1941. 26;i For on November 24, 1941,
in a message to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, the Chief of
Naval Operations warned that a surprise Japanese aggression in any direction could be
expected. 261 From the movements of Japan's military and naval forces a surprise attack
on the Philippines or Guam was indicated. Senior Army officers in the areas to which this
OpNav message was addressed were to be informed of this fact. In the meantime these
commanders were to observe the utmost secrecy in regard to their actions in order not to
precipitate the expected Japanese attack. 266
'/bid.
mm i
S. D. D, 757-762; IV, 161.
!6 'IV, 162-163.
3fi, rV, 162.
IV, 164.
itt
Ibid.
72
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
On the same day unusual activity was noted in the Mandates on the part of the Japanese.
Coast batteries, lookout stations and landing forces were identified on Truk and Saipan.
From these and other indications it was assumed that similar Japanese defense preparations
were being made at islands in the Jaluit and Palao vicinities, where bases were already
located. 266
77. Ambassador Grew Discusses Japanese Proposals with Foreign Minister Togo* 67
On November 21, 1941, Ambassador Grew advised Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of
State Welles of the details of his conference with Foreign Minister Togo. 2 * 8 During the
conversation Foreign Minister Togo asked whether Ambassador Grew was familiar with the
Japanese proposals presented to the American State Department on November 20, 1941, 269
and with the conversation between Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu
on November 22, 1941."° Although Ambassador Grew had received a copy of the Japanese
proposals, he had not yet been informed of the details of the conversation which took place
on Novem ber 22, 1941. Therefore, Foreign Minister Togo gave him some of the more pertinent
details. 2 ' 1
Foreign Minister Togo disclosed to Ambassador Grew that Secretary Hull, in a conference
with representatives of other governments interested in the Pacific, had learned that Japan's
offer to withdraw its troops from the southern part of French Indo-China did not meet with
their approval. In explaining to Ambassador Grew that Japan could not withdraw its troops
from the northern part of French Indo-China as well, since they had been sent there to hasten
the conclusion of the China affair, Foreign Minister Togo insisted that Japan's offer had been
an attempt to ease the tension in the Pacific.
Remarking that the United States and Great Britain had put their freezing orders into
effect in the first place because Japan had moved its troops to southern Indo-China, Foreign
Minister Togo could not understand why the withdrawal of its troops from that section was
not satisfactory to those governments. In any event, Foreign Minister Togo continued, Japan's
maximum concession was the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the northern part of French
Indo-China.
Foreign Minister Togo stated that the settlement of the China affair had always been one
of the principal obstacles to the restoration of friendly relations between Japan and the
United States. If, however, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were to state his desire to restore
peace with Japan, as President Roosevelt had suggested he might do, Foreign Minister
Togo said Japan would enter into negotiations with China provided that the United States
refrained from any action prejudicial to the restoration of peace. Since Foreign Minister Togo
insisted that the United States' activities must not obstruct peace between Japan and China,
Ambassador Grew interrupted to inquire as to which American activities Foreign Minister
Togo referred. Foreign Minister Togo replied that although he was unfamiliar with military
matters he felt that any American action calculated to aid Chinese military forces should
cease as soon as peace negotiations were started.
Foreign Minister Togo turned the conversation to a discussion of the Japanese proposals
presented to the American State Department on November 20, 1941. Since he had formulated
the document, Foreign Minister Togo felt qualified to state that the proposal was a
manifestation of Japan's future cooperative spirit, based on a desire for peace. Ambassador
m IV, 165,
M, The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State— November 24, 1941, S.D. [I, 762-764.
™Ibid.
1M S.D. II, 755-756.
'""S.D. n, 757-762.
s,, S.D.n, 762-764.
73
Grew's only reply was that be would forward Foreign Minister Togo's remarks to the United
States government.
Just before the conversation ended, Ambassador Grew suggested that, in the event the
Japanese government did not expect the United States to suspend aid to China prior to the
commencement of peace negotiations, the clause in the Japanese proposals referring to
American non-interference in the efforts of Japan to settle the China affair would be interpreted
as a statement designed to save Japanese face." 1 "
78. Ambassador Nomura Warns Against Inaccurate News Reporting
In spite of the fact that both the Japanese Embassy in Washington and the American
State Department were withholding all reports concerning Japanese- American relations,
Ambassador Nomura reported on November 25, 1941 that various Japanese correspon lents
were writing newspaper articles based purely on conjecture. Although many of these
correspondents recognized that their articles were valueless, they were forced to make such
reports concerning the conversations because of pressure exerted by heads of newspaper
offices. Since the situation was becoming extremely critical, Ambassador Nomura urged
that Foreign Minister Togo exercise more control over Japanese correspondents, and
particularly over the officials in charge of the newspaper syndicates. If newspaper officials
directed their special correspondents to publish only authorized information concerning the
Japanese- American negotiations, this difficulty could be cleared up immediately . m
79. Foreign Minister Togo Questions Newspaper Interpretation of Proposals
Tokyo as well as Washington reported problems arising out of unauthorized newspaper
articles. 213 On November 26, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo questioned an American news-
paper interpretation of the Japanese proposals in which Japanese evacuation of French
Indo- China was indicated as depending upon the rescinding of the American freezing act.
In case Ambassador Nomura himself believed that there was some connection between the
two measures, Foreign Minister Togo stated that even if such a mutual agreement on
those two points could be reached it would be inadequate to meet the present situation.
The Japanese government desired an agreement based on its Proposal B, excluding the
questions of non- discrimination of trade and the Tripartite Pact, and incorporating the
suggestion made by the United States on November 12, 1941 concerning the establishment
of peace between Japan and China through the mediation of the United States. Since the
time allotted for the successful conclusion of the present negotiations was growing short
Foreign Minister Togo asked Ambassador Nomura to get in touch with United States'
authorities and influential Americans in an effort to obtain an immediate answer to
Japanese proposals. 273 "
In reply to Tokyo's instructions, Ambassador Nomura stated that the question concerning
the evacuation of Japanese troops from all of French Indo- China, appearing in the American
newspapers, had been unauthorized and not founded upon any discussion between
American and Japanese representatives in Washington. Although he had attempted to use
his influence to work upon the sympathies of influential Americans, Ambassador Nomura
" l 'Ibid.
17i rV, 166. The pessimism of Japanese newspapers toward these conversations was reflected in a statement made
by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi denouncing the Kurusu mission as a failure. The Domei news service agreed that condi-
tions were such that any optimism on the part of the Japanese was totally unwaranted. (New York Times,
November 25, 1941, 1:5).
213 IV, 167.
""Ibid.
74
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
continued, Secretary Hull was already turning the opinion of these American representatives
to his own advantage. 274
80. Tokyo Wishes Agreement to Include Petroleum Exports
In the event that a settlement should be reached on the basis of the latest Japanese
proposal, Foreign Minister Togo wished for an immediate agreement regarding the
acquisition of necessary materials. Even prior to the signing of an understanding the
Japanese Foreign Minister desired a definite guarantee from the United States regarding the
amount of petroleum to be exported to Japan. An average amount of 4,000,000 tons of
petroleum per year had been exported from the United States to Japan during 1938, 1939
and 1940 before the freezing legislation went into effect. These exports amounted to
approximately 333,000 tons per month. Under the suggested agreement the Japanese govern-
ment would expect to receive the same amount of petroleum with a gradual increase if the
negotiations continued favorably. In addition, the Japanese government wished to import
1,000,000 tons of petroleum a year from the Netherlands East Indies. In order to validate the
verbal agreements reached, Foreign Minister Togo suggested that a definite statement be
incorporated into the exchange of documents between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary
Hull." s
81. Japanese Ambassadors Offer to Tokyo Final Suggestion for Peace
After Tokyo had wired its embassy in Washington concerning the demands to be made
once an agreement was reached with the United States, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu
replied that there was very little possibility of the United States' acceptance of Japan's
Proposal B in its entirety. 27 * In fact, the two Japanese ambassadors felt that negotiations
would be completely ruptured if the present situation were not alleviated immediately in
some way. By way of a suggestion Ambassador Nomura proposed that President Roosevelt wire
the Japanese government personally to request cooperation in the maintenance of peace in
the Pacific. In return, Japan would extend a cordial reply.
In declaring their friendliness to the United States, however, Ambassador Nomura and
Ambassador Kurusu warned the Japanese cabinet that it must not overlook the fact that
England and the United States were attempting to bring the Netherlands East Indies under
their military domination. In order to forestall the domination of French Indo- China, the
Netherlands East Indies and Thailand by the allied nations, Ambassador Nomura suggested
their establishment as neutral nations in accordance with a proposal submitted by
President Roosevelt in September, 1941.
Although the breakdwon of negotiations might not necessarily mean war between Japan
and the United States, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu felt that once England and the
United States had militarily occupied the Netherlands East Indies, Japan would be forced
to attack allied troops. In the event that such a war did take place, a problem would arise
as to whether Germany would feel bound by the Tripartite Pact to come to the assistance
of Japan. Both Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu doubted that such aid would
be forthcoming from Berlin.
Referring next to the Sino-Japanese incident, the two Japanese representatives stated that
the end of the world would come before this problem was settled. Since this was the last
expression regarding the negotiations which either Ambassador intended to make they
"TV, 168.
m Vi, 169.
" e IV, 170.
176 ° Ibid.
75
requested that a copy of their opinions be submitted to the
and that some answer be made immediately by the Japanese government. 271
82. Tokyo Orders Reports on Negotiations to Be Made by Telephone
Since the situation was becoming so tense that immediate reports on the negotiations
were desired by Tokyo, the Foreign Office ordered the Japanese Embassy in Washington
to make future reports by telephone to Chief Kumaicho Yamamoto, Chief of the American
Bureau in Tokyo. As a security precaution the Foreign Office sent Ambassador Nomura
a copy of a verbal code to be used for telephone communications. 278 However, Ambassador
Nomura did not believe that a sufficient amount of time would be saved by this new means
of communication to warrant use of the international telephone system. He pointed out
that the hours for telephone conversations between Japan and the United States were
restricted to the time between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., 2:00 p.m.
and 5:00 p.m., Tokyo time. Therefore, he held that it would be better to continue wiring
urgent news. 279
83. Secretary Hull Confers with Allied Representatives (November 24, 1941)
On two different occasions, Ambassador Nomura reported, Secretary Hull had conferred
with representatives of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and China.
Since Japanese-American relations affected Great Britain more than any of the other
countries, Secretary Hull had discussed the Pacific problem chiefly with the British
Ambassador, and was maintaining communications with the Australian, Dutch, and
Chinese representatives largely through him. As the result of conducting some separate
conversations with each of these representatives, instead of having them meet for joint
84. Conference with Japanese Representatives Postponed by Secretary Hull
Although a conference between Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu
had been arranged for November 24, 1941, Secretary Hull postponed this meeting since he had
not yet completed discussing the Japanese proposals with representatives of the Allied nations. 261
On the following day, therefore, the Japanese representatives again inquired whether Secretary
Hull was free to meet with Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu. The State
Department replied that an answer would be forthcoming on the next day. Since various bureaus
of the State Department were still debating the items in the Japanese proposals, and in view of
the fact that Secretary Hull was still conferring with the British Ambassador, Ambassador
Nomura was convinced that the United States desired to speed up the present negotiations. He
felt that a conference between American and Japanese officials would undoubtedly take place on
November 26, 1941. 282
On the morning of November 26, 1941 Mr. Terasaki called on Mr. Ballantine to arrange the
time for this interview. However, Mr. Ballantine stated that Secretary Hull was still studying the
Japanese proposals; nevertheless, from Mr. Ballantine's remarks Mr. Terasaki concluded that
Secretary Hull would be free to confer with Ambassador Nomura later in the day. 283
Consequently, a i
i77 rv, i7i.
m IV, 172.
278 IV, 173.
194 IV, 174.
i!1 IV, 175.
m IV, 176.
m W, 177.
3flH IV T 178.
76
THE -'MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After the time of the conversation had been set Minister Wakasugi called Mr. Yamamoto by
international telephone to notify the Japanese Foreign Office that a conference had been arranged
with Secretary Hull. In reply to a question by Mr. Yamamoto during this telephone conversation,
Minister Wakasugi stated that arrangements had not yet been made to see President Roosevelt.
However, since Secretary Hull had been conferring with the Chinese representatives for the past
three days, it seemed apparent that the day's interview would decide the course of future
negotiations. Mr. Yamamoto then ordered Minister Wakasugi to report the results of the day's
meeting by telephone. 286
85. Hull- Nomura Conversation (November 26, 1941)
a. State Department's Report 2se
When Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called at the American State Department on
November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull handed each of the Japanese representatives an outline of a
tentative and unofficial proposed agreement between Japan and the United States. 287
In this document, under Section I "Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy", the United States and
Japan, in declaring that their policies in the Pacific were peaceful, were to guarantee not only
that they had no territorial design on any part of the Pacific, but that they had no intention of
using military force, ot in any way threatening any neighboring nation. In pursuit of this peaceful
national policy, both governments were to apply the following principles to their relations with all
other governments:
1. The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treat ment.
4. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention
and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by
peaceful methods and processes.
In order to provide a strong economic basis for peace, Japan and the United States agreed to
eliminate political instability and prevent recurrent economic collapse by adopting the following
principles:
1. The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
2. The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism
as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
3. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
4. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as
respects the operation of international commodities agreements.
5. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international
finance as may lend aid to essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries,
and as may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all
countries. iBS
Under the provisions of Section II "Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States
and by the Government of Japan", the United States and Japan were to conclude a multilateral
non- aggression pact with the British Empire, China, the Netherlands, Russia and Thailand.
With the British, Chinese, Netherlands and Thaiese governments Japan and the United States
were to conclude a separate agreement pledging the territorial integrity of French Indo-China,
2BS TV, 179.
'""Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine— November 26, 1941, S.D. II, 764-766.
291 Ibid.
"""Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) — November 26, 1941", S.D.
II, 768-770. For Japanese version of this document wired to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on November 26, 1941, see IV,
77
and guaranteeing that any necessary measures would be taken to offset the threat of aggression
against that territory.
In the matter of trade and commerce these governments would agree not to accept preferential
treatment in economic dealings with French indo-China. In following the spirit of this pledge,
Japan would withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from French Indo-China and from
China. Furthermore, the United States and Japan, in order to restore the regular government at
Chungking, would refuse to recognize any military, political or economic government established
in China and would give up all extra-territorial rights, including those gained under the Boxer
Protocol of 1901 and other international settlements and concessions.
Every effort was to be exerted to have Great Britain and other governments interested in the
Pacific give up similar extra- terr i tori a i rights in China. For the conclusion of an equitable trade
agreement between the United States and Japan negotiations were to be based upon reciprocal
measures calling for the reduction of trade barriers by both countries. For example, the United
States would place raw silk on the free list, and both governments would remove the freezing
restrictions placed on the funds of the other. As another means of aiding economic relations
between the two countries, the dollar-yen rate would be stablized with funds supplied by Japan
and the United States. In order to ensure the maintenance of these political and economic
agreements the United States and Japan were to guarantee that they would not enter into any
alliances with a third power prejudicial to these principles. Both governments were to attempt to
influence other countries to give practical application to the basic political and economic
principles as stated in this document. 289
Secretary Hull then handed Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu an explanatory oral
statement in which the Japanese government was reminded that the informal conversations
carried on between representatives of both governments for the past several months were aimed
at settling the Pacific problem by a complete application of the principles of peace and non-
discriminatory treatment. These principles included the inviolability of the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of each and every nation; non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries; opportunity for commercial equality and the improvement of international conditions
by the peaceful settlement of controversies. 29 "
Because the Japanese government believed that a favorable atmosphere would be created if a
temporary ''modus vivendi" could be agreed upon while the conversations continued toward a
more complete settlement of Pacific problems, Ambassador Nomura had handed Secretary Hull
a set of new proposals on November 20. 1941. Anxious to contribute to the promotion and
maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, the United States was aiming toward a
broad-gauge program. After carefully considering the Japanese proposals of November 20, 1941,
the United States came to the decision that these proposals conflicted with the fundamental
principles upon which this broad-gauge settlement was to be formulated. Therefore, the United
States offered the Japanese government its own suggestions for the simple settlement of the
Pacific problems. Although making a new approach to old problems, this plan was still based
upon the practical application of the fundamental principles already agreed upon during the
informal conversations and it was designed to bridge the gap between the United States proposals
of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese counter proposals of September 25, 1941. 1:31
When he finished reading both documents, Mr. Kurusu asked whether this constituted the
United States' official reply to Japan's proposal for a "modus vivendi". Because of the natural
reaction which the American people felt towards some Japanese who were continually advocating
S83
'Ibid.
!90 "Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)— November 26, 1941", S.D.
U. 766-767. For Japanese version of this oral statement sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on November '>6 1941 see
IV. 186-1S9.
IV, 186-189
'"'Ibid
78
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
warlike aggression, Secretary Hull replied, the United States had been forced to treat the
Japanese proposals in this manner. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura,
although it was not specifically stated in the counter proposal which the United States
government had just presented to the Japanese representatives, that the United States might
give Japan financial aid and might even settle the immigrant question if the Pacific problems
were satisfactorily settled.
In replying to Secretary Hull, Mr. Kurusu referred to the proposed agreement in derogatory
terms, ^ noting that the principles contained therein were reiterations of the Stimson Doctrine.
The doctrine to which Mr. Kurusu referred was enunciated by Secretary of State Stimson in a
dispatch sent to Ambassador Forbes in Japan in 1932. m At that time the United States had been
confident that the neutral commission authorized by the Council of the League of Nations would
bring about the solution of the difficulties existing between Japan and China. However, the
United States wished to notify both the Japanese government and the Chinese Republic at the
same time that it would not recognize the legality of any treatment or agreement between those
countries which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or American citizens in
Japan, including any treaties relating to the sovereignty, independence, territorial or
administrative integrity of China, or to the Open Door Policy in China. Any agreement contrary
to the covenants and obligations undertaken by Japan and the United States in the Pact of Paris
on August 27, L928, would not be recognized by the United States government. 294
Citing Japan's experience with the Hague Tribunal, when it lost a case in connection with
perpetual leases, Mr. Kurusu pointed out that Japan's bitter experience with international
organizations made it object to the United States' present proposals for multilateral non-
aggression pacts. In fact, Mr. Kurusu blamed the Washington Conference Treaties for China's
taking advantage of Japan's rights. If the United States continued to request that Japan
recognize Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, then Mr. Kurusu did not see how any understanding
on the Chinese question could be reached. Knowing that the proposal which Secretary Hull had
just handed Ambassador Nomura was tentative and unofficial, Mr. Kurusu suggested that it not
be referred to the Japanese government before American and Japanese representatives discussed
its contents further. At a time when the American public had lost the proper perspective of the
Japanese-American situation, Secretary Hull said, the United States had felt it necessary to draw
up a document presenting a detailed picture of its position in regard to every essential point
connected with the Pacific question.
Referring next to the question of exporting oil to Japan, Secretary Hujl emphasized that public
opinion was so strong that if he freely permitted shipments of oil to Japan he might be lynched.
He then reminded Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu that the mobilization of Japanese
forces in French Indo-China was directly affecting American interests as well as menacing
countries to the south and west of French Indo-China.
Turning back to the pertinent questions of the China problem, Mr. Kurusu stated
frankly that Japan would find it difficult to renounce Mr. Wang Ching-wei. Mr. Kurusu
then attempted to show the value of the Nanking regime which had been set up in China,
but Secretary Hull remained unconvinced.
When Ambassador Nomura requested that he and Mr. Kurusu be permitted to see
President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull replied that President Roosevelt would be happy to
see them at any time. Mr. Kurusu referred to America's lack of interest in the "modus
vivendi", and said the American response could be interpreted as meaning the end of
negotiations. Refusing to state definitely whether the United States had been influenced in
S.D. 11,764.
"Secretary of State to Ambassador in Japan (Forbes)— January 7. 1931", S.D. I, 76.
Ibid.
79
this matter by the opinions of the other powers with which a discussion had taken place,
Secretary Hull merely stated that the United States government had explored the possibility
of a "modus vivendi" and decided against it.
When the question of publicity was raised, Secretary Hull said that he would give a
simple statement to the press tomorrow. Ambassador Nomura said he would not question
Secretary Hull's right to give out what he desired. 296
b. Ambassador Nomura 's Report™
At 4:45 p.m. on November 26, 1941 Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu discussed
the Japanese proposals for approximately two hours. At the outset of the discussion
Secretary Hull stated that after numerous conferences with representatives of other nations
concerned in the Pacific it has been decided that the Japanese proposals submitted to the
United States government on November 20, 1941 were unsatisfactory. Therefore, in order to
reconcile the divergent points of view expressed in the American proposal of June 21, 1941,
and the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941, the United States was at this time
submitting a tentative and unofficial plan.
After reading over that part of the American document which suggested an agreement
between England, the Netherlands, China and Thailand, and also the various points
regarding the stabilization of trade and politics, Ambassador Nomura replied that the
United States' proposals were decidedly unconciliatory and therefore would be entirely
unacceptable to Japan. Ambassador Nomura was convinced that England, the Netherlands
and China had a hand in drawing up these uncompromising terms. In support of this belief
Ambassador Nomura stated that quite recently he had heard rumors that the Japanese
were demanding complete control of Thailand's national defense, and he believed that the
effects of these rumors could be seen in America's latest proposals. 291
Ambassador Nomura did not feel that this latest American proposal made any attempt to
reconcile the American proposal of June 21, 1941 with that submitted by the Japanese
government on September 25, 1941, since the proposal differed from both preceding ones.
Secretary Hull replied that the American people, unaware of the contents of the Japanese -
American conversations, believed their government to be forsaking China. In view of these
beliefs, influential Americans were beginning to utter non-pacific statements. In view of
the present situation, Secretary Hull was unable to combat these unfavorable circumstances. 298
Ambassador Nomura then pointed out various terms in this latest American document
which did not meet with the approval of his government. For example, the four fundamental
principles upon which the United States wished to base its relations with Japan were
a reworking of the Stimson Doctrine. If Japan were to attempt to put these principles into
effect, particularly the one pertaining to non- discrimination in Japanese commercial dealings
with China, the economic situation in that occupied territory would be seriously impaired.
However, Secretary Hull maintained that the application of that principle would not have
to take place immediately.
Referring next to Section II of the American document, in which the United Stated proposed
a non-aggression pact among Great Britain, China, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia,
Thailand and the United States, Ambassador Nomura insisted that it revived the Nine-
Power Treaty. In view of the fact that the Japanese had been at war for longer than four
years with China and as yet had received no benefit from this war, the government could not
^S.D. n, 764-766.
iS6 IV, 190.
iS7 IV, 191.
"TV, 192.
80
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
accept this proposal. 2 9 s According to Ambassador Nomura, Japan could not agree to
denounce the Nanking regime.
In regard to troop evacuations from Japanese-occupied territories, Secretary Hull answered
that such a move need not take place until negotiations had been satisfactorily concluded. In
speaking of Japan's refusal to renounce the Nanking government of China Secretary Hull
stated that, since the Japanese puppet government was known to have little influence over
the Chinese anyway, it would make little difference if that government were completely
dissolved. Ambassador Nomura merely stated that throughout the history of China there
had been many governments. In the matter of the entire Chinese question, Ambassador
Nomura felt that the United States was unreasonable in expecting Japan to make every
possible concession and on the other hand to "apologize to Chungking". 3 ™
Although promising to read over the American proposal and give it careful consideration,
Ambassador Nomura did not offer any hope for an understanding based upon the proposal
since he felt that it would be unwise to submit the proposal to the Japanese government as it
stood. Nevertheless, hoping that some agreement could be reached. Ambassador Nomura
requested an interview with President Roosevelt. Secretary Hull promised that he would
arrange for that meeting, 301
86. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Mr. Yamamoto (he Outcome of the Conference
On the evening of the conference Ambassador Kurusu advised Mr. Kumaicho Yamamoto
by telephone of the outcome of the discussion with Secretary Hull. Stating that the situation
was now serious and that the American representatives refused to yield a point, Ambassador
Kurusu said that he could not guarantee any satisfaction from the future meeting with
President Roosevelt unless some method could be found for concluding an understanding.
After thanking Ambassador Kurusu for the efforts he had already made, Mr. Yamamoto
explained that the situation in Tokyo was also extremely critical. 301 " Though Mr. Yamamoto
had not been too hopeful of the outcome, in concluding the telephone conversation,
Ambassador Kurusu expressed the hope that some workable solution could be found. 30 ' 2
87. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Terminating the Present Negotiations
Because of the unsuccessful trend of the Japanese- American negotiations Ambassador
Nomura informed his government on November 26, 1941 that there was little hope that the
United States government would agree to any of the suggestions made by the Japanese
within the time limit set by the Foreign Minister. ,02 ° According to Ambassador Nomura the
United States was delaying negotiations on the grounds that it had to discuss Pacific
problems with representatives of various other governments.
Ambassador Nomura warned that the Japanese government would have to exercise
extreme caution in making any move in the Pacific, for already American propagandists
were reporting that the Japanese were continuing negotiations only as a means of preparing
for further aggression. If, then, the Japanese government should complete its scheduled
operations, the United States would immediately blame Tokyo for the rupture of Japanese-
American negotiations. On the other hand, if Japan were to force a rupture in the negotia-
tions, America would also use this move as counter propaganda against the Japanese
m IV, 193.
"IV, 194.
W 1V, 195.
3 °'"See Section 16-A which indicates that Japan had made plans as early as November 5-7, 1941 to attack
Hawaii. This information was not available until June 4, 1945.
M, IV, 196.
•"•IV, 199-200.
81
government. Though Ambassador Nomura recognized the fact that clarification of Japan's
intentions must remain a strict military secret, he suggested that the current negotiations
be clearly and irrevocably concluded through an announcement to the American Embassy
in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. At the same time, a
similar announcement would be made by Ambassador Nomura to the State Department in
Washington. 303
88. United States Occupies Dutch Guiana
In the midst of the United States' discussions with the Netherlands regarding Pacific
problems, the White House suddenly made the announcement on November 24, 1941, that
the United States, under an agreement with the Netherlands, would occupy Dutch Guiana
to protect the aluminum deposits found in that territory. While ordinarily the Netherlands
would be able to protect these deposits by means of its own armed forces, the present
situation in the South Pacific made it impractical for that government to divide the strength
of its troops. Brazil was to assist the United States in this protective measure.
The Japanese Ambassador notified Tokyo that while en route to the Netherlands East
Indies the Dutch Foreign Minister had stopped off at Washington to speak with American
officials, and as a result the United States had increased the amount of military supplies
sent to the East Indies and had effected an exchange of technicians and military experts
with the Dutch. In view of these events Ambassador Nomura felt that once Japanese-
American negotiations were broken off the United States and Great Britain would occupy the
Netherlands East Indies with their troops to protect the Netherlands' tin and rubber. 30 "
89. American Armed Forces Prepare for War
On November 26, 1941, traffic analysis disclosed that strong forces of Japanese submarines
and air groups were operating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. As this force grew to
include the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier and one-third of the submarines in
the Japanese fleet, it was surmised that a strong Japanese task force was preparing to
operate in southeastern Asia with its component parts operating from the Marshalls and
Palao. 306 Another report, however, stated that it was impossible to confirm the supposition
that carriers and submarines were in the Mandates, since the best sources indicated that all
known First and Second Fleet carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. However, a number
of cruiser and destroyer divisions, as well as Batdiv 3 and base forces were expected to
operate in the Mandates. 306
On November 26, 1941, the Office of Naval Operations notified the Commander-in-Chief
of the Asiatic Fleet that once war was declared between Japan and the United States
"Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare, May
19, 1941", would become effective. 307 Besides the instructions contained in this document
the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was authorized to order unrestricted sub-
marine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping in a defined strategic area covering the
waters from Shanghai to the Netherlands East Indies.
All friendly, enemy and neutral vessels were to be warned to enter this prescribed area
only through lanes leading to naval control stations. Such safety zones would be carefully
defined and set up after conferring with British and Dutch naval authorities. However, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was warned not to reveal America's intentions
regarding unrestricted submarines and aerial warfare.
301 rv, 20i.
^IV, 197.
306 IV, 198.
M1 rv, 202.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Particular precautions were to be taken in order to prevent any hostile ships from obtaining
information which would be detrimental to American armed forces, if transmitted to
Japan. On the other hand, if hostilities began without the formal declaration of war the
same procedure would probably be followed although orders from the Chief of Naval
Operations would first have to be issued.' 107 " To allow the Army Air Forces in strategic areas
of the Pacific to make appropriate plans, the Army Chief of Staff requested that the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, send this information to General MacArthur. 308
On November 26, 1941 the United States Army offered certain infantry units for reinforcing
existing naval defense battalions. Although anti- aircraft units were not available, the
Army proposed to garrison troops in Hawaii at the Navy's request. The Chief of Naval Opera-
tions passed this information to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet with the respect-
that he be informed of the number of troops and the armament desired. 309
In order to leave planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing free for expeditionary nights,
the Army on November 26, 1941 proposed to supply Midway and Wake each with twenty-
five pursuit planes. However, the Navy would be responsible for transporting the planes
and ground crews from Oahu to these islands aboard aircraft carriers. Furthermore, the
Navy was obligated to supply water and subsistence to the Army Air Force crews as well as
to supply them with necessary equipment. It was understood, nevertheless, that the
transfer of these planes to the Navy's use was not to interfere with the planned movements
of Army bombers in the Philippines. When arrangements had been made with the Command-
ing General, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was to advise the Chief of Naval
Operations on the decisions made. 310
Further orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations revealed cooperation between the
Army and Navy. Army troops were to be dispatched to support Marine Units in the Pacific,
and 37mm. anti-aircraft guns would also be sent, although probably not until February.
Effective defense plans for all outlying bases and increases scheduled for the immediate
future were to be sent to the Chief of Naval Operations. 311
90. Roosevelt-. Nomura Conversation (November 27, 1941 )
a. Secretary Hull's Report 312
Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on President Roosevelt on November 27, 1941.
Although President Roosevelt began the conversation by referring to German international
psychology, Ambassador Nomura immediately turned the discussion to Japan's disappoint-
ment over the United States' attitude toward a "modus vivendi". Although expressing the
grateful appreciation of the United States government to the peaceful element in Japan and
emphasizing the fact that the United States still desired the realization of this peace. President
Roosevelt mentioned Japan's recent occupation of French Indo-China and the aggressive
attitude of Japanese statesmen as serious obstacles to the re-establishment of Pacific stabi-
lity. Even during the informal, exploratory conversations. President Roosevelt continued, the
United States had noted with considerable disappointment that Japanese leaders opposed
the fundamental principles of peace, thereby creating an atmosphere wholly unsuitable to
the establishment of law and order.
President Roosevelt pointed out that public opinion in the United States would not allow
the government to relax substantially its economic restrictions unless Japan gave a clear
"'Ibid.
'"IV, 203.
,S IV, 204.
"IV, 205.
'IV, 206.
S3
manifestation of its peaceful intent. President Roosevelt stated that Japan's best interests lay
along peaceful lines and not those advocated by Hitler. After four years of war, President
Roosevelt continued, the Japanese people needed peace and, therefore, he could not under-
stand why Japanese statesmen should obstruct the whole movement under discussion in
Washington. ;m °
Mr. Kurusu replied that after being here for ten days and studying the problems firsthand,
he had decided that the trouble lay, not with the fundamental principles, but with their appli-
cation. Mr. Kurusu then referred to President Roosevelt's recent suggestion about introducing
Japan and China in order that peace might be worked out between those two countries. Reply-
ing to Mr. Kumsu's question as to which of the two sides would make the first move, President
Roosevelt stated that both sides would be responsible. Secretary Hull then declared that the
250,000 carpetbaggers who had followed the Japanese Army into North China must be forced
to give up the property they had taken from other people.
Commenting on Japan's attempts to colonize countries under its domination, President
Roosevelt said Japan would fail as Germany had because of lack of experienced people to
govern those captured countries. Furthermore, President Roosevelt felt that Japan could not
claim encirclement when Japan itself was encircling the Philippines.
At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull stated that the Japanese government would
have to control its warlike elements before the exploratory conversations could achieve success.
In Secretary Hull's opinion, everyone recognized that Japan's slogans, "co-prosperity" and
"new order in the Far East", merely camouflaged a policy of military domination of the politi-
cal, economic and social affairs of the countries in the Pacific. As long as Japan maintained
alliances such as the anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull concluded,
no real progress could be made in the peace negotiations with Japan. 31 3
b. Ambassador Nomura 's Report 11 *
In accordance with the arrangements made by Ambassador Nomura, both Japanese Am-
bassadors called on President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on November 27, 1941.
President Roosevelt began the conversation by stating that during World War I, when Japan
and the United States were allies, both governments had come to realize that Germany did
not understand the thoughts of other nations. President Roosevelt realized that there were
many in Japan, as there were in the United States, who were anxious to re-establish the for-
mer peaceful relations between the two governments. However, during the past several
months, particularly after the Japanese occupation of southern French Indo-China, the United
States had been very much disappointed in the trend of events. Although President Roosevelt
admitted that the Japanese people had been living under war conditions for some time, and
that the American people had been living in peace, he could not understand why the leading
officials of the Japanese government could not turn Japanese public opinion toward a policy
of peace. The suggestion offered by the Japanese representatives that a "modus vivendi" be
arranged would not be of any value, President Roosevelt continued, unless the basic principles
of international relations were agreed upon. By way of example, President Roosevelt reminded
the Japanese ambassadors that before his conference with Prime Minister Churchill on the
high seas Great Britain and the United States had already determined their respective basic
policies and found them to coincide.* 140
Ambassador Kurusu replied that the differences in opinion existing between Japan and the
United States were not traceable to the basic principles of those governments, but rather to
""Ibid.
313 Md.
3,, IV, 207
"'"Ibid.
84
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
the application of those principles. For example, he pointed out, Japan agreed with the United
States that the principle of commercial non-discrimination should be established, J16 However,
if it were immediately applied to China, Ambassador Kuruau continued, the radical and
sudden change in the economic situation there would be dangerous.
Secretary Hull answered that the United States understood fully the economic situation
in the Far East. As for the danger of a sudden economic change in China, Secretary Hull re-
ferred to the 250,000 Japanese residents who had followed their troops to occupied China and
set up various enterprises there. If the Japanese government wished to consider the effects of
a changing economic system on these merchants, then Secretary Hull admitted the the prob-
lem would be difficult. However, the American Secretary of State did not believe that these
merchants had any valid claims to be considered. Ambassador Kurusu merely answered that
Japan was concerned only with the major economic problems.
The discussion then turned to President Roosevelt's suggestion for bringing about a peace
agreement between Japan and China. President Roosevelt stated that it would be necessary
for both countries to give some indication that they sincerely wished to negotiate for such a
peace. Since President Roosevelt bad had considerable experience in acting as a mediator
between two opposing elements in many domestic crises, Ambassador Nomura was con-
vinced that the American President would be able to handle the Japanese-Chinese situation
satisfactorily. However, the Japanese Ambassador explained that he would need instructions
from Tokyo.
Secretary Hull said that another reason for the failure to agree upon a "modus vivendi" was
that the United States could not reconcile itself to Japan's aggressive measures. Furthermore,
Secretary Hull stated, Japan was allied to Germany under the Tripartite Pact and under the
Anti- Communism Pact. In addition, Japan was continuing to send vast numbers of troops to
French Indo-China in order to check the military powers of other countries in that area. Yet in
spite of these aggressive moves Japan asked for American petroleum exports in the name of
peace. As he had pointed out in former conversations, Secretary Hull continued, neither the
Japanese Prime Minister nor Foreign Minister Togo had taken any concrete action to facilitate
peace negotiations. In fact, Secretary Hull stated, they continued to speak of establishing a
new order by means of force. 316
Bringing the interview to a close President Roosevelt stated that he was leaving the follow-
ing afternoon for a rest; however, he hoped to meet with both Ambassador Nomura and Am-
bassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu when he returned the following Wednesday. Am-
bassador Nomura commented that President Roosevelt looked very tired. President Roosevelt
sincerely hoped that while he was gone some means of settlement might be found by the Japa-
nese and American officials. 3160
91. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Mr. V am am o to
Using the voice code established by Tokyo, 317 Ambassador Kurusu telephoned Mr. Yama-
moto, Chief of the American Division of the Japanese Foreign Office, on the evening of Novem-
ber 27, 1941, in order to report on the interview with President Roosevelt. In reply to Mr.
Yamamoto's questions regarding the negotiations Ambassador Kurusu stated that little
progress had been made. Although at one time it seemed as though some agreement could be
reached, at present it was obvious that a crisis was imminent. In spite of the unfavorable
trend of affairs, however, Mr. Yamamoto urged Ambassador Kurusu not to break off negotia-
tions.
3,S IV, 207.
m Ibid.
S17 rv, 172.
85
Ambassador Kurusu agreed to continue the conversations though Mr. Yamamoto indicated
that Japan was preparing for an imminent crisis. According to Mr. Kurusu the Japanese
Army was very impatient at this time. Mr. Yamamoto said that the Japanese government
could not make any further concessions. After emphasizing the fact that Japanese aggression
in French Indo-China was largely responsible for the lack of progress in Japanese-American
negotiations, Mr. Kurusu terminated the telephone conversation. 318
92. Chief of Naval Operations Issues War Warning
Although no formal announcement had been made, it seemed apparent that peace nego-
tiations between Japan and the United States were at an end. In anticipation of Japanese
aggression in the Pacific, on November 27, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Asaitic Fleet and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet a war
warning. It announced that negotiations with Japan had ceased, and an aggressive move by
Japan was expected within the next few days. From the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and naval task forces there were indications of an amphibious expedition against the
Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsular or possibly Borneo. Appropriate defensive prepa-
rations in conformity with WPL/46 were to be taken immediately. The War Department was
sending a similar war warning to its field units, and the British were to be informed. The Con-
tinental Districts of Guam and Samoa were particularly warned against sabotage. 318
Other warnings were received of the movements of Japanese warships and loaded trans-
ports to the South Pacific. 320 A shift in the communication zones of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Second Fleet implied that this fleet was scheduled for southern operations. 321
93. Tokyo Notifies Embassies of Rupture in Japanese- American Negotiadons
On November 28, 1941, Tokyo notified Japanese embassies throughout the world that rela-
tions with the United States and Great Britain would become extremely critical within the
next few days, since the counter proposal presented to Ambassador Nomura on November 27,
1941, by Secretary Hull did not meet the approval of the Japanese government, and further
peace negotiations were to be broken off.'' 22 DoD comment: This message was not translated
until December 9, 1941.
On the same day the Japanese Foreign Minister, while complimenting Ambassador No-
mura and Kurusu for having extorted every effort towards peace, nevertheless informed the
two men that no agreement could be reached in view of the humiliating counter proposal
presented to them by the United States. Although the negotiations were at an end, Japan did
not wish to give American representatives this impression. In future conversations Ambassa-
dors Nomura and Kurusu were to state that they were awaiting instructions from the Japanese
government. At the same time, however, the two representatives in expressing their own per-
sonal opinions were to make it clear to the State Department that Japan had made many
concessions for the sake of peace in the Pacific, while the United States by its unbending
attitude made the realization of this peace an impossibility. 323
94. Ambassador Nomura Urges Open Break in Diplomatic Relations
Replying to Tokyo's message on November 28, 1941, Ambassador Nomura expressed his
disapproval of pretending that negotiations were still possible while in actuality Japan con-
,la IV, 209.
"TV, 210.
M IV, 211.
351 IV, 212.
322 IV, 213.
S25 IV,214.
86
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
sidered them at an end. Instead Ambassador Nomura suggested, as he had done once before,
that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either by an announcement to the American
Embassy in Tokyo or by a general declaration to the world at targe. If such an open declaration
were not made and if Japan began its scheduled operations while negotiations were being con-
ducted, Ambassador Nomura feared that Japan would be held responsible for disrupting the
peace of the Pacific. To prove his point Ambassador Nomura referred to articles appearing in
American papers which stated that the United States had submitted a peace proposal to Japan
and that if Japan refused to accept it, the United States could not be held responsible for any
resulting war. 354
95. United States Forces Await Japanese Attack
Although the United States was convinced that Japan would make an attack somewhere in
the Pacific it desired that the first overt act of aggression be taken by Japanese forces.
On November 29, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations informed his Pacific commands that
the Army had issued instructions to the Commander Western Defense Command to undertake
such reconnaissance and other measures as were possible without alarming the civilian popu-
lation or disclosing their intent. Hostilities with Japan were possible at any moment, but
American forces were to refrain from taking any offensive action though they were not to jeop-
ardize their own defenses. Instructions had already been sent out to the Ninth Corps Area
concerning subversive acts in the United States, and to forces in the Far East submarine area
and to the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier regarding the defensive action to be taken once
Japan commenced hostilities. 32S
In order to protect American interests in the Philippines, Navy planes were to begin recon-
naissance flights on November 30, 1941, and cover the area from Manila to Camranh Bay.
British air forces would search for the Japanese overseas expedition, reported ready to attack
the Indo-Chinese isthmus, in an arc from Tedta Bahru. At the same time British ground troops
were moving into position directly opposite the Indo-Chinese isthmus, at a point somewhere
near Singora.
The Chief of Naval Operations warned naval air forces not to fire upon Japanese units unless
in self-defense. Careful reconnaissance was to be carried out, however, and if a Japanese ex-
pedition was sighted approaching Thailand, General MacArthur was to be notified. 326
S2 'IV, 215
3al lV,216.
SI9 IV, 217.
87
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(December 1, 1941 - December 7, 1941)
PART A— HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
Final Phase
96. Tokyo Investigates President Roosevelt's Sudden Return to Washington 3 "
When President Roosevelt returned to Washington unexpectedly from a weekend vacation
in Warm Springs, Georgia, Tokyo was informed that the United States was anticipating a
Japanese move in the Pacific. Japanese representatives in Mexico City advised their govern-
ment on December I, 1941, that the southward advance of the Japanese army and Prime
Minister Tojo's speech were largely responsible for awakening the American public to Japan's
real aims in the Far East. As a result, recent surveys showed that political and economic
circles in Washington and New York anticipated war with Japan. 327 "
In spite of the fact that November 29, 1941, the deadline set by Foreign Minister Togo, had
passed Japan did not desire to sever diplomatic relations. In order to allay American suspi-
cions regarding Japan's future actions, Japanese representatives were ordered to advise news-
papers that negotiations between Japan and the United States would continue in spite of wide
differences of opinion. In the meantime, Ambassador Nomura was to determine whether
President Roosevelt had returned to Washington because of Prime Minister Tojo's speech, or
because of the critical Far Eastern situation. 328
97. Ambassador Nomura Reports Unfavorable Reaction to Tojo's Speech
Answering Tokyo's message on December 1, 1941, Ambassador Nomura reported that Ameri-
can governmental circles believed that Prime Minister Tojo's speech indicated Japan's refusal
to accept the United States' proposals of November 6, 1941. Although a United Press dispatch
from Tokyo stated that Japan desired to continue negotiations for at least two more weeks,
Ambassador Nomura stated that the report had an ominous tone in the light of the comments
made by the Japanese Prime Minister. American newspapers were accusing Japan of stalling
for time until developments in Europe provided it with an opportune moment for carrying
out the already planned invasion of Thailand. 329
98. Hull- Nomura Conversation (December 1, 1941)
a. State Department s Report 330
In compliance with Tokyo's instructions, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on
Secretary Hull on December 1, 1941, to inquire concerning the reason for President Roosevelt's
sudden return to Washington. Secretary Hull replied that the principal factor was the recent
speech of Prime Minister Tojo. 331
"'Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents— Papers Relating to
the Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931 -194 1 in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington, 1943, Volume 11, 378. Hereafter referred to as S.D., II.
"'"IB, 218.
"TV, 219.
3 "1V, 220.
"""Memorandum of a Conversation" -Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine— December 1, 1941, S.D., D, 772-777.
"'Ibid.
SQ
A summation of Prime Minister Tojo's speech commemorating the Japanese- Chinese -
Manchuokuoan declaration' 32 was sent to Washington by Ambassador Grew on December 1,
but did not arrive until December 5, 1941. Therefore, at the time of his conversation with
Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu, Secretary Hull was relying on the report of the Asso-
ciated Press. In the extract made by Ambassador Grew Prime Minister Tojo was quoted as
stating that achieving the collaboration of Japan, China and Manchuokuo was one of the
greatest tasks of the present century. However, Prime Minister Tojo said, there were still many
countries which desire to obstruct the construction of a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia in
order that they themselves might exploit the peoples of East Asia and thereby satisfy their
own greed of possession. Because of the desire of Great Britain and the United States to fish
in the troubled waters of East Asia, Prime Minister Tojo said Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
continued to expend able-bodied men in futile resistance against Japan. "For the honor and
pride of mankind, we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance",
Prime Minister Tojo concluded. asa
After stating that the Japanese Prime Minister should have been deterred from making such
a speech at a time when Japanese and American representatives were endeavoring to re-estab-
lish good relations, Secretary Hull then asked Ambassador Nomura about the general trend
in the world situation, especially about the Japanese reaction to the situation in Libya and
Russia.'"' Ambassador Nomura replied that he was primarily interested in the situation exist-
ing between the United States and Japan.
Turning the conversation to Prime Minister Tojo's speech, Ambassador Nomura and Mr.
Kurusu insisted that the United States had taken his views too seriously. Secretary Hull
pointed out that the fact that it was broadcast made it more effective. Mr. Kurusu stated that
it was quite possible that Prime Minister Tojo had been misquoted, since the Japanese news
service did not always translate statements correctly into English.
Emphasizing the warlike attitude of both Japanese statesmen and the Japanese people
throughout the nine months of peace conversations conducted between Ambassador Nomura
and himself, Secretary Hull said that the situation had now reached a critical point. Secretary
Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka's blustering talks
on the value of the Tripartite Alliance and of the Japanese move into French Indo-China, even
while Ambassador Nomura negotiated for a peaceful agreement in Washington. Expressing
surprise at the United States' reaction to Prime Minister Tojo's speech, Mr. Kurusu said that
within a few days Secretary Hull would be given the correct translation of the Japanese Prime
Minister's statements. Within that time the Japanese government would also reply to the
United States' document of November 26, 1941. However, Mr. Kurusu stated that the Japa-
nese government had not as yet discovered the reason for the position taken by America in the
document of November 26 since the proposals submitted by Japan on November 20, 1941 had
given full consideration to the points of view expressed by both sides during the conversation.
The proposal of the United States failed to take cognizance of conditions in the Far East. In an
effort to show Japan's extreme desire to promote a peaceful settlement, Mr. Kurusu said that
Japan would offer to withdraw its troops from southern French Indo-China still held.
Replying that the Hitler-like methods used by the Japanese in China and in other sections
of the Pacific continued to obstruct peace arrangements, Secretary Hull said that the United
States refused to yield to the principles of force advocated by the Japanese militarists. Not-
withstanding the bellicose statements emanating from Japan, Secretary Hull said, his govern-
""By this declaration Japan recognized its own imperial government in Manchuokuo and the Japanese-sub-
M3 "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State— December 1, 1941", S.D. n, 148-149.
*"S.D.U, 772-777.
90
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
ment still hoped for stability in the Pacific. Denying that Japan's aim was conquest by force,
Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that his country's idea of a co-prosperity sphere
in the Far East paralled Pan- Americanism in the western hemisphere. 334 "
Motivated purely by a desire for self-defense similar to that motivating Britain's actions in
Syria, Ambassador Nomura explained, Japan had been forced to obtain access to certain nec-
essary materials. Secretary Hull replied that the Japanese troops in French Indo-China, re-
gardless of their actual location, constituted a menace to the entire South Pacific and forced
the United States and its allies to maintain large numbers of troops in East Asia. In this way
Japan was actively aiding Hitler. Ambassador Nomura commented that actual warfare
could be conducted through the agency of economic restrictions and that Japan was now suf-
fering under that type of warfare.
Asserting that the United States would give Japan a sufficient amount of raw materials if
it ended its aggressive policies, Secretary Hull said that he would be subject to severe criticism
for his policy of patience if he even attempted to advocate oil shipments to Japan while Japa-
nese military leaders continued to bluster and make blood-curdling threats. On November
22, 1941, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura, the United States promised to con-
sider the release of oil for Japanese civilian purposes.
Furthermore, the United States was anxious to help Japan settle the China affair, but
until such negotiations were underway the United States could not cease aid to China any more
than it could cease aid to Great Britain. With the concentration of Japanese troops in French
Indo-China becoming more obvious and with Japanese statesmen promising to drive the white
men out of East Asia, Secretary Hull said that his government could not remain inactive.
Since Mr. Kurusu believed that the two sides had been near agreement many times during
the conversations of the past several months, he could not understand why the latest proposals
of the United States government should emphasize the divergence of view. Expressing grave
doubt that any peaceful agreement could be accomplished as long as Japanese militarists
continued to preach aggression, Secretary Hull observed that there had been various contrac-
dictions between Japanese stated policies and Japanese action. Mr, Kurusu continued to
insist that the Washington Conference treaties had only served to enable China to flaunt a
certain advantage over Japan. Referring to his previous statement that Japanese actions were
directly opposed to the purpose of the informal conversations, Secretary Hull said that to clear
up the confusion resulting from Japanese contradictions the United States had embodied all
its fundamental principles in the document handed to the Japanese government on Novem-
ber 26, 1941. 334 4
Although Mr. Kurusu endeavored to convince Secretary Hull that Ge*""- 1 ^ojo could con-
trol the Japanese militarists, Secretary Hull pointed out that the Japanese slogans of "con-
trolling influence", "new order in East Asia" and "co-prosperity sphere" indicated that Japan
was following Hitler's program of conquest. Both Mr. Kurusu and Ambassador Nomura dis-
claimed any desire on the part of Japan for war, but added that the Japanese people believed
the United States was promoting the Sino- Japanese War in an endeavor to strangle Japan.
Furthermore, Ambassador Nomura said, the Japanese people believed they had the alter-
native of surrendering to the United States or fighting.
Promising to communicate all of Secretary Hull's statements to his government with a view
to offsetting the dangerous situation which Secretary Hull felt was imminent, Ambassador
Nomura brought the conversation to a close. 331 '
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report
There is no Japanese message available relating to this conversation.
""Ibid.
i3il Tbid.
™<lbid.
91
99. Tokyo Prepares for Results of Diplomatic Break
Although the pretense of maintaining negotiations between Japan and the United States
was being continued, Tokyo seemed to be preparing for the eventual announcement that diplo-
matic relations had ceased and for the inevitable results of such an announcement. On De-
cember 1, 1941, a Japanese broadcast announced that an important disclosure would be made
the following morning between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. 335
Tokyo also cabled Ambassador Kurusu and Mr. Yuki eight thousand dollars each for travel-
ing expenses, which would have to be cleared through the State Department. 33 *
100. Japan Safeguards Its Code and Cipher Systems
On December 1, 1941 Japan informed Ambassador Nomura that its four offices in London,
Hong Kong. Singapore and Manila had been ordered to destroy their code machines. The code
machine from Batavia had already been returned to Japan.
Apparently revising former orders, however, the Japanese Embassy in the United States was
to retain its machines and machine codes. 337 On the following day, however, Tokyo ordered
Ambassador Nomura to destroy all codes except one copy of the codes being used in conjunc-
tion with the machine. When this was completed the word "haruna" was to be wired to Tokyo.
Furthermore, all codes brought by telegraphic courier, Kosaka, were to be burned. Japanese
officials were to use their own discretion about disposing of other secret documents. 33 "
As a further safeguard, all Japanese service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000
on December 1, 1941. 339 A complete change in an important Japanese cipher system became
effective a few days later on December 4, 1941. 340
On December 3, 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations notified his Pacific commanders that
Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washing-
ton and London had been ordered to destroy most of their codes at once and to bum secret
documents. 340 °
On December 2, 1941 Mr. Terasaki, First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, called on Mr.
Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt in order to explain the newspaper reports of the Tojo speech which
was supposed to have taken place on November 30, 1941. 342 Mr. Terasaki handed Mr. Ballan-
tine and Mr. Schmidt a statement declaring that the speech of Prime Minister Hidaki Tojo,
originally drafted by the staff of the East Asia Restoration League, was to have been delivered
on November 30, 1941 343 in commemoration of the treaty concerning the basic relations between
Japan and China. 344 This manuscript, at the time of its publication in the newspapers, had
been unapproved by either the Japanese Prime Minister or other government officials, and in
addition, Prime Minister Tojo did not make this apeech on November 30, 1941, as scheduled.
336 rv, 222.
356 IV, 221.
3.7 IV, 223.
338 IV, 225.
3.8 IV, 226.
310 IV, 227.
i,u "lV, 224.
ai! "Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialled bv Max W. Schmidt— December 2, 1941, S.D. 0, 777, 778.
'"Ibid,
i4a "Statement Handed by the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Terasaki) to Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine
on December 2, 1941", S.D. D, 778.
"'Treaty signed with President Wang-Ching-wei at Nanking, November 30, 1940, S.D. II, 117-122.
a. State Departm*
92
THE ":
HARBOR
Furthermore, this Japanese explanatory statement pointed out that "for the honor and pride
of mankind, we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance" was a mis-
translation. The correct translation should read "for the honor and price of mankind, this sort
of practice must be removed. " J4
Immediately upon noticing press reaction to Prime Minister Tojo's scheduled speech, Mr.
Terasaki said, his government had wired this explanation. In an off- the- record remark, Mr.
Terasaki informed Mr. Schmidt that Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau of the
Japanese Foreign Office, had not even known what speech was referred to when Mr. Kurusu,
in a telephone conversation, reported its unfavorable effects upon Japanese-American relations.
Mr. Schmidt then promised to remind Mr. Ballantine to inform the Japanese representatives
exactly how the State Department desired the Japanese explanation of Prime Minister Tojo's
speech to be made public. 346
ft. Japanese Embassy Report
There is no Japanese message available indicating that Mr. Terasaki reported this conver-
sation to Tokyo.
102. Welles-Nomura Conversation (December 2, 1941)
a. State Department's Report 341
Since Secretary Hull was absent from the State Department on December 2, 1941, Mr.
Welles, at the request of President Roosevelt, delivered a statement to Ambassador Nomura
and Mr. Kurusu. President Roosevelt's statement, which Mr. Welles then read, referred to
reports of continued Japanese troop movements to southern Indo- China and pointed out that
by the terms of the treaty between Japan and the Vichy government, the Japanese forces per-
mitted to be stationed in Indo-China were considerably less than the number already there.
Since such a large concentration of troops could not possibly be necessary for policing that
region, the United States interpreted the move as contemplated aggression against the Philip-
pine Islands, the East Indies, Burma, Malaya or Thailand. The possibility of this new aggres-
sion, in addition to the acts already undertaken against China, only served to widen the breach
in Japanese- American relations. Since Japan's policy might be in conformity with the con-
stant and steady encroachment upon the territories and rights of free and independent peoples
undertaken in Europe by the German government, it was requested that the Japanese govern-
ment make a clear statement of its intentions.
Though Ambassador Nomura said that he was not authorized to indicate his government's
intentions at this time, Mr. Kurusu reminded Mr. Welles of Japan's offer, made on Novem-
ber 20, 1941, to transfer all its forces to northern Indo-China, which indicated that no threat
was intended. Furthermore, both Japanese representatives insisted that the lack of adequate
land communication facilities in French Indo-China would make an attack from southern
Indo-China against neighboring territories almost impossible. Mr. Kurusu then asked the
source of President Roosevelt's information, but Mr. Welles declined to give it.
In view of the strengthening of armaments and military dispositions by other countries.
Ambassador Nomura said that it was only natural that Japan should take some defensive
measures. Insisting that the Japanese people had been severely affected by the economic
weapons of war applied by the United States, Ambassador Nomura called for the exercise of
wise statesmanship by both sides. Mr. Welles replied that the United States' proposals for
for settlement would ensure Japan of peace and would guarantee satisfaction of its economic
3 "'S.D. D, 776.
31, S.D. II, 777-778.
"'"Memorandum of a Conversation --Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine — December 2, 1941, 8.D. II, 778-781.
93
needs. Believing himself to be more qualified to speak accurately of the results of the Ameri-
can freezing measures upon Japan than Ambassador Nomura, Mr. Kurusu said that America's
economic restrictions had put the Japanese people into an unfavorable frame of mind. How-
ever, Mr. Welles replied that the four years of warfare waged by Japan upon China which
had eventually squeezed American interests out of Japanese-occupied territories had put the
American people in a similar frame of mind.
Repeating his previous statements on the bad effect which the Washington Conference
treaties had had upon China, Mr. Kurusu said that certain points in the American proposals of
November 26, 1941 failed to take into account the actual situation in the Far East and, there-
fore, were difficult for the Japanese government to accept. Ambassador Nomura then pro-
mised a reply within a few days from the Japanese government concerning the American pro-
posals. According to Mr. Kurusu, the Japanese government had hoped some settlement could
be worked out on the basis of the American draft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of
September 25, 1941 instead of approaching the problem from a new angle, as the United States
had done in its latest proposal.
Mr. Welles then promised to refer to Secretary Hull Mr. Kurusu's suggestion that the differ-
ences between the two governments be reconciled on the basis of those two documents. 3 "
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report 349
Since Secretary Hull was not present in Washington on December 2, 1941, Ambassador
Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu conferred instead with Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles. Mr, Welles began the conversation by referring to reports of new Japanese troop move-
ments in French Indo-China and requested an explanation of this aggression. Ambassador
Nomura replied that he had received no notification by his government of any further move-
ments in that area. However, he promised to ask for information from his home government.
Ambassador Nomura pointed out that American economic pressure was having as much
effect upon Japan as Japanese troops were having on other territories. While not wishing to
argue the pros and cons of this question, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless made it clear that
unless this economic pressure were greatly reduced the Japanese people would be forced to
take measures in order to guarantee the well-being of their nation.
Ambassador Nomura reiterated that the Japanese people were suffering from the four year
war with China, 349 ° and in view of Japan's critical internal situation, the latest American pro-
posals, submitted on November 26, 1941, offered no basis for a satisfactory agreement. Thus,
in spite of the fact that the Japanese government would carefully study the American pro-
posals, Ambassador Nomura did not feel optimistic regarding the outcome.
The Japanese proposals submitted on September 25, 1941, according to Ambassador No-
mura, represented the greatest concessions Japan could make based on the American pro-
posals submitted on June 21, 1941. Recently the Japanese government had offered to evacuate
its troops from French Lndo-China upon the settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the
establishment of a just peace in the Far East. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura could not
understand the need for submitting new proposals at this time.
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles replied that the United States government was
also faced with a serious internal situation, and in view of that fact had found it necessary to
clarify its position in its proposals of November 26, 1941.
From the tone of the interview with Secretary Hull on the previous day and this conversation
with Under Secretary of State Welles, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the United
States desired an immediate successful conclusion of the negotiations; therefore, Ambassador
M IbuL
"TV, 228.
""Ibid.
94
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Nomura urged his government to give the latest American proposal every possible considera-
tion and in its reply to leave room for a speedy peaceful settlement/ 50
103. President Roosevelt Orders Reconnaissance of Forces Around Thailand
On December 2, 1941 President Roosevelt ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic
Fleet to form a "Defensive Information Patrol" for the purpose of reporting on Japanese move-
ments in the West China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. This defensive patrol, consisting of three
small vessels, each commanded by a U.S. naval officer, manned by Philippine crews, and
carrying only a small gun and one machine gun, was to patrol between Hainan and Hue, off
the Indo- China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St, Jacques, and off Pointe de Camau.
To check on the effectiveness of reconnaissance measures currently employed by American
aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, reports were to be made regarding the regular patrols
performed at sea by the Army and Navy. 361
104. U.S. Navy Exchanges Information with British and Dutch
Because of the importance of defending Allied interests in the Far East, on December 3, 1941
the Chief of Naval Operations ordered the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to ex-
change military information with the British and Dutch Commander-in-Chief except when
such an exchange of information was considered inadvisable. It was suggested that military
information could be relayed through naval observers in Singapore and Batavia by means of
secure cipher systems. At an early date in the future the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic
Fleet was to consider the placement of a Dutch liaison officer at Manila/"
105. Japanese Military Attache in Spain Reports on Japanese- American Negotiations 353
The Japanese Military Attache in Madrid believed the continuation of the conversations in
Washington to be an indication of new hope for the settlement of Pacific problems. According
to the Madrid representative Japan was making numerous concessions. For example, Ambas-
sador Kurusu and certain Japanese newspapermen had apologized for the phrase appearing
in Premier Tojo's speech concerning the destruction of the Anglo-American hegemony. Fur-
thermore, Japan had completely ignored President Roosevelt's statement that America would
probably be in the war by next year, and that of an American naval officer who believed that
the Japanese navy could be wiped out in no time at all.
The Japanese Military Attache' in Madrid did not approve of Japan's conciliatory attitude.
Stating that Japan was pursuing a conservative and hesitant course, thereby allowing America
to build up its defenses, the Japanese representative pointed to the recent Anglo-American
agreement providing for the establishment of military bases on the Islands of Christmas,
Fiji and Samoa, and urged the Japanese Army to take more decisive action in the future/"
106. American Officers in Far East Destroy Codes
On December 4, 1941 the United States Chief of Naval Operations ordered that with the
exception of cryptographic channels necessary for essential communication and certain regis-
tered publications needed for current operations and special intelligence, American naval and
marine offices at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Tientsin, Shanghai, Guam and Wake were to de-
stroy their codes and secret documents to prevent their falling into enemy hands/ 64
im Ibid.
161 IV, 229.
asl IV, 230.
""IV, 231. (This message was not translated until February 15, 1945.)
3630 Ibid.
3M IV, 232-236.
96
107. Hull-Nomura Conversation (December 5, 1941)
a. State Department's Report 3 **
In order to deliver to Secretary Hall the Japanese government's reply to President Roose-
velt's inquiry regarding additional Japanese troops in French Indo-China, Ambassador Nomura
and Mr. Kurusu called at the State Department on December 5, 1941. 356
In this statement the Japanese government explained that Chinese troops had been show-
ing signs of movement along the northern frontier of west Inda-China, bordering on China, and
as a strictly precautionary measure Japan had reinforced its troops in that area. Consequently,
troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China had also to be moved. However,
none of these measures taken by the Japanese government transgressed the stipulations of
the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France. 357
After reading this explanation, Secretary Hull said that he understood that the Chinese
were massing their troops in Yunnan against the Japanese troops massed in Indo-China.
Ambassador Nomura replied that the Chinese might attack in Indo-China as a means of pre-
venting a Japanese attack upon the Burma Road. 358 Not having heard before that Japan was on
the defensive in Indo-China, Secretary Hull said that he understood Japan's purpose was to
attack China from Northern Indo-China.
Ambassador Nomura answered that the increased naval and military preparations of the
A-B-C-D powers in the Southwest Pacific area had alarmed the Japanese. Furthermore, Am-
bassador Nomura continued, Japan recognized that one of the foremost American principles
was that offense is the best defense. Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura applied this
observation to the defensive measured taken by the United States against Hitler. Declining
to commit himself, Ambassador Nomura merely said that because of Japan's apprehensions
it had submitted its proposals of November 20, 1941. Secretary Hull felt that if Japan anti-
cipated an attack on its forces in French Indo-China by the Chinese this constituted another
reason for withdrawing its troops from that area.
Since the Japanese government had made it plain to America that it desired to settle the
Chinese question, both Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu stated that the United States
should be willing to discontinue aid to China as soon as peace negotiations between Japan and
China were initiated. Secretary Hull inquired whether Japan would stop its aid to Hitler. To
Mr. Kurusu's question as to the method by which Japan was aiding Hitler Secretary Hull
answered that Japan's aggression in the Pacific was keeping the forces of the United States and
other countries immobilized in the Pacific area. Ambassador Nomura murmured sotto voce,
"This isn't getting us anywhere."
At this point Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that on November 22, 1941 the
United States has exhibited its unwillingness to ship oil to Japan for use by the Japanese navy
for Pacific operations and he also reminded Ambassador Nomura of the United States' atti-
tude toward continued aid to China. If Secretary Hull explained that the oil exports to Japan
would aid the conclusion of a peaceful agreement, Ambassador Nomura said, the American
people would accept the action without question. Secretary Hull did not agree.
Referring to his comments on the Japanese proposals of November 20, 1941, Secretary Hull
reminded Ambassador Nomura that the United States could not discontinue aid to China,
and that, because the presence of Japanese troops anywhere in Indo-China threatened the
security of neighboring countries, the United States could not supply Japan with oil for mili-
iS4 "Memorandum of a Conversation "-Initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine-December 5, 1941, S.D. II, 781-783.
"'Ibid.
367 "Statement Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on December 5, 1941",
S.D- H, 784.
™S.D. II. 781-783.
96
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
tary and naval needs. Ambassador Nomura agreed that the United States' stand on these
questions was clear. At the same time, however, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that if
French Indo-China were controlled by any other power it would be a menace to Japan. 3M "
Ambassador Nomura then said that if some agreement could be reached on temporary
measures the exploration of fundamental solutions could be continued. But Secretary Hull
pointed out that the attitude of Japanese statesmen and officials in Tokyo did not create an
atmosphere conducive to peace. Attempting to point out that injurious newspaper propaganda
had been prevalent in the United States as well as Japan, Mr. Kurusu cited newspaper inter-
views with Secretary Hull. Secretary Hull replied that Japanese officials had continuously
proclaimed aggressive slogans; yet whenever he said a single word in explanation of his gov-
ernment's principles the Japanese complained. Mr, Kurusu said that aspersions had been
cast upon himself and Ambassador Nomura by American newspapermen, but Secretary Hull
answered that he had heard only good reports in regard to the ambassadors. With the usual
apologies for taking up so much of Secretary Hull's time Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu
left. 35 "
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report
There is no Japanese message available which contained Ambassador Nomura's report of
this meeting.
108. Japanese Military Attache Discounts Immediate Possibility of War with America '
Although the United States had directed serious criticism against Japan, Major General
Isoda, the Japanese military attache in Washington believed that these reprimands were
merely intended to coerce Japan into checking its southward advance. Referring to Japanese-
American relations during the invasion of Siam, Major General Isoda said that at that time
the American public as a whole advocated a temporary agreement between the two countries
on the basis of the existing status quo in the Pacific, so that by proceeding carefully with nego-
tiations the seemingly insurmountable obstacles to peace could be overcome. In view of this
feeling, it seemed improbable to Major General Isoda that at the present time the United States
government would fling the country headlong into war with Japan,
Major General Isoda pointed out that neither President Roosevelt nor Secretary Hull had
commented on the authenticity of an article which, appearing on December 4, 1941 in the
Washington Times Herald, spoke of a proposed increase in the Army and Navy of 10,000,000
men, with an expeditionary force of 5,000,000 men to be sent against the Axis. While Major
General Isoda believed that there might be a certain degree of truth in reports of American
preparations for war, the Japanese military attache wondered whether the war propaganda
was not actually a scheme of United States authorities to scare Japan. The theory that the
United States actually desired peace was further circumstantiated by the conference between
Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull on that day. 360
Should the Japanese Army invade Siam, however, Major General Isoda continued, a war
with England and the United States would undoubtedly ensue, though perhaps not imme-
diately. He believed that the two allied nations would only close Japanese consulates and in-
crease economic pressure against Tokyo at first, but if Japan invaded the Netherlands East
Indies and attacked Singapore, American retaliatory measures would become more severe. 361
'Ibid.
Ibid,
at »IV, 237. (This information was not made availah
""/bid.
S,, IV 238.
97
109. Japan Plans to Consider Holland a Semi- belligerent Country When at War with the United
States
Once a war was declared on Britain and the United States Japan intended to treat Holland
as a semi- belligerent country, exercise strict surveillance over Dutch consulates, and prohibit
all communication between Holland and the allied nations. In fact, Tokyo intended to put
into effect practically the same measures against Holland as would be taken against Britain
and the United States. 362
110. Japan to Send Formal Reply to American Proposals
On December 6, 1941 the Japanese government notified its Embassy in Washington that it
would submit a reply to the United States' proposal of November 26, 1941 on the following day.
After decoding the four -part message, Ambassador Nomura was to reorganize it before present-
ation to the American State Department. The existence of this message was to be kept strictly
secret until 1:00 p.m. on December 7, 1941, when it was to be submitted to the United States
government, preferably to Secretary Hull. 369
As a result of learning the time established by the Japanese for the delivery of an important
message on December 7, 1941, General Marshall sent a warning dispatch on December 7,
1941 at 12:17 p.m., Washington time (06:47 a.m., Honolulu time), which did not reach Pearl
Harbor until 07:33 a.m. (Honolulu time), twenty-two minutes before the attack. 3S3a This mes-
sage was not delivered to General Short until the afternoon of December 7, 1941, long after the
Japanese had launched their attack.
The dispatch of General Marshall is believed to have read as follows:
"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum; also they
are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately.
"Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform Naval author-
ities of this communication."
1 1 1. Japan Seeks Information on Roosevelt Message
Since Associated Press and United Press reports disclosed that President Roosevelt had sent
the Emperor of Japan a special message, Tokyo asked Ambassador Nomura on December 6,
1941 to investigate the matter. 364
1 12. President Roosevelt's Message to Emperor Hirohito (December 6, 1941 ) sw
In his message to Emperor Hirohito of Japan President Roosevelt said that since a President
of the United States had extended an offer of friendship to Japan almost a century ago 3ee a long
period of unbroken friendship had ensued under which both peoples had prospered substan-
tially. Since all humanity had benefited from the peace formerly existing between Japan and
the United States, and in view of the fact that the developments occurring in the Pacific area
contained tragic possibilities, President Roosevelt felt it necessary to address Emperor Hiro-
hito at this time.
Advocating peace for all nations, the United States had hoped for a successful conclusion to
the present informal conversations and for a termination of the present war between Japan
341 IV, 239.
"'IV, 240-241.
""Navy Report on Pearl Harbor, Section XVIII, places the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor at 7:55 a.m. (Hono-
lulu time.) The State Department reports the attack as beginning at 7;50 a.m. (Honolulu time), S.D., H, 786.
3 "IV, 242.
"'"President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan, December 6, 1941", S.D. 0, 784-786. This message was
sent to Ambassador Grew with instructions to communicate it to the Japanese Emperor at the earliest possible
moment in the manner deemed most appropriate by Ambassador Grew. The press was informed that President
Roosevelt had sent this message to Emperor Hirohito.
"A Letter from President Fillmore to the Japanese Emperor, May 10, 1861".
98
"MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
and China, in order that the diverse peoples of the Pacific could live without threat of invasion
and carry on their commerce without fear of discrimination. President Roosevelt felt certain
that Emperor Hirohito agreed that, in order to attain these high objectives, any form of mili-
tary threat must be eliminated from the principles of both countries.
President Roosevelt then referred to Japan's agreement with Vichy France concluded over
a year ago, under which 5,000 or 6,000 Japanese troops were stationed in northern French Indo-
China as a defensive measure against the Chinese forces further north. Later Vichy France
permitted Japanese military forces to enter the southern part of French Indo-China. The con-
tinuation of the mobilization of Japanese military, naval and air forces in French Indo-China
created a reasonable doubt on the part of neighboring nations that these troops would be used
merely for defensive purposes. In fact, with the concentration of Japanese forces in the south-
east and southwest corners of the peninsula, the peoples of the East Indies, Malaya and Thai-
land feared invasion. Certain that Emperor Hirohito could appreciate this fear and understand
why the United States looked askance at the establishment of such powerful military, naval
and air bases, President Roosevelt stated that such a situation could, not continue and that
none of the peoples of the South Pacific could sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg
of dynamite.
Assuring Japan that French Indo-China was not in danger of invasion, President Roosevelt
asked that Japan ensure peace by withdrawing all its forces from that territory. For the sake of
the two countries themselves and humanity in neighboring territories, to restore traditional
amity and to prevent further death and destruction in the world, President Roosevelt asked
that Emperor Hirohito give thought to this emergency. 367
On the following day President Roosevelt instructed Secretary Hull to send Ambassador
Grew a copy of the Japanese explanation of the troop movement in French Indo-China. 36,0
113. Hull-Nomura Conversation (December 7, 1941)
a. State Department's Report 3 ™
Ambassador Nomura had asked to see Secretary Hull at 1:00 p.m. on December 7, 1941, but
he and Mr. Kurusu did not arrive at the State Department until 2:05 p.m. They were received
by Secretary Hull at 2:20 p.m. Apologizing for the delay in delivering the document to Secre-
tary Hull, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had been instructed by his government to de-
liver it at 1:00 p.m. He was not able to explain to Secretary Hull the reasons for this instruc-
tion. 369
In the memorandum which Ambassador Nomura handed to Secretary Hull the govern-
ment of Japan stated that it had continued negotiations with the United States since last
April with the genuine hope of adjusting and advancing Japanese -American relations and
stabilizing the situation in the Pacific area. After examining the claims of the United States
government and the measures which it and Great Britain had taken against Japan during the
past eight months, the Japanese government had decided to declare its views. As a basis for
its whole policy, the Japanese government had sought the promotion of peace in an endeavor
to allow all nations to find their proper place in the world. Even during the war with China the
Japanese government had striven to restore peace and prevent the extension of the war. With
,!1 S.D. D, 784-786.
""""President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, December 6, 1941", S.D. n, 784.
"'"Memorandum of a Conversation"— Initialed by Joseph W. Ballan tine— December 7, 1941, S.D. U, 786-787.
"*Tbe Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, took place on December 7, 1941, at 1;20 p.m. Washington time,
7:50 a.m., Honolulu time, December 8, 3:20 a.m., Tokyo time. On December 7, 1941, at 4:00 p.m., Washington
time, which was December 8, 6:00 a. jr., Tokyo time, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced that war had
begun at dawn. S.D. D, 786-787. See IV, 241.
99
that end in mind Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September,
1940. By assisting the Chungking regime, however, both the United States and Great Britain
obstructed Japan's endeavors toward the stabilization of East Asia. Furthermore, both the
United States and Great Britain wilfully misinterpreted Japan's protocol with France and in-
fluenced the Netherlands government to such an extent that freezing orders against Japan
frustrated its aspirations for a common cooperative economy in these regions. The very exist-
ence of the Japanese Empire had been constantly threatened by the military preparations of
these countries, which had gradually perfected an encirclement of Japan. Yet, in spite of the
hostile attitude exhibited by Great Britain and the United States, in August, 1941, the Japa-
nese Prime Minister had sought a meeting with President Roosevelt and was refused on the
basis that the meeting should take place only after an agreement had been reached on funda-
mental and essential questions. Still anxious to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Japanese
government on September 25, 1941, submitted proposals which took into consideration both
the United States and the Japanese points of view. Since no agreement resulted, the present
Japanese Cabinet made another attempt but the United States failed to display any degree of
conciliation. 370 With a view to averting the almost imminent crisis, on November 20, 1941,
the Japanese government simplified previous proposals. 371 Furthermore, even though the
Japanese government was willing to have President Roosevelt act as "an introducer" of peace
between Japan and China, the American government withdrew its offer to mediate in the
Sino- Japanese war and refused to agree to discontinue aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
shek. 3 "
Finally, completely ignoring the claims of the Japanese government, the United States
submitted proposals on November 26, 1941. From the very beginning of the present negoti-
ations, even with regard to the China question, the principle of non-discrimination in inter-
national commerce and the withdrawal of its troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese
government had exhibited a most conciliatory attitude, but, on the other hand, the United
States refused to yield an inch on its impractical principles. Therefore, the Japanese government
desired to answer the points brought up by the United States' proposals on November 26, 1941.
Although some of the principles set up by the United States government were agreeable to
Japan, they all presented only a Utopian ideal, ignoring completely the actual conditions of
the world which would prevent their immediate adoption. Japan felt that the idea of a multi-
lateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet
Union, the Netherlands and Thailand was the old concept of collective security and incapable
of solving the problems of East Asia. Since the United States' proposals stipulated that neither
Japan nor the United States could conclude an agreement with any third power which would
conflict with the fundamental establishment of peace throughout the Pacific area, Japan
presumed that such a provision constituted an attempt to restrain the carrying out of Japanese
obligations under the Tripartite Pact should the United States participate in the European
War. While America claimed to be seeking the stabilization of the situation in the Pacific,
actually it was scheming for the extension of the European War by aiding Great Britain and
preparing itself for an attack against Germany and Italy.' 172 "
In conjunction with other nations the United States government was conducting an eco-
nomic warfare far more destructive and inhumane than military pressure. In fact, the United
States government actually desired to strengthen its domination of China and all the other
'""Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m. on
December 7, 1941", S.D. U, 787-792. See also IV, 241a.
3,1 For draft of proposals see S.D. II, 755-756.
3 " S.D. II, 787-792.
100
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
areas of East Asia in coalition with Great Britain and other allies. For the past hundred years.
East Asia had been forced to endure the imperialistic exploitation of the Anglo -Am eric an
policy, while Japan now determined to overthrow that situation and enable the nations of the
Pacific to enjoy their proper place in the world.
In order to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and to
guarantee equality of trade and commerce in that area, the United States government proposed
an agreement between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and
Thailand. In the opinion of the Japanese government, not only would this proposal ignore the
rights of the French government but it would extend, in effect, the Nine Power Treaty struc-
ture which was responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.
In regard to America's attitude toward the China affair, the Japanese government pointed
out that America's demands would completely destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing
factor of East Asia. In view of the United States' demands that Japan ignore the existence of
the Nanking government in China and because the United States refused to cease aid to the
Chungking government, it was clear that the United States desired to obstruct peace between
Japan and China and throughout East Asia. Not only would the United States' proposal of
November 26, 1941, disparage the honor and prestige of the Japanese government but it ignored
the sacrifices Japan had made throughout its four years of war with China. It was admitted
that certain clauses of the American proposal, including those regarding commerce, a trade
agreement, removal of freezing restrictions and the stabilization of yen and dollar exchange
were acceptable to the Japanese government; but, on the other hand, the insistence of the
American government and, it was presumed, of other interested countries to offer the pro-
posals of November 26, 1941 prevented any agreement based on the present negotiations.
Although the Japanese government had honestly desired to adjust its relations with America,
the establishment of peace and the creation of a new order in East Asia had been impeded by
the lack of American cooperation. In view of this attitude, the Japanese government found it
impossible to reach an agreement through any further negotiations. 372 *
After reading this document Secretary Hull replied that in all his fifty years of public service
he had never seen a document crowded with such infamous falsehoods and distortions, nor had
he imagined that any government was capable of uttering them.
Without making any comment Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu left. 373
b. Ambassador Nomura's Report
There is no message available which contains Ambassador Nomura's report of this meeting.
114. Tokyo Extends Appreciation to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu
Although they had failed to adjust Japanese- Am erical relations, Tokyo recognized the fact
that Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu had made every possible effort towards the re-estab-
lishment of peace in the Pacific. Therefore, on December 7, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo ex-
tended to the two ambassadors his sincere appreciation for what they had accomplished. ' 7 "
1 15. Japanese Embassy Destroys Codes
With diplomatic relations severed, the Japanese Embassy in Washington in accordance
with instructions from Tokyo, proceeded with the destruction of its codes and cipher systems,
cipher machine and machine codes. All secret documents were to be destroyed by fire. 3 "
mt Ibid.
" 3 S.D. D, 786-787.
3 "IV, 243.
37S IV, 244-245.
101
116. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941 )
a. Secretary Hull's Statement 3711
In a statement handed to the American press on December 7, 1941, Secretary Hull announced
that Japan had made a treacherous and unprovoked attack upon the United States. He stated
that even while Japanese representatives discussed the basis of peace with the United States,
Japan's armed forces were assembling for attack upon not only the United States but also
other nations with which the Japanese government was professedly at peace.
At this time' Secretary Hull released the proposals handed by the United States government
to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941, and the text of the Japanese reply handed
to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on December 7, 1941. By baaing its actions upon
the underlying peace, law, order and justice between all nations, the United States had hoped
to promote and maintain friendship between itself and other nations of the world. However, it
was now apparent that Japan's professions of peace had been infamously false and fraud-
ulent." 7
b. President Roosevelt 's Message 3 ™
Before the United States Congress on December 8, 1941, President Roosevelt declared that
"Yesterday, December 7, 1941— a day which will live in infamy— the United States was sud-
denly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan."
Although the United States, through its conversations with the Japanese government, still
hoped for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, Japanese air squadrons bombed Oahu even
before Ambassador Nomura delivered the Japanese reply to the United States proposals. This
reply of the Japanese government contained no hint or threat of war or armed attack, although
it stated that it seemed useless to continue diplomatic relations. While stalling for time by
making false statements about the establishment of peace, Japan was planning its attack
upon Hawaii. This attack caused severe damage to American naval and military forces; Amer-
ican ships en route between San Francisco and Honolulu were reported torpedoed. In a sur-
prise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area on December 7, 1941, the Japanese gov-
ernment launched an attack against Malaya, Hongkong, Guam, the Philippine Islands and
Wake Island. On the morning of December 8, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Midway Island.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, President Roosevelt directed that all meas-
ures be taken for the defense of the American nation. No matter how long it took to overcome
this premeditated invasion, the American people, remembering the character of the onslaught
against them, would win through to absolute victory and would prevent this sort of treachery
from endangering them again. "With confidence in our armed forces— with the unbounded
determination of our people— we will win the inevitable triumph— so help us God."
President Roosevelt concluded his statement by asking that Congress declare war against
Japan. 879
117. The United Stales Declares War (December 8, 1941 ) 9fl0
JOINT RESOLUTION Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial Govern-
ment of Japan and the Government and the people of the United States and making provisions
to prosecute the same.
Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against
the Government and the people of ' '
"""Statement by the Secretary of State-December 7, 1941", S.D. II, 793.
"'Ibid.
478 "Message by President Roosevelt to Congress— December 8, 1941".
™Ibid.
"""Declaration by the United States of America of a State of War with Japan— December 8, 1941". S.D. R, 795.
102
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled. That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Govern-
ment of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared;
and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military
forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the
Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of
the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States. 381
1 18. American Forces Begin Unrestricted Warfare
The Chief of Naval Operations notified his United States forces on December 7, 1941, that
unrestricted air and submarine warfare was to be carried out against Japan. The Commander-
in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was to inform the United States Army and British and Dutch
authorities of this action. 382
119. Japan Spreads Anti-allied Propaganda in Allied Countries
On December 8, 1941, the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo sent a message to Berlin
and to neutral countries in Europe and South America concerning its reasons for the attack
upon the United States territories. Because the United States refused to make any compromise
in its negotiations with Japan and had instead adopted an extremely tyrannical attitude, the
Japanese government was forced to send its army, navy and air units against American forces
in the South Pacific. Throughout previous negotiations Great Britain and the United States
had strongly opposed Japan's natural prosecution of the China war. This opposition reached
such a degree of organized economic blockade and military encirclement of Japan that the
Japanese Empire itself was threatened. During this time Japan repeatedly professed its de-
termination to cooperate in the establishment of a new world order primarily through its ad-
herence to the Tripartite Pact. 383 In carrying out its propaganda against the United States
Japanese representatives in neutral countries were to emphasize the above mentioned points.
From time to time Japanese representatives in Berlin, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City and
Stockholm were to send intelligence reports. These representatives themselves were to rely for
general information upon the Domei News wires and overseas broadcasts. 384
120. Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor Surprises Turkish Foreign Minister
From information contained in a message sent to Tokyo on December 13, 1941, from Ankara,
Turkey, it appeared that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had been a surprise. On Decem-
ber 8, 1941, Foreign Minister Saradoguru told the German Consular in that city that Japan
would begin its war with America on December 10, 1941. Therefore, the announcement of the
attack on December 7, 1941, was most unexpected. 385
"Ibid.
2 IV, 246.
"IV, 247-250.
"IV, 251. (This message was not translated untilJanuary 13, 1945.)
"IV, 252.
103
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
OUTLINE OF PART B
Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages
(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from Mexico
(c) Reports from Central America
(d) Reports from the Panama Canal
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(g) Reports from the Ph Hip pine Islands
(h) Reports from Singapore
(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking
PART B— JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES
During the period between October 17 and December 6, 1941, Japanese officials in Tokyo
continued to receive, through diplomatic channels, dispatches from the United States, Central
and South America, Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands. This intelligence, in addi-
tion to that which was sent from Singapore, Vladivostok and Hsinking, gave important infor-
mation to the Japanese leaders preparing tor war. This was especially true of the detailed reports
from Honolulu, Panama and Manila concerning American ship movements, fortifications,
installations and defenses of every variety.
(a) Reports from the United States
121. Consul Sato Reports United States Navy Day Ceremony
Only five Japanese intelligence reports transmitted from agents in the United States to
Japan between October 17 and December 6, 1941 are at present available. The information
that the Warspiie and the Maryland had entered Bremerton on October 21, 1941, was reported
by Consul Sato at Seattle. Repairs were to be made on the bridge of the Warspite. 3 **
Consul Sato in Seattle on October 28 announced that fifteen Coast Guard vessels had sailed
through the Seattle harbor in single file in commemoration of Navy Day, October 27. These
vessels were listed as the Kane, the Gilmore, the Brooks, the Fox, the Bird, the Crow, the Pin-
tail, the Eagle 57, the Batukei (Kana spelling), the Butternut, the Amber, the VP S3, the YP87,
the YP 89 and the YP 90. 397
On November 7 it was thought possible that the dispatching of a large number of United
States planes to Alaska might have been an "underhanded American scheme" to force Japan
to compromise by making a show of readiness to go to war. Reporting the source of information
to be a certain important person or persons having connections with the United States War
Department, the Japanese dispatch disclosed that six companies of bombers and twenty
companies of fighters, probably about 150 planes, had been sent on November 3, 4 and 5. 3fW
a "IV, 253.
"'IV, 254.
3M IV, 255.
105
Consul Sato further reported that the Saratoga, the Warspite, the Colorado {which had for-
merly been identified as the Maryland by the Consul), and the Charleston were anchored in
Bremerton on November 9. aas
122. Ambassador Nomura Requests Information Concerning The Warspite
A special request to Seattle from Ambassador Nomura on November 25 directed Consul
Sato to investigate the progress of repair, and to report the time of the vessel's departure and its
destination. 3 "
123. Tokyo Outlines the Type oflnformation Needed
A circular from Tokyo on November 29 directed that in December full reports be made on
each ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed or at which it had arrived,
port of destination and date of departure of all foreign commercial and warships in the Pacific
Ocean, Indian Ocean and South China Sea. 391
124. Consul Identifies Warspite, Colorado and Saratoga at Bremerton
In a report of December 6, 1941, marked "Urgent Intelligence", Consul Sato of Seattle re-
ported that the Warspite and the Colorado were at anchor in Bremerton on December 5 and
that the Saratoga had sailed on that day. 392
125. Japanese Naval Officials in Mexico Disapprove of Furnishing General Intelligence
To Foreign Minister Togo's inquiry whether the office in Mexico had begun the work of fur-
nishing general information, 393 Ambassador Miura replied that he had discussed this matter
with his Naval Attache and had subsequently wired the Chief of the Special Service Section of
the Naval General Staff. Although at present they were awaiting a reply, he pointed out that
because of the necessity of maintaining the security of the "L" organ the naval authorities
disapproved of furnishing general information. He asked that the Japanese Foreign Office
discuss this matter with the Navy and subsequently wire its decision. 394
Eight days later Foreign Minister Togo declared that general intelligence was to be distin-
guished from naval intelligence in that it was used for reference purposes by the Foreign
Office. He was instructed to reorganize his office immediately for the collection of general
intelligence. 396
(c) Reports from Central America
126. Intelligence Dispatches Outline United States Activities in Central America
Intelligence dispatches of military significance which originated in Central America were
sent through the diplomatic office at Panama. In Costa Rica it was rumored that the Ameri-
can Air Forces had decided to take over bases in the Golfo Dulce off Costa Rica and the Gulf of
Fonseca which faces the territory of Honduras.
It was further reported on October 28, 1941, that the United States was preparing to con-
struct destroyer, submarine and air bases in the southeastern area of Cocos off Puntarenas
M2 IV, 259. (On Dec. 6 or 7 Japanese Commander in 2-man submarine definitely identified the Saratoga anchor-
ed in Pearl Harbor. The Saratoga was actually at San Diego, Calif., for repairs. See Battle Report, p. 26.)
IV, 256.
IV, 257.
IV, 258.
IV, 260.
IV, 261.
IV, 262, 263.
106
and that the various nations of Central and South America had been admonished to watch
rigorously the residents of Axis affiliation. 396
(d) Reports from the Panama Canal
127. Minister Akiyama Reports Canal Military and Naval Activity
Although the Japanese intelligence reports concerning ship movements from inside the
United States were few, those originating in the Panama Canal Zone were more numerous
during this period of October 17 through December 7. It was found that routine ship movement
reports were transmitted to the homeland regularly every two or three days.
In a dispatch of October 18, 1941, Minister Akiyama at Panama reported the movement of
four American freighters, one British freighter and two American tankers toward the Pacific
from October 14 to 18.
Moving toward the Atlantic through the Canal in this period had been four American
freighters, two British freighters, one Dutch freighter, one American tanker and one American
passenger steamer. The Japanese agent discovered that of late ships passed through the Canal
at night.
In an inspection of military establishments at the Pacific end of the Canal, the Japanese
official found that construction was progressing at a rapid rate and that the whole area was
being covered with fortifications. Specifically mentioned were Albrook Field, where three large
hangers, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and eight barracks to accommo-
date 200 men each were being constructed; moreover, at Corozal four 200- men barracks, fifty-
five two-family officers' quarters and a 500-patient hospital were being completed. 397
128. Intelligence Reports Military Construction Work and Navy Patrols
According to an intelligence dispatch, the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st Engineers
and 33rd Infantry were stationed at Fort Clayton, where barracks large enough to accommo-
date 250 persons were nearing completion. At Fort Kobbe barracks for twenty-six companies
had been completed in addition to the recently finished hangars at Howard Field. It was noted
that the construction work at the submarine base at Balboa was progressing, that 16-inch
guns had been emplaced on Pearl Islands, and that warships were patrolling the waters
around them. In addition, three cruisers, eight new-type destroyers, eighteen submarines, one
gunboat and one submarine tender were in the Canal Zone. a9B
The Japanese marked the departure of an Omaha class warship toward the Pacific on Octo-
ber 27 as well as the anchoring of two single-funnel destroyers, one light cruiser and one
10,000 ton transport in Balboa harbor. It was further reported that one American destroyer
and two submarines were anchored in the harbor at Cristobal on October 26. From October 22
to October 27 four American and four British merchant vessels had passed through the Canal
to the Pacific, while six American merchant vessels, one American tanker and one Nether-
lands cargo ship had passed through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. 39S
129. Reports Enumerate Vessels Passing Through Canal
In a routine report transmitted on November 4 Minister Akiyama declared that one Ameri-
can destroyer and an American warship of 2,000 or 3,000 tons had passed through the Canal
toward the Atlantic on November 3. Nine American freighters and one tanker had passed
through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific, and five American freighters and one Ameri-
M6 IV, 264.
897 IV, 265.
SM IV, 266.
3 " S IV,267.
107
can passenger vessel, as well as one Danish ship, had moved through the Canal in the direc-
tion of the Atlantic from November 2 to November 4. 400
Since the routine ship movement report had been sent on November 4, Minister Akiyama's
transmission from Panama to Tokyo on November 5 appeared to be a special intelligence dis-
patch informing Tokyo that fifty army air officers of Italian origin had departed from China
at the end of October, It was thought that they were being sent to China since they were of
Italian blood and consequently would not be suitable for Europe.
In addition, the ship movement report on this dispatch listed an army transport of more
than 6,000 tons filled with army men which had headed for the Pacific on November 2; the
statement that two cruisers of the Omaha class were anchored at Balboa on November 4 was
noteworthy, as well as the information that one United States freighter and one British
freighter had moved toward the Pacific on November 4 and November 5.
Entering the Canal from the Pacific at this time were three United States freighters, one
United States tanker and one British freighter. 401
130. Japanese Minister Corrects Identification of Vessel
On November 10, 1941, Minister Akiyama corrected a previous report to the effect that a ves-
sel formerly identified as one of the Vanoc class had been confirmed as the Diomede, which
was headed toward the Pacific. He added that two American submarines had also sailed into
the Pacific on November 10. 402
Passing through Panama during November 11 and 12 toward the Pacific, according to the
Japanese official, were one American and two British freighters, while moving toward the
Atlantic were three American and three British freighters. 403
131. Japanese Report Movement of the British Cruiser Liverpool
A British light cruiser (tentatively identified as the Liverpool), which had been under repair
in San Francisco, was reported as having gone through the Canal in the direction of the At-
lantic on the night of November 11.
A British military transport which was loaded to capacity with military personnel had sailed
through the Canal on its way from the Pacific.
Moreover, twelve Douglas two-motored bombers and six Airacobra pursuit planes had been
added to the Canal air force early in November. 4 " 4
132. German Agents Correct Japanese Identification of British Cruiser
It was reported on November 13 that according to German reports the heavy cruiser
{previously called a light cruiser) which had passed through the Canal on November 11 was
not the Liverpool class. This ship was believed to be joining a convoy in the Atlantic.
A ship formerly reported as of the Omaha type was described as looking like a destroyer
with its bow painted black and its stern white.
A commercial ship of the Union Castle type, carrying approximately 1000 of what seemed
to be evacuees and a few wounded, passed through the Canal on November 13. 405
133. Intelligence Dispatches List Type, Nationality and Number of Ships Crossing Isthmus
Tokyo learned on November 18, 1941 that one British ship and one 17,000 ton Netherlands
vessel had passed through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific on this day, while one 10,000
""TV, 268.
"TV, 269.
,t,! rv, 270.
403 IV, 271.
"TV, 272.
tM IV, 273.
108
iD OF PEARL HARBOR
ton British vessel and one American ship had gone through the Canal in the direction of the
Atlantic. It was also noted that one destroyer and one submarine were undergoing repairs at
Cristobal. 406
Minister Akiyama wired that four American cargo ships, one British cargo ship, one tanker
and one French vessel had passed across to the Pacific and that an American cargo ship and
one tanker had sailed toward the Atlantic on November 19 and November 20. 407
134. United States Sets Up Defense Fortifications in Canal Zone
Although the Japanese Minister in Panama felt that Tokyo was probably already cognizant
of the Canal's defenses, he summarized the latest developments in a dispatch transmitted
November 22, 1941. 4 "
According to informational sources, the United States had set up air bases, anti-aircraft
gun bases, and airplane detector bases, which were reported as being able to discover a plane
200 miles away.
Citing examples to illustrate that the United States was exerting pressure on the Panama-
nian government, Minister Akiyama declared that Canal officials were checking the 2,000
Germans, 700 Italians and 400 Japanese in Panama because the United States had intimated
that dangerous elements were to be found not only among the foreigners in Panama, but
also in government circles. The United States was expending vast sums of money in building
up the defenses of the Canal Zone; its coercion of Panama was alleged by the Japanese official to
be in violation of the treaty concluded in 1936. The United States had begun to construct a
road of macadam which would probably go as far as Colon and was completing the American
continental highway, which would extend as far as the borders of Colombia. It appeared that
the United States was assuming that an attack on the Canal would be made from both air
and sea, and was preparing especially for a possible attack from the Pacific side. Having
reinforced the special fleet, an area of 900 kilometers {?) with the center at Panama was
being constantly patrolled. Army fortifications with 16-inch and 14-inch gun emplacements
were being constructed in the territory of Panama.
The Americans were endeavoring to guard such vital points as locks, spillways and
especially the control tower on Lake Gatun and the electric plant. In addition, the anti-
aircraft defenses on lock # 1 were being improved and it was noted that lock # 3 was also
equipped with anti-aircraft defenses.
Minister Akiyama said that the naval defense area which was being patrolled against
possible lightning attacks extended in the north from Salina Cruz to Monepene on the Gulf
of Fonseca with the southern limits extending to the air base on the Galapagos Islands. The
intelligence report listed the present army strength at 47,000, naval strength at 10,000 and
air force at 5,000, and it was further estimated that twice this general total made up the
families of laborers, excluding Panamanians. 40 *
On December 1, 1941, a wire from Washington directed that Japanese officials in Panama
report the passage of the United States' ships, the Mississippi, North Carolina, Washington
and Wasp through the Canal. 410
(e) Reports from South America
135. Agents Speculate Concerning Planes Flown to Bathurst
That twenty-five planes had been flown from Natal to British Bathurst on the west coast
of Africa was reported by Ambassador Ishii in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 1941. These
406 IV, 274.
* 0, IV, 275.
""IV, 276.
m rV, 277. (The Wasp was operating off the Atlantic Coast at this time. See Battle Report, p. 9)
109
THE
planes, flown during the period from August 30 to November 12, had carried varying numbers
of passengers. Those having a large number of passengers were thought to be carrying
technicians to strengthen bases at Bathurst, while those with few passengers were thought to
be en route to the Near East for the use of the British forces there/ 11
{f) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
136. Foreign Minister Togo Asks for Semi- weekly Ship Movement Reports
Instructions from Foreign Minister Togo directed officials in Honolulu to report irregularly
but at the rate of twice a week on "ships in harbor", in view of the critical relations between
Japan and the United States. Although this dispatch was transmitted on November 15, 1941,
because of the recent change in the Japanese diplomatic code it was not translated until
December 3, 1941. The dispatch requested that care be taken to maintain secrecy. 412
On November 18, 1941, Consul Kita wired that a battleship of the Oklahoma class had
entered port and one tanker had left port between Ford Island and the Arsenal. At anchor in
the East Loch area were three heavy cruisers and a carrier, the Enterprise or some other
vessel, while two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class and one of the Pensacola class were tied
up at the docks at a point designated as "KS". Four merchant vessels were at anchor in the
Middle Loch area.
The entry of eight destroyers, which had entered Pearl Harbor in single file 1000 meters
apart at a speed of three knots, was observed. It was added that these vessels had changed
course at a thirty degree angle five times from the entrance of the harbor through the waters
between Ford Island and the Arsenal to the buoys in East Loch, and that one hour had elapsed
during these maneuvers. 413
137. American Experts, Allegedly en Route to Burma Road, Arrive in Hawaii
Tokyo also learned at this time that 46 American transport experts and engineers, headed
by Captain Richard M. Jones, had arrived in port, and were en route to China to operate
trucks on the Burma road, where 3,500 new-type trucks, mostly of 2V 2 ton capacity, were
411
in use.
138. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Report of Vessels in "N" Area
Foreign Minister Togo requested that a report be made concerning the vessels anchored in
"N" Area at Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay and the ajacent areas, as well as the fleet bases near
Hawaiian military reservations. These investigations were to be made in great secrecy. 118
139. Consul Kita Reports Regular Naval Maneuvers
On November 24, 1941, Mr. Kita wired that the fleet normally left Pearl Harbor, conducted
maneuvers and returned. It was found, however, that the Lahaina Roads area had not been
used by the fleet for maneuvers or for anchoring for some time, and that only destroyers and
submarines rode at anchor in this neighborhood. Furthermore, battleships seldom entered
the ports of Hilo, Hanalei or Kaneohe. Normally, the Japanese official explained, battleships
exercised in groups of three to five, conducting maneuvers for one week at sea, either to the
south of Maui or to the southwest.
Although aircraft carriers maneuvered by themselves, seaplane tenders operated with
another vessel of the same class, and airplane firing and bombing practice was conducted
near the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe. 418
'" TV, 278.
4,1 TV, 279.
,u rV, 280.
'"IV, 281.
'"IV, 283, 282.
" S IV, 284.
110
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Also reported were the normal maneuver times and areas of the heavy cruisers, light
cruisers, submarines, destroyers and minelayers, with a note added to the effect that mine-
layers had recently conducted operations outside Manila Harbor. This dispatch of November
24, 1941, Honolulu message 234, outlining the activities of a large part of the American fleet as
reported by Japanese agents, was not translated until December 16, 1941.""
140. Japanese Agents Observe American Defenses
On November 28 a military report to Tokyo stated that eight B-17 planes were stationed
at Midway, and that the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns was 5,000 feet (?).
Observing Sand Island maneuvers, Japanese agents reported that twelve shots were
fixed, that the interval of shot flight was thirteen seconds, that the interval between shots
was two minutes, and that there were no direct hits. It was rumored that 12,000 men,
chiefly Marines, were expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or
January. One cruiser usually remained in the waters south of Pearl Harbor and one or two
destroyers at the entrance to the harbor. This dispatch was read on December 8, 1941. *' B
141 . Frequency of Ship Movement Reports Is Left To Discretion of Consul
Since intelligence reports of battleship movements were made once a week, and the
vessels could have traveled far from the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands in that interval,
Consul Kita was instructed by Tokyo to use his own judgment in reporting such movements.
In addition, the Consul was asked to note the entrance or departure of capital ships and the
length of time they remained at anchor. This dispatch of November 28 was translated on
Decembers, 1941. 4,9
According to a dispatch transmitted on November 29 and read by United States trans-
lators on December 5, Tokyo requested that, in addition to giving reports on ship movements,
Japanese officials in Honolulu report even when there were no ship movements. m
142. Foreign Minister Togo Wires Instructions Regarding Japanese Communications
In a dispatch dated November 28, 1941, which was translated December 7, 1941,
Foreign Minister Togo wired instructions regarding Japanese Communications. Antici-
pating that ordinary communications might be severed, he said that broadcasts would
inform Japanese diplomats of the situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels.
It was directed, however, that codes be retained as long as the situation in the country
permitted and until the final stage was entered. 421
143. Japanese Continue to Watch Navy Maneuvers
From December 1 to December 6, 1941, Japanese intelligence dispatches were transmitted
regularly to Tokyo. On December 1 a significant dispatch reported that ship maneuvers
were held approximately 500 nautical miles southeast of Honolulu, with the battleships
leaving Tuesday and returning Friday, or leaving Friday and returning Saturday of the
following week. It was noted that the fleet had never sailed westward or headed for the "Kaiui"
straits northward; the sea west of the Hawaiian Islands was not suitable for ocean maneuvers.
The estimate of distance was based on the fact that fuel was plentiful, long distance high
speed possible, and the guns could not be heard at Honolulu.' 1 "
4 "IV, 286.
"TV, 287.
450 IV, 288.
"TV, 289.
" 2 IV. 290.
Ill
144. Mr. Fujii Changes American Ship Maneuver Signals
On December 3, 1941, Ichiro Fujii informed the chief of the # 3 section of Military Staff
headquarters that he wished to change hia communication signals for American ship
maneuvers. Signal one would mean that the battle ship divisions included scouts and
screen units and were preparing to sortie; signal two that a number of carriers were pre-
paring to sortie; signal three that all battleship divisions had departed Hawaii between
December 1 and 3; signal four that several carriers had departed between December 1 and
3; signal five that all carriers had departed between December 1 and 3; signal six that all
battleship divisions had departed between December 4 and 6; signal seven that several
carriers had departed between December 4 and 6; signal eight that all carriers had departed
between December 4 and 6.
A house on Lanikai Beach would be used as a signal station and would show lights during
the night. One light in the window between 8 and 9 p.m. would denote signal one, one light
between 9 and 10 p.m. would mean signal two, and so on; two lights between midnight and
1 a.m. would signify signal five, and so on. It was further explained that if there was a star
on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it would indicate signal one, two, three or four; if
there was a star and the Roman numeral HI it would indicate signal five, six, seven or eight.
Also used at night would be the attic window of the Kalama House, located on the east coast
of Oahu northwest of Lanikai. A similar system was to be used; for example, if the window
were lighted between 1900 and 2000, it would indicate signal three, between 2000 and 2100,
signal four, and soon.
In addition, signals would be transmitted through the regular broadcast station in Honolulu.
For example, if a radio advertisement read, "Chinese rug for sale, apply P.O. Box 1476", it
would indicate signal three or sis, whereas the advertisement, "Beauty operator wanted,
apply P. O. Box 1476" would indicate signal five or eight.
In case the light or broadcast signals could not be sent from Oahu, the signals would be
given by bonfire daily on Maui Island until the Japanese "EXEX" signal was received. The
signal bonfire would be located at a point halfway between lower Kula Road and Haleakala
Road, and would be visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island.
If the fire was seen between 7 and 8 p.m., it would indicate signal three or six; between 8 and
9 p.m., signal four or seven; and between 9 and 10 p.m., signal five or eight. 423
145. Consul Wires Movement Report of Rarin and Wyoming
On December 3 Consul Kita wired that an unidentified military transport had sailed out
toward the mainland, that the Rarin had sailed into port 124 from San Francisco, and that
the Wyoming and two seaplane tenders had left port. There were no other ship movements
on this day. 426
146. British Vessel Enters Honolulu Harbor on December 4, 1941
A report to Tokyo on December 4 contained the information that a British gunboat had
entered Honolulu harbor on the afternoon of December 3, leaving early on the morning of
December 4. Immediately after the vessel had entered port, a sailor had taken some mail
to the British Consular Office and had received some in return. * u
"'TV, 292. (This message was sent on December 3, 1941 but was not translated by American cryptanalysts
until after the attack on Pearl Harbor.)
"'IV, 293.
" S V, 294. (The Wyoming had been demilitarized as a battleship in 1932, and was at that time in use as a train-
ing ship on the Atlantic Coast, Battle Report, p. 26.)
126 rV,295.
112
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
147. U.S.S. Lexington Departs Hawaii
Noting that three battleships had been at sea for eight days, Consul Kita said that the
vessels returned to port on Friday morning, December 5. On the same day the Lexington and
five heavy cruisers left port. In port on the afternoon of December 5 were eight battleships,
three light cruisers and sixteen destroyers, while four ships of the Honolulu class were in
dock/ 27
148. Consul Kita Notifies Tokyo of Balloon Barrage Defenses
On December 2, 1941, Tokyo directed the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to wire day by day
reports concerning observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or any indication that they would
be sent up. In view of the present situation, the presence of warships (battleships), carriers
and cruisers was of utmost importance, Foreign Minister Togo declared. He asked also that
he be advised whether or not the warships were provided with anti-mine (torpedo) nets.
This dispatch was not translated until December 30, 1941. 428
In accordance with these orders, the Consul informed Tokyo on December 6 that 400 or
500 balloons had been ordered in America and that their use was being considered in the
defense of Hawaii and Panama, He reported, however, that, as far as Hawaii was concerned,
no mooring equipment had been set up at Pearl Harbor nor had the troops been selected to
man them. Furthermore, there were no indications that any training for the maintenance of
balloons was being undertaken.
In addition, it was difficult for him to imagine that the Hawaiian defenses actually possessed
any balloons. Moreover, there were limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. He imagined
that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left for a surprise attack against
Pearl Harbor, Hickam and Ford. He added that he thought the battleships did not have tor-
pedo nets, but he would investigate the details further. 429
149. Last Intercepted Intelligence Report before Pearl Harbor Attack Lists Ships in Port
In an intercepted intelligence dispatch transmitted on December 6, 1941 from Hawaii,
the last before the Japanese attack on Peral Harbor, the Japanese Consul reported that a
number of battleships and one submarine tender had entered port on the evening of December
5. Nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders and seventeen destroyers
were at anchor, and four light cruisers and two destroyers were lying at the docks. The heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers had left Honolulu. It appeared that no air reconnaissance was
being conducted by the fleet air arm. 4,11
( g) Reports from the Philippine Islands
150. Consul Nihro Reports Movement of Philippine- Based Ships
Military, naval, installation, construction and fortification along with troop movement
and disposition reports continued to flow constantly from the Philippine Islands to Tokyo.
There is little doubt that the Japanese naval intelligence telegrams were explained in more
detail by mail. Although Kana abbreviations, which could not be translated, were used to
designate American ships, United States Intelligence estimated the possible equivalents for
the Kana names.
'"TV, 296. ("At sea near the end of this first week in December was the carrier, U.S.S. Lexington accompanied by
three cruisers and five destroyers on a combined search which took them to the south and westward," Battle Report,
p. 8.)
J2B rV, 291.
1IS IV 297.
298. (Berthed in Pearl Harber were eight of the nine battleships of the United States Pacific Fleet, nine
cruisers, and a third of the Fleet's destroyers", Battle Report, p. 6.)
113
On October 21, 1941, a Japanese official, Mr. Kihara, reported that the ground for an air
base was being leveled in the central Mindanao district. Although an underground hanger
and underground oil tanks were being planned, the building was not progressing as quickly
as could be expected. It appeared, Mr. Kihara said, that large heavy bomber planes were
expected at this base very soon," 31
The unloading of more than ten tanks from the American Leader, which touched port
at Manila on October 20, was reported by Consul Nihro. He estimated that each tank was
equipped with a gun having a barrel approximately 6 feet long. 43 '
Although the Houston and the Marblehead were reported to have left Manila along with
eight destroyers, ten submarines and one mine layer on October 20, 1941, 433 five days later
Consul Nihro declared that these two vessels were then in Manila. The Consul also informed
Tokyo that the Langley and one destroyer had sailed during the morning of October 25, but
that their destination was not known. At port in Manila on that day were the Houston, the
Marblehead, the Chester, the Black Hawk, the Isabel, the Heron, one vessel the name of
which was undeciphered, five destroyers, eleven large submarines and five small sub-
marines. Reported as under repair at Cavite was the Canopus, and two destroyers were also
in that port."* The President Cleveland was reported to have landed perhaps 2,500 soldiers
on October 23, 1941. 435
On the morning of October 27, it was reported, three destroyers, eleven submarines of the
"N" type, the Heron and two minelayers left port for unknown destinations. 438 The Pecos
entered Cavite on October 26 and the Langley on October 27.
The Houston and the Marblehead sailed from Manila on the afternoon of October 28,
while the Chester departed on the morning of October 29. 437
On November 1, 1941, the Houston, Marblehead, Heron, seven destroyers, eight sub-
marines and three minesweepers were reported to have entered Manila on October 31. But
the Houston left Manila on November 1; so did the President Cleveland and the President
Madison, which were loaded with American soldiers. A significant fact included in the
dispatch of November 1 was the estimation of American military and naval planes in the
Philippine Islands. In the total of 1,283 military aircraft were large bombers, scout planes,
fighters, pursuit planes and training planes. Japanese agents reported that twenty-six large
flying naval boats were based in the Philippine Islands.
Ships in port on November 1 were to be the Marblehead, the Black Hawk, the Pecos, the
Heron, the Isabel, nine destroyers, three submarines, a ship called Wohotosu (Kana
spelling), and three minelayers. At Cavite were the Langley, the Canopus and the 2 Z. 43 "
151. Consul Nihro Obtains Information from Newspapers and Foreign Office Reports
On November 1, 1941, Consul Nihro complained that a strict guard was being maintained
and the gathering of military and naval intelligence was extremely difficult. From news-
paper and foreign office reports he learned that 120,000 of the Philippine army would be
incorporated into the Far Eastern army and additions to barracks at various camps were
being Tapidly made. Indications pointed to the fact that there was to be an increase in the num-
ber of soldiers stationed in the vicinity of Lingayen during November, that the military
1,1 IV, 299.
,SS IV, 300.
" :l IV,301.
"'IV, 302.
" 5 IV, 303.
4M TV, 304.
"TV, 305.
t3 *IV,306.
114
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
projects in the vicinity of Mariveles were being rushed, that three airports were being built
in that vicinity; and that the docks at that location were being enlarged. In the Bataan area
military surveillance was particularly strict, and it was reported that even the entry of
Filipinos was restricted. It was found that a road was being constructed between Dingalan
and Laur {?), and that the road between Infanta and Manila was being widened to five
meters.
Consul Nihro disclosed in this same dispatch that thirty or forty fighter planes, twenty
or thirty light bombers and several score of "altitude planes {?)" were stationed at Iba. 439
152. Brown Soldiers Puzzle Japanese Consul
The arrival of 2,000 or 3,000 brown soldiers at the Fort Stotsenburg barracks elicited an
intelligence report from the Japanese Consul on November 4, 1941, In view of the fact that
the soldiers spoke Spanish he guessed that these could be "Iko's"; they were not too friendly
with American soldiers.
According to rumors, the American soldiers stationed at Fort Stotsenburg were arrogant
toward the Filipinos, and since there had been two or three cases of assault on Filipinos the
natives were furious.
He reported further construction work at Tarallo on Migual Air Field; the wooden bridges
on the highway between Tarallo and Lingayen had been replaced with concrete bridges and
approximately 200 barracks had been constructed near Tarallo overlooking the Lingayen
Gulf/ 40
153. Tokyo Directs Secretary Vuki to Investigate Philippine Defenses
On November 5 Tokyo directed that Secretary Yuki conduct an investigation for the
Naval General Staff. At each "port of call" he was to enumerate the conditions at airports; the
types and number of planes at each; the warships and the machinery belonging to the land
forces; and the state of progress being made on all equipment and establishments. 141
154. Foreign Minister Togo Asks Confirmation of Report of November 1, 1941
Referring to the report on military and naval planes made on November 1 by Consul
Nihro, Foreign Minister Togo requested that the Consul send a wire immediately as to the
validity of these reports. 442
155. Consul Nihro Wires Further Information on Military Installation at Manila
The military installations in and around Manila were the subject of a report from Consul
Nihro to Tokyo on November 6. According to his information, fifty American officials and
1,200 Filipino soldiers were stationed at Bugallon, which is located in a province north of
Manila. Also at this location were eight light tanks and eight anti-aircraft guns.
At Iba in Zam bales Province, which is across the bay from Manila, were ten two-motored
light bombers, 190 Curtiss fighting planes and 400 American air force officers.
Stationed at San Marcelino, where the construction of a new air field was under way, was a
division of Philippine soldiers numbering 15,000. Furthermore, 320 Philippine soldiers were
stationed at Botolan and there were 200 light tanks at Fort Stotsenburg,
Construction work was reported in Tarlac Province in the form of barracks and a new air
field, as well as the building of a military road from Capas to Botolan in Zambales Province. 443
43S IV, 307.
"°IV, 309.
m tV, 310-
" ! rv, 3ii.
'"TV, 312.
115
Consul Nihro declared on November 8 that the province of Bataan had been reinforced by
4,000 or 5,000 soldiers, who were stationed along the coast and in the central mountain
districts.
With the building of an excellent military highway between Lamao and Mariveles sentries
had been posted prohibiting the passing of civilians, Philippine military personnel and
others not in possession of special permits. Although the road between Bagao and Balanga
had been converted into a military highway, construction of a road connecting Moron and
Olongapa had been suspended and the commercial connection between these places was
possibly by boat. 444
156. Twenty-Three Ships Anchored at Manila on November 8, 1941
In a separate routine ship movement report Tokyo was informed that the Marblehead, the
Black Hawk, the Heron, the Isabel, the tanker Trinity, the Wohotosu, eight destroyers and
nine submarines were at anchor in Manila harbor on November 8, 1941. 445
The Houston touched port at Cavite on November 8; two cargo boats with the names
painted over entered port on November 9, landing 2,300 soldiers, and four destroyers departed
on November 10 for an unknown destination. 446
157. Japanese Consul Corrects Previous Estimate of Airplanes in Philippines
On November 10, 1941, Consul Nihro sent a correction to his dispatch of November 1
reporting the number of planes based in the Philippine Islands. The number of large
attack planes (bombers) he raised from 29 to 32. He further disclosed that the brown soldiers,
formerly believed to be "Iko's", were American Negroes. 447
The arrival at Manila of an American cruiser, identified as one of the Chester class, was
noted on November 12, 1941, and it was believed that this vessel accompanied one of the
President Line ships into port. 44 *
1.58. Consul Gathers Information from Japanese Residents
From a Japanese who had lived in the Province of Ilocos for about fifteen years Consul Nihro
ascertained that approximately 400 Philippine soldiers and seven or eight officers were
stationed in Laoag in the Province of Ilocos Norte on Luzon, and it was rumored that this force
would be increased to approximately 1,700. No expansion of the present civil airport in
Laoag was planned, no military planes were being stationed at that field, and no extensive
activity was in progress with the exception of one reconnaissance flight nightly by one plane
over the coastal area in the vicinity of the city, 44a
According to a report from a Japanese resident in Camarines Norte, only about sixty
members of the Philippine Patrol organization were located in that area and every day five
or six of these patrolmen were dispatched to Paracale and Jose Panganiban. 450 That the civil
airport at Paracale was not being used and that no military planes had landed at Daet since
February was also reported. During the latter part of 1940 thirteen American freighters had
entered the port of Panganiban and since then on the average of once a week American
freighters sailed from Batangas in southwestern Luzon to Hondagua off Lamon Bay. 451
"'IV, 313.
4,6 IV, 314.
" 6 IV, 315.
,,7 IV,316.
" a IV, 517.
"'IV, 318.
""These are located on the Island of Luzon.
,S1 IV, 319.
116
"MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
On November 13 Manila reported that the cruiser which had been identified as a member
of the Chester class entering Manila Harbor on November 12 was now identified as the Portland,
and it was added that a British destroyer of the Defender type had sailed into Manila Harbor
on November 13. 452
159. Japanese Report Concerning Preparations on Cebu
According to the report of a Japanese resident in Cebu, Manila informed Tokyo on
November 15 that there were 300 American and 2,500 Philippine soldiers stationed on that
island. The airport was being enlarged and twelve medium -sized planes, which were used
by the Philippine army, had been transported to Java by air. Twelve or thirteen American
army planes were stationed there, and one large bomber was in the hanger.
Moreover, the headquarters of the former patrol force was being used as the commissariat
storehouse with all sorts of provisions being stored there.
Twenty American warships had anchored off the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago
on September 22, two destroyers and one cruiser had entered Cebu Harbor in October, and
one oil supply ship and a camouflaged cruiser had anchored there early in November for
two or three days. 463
Referring to the report of November 1, as well as Consul Nihro's correction of November 10,
Tokyo requested on November 15 that the Japanese in Manila discover by what route the
large bombers had flown to the Philippines. It was also asked that their number be ascertained
again. 454
160. Manila Identifies the British Ship Awatea
A ship which had entered Manila Harbor on November 13 was identified as the British
transport Awatea, with 700 or 800 soldiers on board. That the vessel under escort had sailed
again on the evening of November 14 to an unknown destination was also reported. The
routine intelligence report of ships in harbor as of November 15 was added to this dispatch. 468
After reading an AP dispatch from Hong Kong Consul Nihro suggested on November 17
that the 700 or 800 soldiers embarked on the Awatea were possibly the same as those reported
disembarking at Hong Kong on the morning of November 16. 456
The departure of the Marblehead, the Portland, possibly ten destroyers and one minelayer
from Manila was the subject of a routine ship movement report on November 17. 4&7
A troop movement report from Lingayen which had been published in the Bulletin on
November 17 publicized the movement of fifty-four 14-ton tanks as well as scout cars, provi-
sion cars, baggage cars and various types of military trucks together with mechanized troops
from Fort Stotsenburg. They had stayed only overnight at Lingayen, returning to Fort
Stotsenburg the next day. 451 *
On November 20 Tokyo requested in a special dispatch to Manila that the home office be
advised immediately of the type of craft presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay.
This information was to be transmitted to the Asama Mara 459 as well as to Tokyo. 46 "
The arrival and departure of an unidentified camouflaged British cruiser on November 21
was reported in a diplomatic wire of November 22, 1941. The entry into port of an American
152 IV, 320.
" 3 IV, 321.
1 " IV, 322.
'"IV, 323.
416 IV, 324.
" 7 IV, 325.
46 "IV, 326.
""The Asama Mora was scheduled to touch port at Manila on November 19 or 20.
'"IV, 327.
117
transport, which was rumored to be the President Harrison, for the purpose of loading soldiers
and material was also noted. At Manila on November 22, according to the Japanese intelligence
dispatch, were the Portland, the Marblehead, the Black Hawk, the Isabel, the Heron, the
Wohotosu, the Pecos, one minelayer, nine destroyers and twenty submarines. At Cavite were
the Houston and the Canopus. m
161. Consul Nihro Reports Tense Feeling in Manila
On November 24, 1941, Consul Nihro declared that the feeling among the people of Manila
had, in general, become tense in view of the military activity in that area. It appeared that
military stores had been removed from the "port area" during the "black out" on November
21, and, in view of the movement of forty or fifty buses in the Rizal province district, investiga-
tions were being made to find if these were loaded with troops.
On the afternoon of November 22 sixty light tanks and twenty ammunition trucks, which
had earlier been grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" military police, were seen
leaving Quezon Bridge. It was a conjecture that troops had recently arrived in military boats,
and that light tanks and ammunition trucks had been landed on November 21. Although at
present the tanks and trucks were said to be en route to Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and
San Fernando in Pampanga Province, their final destination was being investigated. Besides
the two or three hundred American army trucks near the "port area", which had been
imported at short intervals, it was noted that troops had arrived in hill areas within the city. 465
162. Submarine Tender Enters Port
The information that a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland, had entered port
on November 23, that five submarines had sailed to unknown destinations on November 24,
and that seven destroyers had left for unknown destinations the next day was transmitted to
Tokyo on November 25. 463
Two days later the Japanese Consul reported the departure of the Portland, the Black
Hawk, two destroyers and ten submarines for unknown destinations. 464
163. Inaccuracy of Japanese Intelligence Reports
Since it was obvious at this time that Japan was attempting to obtain a total picture of
military and naval strength in the Philippines, as well as last minute information of ship
movements and troop allocations, the accuracy of their spy reports may be gauged by
comparing the information with an estimate of the strength of United States air forces in the
Philippines on November 27, 1941, as released by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. 466
Japanese agents estimated that 1,283 military and twenty-six naval planes were based in the
Islands 466 (the former number was later very slightly raised). 467 Since, according to the
American estimate forty-three Navy planes and 298 Army planes were based in the
Philippine Islands, our air strength in the Islands was greatly overestimated; there was
seventeen more Navy planes than were reported but 985 fewer Army planes than were listed
by Japanese agents. 469
""IV, 328.
462 IV, 329.
463 IV, 330.
4,4 IV, 331.
*"IV, 332. "U.S. Navy estimate of U.S. Air Strength in Philippines, November 27, 1941."
"*IV,30e.
,6 'IV T 316.
'"TV, 352. "U.S. Navy estimate of U.S. Air Strength in Philippines, November 27, WL"
118
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
164. Manila Notifies Tokyo of Scouting Patrols
High-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila were the subject of an intelligence report
to Tokyo on November 28, 1941. The patrols were divided into one flight of six planes and
another of three planes beginning at four o'clock in the morning. Three additional planes
were noted to be flying over the city independently. 469
In a shipping report of November 29, 1941, Consul Nihro said that the submarine tenders
Wotosu (Kana spelling) and Holland, five submarines of the 170 class, five of the 180 class,
five of the 190 class, five of the 150 class, four small-sized submarines, the oilers Pecos
and Trinity, two destroyers, the gunboat Isabel and one minelayer were in port at Manila.
At Cavite were the Houston and the Canopus. Consul Nihro further reported that the lights at
Langley Point in Cavite, at Manila, at Baguio, and on the buoys in the bay would be turned
out for a time. 470
165. Intelligence Report Lists Ships in Port on December 1, 1941
Manila informed Tokyo on December 1, 1941, that fourteen large submarines (possibly
with the submarine tender Wotosu) and two destroyers had left port that morning. From
the American Navigation, which had entered port about three days earlier, were unloaded
twelve objects which appeared to be boilers.
In addition, the Manchen Maersk, a former Danish ship sailing under Panamanian
registry, entered port December 1; and, although details were not ascertained, five British
freighters were loading cargo at the pier. The American vessel, Spencer Kellogg, had un-
loaded crude oil and was scheduled to load castor oil; and the American Army's Don
Esteban entered Manila harbor December 1. In port on this date were the Holland, the
Wotosu (possibly), the Pecos, the Trinity, a gunboat, two small and six large submarines,
while the Houston remained at Cavite. The Campus and a cargo ship were in the vicinity
(exact position not clear). 471
(h) Reports from Singapore
166. Japanese Officials in Singapore Learn of Squadron Sailing
On October 22 Tokyo requested officials in Singapore to report the drills and battle
maneuvers and to investigate the organization of the air force stationed in the Federated
Malay States. 472
The Japanese Foreign Minister informed officials in Singapore on November 18, 1941,
that a squadron of ships had left port (name missing) on November 4 headed for the Malay
States. The squadron had consisted of eight ships of the 15,000 ten class and ten other
craft, carrying approximately 10,000 British troops, including many aviators.'* 73
167. Tokyo Requests Information on Ships in Port
On December 5, 1941, Tokyo requested an immediate report on ships in port as well as
on the movements of capital ships. 474
(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking
,59 IV,333.
"°IV, 334.
41, IV,335.
4 "IV, 336.
,,5 IV, 337.
119
168. American Tankers en Route to Vladivostok
Investigating the routing of American vessels to Russia, Japan learned from its embassy
in Vladivostok that up to October 20 the American Consul there had received no official
communication concerning the tankers being routed to Valdivostok. Although it had
been decided at the Moscow conference to continue aid to Russia, it had been decided
to discontinue the transportation of material to Russia via Vladivostok after the ships en
route had arrived, and a new routing would be used, undoubtedly via Iran. 475
169. Russian Incidents
On November 28, 1941, a message from Hsinking reported that forty-seven airplanes of an
unrecognizable type, although they were definitely of American design and construction,
had flown over the city of Kuibyshev during a military review in celebration of the
anniversary of the revolution. It was further reported that large bodies of anti-communist
forces were fighting in the vicinity of Minsk and south of Krasnoyarsk, destroying lines of
communications.
"Intelligence of primary importance" was sent to the effect that twenty unsuccessful
deserters who had tried to get into Manchukuo had been executed before a firing squad of the
39th Sharpshooters Division. By November 28 forty-six Russian troops had deserted. To
prevent further desertions the Soviet Army had moved certain detachments away from
the border and had strung charged barbed wire fences along the border. Regiments, more-
over, were held responsible for detachments from which there had been deserters. On the
Ude front surveillance troops of the outer Mongolian area had deliberately trespassed on
Mongolian territory several times, even to the extent of ten to twenty kilometers. These
troops were taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveillance troops. 476
The Foreign Office in Tokyo informed Hsinking on November 28 that Russian newspapers,
quoting a Domei news report, had carried the story that a Russian division had crossed the
Manchurian border. In the fighting some soldiers had been killed and others taken prisoner.
However, the Russian press had reported that this was at variance with the facts, and that
Russian soldiers had not crossed the border. Tokyo asked that Japanese officials in Hsinking
report the true situation, since the Japanese Ambassador in Manchuria had reported the
story in substantially the same form. 47 '
* I5 rV, 339.
" fi IV, 340.
"TV, 341.
120
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C — JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
( a ) Japanese-American Relations
170. Japanese Consul Considers Means of Evacuating Nationals
In keeping with plans to embark evacuees on the Hikawa Maru, Consul Jisaburo Sato in
Seattle wired that Vancouver, Portland, and one other office would again be consulted in the
event that funds were not at hand to pay expenses of nationals. He added that, in the matter
of life belts, it was understood that there were plentiful supplies in stock at San Francisco,**' 8
171. Consul Morishima Applies for Permit to Transfer American Mission Funds
Referring to a previous dispatch which concerned the transfer of donations from the com-
bined organizations of all American mission boards to Japan, Consul Morito Morishima in
New York informed Tokyo that he had applied to the government for a permit to transfer these
funds. The amount to be sent to Japan proper totaled more than $37,000, and to Korea, more
than $7,700, excluding the funds for St. Luke's Hospital and the Women's Christian College. 47 "
172. Japanese Fear That Mr. Kasai's Lecture May Cause Embarrassment
From Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco came word on October 20, 1941, that Mr. Jiuji
Kasai, a member of the Japanese Parliament, was scheduled to deliver a lecture on October
29 on the subject "Will Japan and the United States Fight?" Pointing out that such a lecture
might cause embarrassment to the propaganda work in San Francisco, he advised that Japa-
nese officials caution Mr. Kasai as much as possible during his visit in the United States. Con-
sul Muto further suggested that Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura have Mr. Kasai cancel his
lecture. ,fl(1
173. Consul Originates Plan to Repay Nationals in Tokyo
Since Japanese evacuees from the United States were allowed to take not more than $210
with them, the Japanese Consul in Portland, Oregon, asked if some arrangement could be
made whereby the nationals could pay funds into that office and receive payment in Tokyo in
Japanese currency. The difficulty of this plan lay in the fact that the office was short of funds
and could not pay the traveling expenses of any official transferring to another place. He asked,
however, that this plan be considered and that immediate reply be sent to him/ 81
174. Secretary Terasaki Suggests Delay of Orders for Official Harada
Secretary Hidenari Terasaki questioned Mr. Yoshioka in Tokyo as to the advisability of
having Official Harada sail on the Hikawa Maru which would leave Seattle on November 4,
1941, since his stay in the United States would be cut too short to carry out his instructions.
The Secretary suggested instead that Mr. Harada leave on the Terukawa Maru, which would
leave from Manzanillo early in December, and he asked if there were any objections to the
Official's prolonging his stay. 482
1,8 IV, 342.
179 IV, 343.
m IV, 344.
4Bl IV,345.
,HI IV,346.
121
175. Japanese Plan to Route Money to Vancouver Through Seattle
Meanwhile, the Foreign Minister was attempting to procure the consent of the United States
to establish a route for the sending of money through Seattle to Vancouver. The money would
be sent through the Yokohama Specie Bank." 3
176. Sailing of Hikawa Maru Forces Secretary Matsui to Leave Japan Without Visa
Having been forced to leave Tokyo when the Hikawa Maru had sailed, Secretary Matsui, who
was en route to his new post in Washington, had embarked without waiting for his visa to come
through. Foreign Minister Togo directed that Ambassador Nomura have United States officials
send instructions concerning Mr. Matsui to the American Consul in Vancouver. Secretary
Matsui had already procured his Canadian passport and entrance visa. 484
Furthermore, the Ambassador was instructed to negotiate to ensure that the confidential
documents being brought on the Hikawa Maru would be passed through customs without being
opened. 485
Ambassador Nomura learned on October 20, 1941 that the Hikawa Maru had left Yokohama
on this day with Kensuke Sato of the Foreign Office and Communications Engineer Kiichiro
Ueno aboard. 486
177. Japanese Consul at Vladivostok Views Pessimistically the Adjustment of Japanese- American
Relations
Retransmitting the opinions of the Consul at Vladivostok which had been sent to Foreign
Minister Togo, Tokyo informed officials in Hsinking that the present status of the Hull- No-
mura discussions indicated the Tojo Cabinet must not alter Japan's fundamental task of
establishing its place in the Far East. After observing the progress of the Russo-Anglo-Ameri-
can conversations, the Vladivostok Consul felt that the adjustment of the Japanese-American
relations appeared to be hopeless. 481
178. Propaganda Regulations Will Apply to Neutral Countries, Japan Decrees
On October 21, 1941 Tokyo informed Berlin that Japan had decided to apply certain regu-
lations in the case of a neutral country's propaganda work for a belligerent nation. Although
admitting that the United States Embassy had not been distributing bulletins, Japan pointed
out that should this office undertake propaganda work in Britain's stead in Japan, this work
would have to be taken under control. Further, Berlin was coming to understand that British
and American affiliated news correspondents were already being discriminated against to
some extent, and that a large number of dispatches received by Domei and other concerns
were either prohibited from publication or else withheld voluntarily. 4aa
1 79. Harada to Bring Wireless Apparatus on Hikawa Maru
The Foreign Minister directed Consul Rioyji in Los Angeles to send to San Francisco the
wireless apparatus he had previously requested. At that place it would be taken by Adminis-
tration Official Harada and brought to Japan. 489
'""IV, 347.
484 IV, 348.
4Bf TV, 349.
48e IV, 350.
497 IV, 351.
,fl "IV, 352.
4B! Tv\ 353.
122
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
180. Swiss Newspaper Reports Progress of Japanese- American Negotiations
One of the news dispatches referring to the Japanese-American negotiations was reported to
Tokyo from Rome on October 22, 1941. According to the intelligence a Swiss newspaper had
published a dispatch from Washington to the effect that when the Japanese government had
expressed a desire to resume negotiations, the United States had accepted. It was further
alleged that the United States had presented four sine qua non terms and that the Japanese
government had accepted them in principle. 490
181. Delay of Sailing Permit Will Cause Financial Loss, Japan Declares
Ambassador Nomura was instructed by the Home Foreign Office on October 22, 1941 to
attempt to get a permit from the American authorities for the sailing of the Shoyo Maru, which
was waiting in San Francisco harbor. To pay for additional supplies of water and food for this
ship, the Japan-Eastern Mining Company had presented a letter of credit for $900 on the
Yokohama Specie Bank but they had lacked an American permit to cash it. The delay in sail-
ing would amount to $3,000 additional cost. Moreover, as for an application by the San Fran-
cisco branch of the Japanese Mitsui Bussan Company for 350 tons of fuel oil, the permit had
not as yet been granted. 491 On this same day, however, Ambassador Nomura replied that Mr,
Atcheson had arranged to have the permit issued immediately. 49 *
182. Ambassador Inquires Concerning Return of Japanese Students
Ambassador Nomura sent an inquiry to Tokyo in regard to the early sailing of the Japanese
residents who were studying abroad. He asked if it were Tokyo's policy to cut short the terms
of those students and have them return home aboard the Asama Maru, which would touch
port at Lisbon. The Ambassador also inquired as to the date on which the boat would dock
there. 191
183. Ambassador Nomura Sends Part of Persona! Luggage to Japan
Since Semi-Official Obata would carry a considerable amount of Ambassador Nomura's
luggage when he returned to Tokyo on the Tatsuta Maru, the Ambassador requested that a
member of the staff be sent to Yokohama to meet this official. 494
184. Foreign Minister Togo Urges Salary Remittance Exchange for Foreign Correspondents
Another minor matter to be negotiated by Ambassador Nomura in Washington, but one
which would determine future policy, was the transmission of the $1,000 monthly salary to
' who was employed by the Universal News Feature Service. Because the American gov-
ernment had not as yet granted permission to remit monthly salary drafts, was under-
stood to be financially embarrassed. Foreign Minister Togo pointed out that this would deter-
mine the granting of further permits to American newspapers to pay their correspondents in
Japan. 495
4 "IV, 354.
4 " IV, 355.
4,2 IV, 356.
•"IV, 357.
'"IV, 358.
* IV, 359.
"DoD comment: Name withheld.
123
185. Japan Asks tor Foreign Broadcast Suggestions
In a circular dispatch to Japanese officials in North and South American countries, Foreign
Minister Togo reported that Japan had changed the direction, time and contents of its for-
eign broadcasts. Since the change had been made at the end of September, the Foreign
Minister asked in his dispatch on October 24, 1941 that the Japanese officials make any sug-
gestions concerning technique, contents and priority which they considered advisable. 496
Ambassador Nomura requested on October 24, 1941 that the home Foreign Office arrange
for the receipt of twenty-two boxes of records which were being sent to Japan on the Norfolk
Maru. A wooden box inside one of the twenty-two boxes was to be turned over to the Navy
Ministry. 497
1 86. American Embassy in Tokyo to Get Fuel
In referring to the State Department's request for heating fuel for the American Embassy in
Japan, Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura on October 25, that the Fuel Bureau had agreed
to supply oil for the Embassy heating system in Tokyo. The original dispatch explaining the
fuel shortage had been sent on October 14 by Ambassador Nomura. 498
187. Tokyo Requests Officials to Bring Recording Apparatus
Three days later Foreign Minister Togo inquired whether the short wave receiving apparatus
he had previously requested had already been dispatched to Tokyo. Should the set be await-
ing transportation, it was to be sent by the Tatsuta Maru, in care of Extraordinary Official
Kobata, as part of Ambassador Nomura's baggage. 499 Consul Muto in San Francisco answered
that Official Kobata, who was embarking on the Tatsuta Maru, would take the apparatus to
Japan. He further reported that five recording machines and cylinders which were labeled as
the personal baggage of Mr. Kanome Wakasugi had been loaded on the Itsukushima Maru,
and that five # 90 recording machines and five # 66 recording machines as well as twenty type-
writers and cylinders could not be shipped because of the freezing legislation. The wireless
sets had already been loaded on the Itsukushima Maru as the hand baggage of Colonel
Oka. 900
188. Exchange of Diplomatic Expense Funds Gives Rise to Discussion
In reply to a dispatch from Foreign Minister Togo concerning the procurement of expense
money by Americans in Japan, &tn Ambassador Nomura answered on October 29, 1941 that
according to the American government and the National City Bank, if dollars were paid to the
Yokohama Specie Bank in America and if the Yokohama Specie Bank in Tokyo paid an equiv-
alent amount to the Americans there, the exchange transaction would be complete; conse-
quently, it would be unnecessary for American diplomatic establishments and Embassies in
Tokyo to issue checks and drafts to be cashed by the National City Bank. He pointed out that
inasmuch as there were no mail facilities at present between Japan and America, exchange
and the buying and selling of checks were most inconvenient and that there was no other way
than to remit funds by telegraph. 50 " The Ambassador requested permission to confer with
Secretary Hull in regard to this proposal.
41,6 IV, 360.
'"IV, 361.
,96 IV, 362.
,9S IV, 363.
™TV, 364.
501 IV, 365.
' K TV, 366-367.
124
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Foreign Minister Togo answered on the following day that the American Embassy in Tokyo
had been asked to have its money sent by the American government through the Yokohama
Specie Bank, but that because of the red tape involved, the Embassy preferred to continue
their customary method of selling money orders and checks. At the present time, he said, the
staff of the Embassy and its members wrote checks on their private accounts in banks in the
United States. These private checks would be sold, according to the practice of using the re-
verse money order. 603 Therefore Japan suggested that the responsibility for this practice be
placed on the National City Bank of New York and affiliated banks, and that the National
City Bank's cash funds in Japan be held to ensure its fixed deposits rather than to buy money
orders. The only money which could be used for this purpose would be that received by the
Yokohama Specie Bank through the sale of telegraphic money orders from America. It was
asked that the proposal be made along these lines to the State Department and the result
wired by 2:00 p.m., October 31. 504
From Mr. Atcheson of the State Department Finance division, Mr, Sadao Iguchi learned
that details of the negotiations concerning expense money for diplomatic staffs and employees
would be sent to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. Ambassador Nomura asked that those instruc-
tions sent to Ambassador Grew be carried out, although the question of the payment of back
salaries still remained pending. Since the United States had asked that the salaries for August
and September as well as those for October be paid in a lump sum, Ambassador Nomura
asked that the Foreign Office contact the finance ministry immediately and wire a reply. 505
On October 31, however, Ambassador Nomura informed his home Foreign Office that Treas-
ury Department officials had insisted on further delay, declaring that they would have to con-
sider the mutual release of funds for the expenses of diplomatic establishments from all
angles. He pointed out that the United States refused, moreover, to ease its economic pres-
sure on Japan, particularly in the matter of supply oil, unless Japan completely mended her
ways. Certain oil tankers which were evidently in the United States and which were awaiting
developments had been ordered to sail. Ambassador Nomura believed that all matters in-
volving relations between the two countries were greatly affected by the adjustment of the
relations proposal under consideration.* *
189. Minister Directs That Cargo Ships Return to Japan
Referring to a dispatch of October 14 regarding export permits for gasoline, Foreign Minister
Togo instructed on October 30, 1941 that in case negotiations were not completed soon, ar-
rangements should be made to have the Itsukushima Maru and the Shoyo Maru sent back to
Japan. In this regard Ambassador Nomura was to get in touch with San Francisco and Japa-
nese finance officials. 501
190. Broadcast Wave Length Proves Unsatisfactory
Reporting, as was requested on October 24, Ambassador Nomura declared that there was no
sensitivity and that reception was impossible on the new wave length. He requested that the
wave length be changed immediately to JAU 2-7.237.5 k.c. SDS
505 IV, 368.
SM /i>id.
60S IV, 369.
SU6 IV.370.
S0, IV, 371.
-IV, 372.
125
191. Japan Learns of Alleged Source of News Leak
According to an intelligence report which was transmitted to Tokyo on November 1, 1941, a
conversation with " and Secretary Terasaki was reported. " declared that when he
had talked with President Roosevelt, the President had disclosed that he had hoped more
strongly now than ever to meet the leaders of Japan. With the idea that this disclosure was a
great "scoop", ° had immediately wired his New York editor, who believed this matter
to be too grave in its implication and thereby delayed the publication. In addition, " had
"sounded out" an official in the State Department. He had learned from him that Japan had
proposed the Konoye-Roosevelt conference be held on board a Japanese warship. Although
° had withheld the announcement for a few days, he had finally published it. It was the
belief of ° that the State Department was divided into two factions, the Moderationists
and the Strong Policy Advocates, the first group headed by the President and including Under
Secretary Sumner Welles, Maxwell M. Hamilton and Joseph W. Ballantine, the second group
consisting of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Mr. Stanley Hornbeck and Cabot Coville. 509
192. Ambassador Nomura Sends Representative to "America First" Meeting
Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he had rushed Secretary Terasaki to New York
on October 30 for the meeting of the America First Committee. There the intelligence agent
has met — Secretary Terasaki asked 1 to tell Colonel Lindbergh, who was for
"America First", that the United States was about to fight with Germany concerning its policy
of "Britain First" in the Atlantic, and with Japan under its policy of "China First" in the
Pacific. He commented on the fact that a crisis was at hand between Japan and the United
States and that the American people did not understand the reason for such a war, although,
fundamentally, it would be due to the China problem. Secretary Terasaki had further stated
on this occasion that it was a mistake to think that Japan would give in if it were driven into a
tight corner by the United States. It was necessary to view realistically the situation in the
Orient, since it was most inconsistent to fear a southward push by Japan and at the same time
to cut off her petroleum supplies. 510
193. Japanese Officials Plan to Organize and Finance New Committee
On the morning of October 31, Secretary Terasaki had discussed with " the same topics
about which he and " had talked. 511
Ambassador Nomura reported on November 1, 1941 that * would continue to devote
his efforts toward the organizing of a committee to permit friendly relations between Japan
and America. Although Secretary Terasaki would be the liaison agent, the committee would
be promoted by Americans and would have the appearance of being financed by American
money in spite of the fact that a portion of the actual expense would be born by the Japanese
Embassy.
Ambassador Nomura explained at this time that an early attempt to establish the committee
had been delayed by the United States freezing order and by the invasion of French Indo-
China. The committee had no influential members when the first meeting was held in New
York. " had proposed that a second meeting of the committee be held in Washington in
*DoD comment: Name withheld.
609 IV, 373.
°DoD comment: Name withheld.
"DoD comment: Name withheld,
"TV, 374.
"'IV, 375.
" DoD comment: Name withheld.
126
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
September (sic) to discuss Japanese- American relations. Explaining the present state of
strained relations between the two countries, Secretary Terasaki pointed out that as long as
America continued to withhold oil from Japan, there was not much hope of progress being
made. Secretary Terasaki desired to have a member of the committee meet with Secretary
of State Hull to state the objections of the committee, which meeting would determine whether
the committee should be continued or dissolved. It had been arranged, Ambassador Nomura
said, to have ° come to Washington to carry out this program. 512
194. Tokyo Foresees Need of Survey of United States Economic System
On November 1, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo explained that the necessity of a complete
survey of present United States economics under war time conditions had been recognized by
Japan for a long time. Since Japan's 1941 budget included expenditures for the survey, it was
planned to expand the financial division of the Tokyo, New York, and Washington offices and
to establish an independent economic survey office in New York. Temporarily, however, in
view of present conditions, it had been decided to proceed only with the expansion of present
financial divisions, and the Embassy was instructed to commence their work with the com-
mercial attache's office, using any suitable United States surveys already made on this sub-
ject. The Ambassador would be allowed one secretary and two clerks for this work, and suit-
able persons were now being selected. 513
195. Ambassador Nomura Says American People Not Ready to Enter European War
For the information of the Japanese Foreign Minister, as well as Minister Yoshiaki Miura in
Mexico, Ambassador Nomura sent a dispatch painting a general picture of the situation as he
saw it on November 4, 1941, It was his belief that the public mind in the United States was
not one iota more incensed against Germany in spite of the increase in damages to destroyers
and merchantmen. Therefore, it was unlikely that the government would sever relations with
Germany and invite war. Germany, knowing that a bout with the United States would not be
advantageous, would, as far as possible, refrain from an outright war against America. At the
present time, content with furnishing the maximum material assistance, patrolling the sea,
and affording technical aid, the United States was not yet ready to become involved in Euro-
514
pe.
Inside the United States, the people were worrying about internal problems such as prices,
increased taxes, inflation and other such matters affecting their immediate welfare. Govern-
ment officials, on the other hand, seemed inclined to want to keep England fighting, and when
the last extremities were reached, to jump in and seize the victory. That the United States was
aiding Russia did not signify that it approved of Communism, but meant only that the United
States could use Russia to its own ends, Ambassador Nomura declared. 513
As to the exertion of pressure on the Japanese, however, the American officials had the full
backing of American people, who seemed to think that their present strength in the Atlantic
was sufficient for national defense and for protection against war. In the face of Japan's daunt-
less attitude, the Americans did not show the slightest fear. 516 Military officials, however, did
not share this optimism since they knew both that English morale was not as good as reported
' DoD comment: Name withheld.
ta *IV, 376.
DoD comment: Name withheld.
*"IV,377.
6M IV,378.
S,S IV, 379.
"«IV,380.
127
and that, after the fall of Russia, England might possibly make peace with Germany. They
realized that the Mediterranean Sea was a grave peril and that the United States was intend-
ing to under- emphasize the situation in the Pacific while exaggerating the gravity of the
problem in the Atlantic. These military officials knew full well what a nuisance a war in the
Pacific would be. In the advent of war, editorials had stated that the location of troops and the
moment for striking would be chosen quickly, as soon as the whole situation had been taken
into consideration. s 17
1%. Japan Asks Representations in Mail Examination
That the American understanding of the arrangements with the United States government
concerning the schedule of ships carrying mail differed from the Japanese understanding, was
pointed out in a dispatch from the Foreign Minister to Washington on November 4, 1941. An
undesirable effect had been created by the unexpected examination of the mail on the night
before the sailing of the Tatsuta Maru, and it was suggested that representations clarifying the
mail situation be made to the State Department. It was necessary that the loading of mail on
the Taiyo Maru and the Hikawa Maru be carried out without difficulty. 518
198. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Broadcast Reception
In answer to a request from Tokyo for comment on the effectiveness of a change in foreign
broadcasts, Ambassador Nomura, on November 5, 1941, explained that the sensitivity of the
JLG 415.105 Kcs broadcast was fairly good but that other powerful stations interfered after
8:00 p.m. The sensitivity of this same wave length to San Francisco, however, was excellent
from 6:00 to 8:00 p.m., and reception was clear. 520
199. Tokyo Itemizes Diplomatic Expenditures of Officials in United States.
On November 7, 1941, Tokyo transmitted a list itemizing the disposition of the October and
November salaries of the various diplomatic and counselor offices in the United States. The
salaries and expenses of twenty -four of the personnel of the Embassy in Washington, as well as
the actual transfer, entertainment and telegraphic expenses, were itemized in yen. 521
200. Japan Reprimands Officials Concerning Dispatch Classification
A dispatch reprimanding Japanese official establishments in the United States, Thailand,
and Batavia because of their high priority dispatch classification was transmitted on Novem-
ber 8, 1941. The chief of the Telegraphic Communications in Tokyo explained that the num-
ber of messages designated "Kinqu" meaning "extremely urgent" had greatly increased, there-
by implying that they were of such vital importance that they need be passed on at whatever
hour received to the Foreign Minister, Vice Minister or any other principal officials. Many of
these wires had been designated "Kinqu" with utter disregard as to their contents, and the
Japanese Embassy in the United States was the most frequent user of this classification.
Furthermore, the Chief said there was certainly no necessity to put the words "very urgent" in
English before the address. He asked that special consideration be given to the choice of
"Kinqu", "Daiqu" meaning "urgent" and "Sikyu" meaning "priority". 522
S1, IV, 381.
'"IV, 382.
6! °IV, 384.
SJI IV,385.
m IY, 386.
128
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
201 . Consul Muto Reports Further Investigation of Japanese Agents
Further investigation by the F.B.I, of a ~° was reported by Consul Muto on November
9, 1941. It was apparent that although primarily interested in gathering evidence to be used
against " and ° they considered this case an important one. It was also evident
that the Department of Justice was conducting the investigation because of the numerous
statements being made by the Dies Committee regarding Japanese propaganda in the United
States. Evidently, too, the Department felt the need of an excuse for demanding the recall from
the United States to Japan of all Japanese Consuls General and Consuls. 523
202. Consul Muto Asks Confirmation of ° Salary As Employee of Japanese Newspaper
In regard to the investigation of " who was officially registered as a foreign correspondent
for the *, Consul Muto said that there was little danger of his being prosecuted since
during the examination he would doubtless be called upon to prove that he was hired by the
-" newspaper at $350 per month. The Consul asked that, in case of an inquiry to the news-
paper's home office, this fact be confirmed. 6 "
203. American Bank in Tokyo Receives No Instructions to Cooperate in Japanese Exchange Plan
Referring to a suggestion made by Japan regarding financial arrangements to take care of the
diplomatic expenditures in the two countries, Foreign Minister Togo wired on November 10
that the National City Bank branch in Tokyo had received no instructions from its home
office. He asked that officials in Washington investigate the possibility that the home office
of the National City Bank did not understand the situation. 525
204. Manchukuoan Officials Seize Baptist Missionaries in Harbin
Ambassador Nomura learned, on November 11, that Manchukuoan police officials had
arrested three American missionaires in Harbin on October 22. Charged with infraction of the
peace preservation laws, the Baptist missionaries were said to have been instrumental in
organizing secret Korean organizations. Tokyo had suggested to its Ambassador in Manchukuo
that the missionaires be deported. After conferring with the military and the Manchukuoan
authorities, the Ambassador said that the missionaries would be deported. 52 '
In a message to Hsingking on the next day, Tokyo declared that the American Embassy had
asked that if the missionaries were to be given a fair trial, they be permitted before banish-
ment to visit Harbin to settle their personal affairs. 527 Manchukuoan officials and military
authorities authorized this visit to Harbin. 528
205. Foreign Minister Outlines Policy in China in Event of United States War
In a circular dispatch to Japanese-occupied states in China, Foreign Minister Togo on
November 14 outlined Japanese foreign policy in China, should war be declared between
Japan and the United States. The Cabinet had decided to destroy completely British and
American power in China, to take over all concessions, rights and interests as well as the rights
and interests of enemy powers, even should they be connected with the new Chinese govern-
ment.
°DoD comment: Name withheld.
"DoD comment: Name and identifying data withheld.
'"IV, 387.
M, Ibid.
i!5 lV,388.
526 IV, 389-391.
"TV, 392.
m IV, 393.
129
In carrying out these steps, the Imperial Government would avoid exhausting its veteran
troops thereby providing strength to cope with a world war on a long time scale. The whole
fundamental policy of the Imperial Government would be to reinforce military strength from
the whole Far Eastern area should Japanese reserves and military strength for total war wane.
In the realization of these steps, it was decided to utilize important Chinese in the occupied
territories insofar as was possible, thereby providing for the cooperative occupation of mili-
tary bases by Japan and China. At the same time, Japan would place great importance upon the
acquisition of materials, especially from unoccupied areas. Consequently, the circular di-
rected that various restrictions then in force would be relaxed, although officials were to await
further instructions before carrying out decisions in this respect. 529
206. Lima, Peru Chosen for Gold Deposits for Emergency Use
Viewing the prospect of an emergency, at which time diplomats, government officials and
other Japanese wouid be forced to evacuate, the finance official in Washington requested that
the Vice Minister of Finance in Tokyo arrange to have gold available in Lima, Peru. Since the
exchange control was more lenient in Peru, he asked that the Yokohama Specie Bank branch
in that city be given the right of attorney for the purpose of issuing the payment of gold. 630
207. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Emergency Destruction of Code Machines
In a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 15, 1941, Japanese officials explained
•the order and method in which their code machines were to be destroyed in the event of an
emergency. Explicit instructions regarding the disposal of the scrambling section, the printer
and all other markers on the machines and rectifiers were included in the dispatch which was
to be relayed by Washington to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. 531
208. United States Attempts to Separate Italy from Axis, Ambassador Nomura Reports
In an intelligence report on November 16, Ambassador Nomura stated that according to
Mr. L. Dainelli, secretary attached to the Italian Embassy, the United States was doing every-
thing in its power to get Italy to leave the Axis. According to the Secretary, American Ambas-
sador Phillips in Rome had worked hard to arrange a conference between President Roosevelt
and Benito Mussolini in the Azores. The attempt ended in failure due to Italy's fear of German
objection. The Japanese intelligence agent who reported the Italian Secretary's remarks,
added that the United States strategy to be employed against Japan in case of a Japanese-
American war was to demolish the manufacturing centers at the outset by means of air raids.
It was an understanding that sixteen airplane carriers were either being remodeled or camou-
flaged and that thirty- two additional ones were in the process of construction. A further strategy
would be to isolate Japanese forces in China by severing through submarine warfare Japanese
supply routes in the China Sea. 532
209. Japan Plans to Preserve Shanghai Public Peace When American Marines Evacuate
Meanwhile, in Shanghai, the Commander of the American Marines had discussed with the
Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces there official orders for the withdrawal of the
'IV, 394.
'IV, 395.
IV, 3%.
IV, 397.
130
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
American Marines at that place. Consequently, it was learned on November 17, 1941 that the
Japanese armies planned to divide the responsibility for the defense of the "C" area between
the Municipal Council Police and the Shanghai volunteer squad. The Japanese army, however,
would participate freely to preserve public peace whenever it was deemed necessary. An
announcement of Japanese intentions in respect to defending this area would be made on
November 20. 533
210. Tokyo Decides to Permit Remittances from America to Cultural Institutions
By November 18, 1941, the Imperial Government had decided to grant permits to religious
organizations in Japan to receive remittances from America. They would also permit remit-
tances from Japanese to cultural organizations in America which amount was estimated at
400,000 yen. According to the dispatch from Tokyo to Hsingking, negotiations were being con-
ducted in America on this matter." 4
211. Tokyo Advises Ambassador Nomura of Plan of Evacuation
Ambassador Nomura was advised on November 18, 1941 of a plan to evacuate from the Uni-
ted States in case of necessity, the remaining Japanese officials and such persons as must
absolutely not be held back, company officials, and all residents who were unable to board
the three ships previously dispatched. No one would be warned save those residents who must
return to Japan. The Foreign Minister explained that the number of those who embarked at the
first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applicants due doubtless to nos-
talgia and reluctance to part with their property in the United States. The consuls were to be
advised secretly to help those citizens who were to remain behind to work together for the com-
mon good, and to destroy immediately such secret documents as were in the possession of
Japanese Companies and Chambers of Commerce. In case of Paragraph "B", (referring to a
dispatch of November 15) 535 means of cooperation between the diplomatic officials and con-
sulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of the high offices, were being studied. Mean-
while, a plan to reduce the sizes of staffs was being formulated. 5 " 16
212. Japanese Officials in European Countries Warned of Critical Situation
To the pro-Axis minded Ambassador in Turkey, Foreign Minister Togo directed a dispatch
concerning Japanese- American relations. He reported that the government had been in con-
ference with Imperial General Headquarters since November 7 for the purpose of discussing
the achievements of diplomatic relations on a just basis. Although there was considerable
doubt that a settlement of negotiations would be reached, Japan felt that it had given its maxi-
mum efforts to bring about a settlement of negotiations. Since an optimistic viewpoint for the
furture was not permitted, Japan expected to find itself in an extremely critical situation
should these negotiations be broken off. Japanese official establishments in Switzerland,
Moscow, France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, South Africa, Roumania, Bulgaria and
Hungary received this information. 537
213. Shanghai United Settlement Council Decides Cooperative Protection Plan
Following the withdrawal of the American Marines from Shanghai, it was decided that the
Military Training Bureau Police should assume patrol of the British section in that city. Ac-
cording to the dispatch of November 20, 1941, this plan had been suggested at the meeting of
1M IV, 398.
™IV, 399.
5M IV, Part A 115.
^ IV, 400.
tJ7 IV,401.
131
the United Settlement Council on November 10. Such a plan was to be communicated to the
Marine Commander and would explain the cooperative protection plan in which the organized
structures would be determined by the various army groups participating. 538
214. Japanese Agents Report American Hospital Staffs To Be Evacuating Peking, China
From an intelligence dispatch originating in Peking, China, Tokyo learned of reports that
Missionary University and Rockerfeller Hospital personnel had received orders from the Amer-
ican government to evacuate. Consequently, Mr. Stewart and other members were hurrying
to leave by way of Shanghai. Further advice on this subject would be later transmitted. 6 3 a
215. Foreign Minister Directs Havana Consul in Regard to Emergency Fund
Meanwhile, the Consul in Havana had received a dispatch on November 20, 1941 from
Foreign Minister Togo concerning the 3,000 dollars which he was to have on hand. 540
Furthermore, instructions were sent from Tokyo on this day to Mr. Mogami, Trade Bureau
representative in New York, to sell his furnishings, close his office, and evacuate with the rest of
the Consulate. He was given permission to dispose of unimportant items. 611
216. Foreign Office Considers Scheduling Another Evacuation Vessel
The information that an understanding had been established between Japan and the United
States regarding the dispatching of a second ship was transmitted to Washington from Tokyo
on November 24, 1941. In view of the ever worsening state of affairs between the two countries,
the Foreign Office was considering the dispatch of a second vessel. Ambassador Nomura was
instructed to impress upon the leaders of the Japanese residents in the United States that
officials were considering their welfare and were looking out for their safety. 3 * 2
217. Japan Makes Provisions for Financing South American Diplomatic Establishments
Japanese officials in Tokyo had decided that the best way to provide funds for the South
American diplomatic establishments would be to collect the unfrozen dollar accounts of Japa-
nese residents in the United States with repayment assured later in Japan proper. As soon as
Ambassador Nomura had estimated the amount which could be collected by this method, he
was to send the information to Tokyo. Furthermore, he was to consider the ways or means of
sending the funds so collected to the South American offices by courier mail. The personal
funds of the Japanese nationals in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco were
also to be utilized in this plan. 543
t
218. Consul Morishima Asks That the Tatsuta Maru Dock at New York
Meanwhile Consul Morishima in New York suggested that the Tatsuta Maru touch port
there since there were many in New York who wished to return home and for whom such an
arrangement would be convenient in many ways. 544
538 IV, 402
iss IV, 403
M °IV, 404
541 IV, 405
5«
IV, 406.
Ma IV, 407-408.
"MV, 409.
132
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
220. Japan Wires Washington Schedule of the Tatsuta Maru
In the tentative schedule wired to Washington it was decided that the Tatsuta Maru would
leave Yokohama on December 2, 1941, arrive at Los Angeles on December 14, 1941, leave Los
Angeles December 16, 1941, and arrive at Balboa on December 24, 1941. 546
Inasmuch as no plans had been made to dispatch any other vessels to the United States,
Consul Morishima was advised to aid in returning as many Japanese as possible by this ship.
Since it was necessary to wire the number to be evacuated, the Consul was to get in touch with
the Japanese who would be returning and in as secret a manner as possible. 547
In accordance with instructions sent on November 18, 1941 that Japanese citizens who re-
mained behind should be aided as much as possible, Ambassador Nomura wired on Novem-
ber 26, 1941 that Japanese residents all over America had already set up a mutual aid system
for this purpose. In San Francisco a fund of $6,000 had been accumulated, but in Chicago and
elsewhere the Japanese residents were weaker financially and had practically no funds. The
Ambassador added that although the F.B.I, had compiled a complete register of members of
the Japanese Association and the Industrial Council, there appeared to be no stigma attached
to the list.""
221 . Japan Decides to Close the Japanese Cultural Association
According to a Japanese dispatch of November 26, 1941 from New York to Tokyo, a proposi-
tion whereby Japan would permit remittances of funds to an unidentified organization and
the Women's College in Tokyo, if the United States would release 30,000 yen for the Japanese
Cultural Association in the United States was refused. Inasmuch as rumors pointed to Secre-
tary Hull's being very suspicious of this organization's activities, the Consul feared that the
Cultural Association had very little chance of getting any expense funds. Although there was
no understanding with the United States concerning the continuance of this organization, if
and when the worst happened it would nevertheless be difficult to close it suddenly. 649
He advised, therefore, that the Cultural Association be closed immediately and that a spe-
cial ship be sent to transport its employees to Japan. Should the organization close down, the
Consul had already effected an understanding with Columbia University to take over the
Association's curies and books. He pointed out that the organization's position as an Ameri-
can institution would be continued in this way. 55 "
222. Bank Employees Receive Instructions to Evacuate With the Embassy Staff
On November 25, 1941 Ambassador Nomura informed Japan that according to Commis-
sioner Tsutomu Nishiyama the New York staff of the Bank of Japan would act in accordance
with the Embassy staff regarding evacuation from the United States. He asked that the For-
eign Office get in touch with all banks and companies with representatives in the United
States. This dispatch was translated on December 5, 1941. 551
223. Japanese Official List of Agencies Printing Japanese Propaganda
On November 25, 1941, the Ambassador forwarded to Tokyo a dispatch which named the
agencies in the United States. According to the dispatch the Los Angeles News, the Calif -
ME IV, 411-412.
M 'IV, 413.
"TV, 414.
M8 IV, 415.
"TV, 416.
"'IV, 417.
133
ornia Daily News and the American Industrial Daily In Loa Angeles had Japanese affiliations.
In San Francisco the North American Times and the North American Daily received Japa-
nese broadcasts. He also mentioned the Globe Press Service and the NBC Broadcasting Com-
pany as having foreign affiliations. He added that the United States Press Wireless, the New
York Times and the New York Herald Times had maintained listening stations from time to
time although at the present time this ervice was suspended. 552
224. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Improvements in Broadcast Service
For the purpose of improving the reception of Japanese broadcasts (Ambassador Nomura
had previously complained about bad radio reception), he suggested that 12,000 to 13,000
kilicycles be used in the summer and that 7,000 to 12,000 kilocycles be used as the best wave
length in the winter. Besides suggesting improvement in sensitivity and time of broadcast,
he said that the contents were unnecessarily verbose and not sufficiently accurate, and that
the reports concerning conditions in Japan should be more terse and up to the minute. In
regard to the China incident, he suggested that the news be summarized from various quarters
about once a week. He further suggested that the Domei Agency take the leadership in keeping
Japanese residents in the United States informed regarding the course of Japanese relations
in case of an emergency. ss *
Two days later Tokyo wired a new broadcast schedule which would apply to the Pacific coast,
to the Western hemisphere and to Europe. 555
On the same day, however, Japanese officials in Washington requested that two of the radio
wave lengths be changed immediately because of poor reception. It was added that the Euro-
pean broadcast could not be heard at all. 556
225. An Emergency Code System Becomes Effective
On November 27, 1941 a circular dispatch from Tokyo outlined an emergency dispatch
system using hidden-word or misleading- language telegrams. A table was to be made up
with the left hand column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain
text. It was directed that a careful study of the table be made and that care be taken to make
no mistake in transcribing the dispatch. To distinguish these cables from others, the English
word "stop" would be added at the end as an indicator. For example, the code word "Hatake-
yama" would mean "relations between Japan and have been severed". Code words to
indicate the names of third countries as well as times of day, month and year were included in
the list. This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 2, 1941. 857 (Comment.")
226. Ambassador Nomura Is Asked to Request Permits for Entrance of Japanese from Hawaii
On November 28, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo asked that Ambassador Nomura negotiate
in the difficulty of returning approximately ten evacuees from Hawaii to Tokyo. He pointed
out the Japanese must either go to Los Angeles by American boat or that they must get special
permits as through passengers on a Japanese vessel by way of the United States. The matter
had been taken up with the American Consul in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo added. 558
6M rv,4i8.
5M IV, 420-421.
SS 'IV, 418.
556 IV, 419.
i66 IV, 422.
*"IV, 423.
"DoD comment: See special supplement, Volume V, for study of ^'hidden word" messages.
"*IV,424.
134
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
An ambiguous reply, sent three days later, answered that the State Department had no ob-
jection to the evacuees changing from Los Angeles to Honolulu. 559
227. Japan Requests Manchukuo to Release American Missionaries
In a wire to Hsinking, Manchukuo, Foreign Minister Togo disclosed that Ambassador No-
mura had again inquired regarding the probable date of the Telease of the missionaries. Since
Japan was interested in cultivating good will in order to dispatch the Tatsuta Maru to evacuate
its nationals, Japanese officials directed that the date of the release of the missionaries and
the prospects for the release be wired to the Home Office immediately. 660
228. Secretary Terasaki Requests Addresses of Foreigners Receiving American Newspapers
On November 29, 1941 Secretary Terasaki in Washington requested from Rio de Janeiro
the addresses of two foreigners in that city who were receiving American newspapers and maga-
zines. He asked that the reply be sent immediately. 561 The names were later transmitted
from Rio De Janeiro on December 3, 1941. 5B!
229. Difficulties Arise Concerning Evacuation of Dual Nationality Holders
A minor difficulty was reported to Tokyo on December 1, 1941 by Consul Kenjo Ito in New
Orleans in regard to consulate employees who were dual nationality holders and wished to
return to Japan. Since, according to previous instructions, employees were to be discharged
and returned via the Tatsuta Maru, he asked whether they should obtain departure visas as
Japanese; whether they should attempt to give up their United States citizenship in a day or
so's time; or whether they could be taken out of the country as Consul employees, thus re-
taining their dual citizenship. 563
230. Japan Issues Orders Concerning Disposition of Codes and Code Machines
In a circular dispatch of December 1, 1941 the Japanese Legation in Washington was ad-
vised to destroy codes, when the necessity arose, by means of chemicals which were on hand
in the Naval Attache's office for this purpose. The Attache should have been advised on the
procedure by the Navy Minister, the disptach declared. 5M
231. Courier Kosaka Ordered Back to Japan
By December 1, 1941 Tokyo had decided to have Courier Samurai Kosaka, who would ar-
rive shortly in Washington from Brazil, return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru, which would
leave Los Angeles on December 25, 1941. If this schedule interfered with Mr. Kosaka's planned
trip, establishing communications with Mexico instead. 565
232. Deslruction of Code Machines Is Ordered in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila
The Washington Legation learned on December 1, 1941 that regardless of a subsequent
wire containing instructions, the United States office would retain its machines and ma-
chine codes. However, the four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila had been
558 IV, 425.
SM IV, 426.
S8, IV, 427.
161 IV, 428.
,ea IV, 429.
'"IV, 430
MS IV, 431
135
instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to destroy them; the machine in
Batavia had already been returned to Japan. The dispatch was translated on December 1,
1941. 666
233. Havana Office Directed to Destroy Codes
In a circular dispatch of December 2, 1941 {which was not read by United States cryptana-
lysts until December 8, 1941) recipients were instructed by the Foreign Minister to destroy all
telegraphic codes, including code books for communication between the three departments
and the code books for the army and navy communication. One copy of the "0" and "L" were
to be retained, and as soon as this operation had been completed, the one word Haruna was
to be transmitted. All secret documents and the work sheets on this dispatch were to be imme-
diately burned. Explaining that these instructions were transmitted in preparation for an
emergency situation, Foreign Minister Togo asked that definite pains be taken to maintain
i action, and that the officials remain calm. 667
234. Officials Directed to Destroy Codes
On December 2, 1941, the Japanese Embassy in Washington received an order from Tokyo
to destroy all codes except one copy each of the "0" and the "L" systems. Only one code ma-
chine, however, was to be destroyed; from this United States cryptanalysts learned for the
first time that the Japanese Legation in Washington possessed more than one code machine.
Further proof of this was the fact that on December 3, 1941, the day after this "destruction
order", there was normal volume in machine traffic between Washington and Tokyo. Also, all
of the codes brought to the Washington office by Courier Kosaka were to be destroyed by burn-
ing. This dispatch was read by United States cryptanalysts on December 3, 1941.***
In a Tokyo circular of December 2, 1941, it was disclosed that orders had been issued to
diplomatic officials in North America and Manila, Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas,
Singora, Chienmai, and to all officials in British and Netherlands territory to return acknowl-
edgment after burning all telegraphic codes except one copy of "0" and "L". This dispatch
was transmitted from Berne, Switzerland, to Turkey on December 2, 1941. 569
235. Officials Directed to Retain Emergency Code System Also
However, according to a circular sent out by Tokyo on the next day, the code list "Ingo
Hikae", or hidden-word code, was to be retained by all offices until the last moment. In case
this had already been destroyed, copies would be resent to those offices. 670
236. Provisions Are Made for Evacuation of Diplomats
In connection with Financial Attache Nishiyama's suggestion that gold be sent to Lima,
Peru, to provide for possible evacuation of diplomats from the United States, he was directed
on December 3, 1941 to handle the matter in this way. He was first, however, to instruct the
Specie Bank of his plans."'
237. Japan Requests Permission to Change Schedule of Tatsuta Maru
Tokyo directed on December 3, 1941 that Ambassador Nomura request the State Depart-
ment's permission to change the schedule of the Tatsuta Maru, since Japan would like to have
the vessel stop at Manzanillo or Acapulco en route from Los Angeles to Balboa. This stop was
5(6 IV, 432.
551 IV, 433.
sas rV, 434-435.
'IV, 438.
136
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
to be made for the purpose of picking up fifty or sixty persons in Mexico who wished to return
to Japan; no general cargo would be taken aboard. 672
238. Ambassador Nomura Urges Magnanimity in Paying Employees Remaining in United States
The question of the length and amount of payments of employees, both foreign and native,
who remained in the United States was discussed by Ambassador Nomura in a message to
Tokyo on December 3, 1941. In case of the unexpected happening, these employees would be
placed in a difficult position from the standpoint of the law, and socially as potential enemies;
and the Ambassador felt that it would be far better, with a view to their friendship in the future,
to treat them with the magnanimity becoming a great nation rather than to make much ado
over the amount of retirement allowances that they should receive. For these reasons he sug-
gested that such employees be paid, in addition to previously specified amounts, one month's
salary for each three years of service, without distinction as to foreigners or natives; he sug-
gested the minimum total of payment to be two and a half months of salary, (and two months
of salary for those who had worked less than two years). This dispatch was translated on Dec-
ember 9, 1941. 673
239. State Department Approves New Schedule for Tatsuta Maru
On consulting the State Department in regard to the rearranged schedule of the Tatsuta
Maru, Ambassador Nomura learned that there was no opposition to the change. However,
since it would be necessary to confirm the permission in writing, the Ambassador asked that
he be advised as to when the ship would arrive in Balboa and what arrangements with Mexico
had been completed. 67 *
As Secretary Terasaki was in the middle of intelligence work, it was requested that he re-
main in the United States during this important time and then sail on the Tatsuta Maru. It
was further added that Mr. Hiroichi Takagi was possibly negotiating with the State Depart-
ment regarding the Tatsuta Maru™
240. Ambassador Nomura is Instructed to Explain Japanese Military Activity in French In do- China
On December 3, 1941 Ambassador Nomura was instructed to explain as follows the rumors
that Japanese military garrisons in French Indo-China were being strengthened: actually
Japan had only increased its forces in parts of North French Indo-China because of the unusual
amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino- French Indo-China border.
As a result of this, there would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part of
French Indo-China. The Japanese Foreign Office presumed that exaggerated reports of these
movements were the sources of the rumors that military strength was being increased. In no
way had Japan violated the limitation contained in the Japanese- French Border Agree-
ment. 576
241. Matichukuoan Officials Decide to Release Americans
Although the American Embassy in Tokyo had made special requests concerning the trial
of the American missionaries in Harbin, 677 Japanese officials in that city decided by December
4, 1941 to pronounce sentence upon the Americans. On December 5, 1941 their banishment
from the country would become effective. The Manchukuoan authorities, however, would like
to have these persons contact the American consul before they were escorted to the border. 578
5,a IV, 439.
! "IV, 440.
"MV, 441.
"TV, 442.
S78 IV, 443.
S "IV\ 444.
"TV, 445.
137
242. Japan Sends Funds for Returning of Families of Japanese Diplomatic Employees
Meanwhile Japan wired that funds had been sent for the return passage for the families of
Sadao Iguchi, Matsudaira, Takashashi, Horiuchi, Hiroshi Hori, Morito Morishima, Toyoji
Inoue, Shinichi Kondo, Saichi Amano, Hayasida, and Watanabe. 57 "
243. American Embassy Requires No Permit for Taking Out Personal Belongings
On December 4, 1941, the Foreign Minister in Japan declared that an officer of the American
Embassy had brought to the Head of the American Section on October 14, 1941 a dispatch
directing that no permit would be required to take out personal effects, household effects, or
personal baggage. sao
244. Ambassador Kurusu Suggests United States Investigate Western Transportation Company
For Ambassador Nomura's information, a Japanese dispatch of December 4, 1941 declared
that eighty or ninety per cent of the materials carried by rail via Burma went to fatten the
coffer of Mr. Soong. This was due to the fact that all shipping on the Burma route was a mono-
poly of the Western Transportation Company, which was in turn controlled by the Soong in-
terest, and that only ten or twenty per cent of the electric freight trains on the route were used
for the transportation of materials for the government. This information had come to Japan
through a °, an acquaintance of Ambassador Kurusu. ° had heard these facts on
November 26, 1941 from the Shanghai Branch Manager of the Canadian Pacific. If Ambassa-
dor Kurusu suggested to the United States that the Western Transportation Company be
investigated, the results of the investigation might dampen United States aid to China. 581
246. Mystery Dispatch or Coded Wire Sent to Rio de Janeiro
Meanwhile, a dispatch to Rio de Janeiro in plain text sent on December 4, 1941 contained
only these words: "Best regards. If you want any money to do any shopping for yourself, let
me know by telegram or air mail. {Eisei)". Apparently it was a code message or a disptach be-
tween telegraph operators in the two Embassies; the actual meaning of the dispatch was un-
certain. 59 *
247. Iguchi Asks Permission to Delay Destruction of One Code Machine
The Counselor of the Embassy, Iguchi, in a dispatch to the Chief of the Communication
Section, wired the information that codes had been destroyed; but since United States-Japa-
nese negotiations were yet continuing on this day (December 5, 1941), he requested permis-
sion to delay the destruction of one code machine. This dispatch was decoded December 6,
1941. E8E
248. Japanese Officials in Washington Learn That American Marines Will Evacuate Shanghai
Retransmitting a dispatch which had been sent from Peking to Foreign Minister Togo on
November 27, 1941, the Foreign Office informed Ambassador Nomura on December 4, 1941
that the American marines would evacuate Shanghai very soon. All would leave except a few
who had been trained in air force service. It was estimated that this group would probably go to
"'IV, 446-447.
i,n IV,448.
"•IV, 449.
" BoD comment: Name withheld.
iM IV, 451.
19i IV,452.
138
"MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Vladivostok as advance troops to lay the ground for the establishment of an American air base
there. According to the dispatch sent to Washington the information had been derived from a
disclosure by the head of a Marine group. 586 According to the dispatch as sent from Peking, it
was a corporal of the Marines who was responsible for the informational slip. 58 '
Only a few days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Marines, evacuated
from Shanghai, China, arrived in the Philippines aboard the President Harrison.™* The liner
was later seized by the Japanese. 689
249. Tokyo Orders Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, and Yamamoto to Return to Japan
A dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on December 5, 1941 asked that Secretary Terasaki,
Mr. Takagi, Mr. Ando, Mr. Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of
days. This dispatch was read by United States cryptanalysts on December 6, 1941. 590
250. Consul Morishima Requests Permission for Mr. Hikida to Return Home
Consul Morishima through the Washington Embassy requested permission from Tokyo to
return Mr. Deniti Hikida on the Tatsuta Mam. Mr. Hikida was an authority on the Negro prob-
lem in the United States and had been utilized by the Japanese propaganda work among the
Negroes. He had also served in gathering general intelligence, in investigations and in various
other capacities. Since the Consul felt that it would be to Japanese interest for Hikida to
return home, he asked authorization to advance him passage for Japan. Because the time of
departure was fast approaching, he requested immediate advice. 691
251. Ambassador Nomura Requests Additional Expense Money
Ambassador Nomura informed his home office also on December 5, 1941 that incidental
expenses and secret expenses for the third quarter had amounted to more than $41,000; more-
over, the telegraph fund had not been sufficient up to December. He, therefore, requested that
one month's allotment limited to the use of the Washington office be transferred by cable. 692
252. Ambassador Kurusu Asks That Secretary Terasaki Remain in the United States
On December 5, 1941 Special Ambassador Kurusu directed a request to Tokyo that Secre-
tary Terasaki be allowed to remain in the United States since, as organizer of the intelligence
setup, he was extremely important in view of the conditions of Japanese- United States nego-
tiations. Making the request as a personal favor, Ambassador Kurusu said that he would have
Terasaki assume his post as soon as he knew definitely that the negotiations were ended. This
dispatch was translated on December 6, 1941. 693
253. Japan Continues Making Evacuation Plans
Mr. Furumoto, managing director of Domei News in Tokyo, instructed his representatives
in New York to return quietly to Tokyo by the Tatsuta Mara, and in case such passage were
not available, to arrange to go to South America. 694
196 IV, 453.
581 IV, 454.
S8 "IV, 455-456.
™ Battle Report, plate LVHI.
M IV, 457.
4S1 IV, 458.
6S2 IV,459.
59S IV, 460.
Domei official Kato in Washington was also asked to attempt to procure passage on the
Tatsuta Maru, the alternative, in case of failure, being an assignment to the South Seas area. 696
It was reported from New York that Mr. Okamuto would embark for Tokyo at Los Angeles
and that Mr. Itamski, being needed in intelligence activities, would return in the same way as
the Consulate staff. Decisions regarding Mr. Moriwaki and Mr. Hiramitsu would be made
later. This dispatch of December 5 was translated on December 8, 1941. 696
Meanwhile, on December 6, 1941, Consul Muto in San Francisco asked for further informa-
tion concerning Tokyo's request for approximately sixty persons aboard the Tatsuta Maru,
since the assignment of staterooms would be necessary. 681
254. Tokyo Clarifies Code Machine Reference
Tokyo advised Counselor Iguchi on December 6 that the reference to code machines in the
instructions wired on December 2 had meant that one set of the code machines were to be
destroyed and the other retained for the time being. 538
On the following day Iguchi and his staff as well as Secretary Yuki received a message of
appreciation and thanks for their patriotic efforts from Bureau Chief Yamamoto. 69 *
255. Japan Issues Its Policy Regarding Allied Diplomatic Officials
Information was disseminated by Tokyo on December 6 and 7 in a circular dispatch con-
cerning its policies applying to allied diplomatic and consular officials, to other subjects resid-
ing in Japan, and to publicly and privately owned allied property. Declaring that Japan
would approach these matters with the magnanimity of a great nation, it would comply with
international law insofar as possible, exercising care that no enemy or third power nations should
have cause for retaliatory measures or unfavorable propaganda.
Diplomatic and consular officials would be exchanged for Japanese diplomatic and consular
officials resident in allied countries. But until the time of exchange, the telephone would be
cut off in diplomatic establishments; consular offices would be closed and sealed and short
wave radio and wireless equipment seized in both consular offices and Legations; no incon-
venience in daily living would be caused to allied officials. In regard to allied subjects resid-
ing in Japan, individuals who were objects of suspicion, military men, seamen, aviation per-
sonnel, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies and all
males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five would be placed under arrest for the present.
Caution would be exercised to avoid ill-treatment of these persons, however, since Japan also
had many nationals resident in allied territories.
Publicly owned property held by the Allies in Japan, with the exception of Embassy, Lega-
tion and Consular building would be confiscated, although privately owned allied property
It was added that diplomatic and consular officials of quasi-allied countries would be denied
the use of codes. Allied diplomatic and consular officials in Manchukuo would be handled in
SM IV,462.
SS6 IV, 464.
5SI rV, 465.
6,8 IV, 466.
SS9 IV,467.
8 ™IV, 468, 469.
140
OF PEARL HARBOR
256. Consul Nihro Desires Settlement of Akino's Fine
On November 25, 1941 Consul Nihro in Manila asked that Japan arrange to advance money
to cover the fine of Rafael Akino, a Filipino arrested in Tokyo, or that permission be given to
remit the money from Manila. This was requested since Government Official Gonzalo Akino
was concerned over the fine and desired to settle the matter without publicity, 601
257. Consul Nihro Requests Competent Assistants
Foreseeing an increase in the duties of his office which entailed the procurement of military
and other information, the dissemination of propaganda, and other machinations, and in order
to keep in touch with the inner circles of the Philippine government, Consul Nihro felt that it
would be necessary to return Mr. Kihara to Manila as soon as possible. Although, according
to instructions, he had let Official Mori take office as Consul to Davao, he requested the ap-
pointment of another Japanese for the Davao post, so that Mori could be returned to Manila,
Furthermore, the Consul asked that, to assist in the basic investigation plans, he be assigned
an American-educated Japanese as aide. Discussing plans to return Mr. S. Kawaminami on
December 8, Consul Nihro declared that even if he stayed in Manila he would not take the
place of the men requested above. 6 " 2
258. Tokyo Plans Utilization of Osaka Steamship Company Funds in Manila
A plan to utilize the 83,000 pesos held in bank branches at Manila and belonging to the Osaka
Steamship Company was advanced by Tokyo on November 27, 1941. In case the wishes of the
company could not be realized and the necessary permit secured to remit the money to Japan,
it was suggested that Consul Nihro borrow the money to retain as a secret fund in the Consu-
late. Japan would, if this plan were accomplished, reimburse the company in Japan. 6 " 3
The resident manager of the Osaka Steamship Company, Mr, Nagawo, reported that the
remittance of this fund through purchases was not feasible at the present time. 6 "* Furthermore,
the secret transfer of the 83,000 pesos from the Osaka Steamship branch office to the Consulate
was virtually impossible since these deposits were in the name of the local Osaka Steamship
Company. 605
259. Consul Nihro Destroys Useless Codes
On November 29, 1941 Consul Nihro wired that codes for which that office had no use, as
well as those of which there were more than two copies had been destroyed on this day. 606
Since these codes had been destroyed, Consul Nihro informed the Foreign Office on Novem-
ber 30 that it was impossible to decipher a message sent from Tokyo on the previous day,* 07
e " IV, 470.
sn2 IV, 471.
' M IV, 472.
M, IV, 473.
606 IV, 474.
Me IV, 475.
IV, 476.
141
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C — JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations
260. Diplomatic Corps in Panama Acknowledges New Government
Minister Akiyama wired Tokyo on October 18, 1941 that the entire diplomatic corps, includ-
ing himself, had made written acknowledgment on October 17, 1941 of the new Panamanian
government. The United States alone had made a statement of acceptance without a mo-
ment's delay; the Italian Minister was the only one who had hesitated, and even then he had
merely declared that due notice had been taken of the matter. In spite of these acknowledg-
ments, Mr. Akiyama reported that the Embassies of the different American countries felt
dissatisfied with the change in government. 608
261 . Latin American Countries Deny "Veiled Intervention" by the United States
According to the Mexican and Colombian Ministers, all Central and South American coun-
tries were acting voluntarily in taking definite steps against the Axis and were not following
the United States. Privately the Colombian Minister had revealed to Minister Akiyama that
America's Good Neighbor Policy was ineffective, and that the only course left to the United
States was a stricter policing of Central and South America. Furthermore, the Panama govern-
ment had denied the "veiled intervention" by the United States, which had been intimated
in a wire from Foreign Minister Togo on October 11, although Minister Akiyama added that
any child could realize that the events were based on a private agreement with the United
States. 6051
262. Minister Akiyama Explains New Government's Foreign Policy
The new administration, Akiyama said, would cooperate fully with the United States in
regard to relationships between Panamanian territory and the Canal Zone, in the registration
of merchant vessels, in the matter of air bases and in the granting of additional advance bases.
Consequently, the new government had appointed the Minister to Mexico City as Ambassador
to Washington and had put the Minister to Germany, who was rumored to be pro- Axis, on the
inactive list.'' 10
Furthermore, the new government had decided that vessels of Panama registry would be
permitted to enter belligerent waters, according to recent newspaper reports. The Panama
government had directed the German Commerce representative to be "persona non grata"
because he had abused diplomatic privileges. Given to understand that requests had been
made by the United States for close collaboration for the defense of the Canal Zone and the
maintenance of canal service, Mr. Akiyama had been informed by the Minister of Eduation
that Canal authorities were making preparations for such time as war between Japan and the
LInited States would break out. These preparations, he had revealed, were on the basis of in-
structions from the American government and in conjunction with the change within the
Japanese Cabinet. 6 "
Calling on Foreign Minister Octavio Fabriga, the Japanese Minister had been told that
Panama had decided to defend the various countries on the American continent hand-in-hand
M9 IV, 477.
e,,s IV, 478.
"'"lV, 479.
6,1 IV, 480.
143
with the United States against Germany. Since the question of Japanese standing as a result
of her alignment with the Axis had arisen, Panama had no choice, should unforetold events
arise, but to assume the same attitude that the United States might take in her relationships
with Japan. 612
In order, therefore, to render full assistance to the United States, Panama would be forced
to take counter measures against Japan should Japanese-American relations reach the break-
ing point. The Japanese Minister replied that the new Cabinet in Japan was exerting itself
to improve Japanese-United States relations, and should Japan have to take definite steps in
accordance with the ''merits" of the case, it was hoped that it would not be necessary for
Panama to cooperate with the United States. Foreign Minister Fabriga answered that the
Panama government had already decided to take such measures as were necessary to defend
itself against Hitlerism. 613
263. Japanese Business Firms Ordered to Close on October 28, 1941
On October 28, 1941 the Japanese Minister to Panama, in a wire to Tokyo, revealed that
eight days earlier he had been informed by telephone that Japanese business firms should
cease operation after October 28, 1941. Although the Minister had attempted to interview the
Foreign Minister privately in regard to this question, he had not been granted an interview.
Consequently, Japanese Official Izawa had called on the Interior Secretary of Foreign Affairs
to point out that the exercising of an embargo on Japanese businesses aggravated the present
crisis. Declaring that it would be impossible to evacuate Japanese residents in so short a time
because of the lack of ships, Mr. Izawa had been told merely that Panama could not grant
permits for the continued operation of these firms. Applications made by Japanese business
people for a ninety day postponement of the prohibition regulations had been vetoed by the
Cabinet at its meeting on this day, October 28, 1941. 614
It was expected that a complete boycott of Japanese goods would be exercised and that ex-
tortion or plundering might ensue, in view of the total discrimination against Japanese resi-
dents. Should Japanese shops or businesses open again under the present conditions, penal
regulations could be applied. For this reason the Japanese residents in Panama would like to
go to Puntarenas, Costa Rica, or Buenaventura, Colombia, or even Lima, Peru, to board ves-
sels for home. 616
264. Uncooperative Course of New Government is Result of Fear, Minister Alleges
In examining the new position of the Panama government it might be wise, the Japanese
Minister said, to consider the publication by American -fin a need newspapers that Japanese
nationalists were planning to evacuate Panama as soon as the opportunity presented itself.
In view of the friendly cooperation with which Panama had treated Japanese problems in the
past, the course now being pursued indicated a fear of arousing the wrath of the United States.
The Minister concluded that it was now impossible to place confidence in the intentions of the
Panama government, and at the same time it would be difficult to evacuate Japanese na-
tionals since Central and South American countries refused to grant travel permits to Japa-
nese residents in Panama. 616
Bii lV, 481.
el5 IV.482.
IV. 483.
81f IV, 484.
M, IV,485.
144
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Reemphasizing that the actions of Panama seemed to be instigated by the United States,
the Minister in his wire of October 30, 1941 revealed that the recent control regulations for the
conduct of business were being rigorously enforced. Furthermore, they were taking the attitude
that even though business permits would not be granted, should war come, neither would they
grant evacuation permits for any Japanese nationalists in Panama. Contributing to Panama's
stand was President Roosevelt's alleged fabrication that the Nazis were plotting the estab-
lishment of five separate dependencies in Central and South America. The United States
was thus instilling in the Panama government the fear that this locality might be used to fur-
ther such a plot. 617
265. Panama Restricts Minister Akiyama's Contacts
Insofar as the Japanese Minister's attempts to preserve his personal contacts with various
Cabinet members were concerned, the Panama Foreign Office had requested some days ago
that he make all contacts through the Foreign Office. He pointed out that the officials seemed
not only to distrust his intentions and activities but that they were particularly suspicious of
his contacts with the diplomatic corps especially with the Italian and German officials. 618
When Minister Akiyama had asked the Foreign Minister if he objected to his personal con-
tacts, an awkward silence had ensued. The logical explanation for this conduct was that, as
an ex-editor of the Panama American, the Foreign Minister was trying to attract the good will
of the United States, Although in the Minister's opinion Panama was a dependency of the
United States, it was being allowed to assume the role of an independent nation and was being
permitted, "like a child militantly waving a famous Masamune blade", to work in conjunction
with the Canal military authorities. 619
266. Japanese Minister Says the United States is Urging Panama to Take the Lead
Panama was being permitted, in the name of democracy, to take the fore, being one step
ahead of the United States in her hostilities to the Axis powers. Possibly it might even go so
far as to sever diplomatic relations, although lacking the strength to effect this act. Panama
had armed her merchant vessels and had recalled her diplomatic officials to Germany with-
out considering their replacement. Furthermore, on October 29, 1941 the Foreign Minister had
said that a group within the Cabinet had argued that diplomatic relations with Axis powers,
including Japan, should be severed; but the majority in the Cabinet had vetoed the suggestion.
Panama, as well as all Central and South American countries, at the insistence of the Presi-
dent of the United States, had ordered the dissolution of all Nazi groups. The Foreign Minister
had added that Japan was not included in the order possibly because its form of government
was not feared, although they considered Japanese government as one form of Nazism. 6 ™
The United States in preserving her position in various countries in Central and South
America seemed to be experimenting by urging Panama into the lead; consequently, Panama's
mission was to test the strength of Germany and Italy in Central and South America as well
as to measure the extent of Japanese inroads in Central and South America. When, on October
30, 1941, Foreign Minister Fabriga told the Italian Minister that diplomatic relations between
the several countries were made difficult by Germany and Italy's sinking of Panamanian
vessels, the Italian Minister had replied that until this time Italy had tried so far as possible
not to touch Panamanian vessels. 621
111 rv, 486.
"TV, 487.
'"IV, 487.
"TV, 488.
"TV, 489.
145
267. Japan Sends Official Complaint to Panama
Japanese reactions to this Panamanian aggressiveness were revealed in a wire to Panama
on November 1, 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo, Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American
Bureau of the Foreign Office, had sent an official complaint to the Panama Consul, and at
the same time Minister Masatoshi Akiyama was instructed to make a strong official com-
plaint to the Panama government in that country. Japan, the Foreign Minister said, would
take a firm stand on this matter in view of the effect on other South American countries. Japan
would demand that (1) Panama make payment for the loss incurred by forcing Japanese to
close their businesses, (2) that Panama would allow a time limit in which the Japanese might
clear up their stock, (3) that arrangements for Japanese capital investments should be made,
and (4) that Panama should arrange for the entry of these Japanese into other South American
countries. It was thought best to advise against Japanese returning to Japan, since it was most
important not to break relations with Panama and South American countries at this time.
Furthermore, to return home would be to play into the United States' hands. 622
268. Minister Akiyama Suggests Retaliatory Measures
By November 5, 1941 Minister Akiyama was able to wire that Panama officials were serious-
ly considering Japan's protest, but that they were still trying to chase all Japanese out of their
country. Since there was a rumor that the government had received funds from the United
States, Panama would no doubt be willing to cooperate with the United States in defending
the safety of the Panama Canal. Consequently, it was necessary to make the Japanese protest
as strong and as effective as possible. If it were impossible to take over part of Panama for the
purpose of protecting the Japanese in that country, then it might become necessary to take
over all ships in East Asia flying the Panama flag. If this were done, it would be necessary to
maintain the utmost secrecy so that no warning would be served. If this emergency act were
carried out, the Panama Consul in the United States would appeal to Washington, so that the
Japanese Embassy there should be prepared not to receive this complaint through the United
States, but to refer it instead to the Panama government. He asked that his protest be sup-
ported in Japan to the full extent when the Foreign Minister made demands of his own upon
Minister Herari. m
Minister Akiyama had further decided to demand that Panama authorities protect Japa-
nese residents, assure them of a living, and help them to re-establish themselves in business.
Japanese individuals were being instructed simultaneously to stay in Panama for the pur-
pose of making complaints. Although Japan could not tell what attitude would be taken to-
wards its complaint, Minister Akiyama felt that in any event the carrying out of his emer-
gency suggestion would be the best retaliation. 62 *
269. Japan Requests Immediate Reopening of Businesses
Since it was clear that Japanese residents were facing increasing hardships in making then-
living, Minister Akiyama requested the Foreign Minister to open immediately the Japanese
shops for business. Meanwhile, he had warned the residents against the indiscretion of illegal
business or hiring lawyers, since the authorities might be given a pretext for their deportation.
For his own information Mr. Akiyama was interested to know the date on which Minister
Fabriga had wired his Minister in Japan. 625
a2! IV, 490.
613 IV, 491.
'"Ibid.
i2i IV, 492.
146
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
270. Radio Broadcast or Domei Service is Suggested to Publicize Panama's Action
Because the Panama newspapers were either owned or controlled by the family of the Minis-
ter of Agriculture and Commerce, it could be expected that Japanese announcements as well
as their re- publication would be interfered with. Since criticism would be based on the United
States' dogmatic conception of "democracy", Japan should enlighten the people either by
radio broadcast or by Domei service. Specifically to be stressed was the fact that the appli-
cation of the control law was arbitrary; it had been applied three days before it was to have gone
into effect, and thus it attempted to drive the Japanese out by the right of prepossession. On
November 5, 1941, when someone had appealed to the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce,
he had forbidden the opening of Japanese shops even temporarily, S2S and he had cruelly for-
bidden their engaging in other work. Discrimination in applying the law had been shown to the
Chinese and to white foreigners. Not only was the law understood to be applicable only to the
Japanese, but the present Foreign Minister, Fabriga, one of the Cabinet's "stooges", had
approved the closing of Japanese shops; rivals were attempting to take over the Japanese busi-
nesses and the landlords were beginning to demand, since the Japanese were unemployed,
that they hand back the shops or auction off the equipment. 617
271. Tokyo Foreign Office Protests to Panama Minister; Requests Formal Statement from Panama
On November 6, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo wired that Bureau Chief Yamamoto had, on
November 1, 1941, protested to the Panamanian Minister Agustin Ferrari in Tokyo with the
request that the protest be forwarded to Panama. It was declared that Japan considered this
question a serious one, calling for a formal statement from the Panamanian government. Min-
ister Ferrari, replying that he had received no information from his country since the recent
change in government, had promised to transmit the request. Foreign Minister Togo declared
that he would like to have the details of the question published in Panama as well as in Japan
and would wire instructions as to when this was to be done. 628
272. Panama Cabinet Says Japanese Note is Phrased in Insulting Terms
In the New York Times, under a Panama dateline of November 8, 1941, was a report that
the Panama Cabinet had refused to consider the protest by the Japanese Legation against the
closing of all Japanese businesses because the note was phrased in insulting terms and con-
stituted intervention in the internal affairs of the nation.
The article explained that the law nationalizing commerce prohibited members of a race
not admitted as immigrants to engage in business, thus causing the closing of all Japanese
shops. 829
273. Minister Akiyama Says Japanese Will Have Trouble Disposing of Large Stocks
Since Panama had been a distributing center for Japanese goods, it would be difficult for
the Japanese to dispose of large stocks because in addition to the ending of retail sales and
re-exportation of goods required a license which could be granted only when the entire proceeds
eM IV, 496. (The New York Times, November 8, 1941, "PANAMA REJECTS TOKYO'S PROTEST, Japanese
"'IV, 493.
K, IV, 494.
826 IV, 495.
147
274. Newspaper Article Originating in Japan Charges Panama with Inhuman Acts
The New York Times report from Tokyo publicized the announcement by the Japanese
Foreign Office that strong protest had been lodged with the government of Panama against
discriminatory and "inhuman" acts which it charged were designed to expel Japanese resi-
dents from the Panama Canal area by depriving them of their livelihood. The protests, the
article stated, were especially significant since the Japanese government undertook to speak
in the name of all Asiatic people and called upon the government of Panama to "revert to a
free, independent policy and settle this unpleasant question without being influenced in any
way by any foreign power". 631
275. Japanese Minister Reports Dismissal of Spanish Minister
On November 10, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported to Tokyo that the Spanish Minister was
of this date "persona non grata" and that, because of circumstances, it was thought that he
could not do otherwise than resign. The reason given for his dismissal was his statement in a
public club that "Panama is being trodden on by the iron boot of Uncle Sam. Panama can no
longer hold her head high among the family of nations as a sovereign state." It was thought
that the United States was back of this action. Ma
The Spanish Minister had informed the Japanese Minister confidentially that he was
merely a sacrifice to the new Panama policy of attachment to the United States and that, al-
though he may have been a little disorderly, the question was not big enough to constitute an
issue. When he had requested the dean of the diplomatic service to ask the President of
Panama not to make an issue of his actions to the Spanish Foreign Office, his request had
been shelved. The Spanish Minister has asked that, if possible, this truth be relayed to Spain
through him, the Japanese Minister.* 33
276. Mexican Minister Incensed at Treatment of Japanese, Returns Home, Akiyama Declares
Minister Akiyama further reported that the Mexican Minister was returning home since he
was extremely enraged at the new regime. In a confidential talk with Japanese official Izawa,
he alleged that the continued United States "tutorship" of Panama had made impossible his
remaining in office any longer. Of his own volition he had decided that the recent unfair and
racial discrimination exercised against the Japanese had made it imperative that he return
home." 4
He questioned whether the Panama government would recognize the diplomatic passport
approved by the former Panama President, Arias, or whether through the meddling of the
United States, an incident similar to that involving the Spanish Minister might occur. It
seemed to him that decisions had been reached to revoke diplomatic rights in Panama. 835
277. Mr. Izawa Negotiates for Reemployment of Japanese in Panama
In order to make the United States realize the desperate situation of the Japanese in Pan-
ama, Mr. Izawa had asked Mr. Kata, head of the Panama Canal, Defense Division, to consid-
er using Japanese in the construction work of the canal. Mr. Kata had answered that this
question would be discussed with those in command of the work. From this reply it seemed
possible, Minister Akiyama reported, that some kind of work might be procured until Japan
could send a ship for them and thus evacuate all Japanese from Panama; at the same time
the damage demand for the Japanese government would be lessened. 838
831 IV, 4%. (The New York Times, November 8, 1941, "Protests Strong, Tokyo Asserts", by Otto D. Tolischus.)
"MV, 497.
6 "IV, 498.
fa4 IV, 499.
" S IV, 500.
638 IV, 501.
148
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
278. Minister Akiyaina Suggests Further Retaliatory Measures
Meanwhile, the Japanese Minister had given though to retaliation for the discrimination
against Japanese nationals. He suggested, on November 15, 1941, that Japan could (1) Refuse
to give permits to Panama ships for sailing out of Japanese ports and to seize or detain Pan-
ama ships in Japanese waters, (2) Freeze Panama capital in Japan making it impossible
for business to be carried on and (3) Carry out items (1) and (2) in Manchuria and occupied
China. Although it would be advantageous to Japan to seize Panama ships, it would be wise,
first, to watch the future development of United States- Japanese relations. 63 '
279. Foreign Minister Togo Plans to Aid Nationals
The Foreign Minister in Japan wired Japanese Official Koshi in Panama that the govern-
ment would consider the expenditure of funds to help the Japanese. In view of the time when
relations might become even more strained, thought should be given to a way of moving all
Japanese to some other country. It was also requested that the policy of disposing of stock
belonging to Japanese companies in Panama be wired to Tokyo. 638
280. Japanese Military Men Are En Route to Homeland
On November 18, 1941, Minister Akiyama informed Tokyo that Lieutenant Colonel Nakano
and Commander Michinori Yoshii, with their party, had left Cristobal safely on November 18,
1941, flying directly to Lima, Peru. Arriving there at 5:30 p.m., they would embark imme-
diately for Japan. 639
281. Minister Suggests that Young Japanese Nationals be Attached to Central and Latin American
Legations
That ten young single men who had been forced to close their businesses because of the
Panama incident be appointed to serve in some capacity in Japanese foreign diplomatic es-
tablishments was suggested by Minister Akiyama in a circular dispatch of November 19,
1941. If appointments were possible, these men were willing to work without salary and fur-
nish their own traveling expenses."
282. Minister Akiyama Stresses Danger of Communication Stoppage
According to a dispatch transmitted from Tokyo on November 19, 1941, Minister Akiyama
reported on November 20, 1941, that should war develop and Panama follow hand-in- hand
with the United States, there was danger that communications might be stopped. As far as he
was concerned, he believed there was no recourse but for Japan to align itself with Argentina,
Chile and Peru. 641
283. Japanese Nationals Urged to Evacuate to Latin American Countries
Because, according to previous dispatches, officials in Tokyo advised that Japanese in
Panama be scattered throughout Central and South America rather than be sent home, Minis-
ter Akiyama in Panama wired on November 22, 1941 that the evacuation vessel which would
touch port at Balboa was being kept a secret from the Japanese nationals. This was done to
influence them to resettle in countries near Panama. However, in case the evacuation vessel
took off some of the Japanese, he asked that Tokyo officials persuade the United States to order
Canal officials to cooperate in the evacuation. 842
ei "IV, 502.
"TV. 503.
"*IV, 504.
""tV, 505.
MI IV t 506.
°«IV, 507.
149
284. Arrangements Made for Tatsuta Maru to Dock at Balboa
Having learned through the State Department in Washington that the Tatsuta Mora must
pay its expenses in cash when it docked at Balboa, Ambassador Nomura requested Tokyo to
have the ship supplied with funds through the Consulate in Panama. 643
On November 25, 1941, Minister Akiyama reported that not only would permission be granted
for the Tatsuta Maru to dock at Balboa but that Panama officials were quite anxious for the
ship to come. It was quite clear that Panama officials did not desire even one Japanese to
remain near the Panama Canal Zone, although some did undoubtedly choose to remain in
Panama in spite of the threat of internment. The Minister inquired about the authority for
selling tickets on the Tatsuta Maru, requesting instructions as to whether they should be sold
through the NYK or through the consulate. 644
On November 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo felt it necessary to explain that the Tatsuta
Maru was not being sent for the purpose of a general evacuation, The fact that it was docking
at Balboa meant only that Japan was giving its citizens who could not stay in Panama or settle
in other countries a chance to settle in Japan. If Japanese nationals could move to other Latin
countries, they were to be guided accordingly, and it was directed that those that were re-
turning home make preparations and those who were going to third countries get their pass-
ports. 64 '
The consulates in Havana, the United States, Canada, Vancouver and Panama learned on
November 26, 1941, the schedule of the Tatsuta Maru. Leaving Balboa on December 26, 1941,
it was scheduled to arrive in Yokohama January 15, 1942, although the possibility existed
that it would stop in Los Angeles also on the way home. 646
285. Panamanian Minister Reports Arrival of Peruvian Minister in Washington
The Minister in Panama reported to Washington on November 29, 1941, that Minister
Sakamoto, the Japanese Minister to Peru, would arrive in Washington on the night of Novem-
ber 29, 1941. 647
2S(i. Japan Proposes Reparation for Treatment of Japan Nationals in Panama
Referring to the formal documents demanding reparation for the treatment of Japanese
nationals in Panama, Japanese Minister Akiyama reported that the Foreign Minister in Pan-
ama had considered the documents neither unreasonable nor without legal grounds, although
he answered that the exclusion of Japanese was by popular demand. Acting as authorized
spokesman for Panama, the Foreign Minister had told Minister Yamagata and Charge d' Af-
faires Izawa that there was nothing to do but administer the law; therefore in the ten times
Izawa had talked with him the Foreign Minister had opposed Japanese claims and would not
give a satisfactory answer. 648
When Minister Akiyama attempted to get reparations on the basis of a previous under-
standing with former Foreign Minister Arias, as had been formally suggested by Japan, For-
eign Minister Arias had nonetheless testified that Japan had been properly notified of the law
many times through her Minister and last November, through the Charge d' Affaires. Since
the protest by the Japanese Ministry appeared to be without success, practically all of the
Japanese except Amano had sold out their business at a fair price and had returned to
Japan. 649
M3 IV, 508.
6 "IV, 509.
6 " IV, 510.
" s IV, 511.
S "IV,512.
M * IV, 513.
"'IV. 514.
150
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
287. Minister Akiyama Communicates with Buenos Aires and Tokyo Regarding Codes
On December 3, 1941, Minister Akiyama directed officials in Buenos Aires to remit a previ-
ous dispatch in one code and from then on to use other codes. 660 This dispatch gave the names
and addresses of two foreigners in Rio de Janeiro who were receiving American newspapers
and magazines. 661
Apparently having already received instructions concerning the destruction of codes and
secret papers, Minister Akiyama reported on December 5, 1941, that code books had been
destroyed by burning in accordance with instructions.* 62
288. Minister Akiyama Experiences Financial Annoyances
On December 6, 1941, Mr. Akiyama requested that expense funds through March 1944, be
immediately remitted with a monthly special increase of $400 as well as the fourth period sum
of $18,185 for the propagation of information.* 63
On December 8, 1941, because of the urgency of the situation, Minister Akiyama made a
full report of the income, expenditures, withdrawals, temporary loans, and reserve and
estimated future expenses of the Panama office. 664
™1V, 515.
"TV, 428.
6SS IV, 516.
6M IV, 517.
651 IV, 518.
151
"MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(c) Japanese-Hawaiian Relations
289. Consul in Honolulu Requests Funds Before Arrival of Tatsuta Maru
In need of funds before the entry of the Tatsuta and Taiyo Mar us into Honolulu port, the
Japanese Consul in Honolulu asked that funds be wired before October 23, 1941, when the
Tatsuta Maru would dock. 655
290. Japanese Official Requested to Bring Money Back to Japan
Aboard the Tatsuta Maru was Japanese Official Maeda, for whom Tokyo had obtained per-
mission from the American State Department to land in Honolulu and San Francisco. 656
Upon his arrival in Honolulu Clerk Maeda was to be told in absolute secrecy to "bring back
that money just as it is". 657
291 . Foreign Office Asks that ° be Kept Under Strict Surveillance
The Japanese Foreign Office advised Honolulu that another passenger aboard the Tatsuta
Maru, * Tokyo correspondent of the ", was to be kept under strict surveillance while
in Honolulu. Since ° actions and words had created various incidents while he was
in Japan, if he said or did anything untowardly, the home office was to be advised immedi-
ately. 658
292. Tokyo Suggests National be Assigned to Second Evacuation Vessel
Since there would be room for fifty first class and eighty second class passengers aboard
the Taiyo Maru, Tokyo suggested that passengers be assigned to the Taiyo Maru rather than
to the Tatsuta Maru. 656 Consequently, a list of available accommodations on the Taiyo
Maru,* 60 which sailed from Yokohama on October 22, 1941, 661 was dispatched to Honolulu.
293. Special Codes to be Retained as Long as Situation Permits
Foreign Minister Togo, explaining that the special code broadcasts were designed to
inform diplomats in the country concerned should ordinary telegraphic channels be
severed, directed on November 28, 1941, that the codes be retained as long as the situation
in that locality permitted, and until the final stage was entered. 682
294. Japan Ponders Recall of Staff
On December 4, 1941, the Japanese Consul and his family in Honolulu were instructed to
wait at that place pending further instructions. Foreign Minister Togo assured the diplomatic
staffs in this circular dispatch that a great deal of thought was being given to the return of the
Consul's staff and families.** 3
'"IV, 519.
SM IV, 520.
'"IV, 521.
"DoD comment: Name withheld.
w IV, 522.
" s rV, 523.
tM IV, 524.
as, IV, 525.
662 IV, 526.
MJ IV, 527.
153
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(d) Japanese- Philippine Relations
295. Consul Nihro Advises Early Evacuation of Useful Nationals
Expressing his opinions in the event of war between Japan and the United States, Consul
Nihro in a dispatch of October 20, 1941, predicted that Japanese residents in the Philippines
would be placed under strict surveillance by the American and Philippines authorities. For
this reason, he felt that it would be particularly expedient to repatriate at an early date the
Japanese nationals who were acquainted with the situation in the various areas. 6 * 4
296. United States Making Preparations for War in Earnest, Consul Says
Furthermore, the political shake-up in Japan was quite a shock to the people in the
Philippine Islands; and it had been pointed out in an aritcle in the Bulletin that although
the new Cabinet did not intend to take any great risks as yet, it was made up of the military
capable of carrying out any decision it might make. In an editorial in this paper, which
could be considered as reflecting the views of one section of the people, it had been stated
that nothing could be expected of the Japanese- American negotiations.
Among the several points Consul Nihro called especially to the attention of Tokyo officials
were his beliefs that the United States Military authorities were making preparation in real
earnest; that they were watching and directing more carefully than ever the government
of the Philippine Islands, as well as the Filipino leaders; that they were instilling in the
minds of the people the idea that because of the power of the United States, the ultimate
victory would surely be on the side of the democracies; and that they were endeavoring to
strengthen the morale of the Philippine people, thereby increasing the sense of reliance
which the Philippine people feel toward the United States. M5
297. Payment of Fine for Manila Youth in Japan Creates Problem of Exchange
Referring to the case of Rafael Akino, who had been arrested in Japan and charged with
black market activities, Consul Katsumi Nihro in Manila wired Tokyo on October 24, 1941,
that Gonzalo Akino had presented a check for 1500 pesos for his fines. Because of the difficulty
of transferring this fund to Japan, due to the freezing of credits, the Consul suggested that
Mr. Morokuma or one of young Akino's friends advance the money for his fine and return to
Manila. This action was advised since Gonzalo Akino was a powerful government official
who desired to avoid unfavorable publicity before the next general election. In order to get
the money out of Manila, it would be necessary to go to the High Commissioner's office,
an act which would expose the present difficulties. Therefore, it would probably be wise
for Morokuma or some friend to pay the fine and win the Manila official's gratitude. Both
Rafael Akino's real father and Gonzalo Akino (Aquino), who regarded the accused as his own
son, would consider ways of paying the fine and expenses as soon as the boy was returned
to Manila. 8 **
61 "IV,528.
«"IV,529.
TV, 470, 530.
155
298. Consul Protests Opening of Diplomatic Mail Pouch
Considerable difficulty was developing in the matter of transporting diplomatic mail, for
it was explained by Consul Nihro on October 21, 1941, that authorities demanded the
examination of the diplomatic mail pouch which was to be taken by Courier Yashiro
Tsuchiya to Japan. When the Consul had applied to the High Commissioner to intercede
with the company to have the mail pouch passed without inspection on the basis of inter-
national law and procedure, he had been informed that the consent of Washington must be
procured before the company could be asked to waive the application of their rules.
Although, actually, there was no objection to a cursory inspection (such as a previous one
when sealed letters were not opened), yet the setting of a precedent in permitting the in-
spection of a diplomatic mail containing official documents would be unfortunate, the
Consul declared For this reason, although Courier Tsuchiya was scheduled to leave Manila
on October 26, 1941, it would be better to delay the Courier's departure until the matter
became clearer. 667
Foreign Minister Togo answered on October 22, 1941, ordering that the inspection of the
pouch be definitely refused and that Courier Tsuchiya's departure be postponed. 668 Re-
viewing the details of the Aeroplane Company's refusal to allow Courier Tsuchiya to board the
China Clipper to Hong Kong, Mr. Nihro wired Tokyo on October 24, 1941, that he had drawn up
for the office of the High Commissioner an official memorandum, which that office had
required, before taking the matter up with the officials in Washington. 669
299. Japan to Investigate the Seizure of Mail
On October 28, 1941, the Japanese Consul at Manila asked that the seizure of mail sent on
foreign ships by way of Hong Kong be investigated. To avoid the difficulties which might arise
should this practice continue, Consul Nihro requested that it be brought to the attention of
the proper authorities. 670
On October 30, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo, in consideration of this request, asked for
information concerning place of origin of all matter censored in Hong Kong. He said that it
was necessary that Japan make all communications absolutely secure. 871
300. The Asama Maru Tentatively Scheduled to Arrive November 10, 1941
On October 31, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister wired that the Asama Maru was
scheduled to arrive in Manila on November 10, and would leave the next day for Singapore.
While at Manila, it could pick up at least seven hundred, and possibly eight hundred passen-
gers by crowding the vessel. Foreign Minister Togo disclosed that the Asama Maru would
possibly make one trip to Britain, after which it would probably be impossible to dispatch
Japanese ships. 672
Since the refugees who were to sail on the Asama Maru were in rather straitened circum-
stances, Consul Nihro suggested that the fares be lowered to approximate those of the Hakone
Maru." 3
667 IV, 531.
669 IV, 532.
afis IV, 533.
670 IV, 534.
671 IV, 535.
61J IV, 536.
STS IV, 537.
156
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
301. Japan Changes Arrival Date of the Asama Maru to November 19, 1941
Replying to Consul Nihro's suggestion that the Asama Maru stop at Singapore before
Manila (so that Manila evacuees might not travel home by way of Singapore), 67 ' the Japa-
nese Home Office answered that the ship would arrive at Manila on November 19, rather
than on the 10th. The ship would not stop at Davao. 676
Furthermore, on November 2, 1941, the Japanese Consul requested permission to return
the families of officials to Japan on the Asama Maru. In spite of the fact that it would be a
stabilizing influence on the Japanese residents in the Philippines if officials' families
remained, Consul Nihro believed that it was not wise to delay too long, should an unforeseen
incident occur." 4
On November 3, the Consul, apparently still concerned over the space available on the
evacuation vessel, inquired whether any of the seven or eight hundred accommodations would
be taken up by passengers from Singapore. 677
A dispatch from Tokyo on November 4, however, ignored the Consul's question reiterating
only that the Asama Maru would leave Singapore on November 6 and arrive at Manila on
November 19 or 20. The Consul was instructed to negotiate with the High Commissioner's
office to arrange for the arrival and departure of the vessel and to procure fuel and supplies. 678
302. Consul Nihro Reiterates Advice that Fares be Reduced
Having received no answer to his request that fares on the maru be lowered, Consul Nihro
reemphasized the fact that the evacuees had but scant means to meet the heavy Enancial
burden placed on them by the high rates. He again asked that the Asama Maru's fares for
all classes, especially second and third, be reduced to the rate of the Hakone Maru. In
spite of the fact that on November 1 the Foreign Minister had wired specifically that the
vessel would not call at Davao, 679 Consul Nihro asked on November 4 that he be advised as
to the possibility of the ship's stopping at that port. 6B0
303. Consul Arranges Permit to Enter Manila as Vessel Sails from Homeland
In accordance with Tokyo's instructions to arrange with the High Commissioner's office
for the vessel's entrance and departure, as well as for fuel and supplies, the Japanese Consul
replied on November 5, 1941, that he had investigated this matter. Mr. Willoughby, of the
Commissioner's office, had said that he did not believe there would be any problem in this
matter; nevertheless, the Japanese Consul had asked for confirmation of this statement in
writing. 661
On November 6, Singapore and Manila were advised that the Asama Maru had sailed on
November 3, from Yokohama. Mr. Masayashi Kakitsubo, an official of the European-
American office, had sailed as a representative of the Foreign office. 682
304. Passenger and Freight Fees to Buy Supplies for the Asama Maru
Tokyo directed on November 13, 1941, that the four hundred fifty tons of diesel oil and one
thousand tons of water, fruit and vegetables be loaded onto the Asama Maru, to be paid for
from the monies collected as fares and freight charges. 683
"'IV, 538.
* 7, IV, 539.
•"IV, 540.
"'IV, 541.
8,9 IV, 538.
""IV. 542.
"'IV, 543.
""IV, 544.
S "'IV, 545-546.
157
305. Asama Maru to Evacuate Japanese Officials and Businessmen
By order of the Secretary to the. Minister of the Navy, Lieutenant Commander Hatakeyama
of the Medical Corps was directed to return to Japan on the Asama Maru. 684
Since, as previously mentioned, this was to be the last evacuation vessel to Manila,
members of the trade promotion organization were to be induced to return to Japan on the
Asama Maru, or Fuji Maru, which had been assigned to the Dutch East Indies for evacuation
purposes. 6as Consul Kihara, however, because of urgent business in Tokyo, was ordered
to return to Japan immediately by plane rather than to await the scheduled accommodation
by steamer. 666
According to a dispatch, transmitted from a Mr. Shirai in Manila to the Department of
Commerce and Industry, the Consul General had suggested that the branch office be closed
temporarily and the personnel be returned to Japan since there was no business at the time. 667
306. Japanese Legation Staff Obtains a Loan
A dispatch, retransmitted to Tokyo and Washington, reported that the high Commissioner
in Manila had granted permits for a loan and for the receipt of the outstanding balance of the
Legation's allowance. However, no instructions relative to the needed cancellation of the
freezing order had yet been received. Moreover, a message from the Washington Embassy
had asserted that twenty-five thousand pesos for operating expenses in Manila and
additional sums for the higher staff members had been approved. The Manila Legation
requested a confirmation of these appropriations. sss
1 IV, 547
•IV, 548
6 IV, 549
'IV, 550
S IV, 551
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(e) Japanese-Mexican Relations
307. Vice Consul Kobayashi Transports Secret Documents to San Francisco
Minister Yoshioki Miura was instructed to send a member of his staff to San Francisco to
meet Vice Consul Ichizo Kobayashi on the Hikawa Maru, since secret documents for the
Mexican Embassy and for all South American offices would be carried by that official. 689
308. Minister Miura Sends to Tokyo a Resume of Comments on Mexico's Position in the Event
of a Japanese-American War
In a message to Tokyo on October 23, 1941, Minister Miura declared that in the event of the
United States becoming involved in the war, it was generally believed that Mexico would
either follow its example or assume a status similar to being in the war. At an informal dinner
party which the Mexican Minister had given on October 21, former Vice Minister of
Communications and Finance M. C. Rolland had discussed the attitude that Mexico
might take should hostilities develop between the United States and Japan. He believed
that the United States would immediately occupy Mexican bases and strengthen anti-
Axis activities in Mexico. Since the government which was formed to support the United
States, naturally was following a course of cooperation, should the United States ask Mexico
to declare war, the government would likely comply at once. Although the populace in
general was friendly toward Japan, Mexican politics and foreign affairs were now manipulated
entirely by a small number of politicians and military men who were not worthy to be
called military men. Since the people were absolutely powerless, it would be a mistake to
expect anything of them. Mr. Rolland declared that the only chance of a change in Mexico's
present policy would occur if Germany gained the supremacy in Europe, and Japan in Asia,
while the United States, on the other hand, would face a national crisis because of economic
breakdown and for other reasons.* 90
309. Navy Department Retracts Alleged Statement by Secretary Knox of "Immediate Action
Within 24 Hours"
On October 25, 1941 Minister Miura in Mexico learned confidentially from an executive of
the Excelsior newspaper of the statement made on October 24 by Secretary of the Navy Knox
referring to the near approach of the crisis between Japan and America. Secretary Knox, in
the statement which reached the newspaper office at noon, had asserted that there would be
"imminent action" in the Far East "within twenty-four hours". At a request from the Navy
Department, word had gone through two hours later to the effect that the phrase "within
twenty-four hours" should be deleted. 691
310. Minister Miura Plans to Return to Japan
An unidentified Japanese official in Mexico (probably Minister Miura) was advised by
Tokyo on October 27 that he would be permitted to announce his intention to return to
Japan only after he had made definite arrangements for his passage home. He was informed
that there was no space on the Terukawa Maru, although it might be possible to find space on
m lV, 552.
,W IV, 553.
'"IV, 554.
the Hikawa Mam sailing from Seattle on November 4. Another possibility was the President
Line vessel which sailed from San Francisco to Shanghai. The official was requested to
choose a method of transportation and to advise the Home Office. 8 * 2
On November 3, Minister Miura wired that the chances of getting reservations at San
Francisco were very slim. It would be necessary, the Minister said, to announce his intention
of returning home by November 14 or 15, at the very latest, since four or five days would be
required to travel by rail to San Francisco. After leaving Mexico, the Minister said, he couldn't
very well "come sauntering back again because he couldn't get ship accommodations in
San Francisco". In addition, he pointed out that if by chance he were successful in finding
accommodations at San Francisco, there was the danger that he would become stranded in
the Philippine Islands or in Hawaii should certain developments occur in Japanese-
American relations. In any event, he, as Minister of the Imperial Government, would be
placed in an undignified position which might result in criticism of the government should
any of the anticipated events materialize. For these reasons, he suggested that he apply openly
and directly to the United States Government to reserve accommodations or he could, as an
alternative, remain in Mexico. In spite of the fact that his position there would be exceedingly
difficult, he would nevertheless endeavor to carry out the instructions of the Foreign Minister
to the best of his ability. 633
311. System of Importing Rayon Undergoes a Change
A fact, which would be announced in a few days in the official Mexican Gazette, was
reported to Tokyo on November 6, 1941, namely, the cancellation by the Economics Depart-
ment of the import certificates of the Rayon Distributing Company. The subsidy system
was to be dispensed with on November 10, Minister Miura said. In the future, the importa-
tion of rayon would take place in a manner totally different since no subsidy would be given to
a controlled distributing company and the importation of rayon could be carried on by
anyone who was willing to pay a tariff of one peso per kilogram. The change in the system
had been brought about by the fact that the distributing company, through its system of
importation and distribution, had never achieved the expected results; consequently, Mexico
was very hard up for rayon. In cognizance of this fact, Japan should watch carefully to see
that no rayon was being transshipped from China to Mexico. Since the Minister had himself
been given a report that Itoochuu had shipped some two thousand cases to Chile, he felt
that the rayon shipments might be going by way of Chile and Argentina to Mexico. 694
312. Panama Incident Has No Noticeable Effect in Mexico
On November 9, 1941 Minister Miura wired that the announcement of the Panama
Incident in Mexico had had no noticeable effects in that country. The Universal had, on
November 8, published a telegram stating that Japan had protested against the new trade
laws which curtailed Japanese businesses in Panama. The report gave Panama's reply,
namely, that this protest constituted interference in the internal affairs of Panama. As yet,
there had been no confirmation of the report from other sources.* 96
642 IV, 555.
893 IV, 556.
694 IV, 557.
£S5 IV,558.
160
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
313. Mexican Newspapermen Return from Japan Via Vancouver and Cuba
Two Mexican newspapermen, Mr. Jose Llerco and Mr. Araisa, who had been sent to Japan
at the expense of the Japanese Government were, according to a dispatch from Tokyo on
November 13, returning to their country on the Hikawa Mara. Since the American authori-
ties had refused to credit the transit visas on the ground that Mr. Llerco was ant i- American,
they had been forced to disembark at Vancouver and return to Mexico by way of Cuba. As
both of the men were exceedingly competent reporters, the Foreign Minister felt that they
would be of great help in Japanese machinations in Mexico. During their visit in Japan,
they had met all of the prominent men and had a very clear picture of Japan's position.
Mr. Llerco was, the Foreign Minister explained, under contract to the Yomiuri news-
paper as its Mexican correspondent. 696
314. Courier I noma Dispatched to San Francisco
In deference to Tokyo's request that a courier be sent to San Francisco to pick up secret
papers which were being brought by Courier Oshino, Minister Yoshioki Miura reported on
November 17 that Courier Inoma had been dispatched for this mission. Courier Inoma
was scheduled to proceed to Los Angeles for explanation pertaining to these papers. It
was further asked that Courier Kosaka, who would pass through Mexico City on November
19, stop in that city on his way to Washington. 897
315. Mexican Reporter Returning from Japan Expresses His Gratitude for Hospitality Extended
On his return to Mexico, Mr. Araisa, one of the Mexican reporters sent to Japan, had
visited a member of the Japanese Legation in his private apartment. At that time he had
expressed his deep gratitude to the Japanese, particularly to the Investigation Bureau, for
the welcome and kindness he had received during his visit to Japan. He explained, however,
that he and Llerco, having visited Japan on the invitation of the Japanese and having
taken quite a sum of money with which to make the trip, were now accused of being spies.
For this reason he hesitated to call at the Embassy or the Chancellery since they were not
allowed too much freedom of movement.
Furthermore, Llerco, who, with his brother, published the newspaper Hoy, had been fired
while he was in Japan, and the people in Mexico were more angry with him than they were with
Mr. Araisa.
For the present, these two men were unable to write articles favorable to Japan. This was
unfortunate since hostile writers would be producing a great deal of anti-Japanese propa-
ganda. He promised, however, that when the time was ripe, they, too, would put pens to
work for Japan's benefit. 888
316. Mexico Enforces Stricter Passport Policies
That passport restriction were becoming more strictly enforced was reported to Tokyo
on November 18 by Japan's Minister in Mexico. Although those who had suffered persecution
by the abolition of passports were political refugees as in the case drawn up by Ambassador
Bureseda, Mexican Ambassador to Panama, which had no bearing on the present question,
it still boiled down to whether or not the Mexican Government wished to exercise clemency
where Japan was concerned. Mexico, he said, did not now recognize the passports of laborers,
and the only way to get into Mexico was by way of a farmer's or investor's passport. In some
cases, the Mexican Government requested that only 750 pesos be put up to return home in
""IV. 559.
TV. 560.
TV. 561.
161
case of emergency but, in other cases, as much as from 60,000 to 110,000 pesos might be
necessary.
Even important reporters had been denied entry into the country as in the case of special
correspondents Asano and Nakano. Although negotiations concerning them had been going
on over a period of months, there did not seem to be much chance of their being admitted. 699
A searching examination was being conducted with a view to expelling all foreigners
who had passports with flaws, and the number of Japanese who might fall victim to this was
approximately one hundred.
The former policy of extending the passports of Japanese citizens whose time was up had
been discontinued, and they were allowed to wait only until the next ship could come to
evacuate them.
Naturally, Minister Miura said, this situation existed as a result of Mexican-American
relations; and, as in the case of Panama, it was not a policy for humane considerations but
simply a question of their relations with the United States.
The predicament of the Japanese was pitiful beyond words and the Imperial Government
itself was on the spot in this respect. Assuring the Foreign Minister that he himself was not
attempting to escape any labor or embarrassment, he pointed out that diplomats in Mexico
must be careful not to say anything to get the countries they represented into trouble. As
soon as the Foreign Minister had evolved an answer to this question, he asked that he be
instructedimmediately. 700
317. Minister Miura Gives His Opinion Regarding Oil Agreement Between United States and
Mexico
Following the announcement on November 19 of the United States- Mexico agreement
concerning the oil question, Minister Miura transmitted his opinions of the matter on
November 20. As a reason for the rapid accomplishment of the agreement, he suggested
that the United States could not afford to have a shadow fall upon her many relations with
Mexico, which played the part of flagman for the various countries in Central and South
America. The United States found it impossible to acquiesce to any policy which would
delay the completion of continental defense in Mexico.
Furthermore, Mexico had reached a condition of great uneasiness because of insufficient
raw materials and capital, as had already been reported. Added to this was the dissatisfaction
of the people in regard to the existing economic agreement as well as the threat of adverse
trade conditions never before seen in Mexico. Since the government found its position
untenable, the United States cleverly took advantage of all this to conclude the oil agree-
ment. 701
318. Agreement Signifies Desire for Mutual Understanding Between United States and Mexico
Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla had explained to newspaper reporters that the agree-
ment removed the obstacles to close cooperation, which were possible sources of friction if
postponed. In establishing the agreement, proof had been given of the desire on the part of
both countries for mutual understanding and honest friendship. The Japanese Minister
added that important writers in Mexico had declared the agreement signified Mexico's
gradual yielding to the United States, to the point where it was no longer possible to move
6S9 TV, 562.
™"IV, 563.
,01 IV, 564.
™IV, 565.
162
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
319. Minister Miura Requests Traveling Expenses and Reservations on the Tatsuta Maru
Minister Miura on November 26, 1941, asked that a room on the Tatsuta Mam be reserved
for him and that traveling expenses be sent as soon as possible. He inquired about the
schedule of the Maru, whether the vessel would sail from Los Angeles to Balboa and directly
to Japan or would stop at Manzanillo on the way back, as it would be necessary for him to
announce the date of his departure. 703
320. Japanese Nationals Request Aid in Obtaining Reservations on Tatsuta Maru
On this day he also informed Tokyo that it was virtually impossible to secure visas for
Japanese nationals in Mexico to enter the United States. The only method of travel to
Panama would be by plane, for all other ways of transportation were difficult to arrange.
Since many of the nationals in Mexico had realized that their only opportunity to return
home would be via the Tatsuta Maru, they had requested Minister Miura's assistance in
obtaining transportation on this vessel. 704
321. Minister Miura Asks that the Tatsuta Maru Load Freight at Manzanillo
He further requested that the Tatsuta Maru be directed to stop at Manzanillo to take on
2,000 tons of miscellaneous freight for transportation to Japan. 706
322. Japanese Officials Use Mexico-Tokyo Diplomatic Channel for Intelligence Routing
Since, according to previous arrangements, Mexico City was to be used as an intelligence
center by the Japanese to glean useful information from the United States, a Japanese
intelligence officer reported on an address made by a United States Marine Corps recruiting
officer in Dallas, Texas, on November 26, 1941. It was learned from the address that, the
United States standing army was 3,000,000, but that 3,000,000 additional reserves were
planned and that the production of armaments had been increased accordingly. The
United States Marine Corps personnel was now about 62,000 but 100,000 would be needed
within one year. 70 * Note: This message was translated in 1945.
Furthermore, the Mexican office reported a German language broadcast from London
on the night of November 30 stating that England was again dispatching warships to the Far
East. Another item sent to Tokyo was taken from an Associated Press dispatch from Manila
on December 1 to the effect that American pilots using American planes had recently organized
an air unit to protect the Burma Road, 707
323. Tokyo Sends Instructions by Courier Kosaka Regarding Japanese and Manchurian Daily
Broadcasts
In regard to a previous wire requesting certain instructions which were to have been
delivered by courier, Tokyo answered on November 29, 1941, that the instructions were
being sent by Courier Kosaka. Having been instructed to impart the knowledge from the
Embassy of the United States to Mexico, Courier Kosaka would discuss the reception of
Japanese and Manchurian (sic) daily 7080 broadcasts: these would pertain to conditions in
"TV, 566
™IV, 567,
m W, 568
™IV, 569
"TV, 570
™TV, 571
10S °IV, 571. DoD Comment: Textual rendition of the message is suspect — appears in retrospect to be the
establishment of a warning system.
163
Japan and Manchuria; the material would be distributed only in the Mexican Legation
and the military and naval attaches' offices; broadcasts received would be put into Japa-
nese text and immediately forwarded to Colombia, Venezuela, El Salvador and Panama. 76 *
324. Tokyo Wires Formal Authorization for Minister Miura's Return
Formal authorization for Minister Miura's return to Japan was wired from Tokyo on
December 1, 1941. 309
325. Minister Miura Reports Impossible Reception of General Broadcast
On this day Minister Miura reported to Washington that conditions intermittently made
it impossible to receive the general broadcasts. He asked that, should a broadcast be
intercepted in the code of the caption telegram (named in the heading of this message), it be
relayed to him immediately. 710
326. Foreign Minister Togo Instructs Minister Miura to Arrange for Employment of Japanese from
Panama
Foreign Minister Togo, in a dispatch of December 1, 1941, instructed that Minister Miura
arrange for the employment of Japanese from Panama immediately. These instructions were
in accordance with the policy of the Japanese government which decreed that as many
Japanese as possible should be resettled in Latin and Central American countries rather
than be returned to Japan. 711
327. Tokyo Orders Mexico to Limit Expenses and to Use "S" Code
Furthermore, the Foreign Minister explained that expenditures in the Mexican Legation
would be confined to the limits of the moneys already granted to that office. It was added
that circumstances made it necessary to consider the use of the Navy "S" code, which had
been explained in a previous circular. 112
328. Minister Miura Discusses with Panama the Employment of a New Staff Member
In accordance with instructions from the Home Office, Minister Miura declared that one
person would be added to the staff in Mexico. Although the dispatch from Panama had
mentioned candidates who would be willing to pay their own fare and to work without
salary, the Minister discouraged this, suggesting that Panama provide travel expenses as
well as a suitable wage after the appointee's arrival in Mexico. 713
329. Tokyo Makes Plans for the Tatsuta Maru to Enter and Leave Port at Manzanillo
On December 4, 1941 Tokyo directed that arrangements be made with the Mexican govern-
ment to allow the Tatsuta Maru to enter and leave port at Manzanillo. Tokyo ordered that no
general freight be loaded. It also asked that negotiations with Mexico be undertaken so that
Mr. Minom Takada, the Foreign Office Liaison official on board the ship, and his aide,
Takade Toshiyuki, might obtain entrance permits. 714
105 IV, 572.
,,l, IV,573.
"'IV, 574.
" 2 IV, 575.
,13 IV,576.
714 IV, 577.
164
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
330. The Mexican Government Reopens Its Legation in China
On December 4, 1941 Tokyo, as well as the Washington office, was informed that the
Mexican government was reopening its legation in China, which had been closed for the last
seven years. Clearly indicating the position of the Mexican government in relation to the
present American-Japanese question was the fact that the radical Miguel Angel Menendez
had been named as Minister to Chungking. 715
331 . Minister Miura Asks for Confirmation of Schedule of Tatsuta Maru
Since the route of the Tatsuta Maru seemed illogical to Minister Miura, he wired for
confirmation of the schedule. He declared that in his opinion there was some mistake about
the Tatsuta Maru leaving Los Angeles and docking at the Mexican port. 716
However, on this same day he relayed Tokyo message #243 to the Consul in Los Angeles
which stated that the vessel would dock at Manzanillo on its way from Los Angeles to Balboa.
Since it was scheduled to arrive on December 19, 1941, and leave two days later, he had
estimated its arrival in Balboa to be on December 26, 1941. This information was to be relayed
to Washington and Panama. 717
That the Mexican government had no objections to the entrance permits for Foreign Office
liaison official Takada and his aide Toshiyuki, who were on board the Tatsuta Maru, was wired
to Tokyo on December 5, 1941. 718
332. Tokyo Informs Minister Miura it Approves Taking American and Mexican Money to Japan
In answer to a request from Minister Miura, Tokyo declared that there were no restictions
on bringing American (?) or Mexican money to Japan and that, in fact, the Foreign Office
approved of the plan. 718
333. Japanese Minister in Mexico Informs Tokyo of Destruction of Ciphers and Code Machines
On December 7, 1941 the Japanese Minister in Mexico informed Tokyo that all telegraphic
ciphers, code machines and safes with the exception of one set each of two separate codes had
been destroyed, although on December 2, 1941 Tokyo had instructed that Washington need
not follow instructions to get in touch with Mexico. 720
Minister Miura declared that he had received the code word Sensan from San Francisco,
possibly indicating that this office had similarly destroyed its codes and code machine. He
added that he would do likewise with his telegraphic ciphers addressed to various South
American offices which were in his care. 721
715 IV, 578.
" 6 IV, 579.
'"IV, 580.
118 IV, 581.
,1S IV, 582.
""IV, 434, 435, 583.
,21 IV, 583.
165
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
{f) Japanese-South American Relations
334. Columbia Refuses United States Overflight Requests
Bogota reported to Tokyo on October 24, 1941, that the government of Colombia had
refused the United States the right to fly over its territory, although Venezuela and Brazil
had agreed to allow the U.S. to overfly their countries, 722
335. Japanese Naval Authorities Ship Transmitter Despite Protests of South American Foreign
Offices
When the Japanese Embassy in Argentina warned that it could not safely accept the radio
transmitter parts being shipped aboard the Too Mam™* Tokyo advised its Rio de Janiero
office that the equipment would be sent to the diplomatic office in Brazil and was to be taken
ashore if there was a possibility of successful transportation. If Brazilian authorities suspected
the nature of the cases, they were to be returned to Tokyo. 721
Word came to Rio on October 27, that the Too Maru had left Buenos Aires, Argentina,
on October 25, 1941, with the radio aboard. 725 Minister Shui Tomii also advised Tokyo that
along with the transmitter he was shipping diplomatic papers which were entrusted to the
ship's Captain. 72 "
336. Mitsubishi Unable to Ship Supplies Aboard Toa Maru
Although Minister Tomii had hoped to include a cargo of Mitsubishi supplies aboard the
Toa Maru, since this material had already failed to reach Japan on the Yamazato Maru,
there seemed to be no possibility of obtaining a shipping release. Even though Vice- Minister
Yusbio Nakamura had already interviewed the Interministerial Commission in Argentina,
the Chief of the Trade Bureau and the Vice Minister of Agriculture to gain a permit, he
was told that the export of tungsten should have been prohibited earlier. Mitsubishi repre-
sentatives, as well as Naval Attache, Katsumi Yukishita, consulted the Chief of the Naval
Staff. In view of the fact that the United States had already agreed to purchase two thousand
tons of tungsten a year from Argentina, it was believed that such a guarantee would consti-
tute a monopoly in the tungsten trade and that the whole matter would develop into a
political rather than a business transaction. With this in mind, Minister Tomii felt that there
was practically no hope of shipping the goods aboard the Toa Maru on October 25, 1941. 727
337. German Representatives Reserve Cabins Aboard Toa Maru
Apparently some German representatives were also aboard the Toa Maru leaving Rio de
Janeiro for Buenos Aires. Although the Toa was crowded, Tokyo advised Berlin on October
27 that two cabins aboard the ship had been reserved. 728
1!S IV, 584,
721 m, 671.
"TV, 585.
"*IV, 586.
12 "lV, 587.
'"IV, 588.
167
338. Japanese Navy Promises to Stow Radio Transmitter
When the Toa Maru reached Rio, Naval Attache Atsuo Shigehiro reported to Ambassador
Ishii on November 6, 1941, that he was bringing ashore the radio transmitter. However, since
Ambassador Itaro Ishii personally, objected to being put on the spot by naval officials he
again warned that hereafter the Imperial Navy and Foreign Departments would need to
cooperate more closely for if the Foreign Service was not informed of future undercover
activities, the Ambassador declared he would be forced to have nothing to do with such
matters. Then the Naval Attache had replied that in view of such opposition, he would
merely store the transmitter in his office without even unwrapping it.
339. Brazil Begins Close Inspection of Japanese Exports and Imports
Ambassador Ishii in the same message, then explained that he had disposed satisfactory
of the 200 additional items which had been sent. He also revealed to Tokyo that the Treasury
Department in Brazil was secretly checking all exports to Japan, even resorting to punching
holes in trunks and bagging when the situation arose. 7 " 9 One method of checking contents
being used by Bra2ilian custom inspectors was that of "accidentally" dropping and bursting
baggage of Japanese. Since in one particular instance a package had been similarly opened
when German Ambassador Henrich D. Stahmer was going aboard a Japanese Maru, Mr. Ishii's
staff was forced to cover up both for Japan and the Brazilian government but Ambassador
Ishii felt that if such a situation occurred again, Japan would be embarrassed and relations
with Brazil irretrievably damaged. He again warned that Japanese naval officials should be
more cautious in their activities and refrain from sending such hazardous orders to their
340, Terukawa Maru to Slop at Cailao
The problem of whether the Terukawa Maru would put in at Cailao was still undecided on
October 20 when Foreign Minister Togo wired the Japanese office in Buenos Aires to make
accommodations for Ambassador Tanakawa aboard the ship. 731 At this time Foreign Minister
Togo advised Minister lungo Yanai in Bogota that the Terukawa Maru's schedule was still
undetermined but instructions had been sent to the Kawasaki steamship agent in Santiago,
arrangements were to be completed immediately for loading the Ambassador's baggage. 732
On November 5 Minister Yanai in Bogota, having learned that the Terukawa Maru would
not stop at Cailao, wired the Japanese Naval Attache in Mexico that certain matters which
were to have been shipped aboard the naval vessel could not now leave Brazil. However, the
Minister explained that he had cabled to Tokyo requesting that the ship's schedule be
altered in order to take aboard the cargo. 133
In spite of all the haggling over the Terukawa's schedule, it was revealed on November 13,
1941, that the ship would dock at Cailao since a party of four, headed by Commander
Michinori Yosii, formerly scheduled to arrive in Trinidad from England, now would sail
aboard the Terukawa Maru departing Cailao November 19. 734
By December 1, 1941, it developed that the Terukawa Maru was to be utilized in returning
the Colombian Ambassador carrying with him special material labeled "canned goods" to
Japan. The Ambassador was to deliver the shipment to the son of Yanai, Minister to Bogota,
who would in turn deliver the special cargo to the Navy Department. 736
18 IV, 590.
"IV, 590A.
"IV, 591.
"IV, 592.
"IV, 593, 594.
"IV, 595.
16 IV, 59G.
168
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
341. South American Countries Change to Code Machine November 7, 1941
On November 7, 1941, both the Japanese Ministries in Rio de Janiero and Buenos Aires
advised Berne, Switzerland; Ankaran, Washington, Mexico, England, France, Germany
and Italy that they had begun to use the code machine. 736
342. Minister Vanai Advises Instigation of New Radio Code
By November 21, 1941, South American countries had undertaken specific plans for the
impending emergency when Mr. Yanai in Bogota advised on this day that it would be
practically impossible to carry on wire communications via United States and British
telegraph companies. Japanese broadcasting stations would be the only direct means of
communication between Tokyo and South America and it would be advisable to set up a code
call sign for each Japanese embassy and legation. 737
343. Tokyo Urges That Maltreated Japanese in Panama Be Taken to South America
It soon became obvious that the situation involving Japanese nationals in Panama would
also come to a head. On November 4, 1941, Ambassador Ishii retransmitted Tokyo's analysis
of the general revised policy of the Panamanian government towards the yellow race. In
the words of Japanese Foreign Minister Togo the Japanese nationals had remained mild
and unruffled in the face of government discrimination against their businesses and that
through pleas and persuasive methods they had induced the former president of Panama to
promise friendly treatment. Nevertheless on October 8, this resume declared, because of a
coup d'etat which resulted in the installation of an unfriendly president, Panama's relations
with Japan immediately turned for the worse, and on October 30 all Japanese business was
to be stopped forcing almost 300 persons into unemployment and bankruptcy. It was Japan's
desire that these nationals be allowed to infiltrate elsewhere in South America. 738
Apparently Japan blamed the United States for anti-Japanese pressure on Panama and
was determined on a relentless opposition in which they would appeal to the great South
American powers and their sympathy for humane treatment of individuals. However
Japan's propaganda organization would endeavor to place the United States in the position of
being a ruthless power in the eyes of Latin America. In addition, it was to be pointed out that
should the Axis power be victorious in the war and an East Asia co-prosperity sphere be
established, Panama's present unfriendly attitude would be remembered for a long time. 7 **
On November 15, a circular message from Tokyo to Mexico was transmitted to Brazil by
Ambassador Ishii for information regarding the attitude of the Panamanian government with
regard to Japanese nationals there. According to the circular, Japan had made representa-
tions to Panama protesting and seeking: —
1. Compensation for damage to Japanese property;
2. A suitable period for the disposition of stocks held by Japanese nationals;
3. Preservation of Japanese property in the future;
4. Abandonment of pressure upon Japanese to evacuate.
The circular advised that Japanese nationals were only permitted to engage in laundry
work, domestic endeavors and chauffeuring in Panama and that some three hundred of them
faced financial ruin. In an effort to obtain the transfer of these nationals all Japanese offices
in important South American cities were advised to make representations to their accredited
countries. 740
,M IV,596.598.
,3 'IV,599.
7M IV.60O.
7 "IV,601.
'"IV, 602.
169
344. Minister Tomii Advises Adjustment of Japanese American Relations to Give Japan More
Time
Minister Tomii in Buenos Aires added to the general picture then on November 22, 1941, he
explained that in recent months South American sympathy toward the United States was
increasing in direct proportion to increased trade. Minister Tomii was of the opinion that it
would be wise to adjust Japanese-American relations immediately in order to give Japan
additional time to restrict this increasing North American influence.
In all his conversations with the Acting President of Argentina, Minister Tomii explained
that Argentina had expressed complete confidence in Japan. He stated that only a success-
ful adjustment of Japanese-American relations could aid in the preparation of a Japanese-
Argentine commercial agreement. In the event of a breach in Japanese- American relations,
the agreement would be terminated. 7 * 1
345. Minister Koseki in Paraguay Burns Codes
On November 22, Japanese Representative Koseki in Asuncion, Paraguay, advised the
Foreign Office in Tokyo that he had burned all codes in accordance with instructions from the
Ambassador to Brazil. 7 * s
346. New Code Words Issued November 29, 1941
Not long after Minister Yanai's request that a new code be installed, a circular from Tokyo
on November 29 revealed a complete list of additional code words with their equivalent
meanings.
347. Tokyo Lists Accomplishments of Pearl Harbor Day
On December 10, 1941, a Tokyo circular was intercepted in transmission from Rio to
Buenos Aires, outlining the December 7 accomplishments of the Imperial Japanese Army
and Navy against American and British forces in the Pacific. According to the report, the
Imperial Navy had carried out a withering air attack on the American fleet at Hawaii, sinking
two and seriously damaging four battleships, seriously damaging about four large cruisers,
shooting down many enemy planes and possibly sinking an aircraft carrier.
On December 8 the combined Japanese Army and Navy Air Corps reportedly attacked the
Philippine Air Force, shooting down forty planes at Iba, fifty to sixty planes at Clark Field,
with a loss of only two planes to Japan. Davao, Wake and Guam were heavily damaged and
at Guam the warship Penguin, was sunk. Midway was subjected to heavy fire on the afternoon
of the 8th with loss of an airplane hanger and fuel reserves. Before dawn on December 8, the
Imperial Navy Air Corps had bombed Tengaa and Seretaa bases near Singapore and the
Imperial Army and Navy, under a unified command, had easily occupied Thailand that
afternoon.
In Southern China, their air corps had attacked an enemy air base north of Hong Kong where
twelve of fourteen planes were burned and the British gunboat Jeitoreru was sunk while the
American gunboat Wake surrendered. At Peking and Tientsin, the American Marine Corps
was disarmed and the Shanghai international concession was completely occupied, as was the
British concession at Shamen. 744
(a) Argentina
IV, 603.
IV, 604.
rv.eos.
IV, 606.
170
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
348. Japan Attempts to Improve Trade with Argentina
Even though Argentina maintained a friendly attitude toward Japan during the pre-Pearl
Harbor months, trade between the two countries became more circumscribed. 70 Export
and import trade with Japan during September amounted to 7,162,614 pesos and 3,391,523
pesos respectively. 7 * 6 Domestic Commerce officials Kosaku Tanaka and Masuo Kato worked
until October 24, 1941, when Foreign Minister Togo issued instructions that Minister Tomii
should secure their transportation back to Japan.' 47
Investigations revealed on November 5, 1941, that it was still possible for Japan to purchase
wool, hides, quebracho, and linseed but no tungsten. They also concluded that since the
purchasing power of Japanese merchants was 2,000,000 yen, it would be wise to increase
their reserve purchasing power by exportation of higher priced raw silk to Argentina. 748
349. Japan Undecided as to Sympathies of Argentina
According to the Japanese, Argentina did not intend to enter the war between the United
States and Japan but would remain on the sidelines. According to the Japanese-Panamaninan
Minister, Mr. Akiyama, on November 12, 1941, this fact was evidenced by the proposed
withdrawal of the Argentine Minister to Panama in the event of war between Japan and
America. 749
With regard to Japanese endeavors to relocate its nationals from Panama to various South
American countries, Minister Tomii wired Tokyo on November 14, 1941, that the atmosphere
in Argentina had been relatively calm as far as the Japanese question was concerned. However,
the fact that the government of Argentina had been so quiet, sticking to a neutral policy,
Minister Tomii believed forebade no good for his countrymen and with this in view revealed
that he had made representations to the government in an effort to prevent unfortunate
action. 75 "
That America had decided to declare war against Japan appeared plain in the reports
received from the United States, it was declared in a message from Buenos Aires to Tokyo on
November 28, 1941 (translated 1-14-45). This fact was substantiated by the progress of
Japanese-American negotiations and the movements of Japanese troops from Central China.
Furthermore, British male citizens in Argentina were being rapidly drafted by England. 751
Minister Tomii continued to work towards better relations between Argentina and Japan
reporting on November 28, 1941, that he had talked with Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranya in
Buenos Aires, Confusion concerning Argentina's attitude toward these negotiations resulted
after La Pazon and British and American newspapers published apparently unconfirmed
reports on the Tomii- Aranya conversation. Mr. Tomii informed his Home Office that the
Argentina government had not refused to cooperate but appeared less enthusiastic.
Mr. Tomii continued that Secretary Nakamura had visited the Commerce Bureau vice-
chief in order to verify the source of the newspaper report and all the leaks regarding the
conversations. Presumably, the Foreign Office was unaware of recent developments but
immediately reassured Mr. Tomii that a thorough investigation would be made. At this
point the Japanese minister generalized that in settling a commerce problem, publicity
was not the desirable thing and asked that the forthcoming negotiations be kept strictly
'"IV. 607.
'"IV, 608.
'"IV, 609.
1 " IV, 607.
m Vf, 610.
'"IV, 611.
711 IV, 612.
171
When Minister Tomii began his conversations with the Foreign Minister of Argentina on
December 5, 1941, he brought up the subject of Japanese-American relations and asked
bluntly what position Argentina would take should the United States and Japan go to war.
In reply the Foreign Minister referred to the Havana Protocol, a declaration calling for the
joint defense of American Continents whereby Japan would naturally be treated as a
aggressor nation. Although the United States was expected to request aid from Argentina,
the Foreign Minister assured Mr. Tomii that no harm would come to Japan. He referred to
this policy as "qualified neutrality" which left the Japanese Minister in considerable doubt
as to the real intentions of the South American nation. With the expectation of a second inter-
view Mr. Tomii departed. 7 sa
In a later dispatch on December 8, 1941, Minister Tomii then revealed the essence of his
talk with the Foreign Minister. During the interview he stated he had stressed Japanese-
Argentine amity through the years and the fact that Japan regarded Argentina as the leader
of all South American countries and then advised the Foreign Minister of Japan's wishes.
In reply the Foreign Minister agreed with the Japanese points of view but stated that it would
be necessary for him to consult with the President of Argentina. According to the Foreign
Minister, London, Ottawa, Canberra, and Chungking had all made the same proposition,
although he had not yet heard from Washington and Rio de Janeiro.™
According to the circular from Tokyo which was intercepted in transmission from Buenos
Aires to Rio de Janeiro, Japan feared that upon the outbreak of war with America and
England it might become impossible to communicate directly with Mexico, Central
America, Panama and Cuba. In this event it would be desirable that Japan be on the alert
for any information regarding declarations of war and detention of Japanese in these
questionable countries.™
(b) Brazil
350. Japafi Improves Communications Facilities to Brazil
Since the direction, time and contents of Japan's foreign broadcasts had been changed
before October 1, 1941, 76e Brazil's receiving station was reporting increased efficiency on
November 11, 1941, while Ambassador Ishii conveyed his pleasure over the improvement in
reception. At the same time, he suggested that it might be wise to inaugurate a more
detailed broadcast of Japanese news in an effort to impress South American listeners with the
fairness of Japan's position in current international affairs."'
351. Courier Kosaka Leaves Rio de Janeiro for Washington
The day following Courier Kosaka's arrival in Rio de Janeiro, October 29, 1941, Ambassador
Ishii confirmed with Tokyo that the Courier would return to Japan via the United States.
He also announced that a member of the Rio office would accompany Courier Kosaka to
New York. 15 *
On November 12, Ambassador Ishii wired to Tokyo on behalf of Courier Kosaka that the
latter would arrive in Washington by the 5th of December and would continue to San
Francisco where he would arrive by the middle of the month. The Ambassador at this time
suggested that Mao, in Mexico, make connections with Courier Kosaka in Washington.™
713 IV, 6U.
™IV, 615.
75S IV, 616.
,ss rV.617.
7i7 IV,618.
759 IV, 619.
768 IV, 620.
172
BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Then the Ambassador advised Japan's Mexican office on November 18 that Courier Kosaka
would stop over in Mexico after arriving at San Francisco. 761
The Japanese Embassy in Washington was instructed on November 12, 1941, to have
Army Surgeon Major Hayakawa, whose status was to be secret, sent immediately to Brazil.
Although Major Hayakawa was to act as a non-career specialist connected with the Embassy
in Brazil and serving only in that country, he was to be under the orders of the attache resident
352. Japan Recognizes Strong United States Sympathies in Brazil
There was little doubt that United States influence was strong in Brazil or that Japan was
aware of the resultant antagonism toward itself. Ambassador Ishii had learned from various
consuls by October 30 that England and the United States had been purchasing Brazilian
newspapers for propaganda purposes with a view toward alienating the Brazilian people
from Japan. In order to combat such activities Ambassador Ishii advised that he was working
with Brazilian government authorities in Rio and in view of the imminent danger of a crisis,
his employees had been diligent in collecting pertinent information, 763
Then in November the government of Brazil conferred upon United States Chief of Staff'
George Marshall the honorary title of Supreme Commander of the Brazilian Army, Ambassa-
dor Ishii lost no time in wiring Tokyo on November 25, 1941. This gesture, he explained, was
an expression of appreciation for General Marshall's assistance to Great Britain in securing
the re-loading of" German anti-aircraft guns consigned to Brazil at the request of Chief of Staff"
Pedro Goez. 7M
353. Japan Transfers Bank Funds
The impending crisis caused a flurry of transactions for a transfer of Yokohama Specie
Bank funds to the Imperial government's ministry in Caracas, Bogota and Panama. An
unidentified representative of the Specie Bank was to arrive in Caracas on November
30, 1941, and would be in Bogota by December 4, from which he would travel to Panama
on December 10. Traveling on a diplomatic passport, the representative would be given the
title of extraordinary official attached to the Rio office. 165
354. Ambassador Ishii Asks for Additional Funds
As British and American pressure upon Brazil became more confining, Japanese repre-
sentatives operated in secrecy. In view of the fact that such machinations would require
increased resources Ambassador Ishii asked on November 28, 1941, that Japan appropriate
temporarily a secret fund. Throughout the message, Ambassador Ishii attempted to
emphasize the need for secrecy in combating the present critical turn of events. 766
355. Ambassador Ishii Has Difficulty in Radio Reception
Although, generally, transmissions to South American countries had cleared considerably
by the last of November, Ambassador Ishii radioed on November 30 that Brazilian and
Argentine receivers were finding difficulty in copying Japan's 10:30 p.m. broadcast.
Thereafter he initialed negotiations to test reception of 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. broadcasts. 767
76,1 Numbering error.
"TV, 621,622.
'"IV, 623.
"TV, 624.
"TV, 625.
765 IV, 626.
76 TV,627.
"TV, 628.
173
356. Japan Prepared for Crisis As Brazilian Army Supports America
Despite Foreign Minister Aranya's . protestations of neutrality when interviewed by
Ambassador Ishii on December 1, 1941, it was apparent that Brazil would be unable to accede
wholeheartedly to a neutrality policy in view of the fact that military authorities were
pressing for a United States-Brazil alliance. The Ambassador described Brazil as "neutral
in favor of the United States". 763
On December 2, 1941, Ambassador Ishii retransmitted the circular from Tokyo to Japan's
Santiago office revealing additional code words and their meanings for activities in prepara-
tion for the coming crisis. ' 6 *
The question of sufficient funds for Japan's machinations in opposition to United States
pressure arose again when on December 2, 1941, Ambassador Ishii advised Tokyo that the
estimated 512 contos previously requested would be insufficient to complete reconstruction
of the Naval Attache's office. In view of the fact that the number of personnel had been
increased by three and additional security equipment was needed, the Ambassador
requested that naval authorities arrange for disbursement of an additional nineteen contos. 7 ™
On the following day, Ambassador Ishii advosed Tokyo that in view of current activities
he had arranged for a loan of 5000 contos from the Specie Bank, making a total of 6000 contos
on hand at diplomatic headquarters in Brazil. In addition, the Ambassador had arranged for
a further loan of 10,000 contos as a safety measure in the event that conditions would take
an adverse turn. 771
357. Ambassador Ishii Requests Release of Secretary Kusano
Three days later, on December 6, 1941, Ambassador Ishii advised that he had released tele-
graphic official Kusano who, for various physical reasons, was inefficient in his position. It
would be desired, the Ambassador said, that Mr. Kusano's return to Japan be authorized
sometime before December 7 and that a more healthy successor, well-versed in telegraphy
and machinery, be appointed. 771
358. Japan Sees United States Military Occupation of South American
Japan grasped quickly at the occupation of Netherlands Guiana by the United States armed
forces as the first military occupation of the South American continent in its analysis of the
international situation retransmitted from Rio de Janeiro to Panama on December 7, 1941.
The analysis emphasized the implications of this action stating that the United States was
just beginning to Teveal its true military objectives.
The release compared the United States' occupation of Netherlands Guiana with Japan's
occupation of French Indo-China, stating that the United States would act as it pleased in
Latin America and under the banner of hemispheric solidarity would constantly threaten all
of Latin America. Foreign Minister Togo called upon all Japanese representatives in South
America to seize every opportunity available to point out the obvious intentions of the United
States affecting South American governments and people. 771
On December 8, 1941, Ambassador Ishii advised Tokyo that he had acted in accordance
with these instructions and by arranging a confidential conversation with the Under
Secretary of State of Brazil. At the interview he had explained the situation from Japan's
viewpoint and questioned the Brazilian regarding his government's attitude toward the
7Bfi IV, 629.
76S IV, 630.
"°]V,631.
7 "IV, 632.
111 IV, 633.
" a IV, 634.
174
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
United States- Japanese war. The Under Secretary had replied that Brazil stressed the
importance of hemispheric solidarity but did not say definitely that Brazil would sever
relations with Japan. 774
From local officials Ambassador Ishii gathered that hemispheric solidarity as interpreted
by Brazil meant political and economic cooperation but had no particular military implica-
tions. In addition, he learned that the Brazilian government was protecting Japanese
workers against fifth column agents and also that the United States was demanding that
Brazil freeze all Japanese property there, with which he believed Brazil would comply.
Ambassador Ishii learned that articles pertaining to any interpretation of Japanese-American
war were being shunned as were all articles which might provoke the Japanese, although
publicity needed to be written sympathetically toward the United States. Ambassador Ishii
said that although he had explained to the press why Japan was forced to fight America, the
control office forebade the newspapers to print it." s
359. Japan Issues Instructions for Burning Codes
On December 8, Tokyo ordered that all codes with the exception of one each of certain codes
he destroyed. Only in the event of a crisis would the remaining codes be destroyed. Foreign
Minister Togo demanded that the files of his message to Ambassador Ishii and other secret
and confidential papers should be burned in accordance with developments in Rio. Certain
code words were to be used if and when Ambassador Ishii burned the various systems. 776
360. Minister Yamagata Suspects United States Machinations in Chile
When Minister Yamagata in Santiago secretly learned that the United States had formally
requested air bases in return for economic favors on October 16, 1941, he immediately
associated this move with the economic crisis within Chile and observed on October 20, 1941,
that the coincidence of the two events disclosed to a degree the United States' attitude
toward Japan. 777
Minister Yamagata then originated a dispatch on November 5 urging Tokyo to take
advantage of the Chilean economic crisis to support a plan for increased Japanese-
Chilean trade and to back negotiations for a new trade treaty. The Minister also voiced a
protest against the cancellation of the Kaku Maru's departure for Chile and against Japan's
failure to arrange for the sailing of another ship in its place. 778 The next day while answering
a query from Japan's Rome office, Minister Kiyoshi Yamagata advised that no foreign ships
were sailing at that time from Chile to the Far East. 779
361. Japan Limits Tour of Chilean Press
For undetermined reasons Japan had decided to return six visiting Chilean newspaper-
men to their native land without allowing them to visit Shanghai 780 or Nanking. 7 " 1 Having
employed the Chilean press members for educating the people of South America to respect
and cherish Japanese nationalism. Foreign Minister Togo on December 2 issued instructions
for the six men returning home via the Tatsuta Maru to be cared for tn Panama. A total of
$2,160 was to be on hand when the Tatsuta docked and specific instructions were issued that
the press members were not to disembark at Panama aboard an American vessel. 783
"'IV, 635.
7.1 IV, 636.
7:4 IV,637,638.
177 IV, 639.
'"IV, 640.
7 "IV,641.
"TV, 642.
TS 'IV, 643.
7.2 IV, 644.
175
362. Japanese Watch Development of South American Sympathies in Face of War
It soon became obvious, when on November 18, 1941, the United States communication
intelligence facility intercepted a retransmission of Tokyo's message, that Japan had
discovered excessive political maneuvers among the South American nations. Since the
Colombian Foreign Minister as well as the Peruvian Vice Minister had been conferring in
Chile and as the Chilean President had been ousted only recently, it was obvious that
machinations were afoot. However, these moves did not necessarily mean that Latin America
was consolidating for war against Japan, the Foreign Minister pointed out as he revealed
that discussions were being carried on among South American nations for independent action
in the event of a Japanese- American conflict. 793
However, another dispatch intercepted on November 21, 1941, originated by Ambassador
Ishii in Rio de Janeiro and transmitted to Tokyo revealed that Foreign Minister Oswald
Aranya of the Brazilian Foreign Office was scheduled to visit Chile in the office of negotiator
between Chile and the United States for allied occupation of one of Chile's military bases.
Ambassador Ishii had been advised of this by the German Ambassador who was a close
associate of the President of Brazil, Getuilo Vargas. 784
By November 25, 1941, Minister Tomii in Buenos Aires had discovered that the principal
object of the Brazilian Foreign Minister's visit to Argentina and Chile was to exchange
opinions regarding the defense of the Americas and the creation of military bases. The outcome
of the informal conversations had been, according to an intelligence report, (1) to preserve
neutrality, (2) to defend the southern portion of South America by Colombia, Peru, Argen-
tina, Brazil and Chile, excluding Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador and Bolivia because of their
strong United States inclinations) and (3) to prevent establishing military bases in
Uruguay (to be guaranteed by Brazil and Argentina). 785
A circular message from Tokyo advised all South American offices on November 28, 1941,
that Japanese-American negotiations would take a critical turn within the next few day
since the United States had overlooked all that Japan stood for. This was for the information
of the Japanese diplomatic offices only. " 6
According to a December 6 dispatch from Minister Yamagata to Tokyo, Germany had
pressed the Chilean government for information concerning its control of the Magellan
Straits. The Secretary of State had revealed to the German Ambassador that Chile planned
joint action with Argentina and that Chile had decided not to permit these straits to be
used as a military base. 7 * 7
On December 2, 1941, Minister Yamagata had supplemented his interpretation of the ABC
conferences. He explained that while Argentina and Chile were resolved to preserve neutrality,
Brazil had already maintained an understanding to support America as a non-belligerent.
However, the Foreign Minister had assured Mr. Yamagata that he would do all in his power
to maintain Chilean neutrality. 788
363. Minister Yamagata Asks Chile to Take in Maltreated Japanese from Panama
When on November 22, 1941, Minister Yamagata visited the Foreign Minister of Chile,
he explained the problems of Japanese nationals in Panama. The Foreign Minister had
been surprised by these activities and listened "with an air of incredulity and horror" as
Mr. Yamagata disclosed the inhumane treatment being meted out to his countrymen and
1,3 IV, 645.
™IV, 646.
"TV, 647.
186 IV, 648.
""IV, 649.
188 IV. 650.
176
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
promised that he would discuss the matter immediately with the Vice President and offered
the suggestion that perhaps Chile could influence Panama to change its attitude. Whereupon
Minister Yamagata assured the Foreign Minister that this would be impossible and
suggested that Chile allow as many as 300 Japanese to enter its boundaries. 799 In reply
the Foreign Minister had inquired as to the possibility of evacuating Japanese nationals in
Panama to which Minister Yamagata explained that Japanese for many years had been
residing in Panama and did not cherish the idea of leaving Latin America.
The Foreign Minister then advised the Japanese Minister that Chile, although it had no
particular racial prejudice, had been discontinuing, in recent months, the issuing of
immigrant passports. Should they change this policy the United States and other countries
might interpret it as definite discrimination in favor of Japan whereas Chile was in no
position to show such partiality. However, the Foreign Minister promised to consult with his
Vice President but Mr. Yamagata held little hope that large numbers of Japanese would be
permitted to enter Chile. 780
The day after this interview Minister Yamagata advised Tokyo that he had visited the
Apostolic Delegate, currently confined because of sickness, where he again repeated the
story of Panamanian discrimination against Japanese nationals and asked if the Catholic
representative could not intercede. However, the delegate had replied that Panama was
not under his jurisdiction and suggested that Minister Yamagata appeal directly to the Pope.
Mr. Yamagata then suggested that perhaps the delegate could intercede on behalf of Japan
in Chile and was advised that at a good opportunity the delegate would consult with the
Foreign Minister. 791
Although Minister Yamagata had been conferring with high officials he was unable to
secure entrance visas for the staff of Amano and company which was to enter Chile and on
November 25 was reprimanded by Foreign Minister Togo who instructed that the matter
should be concluded immediately by obtaining separate visas for these employees. 792
The next day, November 26, Tokyo issued instructions to evacuate as many Japanese
nationals as possible on the Tatsuta Maru which would leave Japan for South America by
the end of November. 7 * 3
Following Tokyo's reprimand with regard to Chile visas, Minister Yamagata called on the
Foreign Minister on December 1, 1941, to explain the problem of entrance visas for Japa-
nese in general, entrance visas for diplomatic employees and primarily visas for Amano
staff members. Since Chile's Vice-President had been quite busy, the Foreign Minister
had seen no opportunity to discuss the matter with him but hastened to inform Mr. Yamagata
that he himself was trying to obtain an entrance permit for members of the Amano company
staff.
However, the Foreign Minister cautioned Mr. Yamagata that present day conditions did
not favor the entrance of Japanese into Chile since British and American agents had already
sought to accuse him of being pro-Axis. He explained that although every precaution was
being taken to avoid being caught, American surveillance had become increasingly strict
necessitating the constant alertness of foreign office officials. The Foreign Minister asked that
this be kept strictly secret and that Minister Yamagata deal directly with him in view of the
fact that he, always sympathetic toward Japan, was attempting to remove obstacles to
Japanese-Chilean trade.
IV", 661.
'IV. 652.
IV, 653.
IV, 654.
IV, 655.
177
Mr. Yamagata asserted his faith in the Chilean Foreign Minister who apparently was
convinced that the Amano staff members were not Japanese spies but was only afraid that
American and British authorities might look askance at such behavior. Then Minister
Yamagata related a story of previous American machinations against the German Minister
in Chile and suggested that similar unpleasant action might be instigated against the Japa-
nese. 794
(d) Peru
364. Minister Sakamoto Asks Permission to Confer with Ambassador Kurusu
Apparently the general opinion of the people and the government in Peru was one of
pessimism regarding the outcome of Japanese-American relations. According to Minister
Tatsuki Sakamoto in Lima on November 12, 1941, Peru held no expectations of success for
Ambassador Saiburo Kurusu in Washington. In a message to Tokyo, Minister Sakamoto asked
that he be given expenses and time for a three weeks trip to the United States in order to
talk with Ambassador Kurusu regarding the international situation and its effect on Peruvian
policies for the future. 795
Since relations with South America had become so foreboding Foreign Minister Togo, on
November 15, granted the Minister's request stipulating a period of ten days for the trip. 196
On December 8, acting Minister Masaki Yodokawa in Lima revealed that Mr. Sakamoto
had been in Washington since November 26. 197
3C5. Acting Minister Yodokawa Analyzes Peruvian Attitude
As the situation developed in Peru, Acting Minister Yodokawa analyzed the current
happenings for the foreign office. Accordingly he reported that at midnight on December
7 an extraordinary session of the Peruvian Cabinet was held to determine their final policy
toward the Japanese situation. However, Mr. Yadokawa believed that Peru would await a
decision from other major South American powers before taking any definite steps. However,
he reported that strict police surveillance was to be expected and that Japanese news-
papers had already been banned.
Realizing that another Cabinet meeting was in the offing, Mr. Yodokawa advised that he had
spoken privately with the Peruvian Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs asking him, in the
interest of Japanese nationals, to permit supervised publication of certain papers. The
Under-Secretary had conceded that Peru differed from other South American countries in
that it supported a greater number of Japanese but on the other hand it was in a highly
strategic position from the standpoint of the United States.
Mr. Yodokawa then confided that the general public appeared resigned to war and he
personally feared that Peru might enter the conflict within the near future,' 98
The next day the Minister submitted a resume to Tokyo concerning the hostile attitude
being taken by Peruvian newspapers which were going so far as to advocate severing relations
with Japan. According to his special spy reports, the Peruvian government had advised the
press confidentially to report all news sympathetically toward the United States.
'TV, 656, 657.
15 IV, 658.
16 IV, 659.
"IV, 660.
8 IV, 661.
178
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
By this time Japanese were forbidden to travel in certain sections and it was expected that
funds would be frozen and the purchase of Japanese goods stopped. All telegrams to Panama
would now of necessity be written in English and an attack on the Japanese sponsored APRA
Party Wing was in the offing, 799
The Minister revealed on December 8, 1941, that the Peruvian Government had broad-
cast its decision to take no steps in opposition to hemispheric solidarity and that Japanese
funds would be retained in local banks. However, Mr. Yodokawa believed that Peru was
merely following the lead of Brazil and Argentina and did not expect any particular
difficulties to arise which might jeopardize the lives and property of the Japanese. Apparently
the Japanese had merely been denied the right of assembly and movement throughout the
country and it was not logical that any sudden and drastic action would be taken against them. 800
By December 8, 1941, Mr. Yodokawa had arranged for the local German and Italian
Ministers to handle all telegraphic business should the government of Peru adopt an active
anti -Japanese policy. 801
°iv, 663.
'IV, 664.
179
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(g) Japanese- British Relations
366. Custom Question Forces Ambassador Tsurumi to Remain in Singapore
Despite the fact that Ambassador Tsurumi had given considerable assistance to the army
attaches in Singapore, he desired to return to Japan. However, on October 20, 1941, he was
informed by Vice Minister Amau in Tokyo that due to the arising of the customs issue, it was
necessary that he remain in Singapore and maintain his duties as Consul-General. Amau
had previously explained this situation to Ambassador Craigie and voiced his regret at the
turn of events. 602
367. Ambassador Tsurumi Receives Permit for the Loading of Raw Cotton
A reciprocal agreement between Japan and Great Britain provided for the shipping of
glycerine to England if British authorities granted the Japanese permission to export cotton. 603
In a previous dispatch dated October 6, Shanghai had been directed to ascertain whether or
not the British Consul-General had succeeded in obtaining export permits for glycerine.
Tokyo also asked that steps be taken to delay the exportation of the shipment until the
loading of the raw cotton and machinery had been completed. 901 On October 22, Ambassador
Tsurumi reported to the Japanese Foreign Office that eight days previous he had received
a written notice from the British chief of administration stating that the latter would permit
the loading of the raw cotton which had been landed from the Star of Egypt but that no
reference had been made to the specified quantity nor to the loading of the machinery. 80 "
However, on October 28, 1941 Tokyo learned that both types of raw glycerine, No. 50 and No.
70 respectively, had already been shipped from Shanghai. SM An investigation was ordered
and on the following day a dispatch was sent to Japan informing the authorities there that
on October 9, 1941 the glycerine had been sent on the Dutch ship Tjimanok to Batavia.* 07
368. Spanish Ambassador Reports Improvement of Conditions in Britain
Mr. Yakachiro Suma, Japanese Ambassador to Spain, reported to Tokyo on October 24,
1941, his recent conversation with the Spanish Ambassador to London, the Duke of Alba, 808
who had returned to Madrid for a short visit. The Duke was favorably impressed with the
general situation in England and stated that the standard of living there was much better
than in Spain. The British officials had anticipated a lengthy war in the Atlantic and
were making every preparation for the defense of the British Isles. Great Britain earnestly
-desired the actual participation of the United States and had sent Sir Alfred Duff- Cooper
to America for the purpose of arousing war fever. The consensus of opinion, however, was
that the United States was unlikely to enter the present war since the public opinion,
paritcularly that of the Isolationists, was strongly against it. 803
80a IV, 665.
>M m, 762.
,M ffl, 775.
B ° S IV, 666.
mt IV, 667.
801 IV, 668.
TV, 669.
"Ibid.
181
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
369. Details of Unloading Scrap Iron Remain Unsettled
Mr. Eiji Kawasaki, the Japanese representative in Vancouver, in a dispatch sent to Ottawa
on October 28, 1941, reported that after making inquiries of the Imperial Shipping Company
in Vancouver and the King Brothers in Victoria, the date of unloading and other details
concerning the scrap iron remained entirely unsettled. 810
370. The Asama Mam Prepares to Evacuate Japanese Nationals from British -Controlled Ports
On October 31, 1941 Singapore learned that an N.Y.K. ship would soon arrive from Tokyo
for evacuation purposes. In order to arrange the sailing schedule of the vessel, Tokyo
requested that it be notified at once as to the number of Japanese nationals to be evacuated
and the requisite procedure for leaving the country. 8 " On the same day, a second dispatch
gave the itinerary of the Asama Maru. With Mr. Sugiyama, of the Ministry of Communica-
tions, on board in charge of the vessel, it was scheduled to leave Japan on November 7, 1941,
and put in to port at Manila three days later, there taking aboard 700 passengers. Leaving
Manila on November 11, 1941, it would arrive in Singapore on the 15th of that month
and embark an additional 500 persons. Arrangements were to be made with the authorities
concerning the provisions for the return trip on November 16, 1941. At a later date the Asama
Maru was scheduled for a trip to Britain but the negotiations were not yet completed, and
meanwhile it would make another round trip to Singapore. 8,2 Because of her sailing to Manila
en route to Singapore, as a precautionary measure, the vessel embarked as one pressed into
the service of the Imperial Government; however, regardless of the capacity of the ship,
the matter of her handling in the port of Singapore was to be arranged on the basis of the
Japanese- British agreement. 813 All evacuees boarding the Asama Maru were to carry their
money in the form of exchange drafts, and Mr, Tsurumi was instructed by the Japanese
foreign Minister to collect the fares of those embarking and to hold the money as a special
account from which the expenses incurred while in port at Singapore were to be paid.
Expenses incurred en route were to be paid after the arrival of the ship in Japan. The
British authorities in Japan had been contacted in regard to this matter and authorities in
Singapore were to be advised immediately . 8M
On November 5, 1941, a change in the itinerary of the vessel was made to the effect that the
Asama Maru would leave Tokyo on November 6 thus advancing the entire schedule by one
day. The supply of food, water, and fuel sufficient for the round trip had been placed aboard,
and the British Ambassador in Tokyo had been contacted in regard to the arrangements con-
cerning the payment of harbor taxes. This matter was to be dealt with in the same manner in the
case of the Fuso Maru. 816
371. The Kito Maru Abandons Trip to Dairen
Meanwhile, as the Asama Maru prepared to sail to Singapore, a dispatch from Shanghai
informed Tokyo that the Kito Maru would sail on to Yokohama after its arrival in Tokyo.
A trip to Dairen had been scheduled but due to the public excitement over the Tomisurafu
matter, the decision had been made to sail directly to Japan. 816
" 1U IV, 670.
611 IV, 671.
ali IV,672.
" S IV, 673.
""IV, 674.
8,S IV,675.
a,t IV, 676.
182
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
372. Japanese Officials in Singapore Continue Negotiations in Regard to the Frozen Accounts
In Japan the withdrawal of British diplomatic funds or bank deposits of the members of
the staff had been forbidden. Although they were not permitted to draw upon their accounts
secretly, legal permits could be issued in case drafts were made against British or American
banks. 817 At that time steps were being taken with competent authorities to prohibit even
the granting of these special permits. In view of the fact that the question of drawing drafts
against Japanese and British diplomatic bank accounts was deadlocked, Singapore was
instructed to continue negotiations for permission to defray necessary expenditures from
frozen accounts. Mr. Togo asked that he be notified as to the result of the negotiations.* 18
373. Japanese and Canadian Officials Disagree Concerning the Purchasing Rate of V 100
Apparently Tokyo had requested a change in the purchasing rate for Y100 in exchange be-
tween America and Canada for on November 6, Mr. Yoshizawa, the Minister in Ottawa,
notified Tokyo that after a member of his staff had conferred with the Canadian officials in
regard to the request, he had learned that in American dollars the latest New York buying
rate for Y100 was $23.44. ai * The selling rate was $23.57, making the average rate 523.50 l / z .
Adding to this the fixed average rate for exchanging money orders between America and
Canada at a premium of 10 Y 2 %, a rate of $25.97 was given. The Japanese staff member
replied that in this case the exchange between American and Canada should be at the New
York market rate rather than the Canadian fixed rate. The Canadian officials insisted
firmly, however, that there was no precedent for taking the New York price. The Japanese
staff member replied that if the above calculations were insisted upon, it would be impossible
to settle the matter. Since it would be necessary to make some reply to Canada, Mr. Yoshizawa
requested a wire from Tokyo at once stating the basis for their submitting the figure of $26%. 820
374. Mr. Wataru Assumes Post as Com rn erica! Attache in Shanghai
On November 6, 1941, Tokyo requested an application, addressed to the Foreign
Minister from Mr. Wataru, in regard to his appointment as Commercial Attache in Shanghai.
The application together with the decision of the head of the industrial section was to be
sent at once by air mail. 821 The following day Shanghai wired a reply to Tokyo concerning
its request for information in regard to Mr. Wataru's period of employment and salary.
Unless in order to comply with regulations within the country, no definite period of employ-
ment would be specified; however, after three years of service a promotion would be in line.
In regard to the remaining points, the basic salary was quoted as $1800.00, national currency;
exchange allowance $1316.57; and living allowance $2605.00; making a total of $5721.57. 822
375. Japan is Concerned Over the Attitude of Great Britain
On November 11, 1941, a discussion of Britain's present position in the war was sent from
London to Washington and later relayed to Tokyo. aiS The British attitude toward Japan
was, of necessity, conditioned by the vicissitudes of the German-Soviet war, which, had
* ,: rv,677.
"'Ibid.
" 3 IV, 678.
™lbid.
* 11 IV,B79.
-IV, 680.
■"IV, 681.
183
reached an extremely critical phase. Due to Russia's continued resistance and the German
losses which had been far greater than anticipated, the Atlantic war and the bombing of
England had been considerably slowed down and Britian's imports and accumulation of
commodities had increased along with the expansion of its production. The British at last
had confidence in their preparations to resist a German invasion and were manifesting a
willingness to carry on the war for seven years if that were necessary to attain ultimate victory.
Operations in the Mediterranean and in the Near East had been more favorable than
anticipated and in addition the financial situation had also been rebeved since results of the
contributions for the Army Drive had exceeded all expectations. Cooperation between
England and America was becoming more closely knit, and in view of this and the improved
conditions in Britian, a break in the negotiations that were in progress between Japan and
America would merely serve to spur the British government on in its attitude toward
Japan. It was the earnest desire of Mr. Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador in
London, that at this time the Imperial Government should formulate a far reaching national
policy in order not to be circumscribed by future developments and that it would face the
Japanese-American negotiations with an epoch making plan and a resolute determination.
After the Ambassador had given the above resume of the British attitude toward Japan,
Mr. Churchill made a special broadcast and took the occasion to utter a final warning to
Japan. The Japanese ambassador was convinced that he was not bluffing and that he had
no intention of seeking a rapprochement made with Japan at the expense of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, 8 "
376. Spanish Charge d'Affaires in Cairo Comments on the Situation in Egypt
Senor Gabriel Alloman Villa-Ionga, the Spanish Charge d'Affaires in Cairo en route to his
home passed through Ankara on November 10 and commented on the situation in Egypt.
He had observed that due to the successes of Germany in the war, the antiJ3ritish attitude
was increasing but the positive policy of the British had thus far managed to suppress it to
some extent. Since the establishment of Tojo's cabinet in Japan, the increase of Australian
troops had been deferred and it was rumored that some of the troops would return to their
homeland. At the same time, as a warning, British troops had been recently stationed in
Syria near the Turkish border and between 170,000 and 180,000 troops were established in
the Libyan border region, 8 "
377. Japanese Naval Reconnaissance Bomber Flies Over Hong Kong
Canton notified Tokyo that on the previous day, November 12, 1941, the British Consul-
General had called to say that on November 5, 1941, a Japanese Naval reconnaissance
bomber made a flight over the southern part of Hong Kong Harbor and then headed north.
As a result of the protest lodged concerning a similar occurrence on September 28, 1941,
Japan had promised to issue strict instructions in order to prevent a repetition of the
incident. This recurrence was most unexpected, hence another protest had been submitted
and it was requested that Canton contact the military authorities immediately. 826 On
November 11, 1941 the British Embassy in Tokyo had also lodged a strong protest giving
a resume of the November 5 incident. Canton received this information on November 13,
1941 and was requested to wire Tokyo immediately upon the completion of the negotiations. 821
"'Ibid.
S "IV, 682.
ese IV, 683.
"'IV, 684.
184
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
378. Ambassador Craigie and the Foreign Minister Culminate the 1 1 on ma Incident
On November 13, 1941, when British Ambassador Craigie called on the Foreign Minister
regarding some other matter, the question of Honma, Vice Consul of Rangoon, arose and the
Minister criticized the British for their action in this matter. The Minister explained that
of its own initiative, the Japanese Government had already issued a recall to Honma where-
upon Craigie declared that the deportation by the British Government would automatically
be dropped. At this point the subject was closed. During the interview the matter of returning
the evidence which had been gathered for the case was not discussed but since England had
discontinued its deportation order, Tokyo demanded that the evidence material imme-
diately be returned to the office from which it was taken. 828
379. Japanese Foreign Minister is Concerned Over Family Remittance Permits
Freezing order permits had been issued for family remittances from certain British subjects
residing in Japan proper as well as those British who were working for Japan's benefit. How-
ever, as a matter of principle no other permits had been granted because it was reported that
Great Britain had refused family remittances to Japan. On November 14, 1941 the Japanese
Foreign Minister informed London that he would be willing to cooperate in allowing such
remittances if Japanese nationals residing in England and the colonies were accorded similar
privileges. BM
380. Canadian Army Troops are Sent to the Orient
It had been rumored that Canadian Army troops would soon be sent to the Orient and as a
confirmation of these reports, on the morning of November 16, 1941, a transport of the
Canadian Pacific Line guarded by a British warship came into port at Hong Kong. It carried
on board about 1,000 Canadian soldiers, all volunteers and of mixed nationality, who were
entered in the Kuryushinho (Kana spelling) barracks. The strength and details of this
division were being held in secret but according to reports another 2,000 troops were expected.
Tokyo received this news on November 17, 1941, and it was relayed to Japanese officials in
Canton, Shanghai, Nanking, and Ottawa."" 1 On the same day Mr. Yano at Hong Kong
informed Tokyo that additional information had been gathered in regard to the Canadian
soldiers. A news correspondent who had visited on board the ship inadvertently revealed that
Brigadier J, K. Lawson, the Canadian Commander, was in command of the 2,000 green troops
whose training would begin soon after their embarkation. 831 Four days later Shanghai
threw further light on the number of Canadian troops stationed in Hong Kong, for according
to a JK dispatch the warship Canada had transported one regiment of 3,000 soldiers and
three more regiments were en route to Hong Kong. 932
381. Makino of the Johol Rubber Plantation is Instructed to Return to Japan
Meanwhile on November 18, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo had instructed Mr. Makino of
the Johol Rubber Planation in Singapore to make arrangements for returning to the home-
land. After expediting affairs relative to the management of the planation, all employees who
could possibly be spared together with the overseer were to return to Japan by way of Thai-
land or any other available route. The matter of the remaining Japanese, non-residents,
rested entirely with Mr. Makino. 833
8i8 IV, 685
" i9 IV, 686
"TV, 687
831 IV, 688.
831 IV, 689.
833 IV. 690.
185
382. Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq and Japan are Severed
Rashid Ali AI-Gailani, leader of the quelled anti-English revolts in Iraq, had been receiving
assistance from the Japanese and because of this alliance, the Iraq government severed
diplomatic relations with the Japanese Imperial Government as of November 16, 1941.
Two days later Tokyo advised Ankara of this new development and at the request of the
Turkish Minister in Iraq, the Ankara officials were ordered to contact the Turkish Govern-
ment in regard to caring for the legation property in Bagdad since Japanese interests were
not represented there. 834
383. Britain Removes from Office the Chief of Staff and His Assistant
In a short time the Chief of the Imperial Staff, Sir John G. Dill would have reached the age
of retirement. Therefore, according to an announcement made on November 15, 1941, he
was transferred from his post to the position of Governor of Bombay and was succeeded by
General Sir Alan-Brooke, Commander of the home forces. His assistant, Lt. General Pownall
was also transferred to another key position and his successor was Major General A. E. Nye.
Lt. General Pownall had been reared and educated in Japan and both he and General Dill
were recognized authorities on that country. The General Staff, so Shigemitsu believes, was
the only organ of the British government which could correctly evaluate and understand
matters pertaining to Japan, and he thought, quite possible that with Japanese- British
relations at such a critical point, the removal of these men from their posts was part of a pro-
gram to purge all those persons who might have leanings toward Japan." 86
384. The Boris Arrives in Seattle
Mr. Seijiro Yoshizawa, Japanese Minister in Ottawa learned on November 18, 1941, that
the Boris had arrived in Seattle but because the Captain possessed no bill of lading he was
forbidden to unload his cargo. The Japanese had been asked to remove the obstacle at once
and Mr. Yoshizawa requested that the Tokyo officials wire instructions to the Ottawa office
immediately after contacting the Mitsui Shipping Company and taking the necessary
steps to clarify the matter. 336
385. Mr. Yoshizawa Seeks Funds for the Ottawa Legation
Officials at the Japanese legation in Ottawa had found it impossible to arrange any payments
out of the frozen funds since August, 1941. After negotiating with the New York office,
provisions were made to secure $3500.00 in American money. Receiving Tokyo's approval
of the measure, Mr. Yoshizawa had sent a member of his staff to New York and as a result
received $10,000 in American currency; however, $3,000 of this amount was required by the
Consular Office in Vancouver. Arrangements had been made for Clerk Kihara who was
soon to leave New York for Seattle to deliver the money to the Ottawa officials. On November
20, the money on hand in the office amounted to $10,500 And, in the event of war another
$20,000 would be available from New York. Provided that Tokyo sanctioned the receipt of this
money, Mr. Yoshizawa believed that the difficulty could be surmounted without receiving
funds from any other source. 837
In the event that the evacuation of Ottawa should become necessary, the Japanese
legation, the office and the interests there would be assumed preferably by Brazil but
a "IV, 691.
5i5 IV, 692.
836 IV, 693.
83, IV, 694.
186
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
should that prove impossible, Argentina would be suitable. Officials in Tokyo, Rio de
Janeiro and Buenos Aires were to be contacted. In addition there was the question of
Italian interests which the Japanese had taken over. If at all possible the Minister in Ottawa
requested that further instructions be wired directly to him. 838
386. Mr. Kawakasi Negotiates for Funds for the Nisso Company in Vancouver
Because of the freezing order placed on Japanese funds by the British, SM) the Nisso
Company branch in Ottawa was unable to ship lumber to Japan since about $65,000 in
Canadian money remained unpaid. Negotiations for the payment of these funds were to be
carried out in Tokyo, and Mr. Kawakasi suggested that the Tokyo officials obtain the
details of the case from Mr. Aida who had just returned to Japan from Vancouver. After the
matter of supplying this money was discussed with the head office of the Nisso Company,
instructions were to be sent to the branch office in Vancouver. 810
387. Foreign Minister Togo is Concerned Over the Remaining Japanese Residents in Singapore
Originally the Asama Maru was scheduled to sail from Japan to Manila and then to
Singapore arriving there on November 15, 1941, to evacuate a group of Japanese nationals
from that city; 841 however, the Japanese Consul had requested that the vessel stop at Singa-
pore before traveling to Manila since many of the passengers could not afford the longer
way to the homeland. On the revised sailing schedule the Asama Maru was to leave Singapore
on November 6, 842 1941. An evacuation trip to Britain was also being planned but since
negotiations were still incomplete the Asama Maru was scheduled for another round trip to
Singapore. 843 On November 20, 1941, the Foreign Minister in Tokyo requested information
concerning the remaining Japanese residents in Singapore after the last evacuation had
taken place. The number of men, women and children were to be listed separately including
their ages and their places of residence and further details were to be given in regard to how
many of those remaining were engaged in farming, mining, exporting and importing, retail
and miscellaneous enterprises as well as their financial condition. Should it prove impossible
for those Japanese to carry on business activities as a result of the freezing legislation, Mr.
Togo was to be advised as to the approximate length of time that they would be able to carry
on their affairs plus the prospects for the possible removal of some of these persons into Thai
or French Indo- China. 844 Four days later, the situation having become increasingly more
difficult, Foreign Minister Togo sent a dispatch to Singapore sympathizing with the unhappy
lot in which the remaining Japanese residents found themselves. Despite the difficulty in
bringing about further evacuation, he promised to do whatever possible in order to send
another vessel to Singapore; however, in the event that the situation should become worse,
he assured the Japanese merchants that their government would continue to make the best
possible arrangements in order to protect the interests of those remaining nationals. 846
" M IV, 695.
!J9 in, 734.
" D IV, 696.
U, IV, 672.
MS IV, 538.
943 IV, 672.
"'IV, 697.
HS IV, 698.
187
388. Tokyo is Concerned Over British Code Material
Meanwhile the Japanese were becoming concerned over certain British code material. On
November 21, 1941, a message had been sent from Peking to Tsingtao, a port in northeast China,
with the information that clues had been obtained there regarding telegraphic codes being used
by the British Embassy. Apparently they were being employed for communications between
Shanghai, Chungking and London and though there was a possibility that they had previously
been decoded by the North Army there was a chance that they might prove to be of some
value. The three codes in question were the diplomatic codes, plain language abbreviations
and numbers code, and information regarding them was to be wired to Peking immediately. 84 "
In addition the following day Tokyo wired Peking to investigate the British codes coming in
at the time. A great deal of the material could not be read and though it was necessary that
the investigation be a cautious one it was equally important that it be done completely
and thoroughly. 8 "
389. The Premier of Burma Attempts to Attain an Independent Status for His Country
On November 18, 1941 U Maung Saw, Premier of Burma who, for the past few weeks had
been in London for the purpose of obtaining an independent status for his country, called
at the office of Hirasawa, Japanese representative in New York. Having failed to accomplish
his mission, the Premier was very disgruntled over Britain's refusal of Burma's request. As
he departed London on November 14, 1941, he had not hesitated to express his dissatisfac-
tion to a reporter of the New York Times in the presence of the British Premier. It was his wish
to interview President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and "appeal" to the British Government
through the "press." After leaving New York, the Premier planned to travel to Bangkok
via Canada, New Zealand and Manila arriving there around December 7, 1941, where he would
remain a few days before returning to Burma. Since he realized that he would be under the
strict surveillance of the British after his return, he desired to take advantage of the
opportunity to confer with some influential Japanese during his visit in Bangkok. At his
suggestion that he meet Consul Saito, Mr. Hirasawa gave him his calling card by way
of introduction. In view of the present world conditions, the Premier apparently desired to
oppose British might by means of Japan's strength. 848
390. Hong Kong Economic Condition is Becoming Critical
On November 24, 1941 Shanghai forwarded to Tokyo a report received two days previous
from Hong Kong concerning the present economic conditions in that city. On November 20,
1941 there were no more than approximately 10,000 bales of cotton thread and 4,000 bales of
cotton cloth in the warehouses. Taking No. 20 Soma cotton thread in Hong Kong dollars as a
standard the sudden rise in price was $345.00, $410.00 and $480.00 at the end of September,
October and November 13 respectively. The factories had accepted orders for their output up
to February 1942; however, the export of cotton to Japan and Shanghai was prohibited and
it would have been impossible to procure the aforementioned cotton from the warehouses
at as reasonable a price as had been expected. Consequently the factories would be seriously
embarrassed.
Control regulations were enforced and it was decreed that the amount of cotton goods on
hand must be recorded each month; that any sale and shipment of cotton must have the
permission of the authorities and that a maximum selling price be affixed.
IV, 699.
IV, 700.
IV, 701.701A.
188
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The prospects for the future were not too encouraging for when control was enforced and
since there were no sellers at the unreasonably low fixed price there were many illegal
transactions at high figures. In addition there was not more than a two months supply of
cotton in the warehouses and eventually difficulties would arise in regard to sending khaki
clothing to England. A suggested plan of operations was therefore submitted whereby it seemed
expeditious to enforce a strict and thorough embargo obstructing transportation of Hong Kong
products to England and the South Seas. When Hong Kong finally yielded, a plan of barter
transactions in rice, flour, sugar and like commodities would be suggested. 819
391, Tokyo is Concerned with Code and Cipher Systems
Tokyo notified Japanese officials in Washington on November 26, 1941, that they would
receive and use temporarily a new keying system which had been devised by the tele-
graphic official in London for the cipher machine for messages between London and Tokyo.
Washington was instructed to transmit to Tokyo the one word AS AD A in clear text which
would signify the receipt and understanding of the information. 860
Later on December 1, 1941, Japanese officials in London received orders from Tokyo to
discontinue the use of their code machine and dispose of it immediately. Extreme caution
was to be observed in carrying out the instructions for its disposition and particular attention
was to be directed to dismantling and destroying the important parts of the machine. At the
same time the rules for use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resi-
dent in England were also to be burned. Upon receipt of the telegram the one word "Setuju"
was to be wired to Tokyo in plain language and after the disposing instructions had been carried
out the word "Hasso" would serve to notify the Japanese Foreign Office of the completion of
the task. 851
On the following day, in a message from Mr. Takanobu Mitani, Japanese Minister to
Switzerland, it was learned that the Japanese diplomatic officials in North America,
Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas and in British and Netherlands territory, had also
been ordered to burn all of their telegraphic codes with the expection of one copy of and L. 85S
Meanwhile, on that same day, Japanese officials in Singapore received from Tokyo a table
which was composed of important code words and their corresponding meaning.* 68
392. Japan Prepares for Hostilities
On December 2, 1941, Japanese officials in Canton notified Tokyo that precautionary
measures had been taken should hostilities begin. The Army had completed preparations to
move upon Thai and in the event that the British resisted to the end, it was prepared to
occupy the country militarily. 854
Two days later official orders for physical examinations had not yet been issued in Shang-
hai; however, this was going to be carried out as of the first and handled as though the order
were confidentially sent on that date. 855
On December 5, 1941, Japanese officials in Peking announced that concurrent with opening
war on Britain and America, Holland would be considered a semi-belligerent and strict sur-
veillance would be exercised over her consulates in China. All communications between them
" S IV, 702.
m IV, 703.
861 IV, 704.
S62 IV, 705.
*"IV, 706.
""IV, 707.
'"IV, 708.
189
and the enemy countries as well as other use of code messages and wireless would be prohib-
ited. In the event that Japan and Holland became involved in a war, the same steps be taken
toward the latter country as were taken in the case of Britain and America. 856 Preparations had
been made on the basis that the treatment accorded the property and staff of Britain, America
and Holland in North China, would be comparable to that accorded them in occupied
territory. Peking suggested that a policy be adopted whereby a suitable person of a third
power such as Belgium, Spain or Brazil be recognized as custodian of the interests of Britain,
America and Holland in North China. 857
In addition, steps which would coincide with measures concerning the departure of the
Japanese Consular Staffs and resident nationals were to be taken for the evacuation of the
Staffs and nationals of the hostile nations. All public property belonging to enemy nations
was to be seized and placed in the custody of Japan. 858
Meanwhile the Japanese Minister in Ottawa, in interpreting recent instructions from
Tokyo, surmised that should the situation become critical, his staff would be cut to the last
possible man. Since they were already working on a "skeleton staff," he felt that further
reduction would be impossible. However, he conceded that in such an eventuality they
could probably manage with only the use of their diplomatic staff. He feared that Mr.
Suzuki, apparently referring to Lt. Gen. Teiichi Suzuki of the Japanese cabinet, would prove
to be an obstacle to the accepted plan and Tokyo was asked to take this into consideration. 869
On December 7, 1941, in a circular telegram, Tokyo revealed that relations between Tokyo
and England were not in accordance with expectations. 860
The following day the local military commander paid a visit to the Japanese official in
Tientsin with the information that though France maintained her neutrality, she would
cooperate with Japan insofar as possible. This had come from the French Consul who had
called on the military commander in regard to the recent incursion of troops into the British
concessions. 861
On December 9, 1941, in a message from Hsinking relayed to Tokyo, it was learned that
immediately following the opening of hostilities, in accordance with prearranged plans, the
telephone wires of the United States, British and semi-enemy consulates in Harbin, Mukden,
and Dairen were cut and their radios and automobiles were destroyed. 862
866 IV, 709.
8S7 IV,710.
858 IV, 711.
SSS IV, 712.
860 IV, 713.
>S1 IV,714.
""IV, 715.
190
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C — JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(h) Japanese-German Relations
393. Ambassador Oshima Asks to Resign
Immediately after the appointment of Shigenori Togo to the position of Foreign Minister in
Tokyo on October 19, 1941, Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima again undertook to secure a resig-
nation from his position in Berlin. Stating that the appointment of the new Foreign Minister
had been a source of much gratification to him since Mr. Togo always had been an excellent
friend, Ambassador Oshima pointed out that although he formerly had been in a position to
offer assistance to the new cabinet, in view of the policy which would now most assuredly be
undertaken, he felt unable to continue representing the -Japanese government in absolute
harmony with its new policies.
The Ambassador pointed to the fact that on previous occasions, during the office of Foreign
Minister Matsuoka, he had requested permission to resign and now in view of conflicting
opinions, he could only hinder the new Foreign Minister. 863
On October 30, 1941 Tokyo wired its refusal stating that Ambassador Oshima now occupied
a very important position and no temporary appointee could satisfactorily hold it down. For-
eign Minister Togo suggested that for the time being Ambassador Oshima subject his person-
al desires to the common good of the Empire. 8 * 4
394. Japan Sees an Increase of British and American Aid to Russia
Probably one important reason for Tokyo's refusal to grant the Ambassador's plea was the
increasingly urgent situation created by growing British aid and American lend-lease to Russia.
On October 20, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo readdressed a London dispatch to Berlin
which stated that although the German army had been advancing at a surprising speed on
Moscow, these gains were counter-balanced by British impatience and the British Parlia-
ment's sudden decision to step up its aid to the Red Army. Although there was some debate
resulting from minor opposition to such a move, Ambassador Namoru Shigemitsu in London
believed that Prime Minister Churchill would not choose to listen to the arguments of ama-
teur strategists and would more firmly entrench his policy of giving military aid to Russia. 9 * 6
In order to explain Great Britain's attitude, it was believed that since the Soviet had proved
itself capable of stronger resistance than had been anticipated, Great Britain realized the
strategy of keeping Germany occupied on its eastern front. This view, according to the Japa-
nese Ambassador in London, was not only upheld by the government and the influential
classes but also by the majority of the people themselves.
Under the existing situation in which both the invasion of England by Germany and the
invasion of the continent by England would be impossible, it was feared by the Ambassador
Shigemitsu that the war would develop into one of Germany against Great Britain and might
last for an indefinite period of time, 866
On October 22, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo transmitted to Ambassador Oshima a telegram
from Captetown in South Africa, which revealed three routes being taken by United States
lend-lease material in its supply line to Russia. The first route moved by railroad and truck
•"IV, 716.
861 IV, 717.
" s rV, 718.
a6B IV, 719.
191
starting at Basra on the Persian Gulf and moving North to the Caucasus via Iraq and Iran. The
second route proceeded through Iran from Bandar Abu Shahr on the Persian Gulf to Teheran
and thence to the Caspian Sea where it shipped across to the Russian shore or from Teheran to
Tabriz where it was railroaded to the Caucasus. However, the water span proved to be limited
since only two large boats could depart from wharves of the first port. Although engineers were
attempting hurriedly to deepen the water sufficiently, it was believed that the railroad facili-
ties, despite their present condition of repair, was proving the most successful of the two lines
from Teheran, American lend-lease shipments also depended upon a third route from the
Indian border to Mirjawa on the Iran- India border from which a railroad line extended to
Mashed on the Iran-Soviet border." 6 '
The Japanese Ambassador at Hsingking, General Yoshijiro Umezu, expressed his views on
the increasing aid Russia was receiving from England and the United States, stating that
actually the help had been so meager that Stalin himself was dissatisfied. He concluded that
insomuch as Russia was fighting Germany single-handedly and was being destroyed for the
benefit of England and America, he believed that it would be to Russia's advantage to make
peace. Suggesting that Japan propose a peace conference to be held in Nanking after the fall of
Moscow, he declared that if Japan acted as mediator, it would be performing a great service.
Ambassador Umezu itemized the conditions which he thought should be a part of this pro-
posal:
1. The holding of a large-scale conference during the summer of 1942;
2. Russia was to relax ties with Great Britain and the United States and was not to interfere
in Japan-China affairs; and,
3. If possible, Russia was to supply Japan with oil.***
395. Exchange Broadcasts Become Acceptable to Japan and Germany
On October 23, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo became impatient of the results which were to be
obtained with regard to the Japanese-German negotiations for the exchange of broadcast facili-
ties and publicity releases. These negotiations which had been underway since August of 1941
and (see Japanese-German Relations, Chapter 3, Volume II, Section 33— Berlin and Tokyo
Begin Negotiations for Improved Communications) concerned the exchange of memoranda
which would offer to both governments the final analysis of all news coverage which was to be
transmitted by private broadcasting companies. By this time there remained only a minor
difference of opinion, and it was left for the two countries to compromise on that point. as9 There-
fore, on October 25, Ambassador Oshima replied that the German Foreign Office had prac-
tically agreed but that its formal reply would be given the following week. 870
396. Progress of the Russo- German War {October 1941)
Tokyo by October 24, 1941 had received detailed information on the Russian- German situ-
ation from its representatives in Helsinki and Bucharest.
a. Report from Finland
The Helsinki Minister, Tadashi Sakaya, reported on the Finnish role being played in the
conflict, saying that Finland had set out to regain that territory which had been seized by Rus-
sia and that its objectives in its recent attack on the Soviet were, first, to regain lost territory
and, secondly, to make secure its own defenses. In the Karelian area, the Finnish army had
already passed the old border line by October 24 and had invaded Russia while at the present
time, it was cooperating with Germany in surrounding Leningrad, The Finnish forces had
881 IV, 720.
" 6B IV, 721.
8S9 IV, 722-724.
"™ IV, 725.
192
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL
also cut the Murmansk railway and were assisting in the invasion of the Kola penninsula.
Southern Hanko, which remained in Russian hands, would probably be the subject of a com-
promise since further pursuit of this territory would only result in further sacrifices.
Although Finland had hoped to abandon her assistance to Germany after the fall of Lenin-
grad and Kronstadt, it was now necessary to assist Germany in the struggle for the Kola Penin-
sula. However, not desiring to inherit Germany's further difficulties, it was thought by the
Japanese Minister in Helsinki, that Finland would soon quietly retire from the struggle. Ac-
cording to Minister Sakaya, as far as Finland was concerned, all that now remained was the
accomplishment of a few compromises to be followed by reconstruction work. 871
b. Report from Roumania
From Bucharest, Roumania, came additional information on the war situation which stated
that in the attack on Odessa, the Roumanian army's losses had been smaller than previously
reported by the Russian propaganda office. In view of the fact that the Roumanian army lacked
large guns and possessed only a few flame throwers in comparison to the mechanized forces of
the Soviet, it was only natural that they should try to avoid a direct encounter. In the battle
around the north coast of the Black Sea the Roumanian and Hungarian armies fought dili-
gently for several reasons. By cooperating with the Germans they were not only assisting in the
oppression and annihilation of Bolshevism, but also attempting to gain for themselves favor
in the eyes of the German war lords who would be in a position to arbitrate in their behalf on
such questions as the Transylvania border line. 9,2
In Bessarabia it was noted that the Russians were carrying out their scorched earth policy to
a great extent, but the amount of damage in the Ukraine appeared to be unexpectedly small.
Probably the Russians did not have either enough explosives or sufficient time to fire the
regions.
The political situation within Roumania was also reported on by the Japanese Minister who
acknowledged that there were still those within the country who, having been in power under
the old order, were sincerely desirous of an English-American victory. However, the majority
were confident of German success over Russia and firmly believed that by the following sum-
mer, the whole question would be settled since Germany would employ her air force and sub-
marines in an attack on England. Many were of the opinion that a direct war between the United
States and the Axis was in the offering, in which case the United States would be chased from
the European continent. According to the Minister, all Americans in Hungary, Bulgaria and
Roumania had already been confidentially advised by their diplomatic offices to evacuate.
Newspapers had become unreserved in their comments against American and English citi-
zens. These same anti-American groups considered that all lend-lease and British aid was of
little importance in the settling of the all-over conflict; and they were showing contempt for
the American and British coquetry in favoring Bolshevism. Since Roumania was a particularly
religious country, it was not favorably impressed by the United States' outward policy of pro-
tecting "religion, humanitarianism and justice," and at the same time carrying on friendly
relations with communistic Russia. Roumania, which considered itself maltreated by the
Soviet Union, was gradually growing more confident and fond of Germany, a feeling which the
Japanese Minister believed to be quite spontaneous. 973
397. Tokyo Relays a Summary of Diplomatic Relations as Advanced by Germany
In a circular letter addressed to Hsinking, Peking, Nanking and Shanghai Foreign Minister
Togo relayed in its entirety a message sent to him by Ambassador Oshiraa on October 16, 1941.
■"TV, 726-727.
m IV, 728.
™ IV, 729
193
According to Ambassador Oshima a specially appointed delegate from Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop informed him that after the fall of Moscow, the German forces would continue the
campaign in the Caucasus throughout the winter. The sweeping plans of the German army
included an invasion of the Near East, including Syria, Iraq and Iran. Although the eastern
Mediterranean would be cleared of all British influence, the battle of Africa would have to be
postponed temporarily because of Great Britain's present strength in that area.
Improved conditions between Germany and Turkey were reported by Ambassador Oshima.
The German objective in Turkey was to induce Ankaran participation in the Three- Power
Pact, and a recently concluded commercial pact between the two countries was paving the
way. Insomuch as Turkey had long hated Italy, it would be a tremendous diplomatic victory
for Germany should she succeed in these negotiations.
Germany needed the help of France and Spain if it were to combat English influence in the
western Mediterranean; and Ambassador Oshima pointed out German progress in regard to
this. Germany had made her Consul -General in Vichy a Minister and France was expected
to send a diplomatic representative to Berlin thereby establishing better relations between
those two countries. The general outlines of a peace treaty between Germany and France had
already been worked out although a few points would require additional negotiation. Once the
German-French relations were firmly established, Spain would undoubtedly prove no barrier.
The German representative had informed Ambassador Oshima that a compromise peace
between England and Germany was out of the question despite the present peace rumors. How-
ever, it was possible that peace terms would be offered Great Britain after the termination of
the Russo-German war. 874
398. Asama Maru Departure is Delayed Because of Unsuitable Routing
The Asama Maru, which had been scheduled to depart from Tokyo at the beginning of
October, 876 was, on October 21, still in port and preparing to sail about the first of November.
There had been some dispute about the route which the Japanese merchant vessel would take
in that Germany had specified an area which the ship's captain believed would take it into
the combat zone. Therefore, Tokyo asked that Ambassador Oshima check with the German
authorities to see why they felt that the previously scheduled route for the Asama Maru, which
also had been taken safely by the Suwa Maru and the Fushimi Maru, would be unsatisfactory
to Germany and why they had prepared an obviously dangerous course. 876
In reply on October 25, 1941 Ambassador Oshima advanced his opinion that the German
course had referred chiefly to waters adjacent to England, but as far as changing the route was
concerned, it was still a matter for negotiations and the Ambassador believed that Germany
was approachable on the matter. He asked that a definite request be decided upon in Tokyo so
that he might present it to German officials. 37.
Minister Kiyoshi Tsutsui in Bucharest suggested to the Senior Adjutant of the War Office
in Tokyo that some of the Poles who had been working on anti-Russian espionage in Roumania
be sent to Japan aboard the Asama Maru. These men, he certified, had Manchukuo pass-
ports; and the Kwantung representatives were in favor of this action. 878
TV, 730-731.
'IV, 732.
W, 733.
TV, 734.
'IV, 735.
194
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Aboard the Asama Maru had been stowed German-Russian war pictures as well as fifty or
sixty reels of cultural film sent by the German Foreign Office. Both the film association and
the German Foreign Office was desirous of having these films transported as official baggage
since it was believed that the British government would refuse to permit their transporta-
tion. 879 On October 27 Tokyo replied that there would be no objections to classifying the films
as diplomatic baggage. 880
By October 31, the Asama Maru still had not left port and newspaper reporters in Rome were
beginning to feel that Japan was showing an indecisive attitude in delaying its departure. 881
Even by December 4 when it would have been timely to have shipped a cargo of decorations to
Germany and Italy the Asama Maru remained at anchor. There seemed to be no prospect of
her departure. 882
399. Axis Powers React! aim the An ti- Comintern Pact
Apparently the continuous discoveries of communistic plots throughout Europe and Asia
at this time were alarming the Axis powers, which in culminating the Tripartite Pact had
specifically stipulated a program of active aggression against the International. On October
25, 1941 Ambassador Eugene Ott had called upon Tokyo's East Asia Bureau Chief suggesting
that the Axis powers promulgate a five-year extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, stating that
he had received orders to make this proposal from his home government. 983
Ironically, on October 24 Tokyo had been forced to report that its judiciary officials had just
arrested a German newspaperman, Wolfgang Sorge, connected with the Frankfurter Zeitung.
He was accused of communistic activities in Japan, Sorge had personally been gathering in-
telligence for Ambassador Ott, who had expressed complete amazement and had demanded
that he be allowed to talk privately with the accused correspondent. Foreign Minister Togo had
then made an exception in view of the particularly friendly relations existing between Japan
and Germany and had allowed the Ambassador to talk with Sorge in the presence of police
officials. In relating this incident to Ambassador Oshima in Berlin, Foreign Minister Togo
asked that the matter be considered in strictest secrecy. 884
Regarding the proposal of October 25, Foreign Minister Togo addressed another dispatch to
Ambassador Oshima on October 31, 194X, relating that he had told Ambassador Ott that the
Japanese Imperial Government was in favor of convening a conference to extend the Anti-
Comintern Pact. He officially instructed Ambassador Oshima to initiate negotiations with
Germany concerning the text of such a proposal.* 86 On November 4 Foreign Minister Togo
advised Ambassador Oshima that Japan felt from a legal point of view that the secret appendix
which had been attached to the previous Anti-Comintern Pact 886 was no longer necessary and
that Japan would attempt to secure an agreement of its Privy Councillors to abolish it. In addi-
tion, the Japanese Foreign Minister offered a suggestion that a distinction should be drawn
between the original signatories and subsequent participants and also that the basic text of the
protocol should be in three languages, Japanese, German, and English. 88 '
In an attempt to secure as many participants as possible in the new protocol, Foreign Minis-
11 in which he stated that the Nanking
'"IV, 73fi.
a90 IV, 737.
881 IV, 738.
i9I IV, 739.
""iV, 740.
a9 'IV, 741.
•"IV, 742.
ei6 IV, 743.
9B, IV, 744.
195
Foreign Minister, Tateki Horiuchi, had applied to Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
for admission to the group of signatories. Foreign Minister Togo outlined the form of the tele-
gram which had been sent to von Ribbentrop. The negotiations which the Tokyo Foreign Office
was holding with the Nanking government in this regard were to be handled by Minister Shi-
niokura Hidaka. 888
On November 11, 1941, an actual translation of the protocol was transmitted to Berlin from
Tokyo which states in part:
The Imperial Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government together with the
Hungarian Government Imperial Manehurian Government and the Spanish Government, recognizing that the
protocol signed by the above governments is a most effective means of combating the activities of the Communist
"International" and believing that the Common interests of the above governments are best served by close co-
operation between them do hereby agree to extend the effective period of the said protocol. For this purpose the
following stipulations are agreed upon. 61 "
Also on November 11, Foreign Minister Togo wired the exact message which he expected Am-
bassador Oshima to give the German government with respect to Japanese cooperation, In
this document, the Japanese government had declared itself to be in complete accord with
the German government in respect to extending the validity of the first Anti-Comintern Pact
of November 25, 1936. Japan had taken the position that Article 5 of the Tripartite Pact,
which stated:
Japan, Germany, and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which
exists at present as between each of the three contracting parties and the Soviet Russia,
superseded this second supplement which the Imperial government desired be nullified. 890
With respect to the supplementary signatories, German Ambassador Ott had called upon
Foreign Minister Togo in Tokyo to request the concurrence of the Japanese government in the
inclusion of Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, Slovakia, and Croatia in an expanded
Anti -Com intern Pact. The Foreign Minister approved and advised that he would instruct the
Roumanian, Bulgarian, and Finnish Ministers in Tokyo to contact the German and Italian
Ministers regarding their inclusion in the pact. Only in the cases of Denmark, Slovakia, and
Croatia did Japan feel that the concurrence of the three Tripartite powers would be sufficient
to include them in the pact. 891
Naturally there were many minor details which threatened to delay the final signing. On
November 12, 1941, Ambassador Oshima, having already transmitted the text of the protocol,
requested that any objections to portions of it be wired immediately. Ambassador Oshima
advised that he had already changed the expressions, "The Hungarian Government" and also
the expression the "Italian Government" to read "All European Governments" and had
changed "The Japanese Government" to read "The Great Imperial Japanese Government,". 892
By November 13, seven governments had expressed their desire to sign the new protocol on
November 25, 1941. Tokyo, in a dispatch to Hsingking, revealed that the Japanese and Ger-
man text had already been completed but that the official Italian text had not yet been re-
ceived. At that time Tokyo advised that certain minor alterations were being made in the
text. 993 Foreign Minister Togo requested that Minister Yoshijiro Umezu in Hsingking extablish
contact with the Manehurian Minister in Germany, Lu Yi-wen, and instruct him to handle the
final signature. 894
""TV, 745-746.
"'IV, 747.
'"TV, 748.
"TV, 749.
8,5 IV, 750.
""IV, 751.
""IV, 752.
196
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
After the Minister in Hsingking had received the official text from Tokyo, he immediately
instructed the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to advise the Manchurian Minister there as to
the proper steps to be taken in signing the protocol. 895
In order to satisfy the Manchurian government, Tokyo asked that Ambassador Oshima
advise the German officials that Manchuria would like to have "The 8th year of Kotoku" 896
inserted in the text. In this regard, Japan felt, too, that Spain would also desire to have the date
of its new era inserted. He asked that a revision be made immediately. However, it appeared
that the German government was anxious to have negotiations completed and advised Tokyo
accordingly. In reply, Foreign Minister Togo acknowledged that it might be possible to en-
courage the Manchurian government to withdraw its insistence upon a revision of the text. 897
On November 15, Foreign Minister Togo attempted to explain to the Manchurian govern-
ment that he had proposed to the German Foreign Minister that the phrase "The 8th year of
Kotoku" be inserted in the protocol, the Spanish government had then requested that a Span-
ish text of the treaty be prepared. As Manchuria could plainly see, due to shortness of time,
it would be impossible to satisfy both Spain and Manchuria although the Germans were fully
appreciative of their viewpoints. Foreign Minister Togo then explained to the Manchurian
government that if the Japanese and Manchurian governments pressed the matter of saving
face for all countries which expected to participate, the settlement of the problem would be
delayed. During such a long pause Germany's proposal to Spain might fall through and severe
repercussions would follow." 98
On November 13 Ambassador Oshima advised his home office that Germany desired to keep
the negotiations involving the participation of the various countries in the pact secret until
November 25, when it was believed that a surprise announcement would be of great propa-
ganda value. On the other hand, it was believed that if the matter should leak out from either
the Japanese or Chinese side before then, it would be most awkward. 8M
By November 14 Ambassador Oshima revealed that Roumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and
Croatia, according to German sources, were at last displaying a desire to join with the past
signees. Finland's reply was to be expected within three days and Denmark would await Fin-
land's decision. 900
In reply, Foreign Minister Togo stated that he had not favored the entrance of any other
nations in the negotiations but Germany's insistence had forced him to agree. The Japanese
government of China would join with the others immediately. 901 Also on this day, Foreign
Minister Togo notified Ambassador Oshima that he should submit the Foreign Minister's
telegram empowering him to sign for the Japanese Empire. 90
From Berlin on November 16, 1941, Ambassador Oshima related that the Assistant Under-
secretary of Foreign Affairs had told Japanese Consul Shun-ichi Kase, in Berlin, that the
Spanish government had been pressed for a reply. By the night of the seventeenth, Germany
expected an answer and was to notify Consul Kase immediately. 90 *
By November 17, when the Nanking government still had not made its final arrangements,
Foreign Minister Togo wired instructions that Ambassador Oshima should present to Nanking
SS "TV, 753.
'"Also referred to as "The 9th year of KO"
*"IV, 754-756.
8 "IV,757.
m IV, 758.
""IV, 759.
""IV, 760.
302 IV, 761.
S03 IV, 762.
a joint statement from Japan, Germany, and Italy urging it to formally enter the negotia-
tions. 904 Whereupon the statement "We wish to have the Nanking Government make formal
application for inclusion in the pact. Please arrange for the application to reach Berlin during
the 25th", was issued to Nanking. 305 Also on November 17, the Italian text was sent to Tokyo
by Ambassador Oshima so that a comparison could be made with the German and Japanese
texts. 906
Hsingking wired Tokyo on November 21 that the exercise to be carried out on November 25
in honor of the signing of the protocol extending the Anti-Comintern Pact had been fixed. They
would include a special broadcast of greetings from the Minister of State and the German and
Italian Ministers on the evening of the 25th and the morning edition of the 26th would carry
the conversations between the Japanese Ambassador, the Minister of State and the Head
Office. 907
For some inexplicable reason the German government attempted on November 21 to post-
pone the date of signing the protocol to November 28, but when Ambassador Ott met with cold
opposition from an anxious Japanese government whose Council had already stipulated in the
original text that there could be no method of revising the text, 908 and when Ambassador
Oshima in Berlin conveyed to the German Capitol these sentiments, 909 the German govern-
ment under the guidance of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, retracted its suggestion and
ordered that the signing would take place as it had been planned on November 25. 910
Foreign Minister Togo notified officials in Nanking and Hsingking on November 21 that the
consent of Manchukuo, Hungary and Spain had been secured in regard to the new protocol and
that the necessary procedures within those countries was being pushed to enable the signing
to be carried out in Berlin on November 25. He mentioned that Germany and Italy probably
would produce a large-scale propaganda effort tying in the Russo-German war on that day but
that Japan did not plan to publicize the extension of the pact more than to make a simple
statement of fact. 911
On November 22 the Axis nations had induced several nations to join with them in reaffirm-
ing the anti- Com intern pact on November 25, 1941. Included in this group were China's peoples
government, Roumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, and Finland with the possible addition
of still doubtful Denmark.*' 2
The ceremony attending the signing was to be held at 10:30 or 6 p.m. and would consist of
speeches by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and representatives of all the participating
powers. Those signing for their respective countries were to be Foreign Minister von Ribben-
trop for Germany, Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano foT Italy, Minister Ro-Gi-bun (Lu-yi-wen)
for Manchukuo and Foreign Minister De Ladislaus Bardossy for Hungary, in addition to Am-
bassador Oshima for Japan. According to Ambassador Oshima the visit of the Spanish For-
eign Minister had not been scheduled as yet. 913
In a dispatch on November 24 Ambassador Oshima confirmed the hour of 12:30 as the sign-
ing time, adding that the Hungarian, Manchurian, and Spanish representatives as well as
himself would make speeches during the ceremony. He also confirmed the adherence of Den-
""IV, 763.
808 IV, 764.
W6 IV, 765.
101 IV, 766.
SM IV,767.
*°*IV, 768.
"'"IV, 769.
'"IV, 770.
ta< w»m
"TV, 772.
198
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
mark and the attendance of the Spanish Foreign Minister. 91 * The following day Denmark's
decision to participate in the signing was relayed to Hsingking by Foreign Minister Togo. 915
Although it had been the ambition of both German and Japanese leaders to keep the proc-
lamation a secret until such a time as its announcement would provoke the greatest propa-
ganda throughout the world, it was inevitable that some leak would occur and Ambassador
Oshima assured his home government that the error which occurred on November 22 was un-
avoidable although it was unfortunate that Germany through interviews with the Foreign
Office Press Bureau had disclosed vital information which might be used by the enemy in
counter propaganda. 31 *
As soon as the ceremony had been completed Ambassador Oshima transmitted a memo-
randum to Tokyo and Hsingking relating the exact order of signing: Japan, Germany, Italy,
Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, by Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima, Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister Ciano, Foreign Minister Bardussy Dlolaszio, Foreign Minister
Lu i-wen and Foreign Minister Ramon Serrano Suner. 917 Ambassador Oshima then proceeded
to assure the Manchurian government that the method of signing had been as it had requested,
and that all copies of the text were identical, 818
On December 4, Ambassador Oshima confirmed the fact that Croatia had also acquiesced
in the reacclaimed protocol opposing the Comintern. 9 19
Ambassador Oshima informed the Home Office in Tokyo that on the morning of November
25 the exchange of official documents abolishing the secret auxiliary agreement of the first
Anti-Comintern Pact had been completed. However, he noted the German request that the
existence of that secret agreement should be kept secret, even though it had been cancelled.
Ambassador Oshima said that notes had been exchanged to that effect. 920
400. Halting of American Shipping at Manila Impedes Japanese- German Trade
In spite of the fact that Japan had been attempting to dispatch additional merchant vessels
to the United States and had been engaging in the proper negotiations, by November 4, 1941,
arrangements still had not been completed. Apparently the American shipping service be-
tween North America and Shanghai had been cancelled at Manila making it impossible for
returning Japanese to reach home from the European continent. 921 This move was viewed with
much anxiety by Ambassador Oshima under pressure from businessmen in Berlin who were
anxious that at least one ship a month should touch port in Germany from Japan regardless of
whether a regular schedule could be maintained. Personally, the Ambassador was much con-
cerned since only by this means could he be assured of a method of return to Japan.*"
401. Progress of the Russo-German War (November, 1941)
By the end of the first week in November, it was evident that Ambassador Saiburo Kurusu
in Hong Kong would be undertaking a gTave mission in order to solve what was called an "un-
precedented crisis" and which would necessitate his complete understanding of the Russo-
German situation. 923 Therefore, in order to assist the Ambassador, Minister Toshijiro Umetsu
9 14 IV, 773.
s,a IV, 774.
B,6 IV, 775.
91T IV,776.
9,B IV,777.
IMjy 77 g
,2t, IV, 779.
M1 IV, 780.
'"IV, 781.
8i nV,782.
199
in Hsingking wired his analysis of the outlook for the Russo-Gerraan war to Hong Kong. In this
resume he pointed out the similarity of the Soviet and Chinese problems.
a . Their territory is so vast that the government can flee anywhere.
b. The population is so numerous that the military forces have unlimited reserves.
c. The living standard is low, and the people are inured to suffering and privation.
d. They have the most skillful of leaders.
e. They have natural fortifications (for example, the Urals and the three provinces to the
north).
f. The Russians are politically indoctrinated. 924
It was Minister Umetsu's opinion that if the Germans did not halt their march after the fall
of Moscow, the Russians could continue to resist and though Germany should occupy the whole
territory west of the Urals, by the following spring, the Soviet Union would still control forty per
cent of the whole resources, population and industry in the east. He believed that the founda-
tions of the Stalin regime were so firmly entrenched that even if its striking power were low-
ered, one would be extremely foolhardy to depend upon its downfall within a very short time.
Because of the evident possibility of Russia's holding out indefinitely, Germany would be
handicapped and would be restrained from attacking England for some time and no early
close of hostilities in Europe could be expected.
On the same day, the Foreign Office in Tokyo advised Minister Umetsu of a resume which it
had received from Budapest, Hungary. In the confidence of the Hungarian Foreign Office,
Ambassador Mauturo Inoue had secured the information that, after the fall of Moscow, the
Soviet government would be totally deported to the Urals, the productive power of which was
at that time still unknown.
Intelligence reports divulged that Germany's next ambition would be a conquest of the
Caucasus, Iran, and Iraq. In pursuit of this aim, it would attempt to cut off the petroluem
supply of the British forces and then take over Syria and Egypt. Should the Nazis be successful
herein, Turkey would have no alternative than to bow to the German will. 926
With regard to the Ukraine, it was estimated that not more than twenty per cent of the indus-
tries had been destroyed and reconstruction work was already successfully underway. 927 The
booty captured from Ukranian armies offered a few minor disadvantages. It had been dis-
covered that Soviet gasoline, untreated, would not propel Hungarian motor cars while Soviet
machines likewise could not operate on the Hungarian type of gasoline. Nevertheless, despite
such difficulties, the Hungarian army had managed to equip one mechanized brigade with
Soviet arms and armament. Supplies from Galicia could be brought to Hungary although
shipping problems prevented immediate use of resources in the Ukraine whjsre the Germans
appeared to be cultivating plants which would produce rubber substitutes.
Guerilla warfare in Serbia, on the other hand, was proving fierce. Rails between Nishi in
southeastern Yugoslavia and Belgrade had been split in sixteen places. The Ukrainian
Danube fleet was seen near Belgarde protecting navigation on the river.
With regard to the situation in the Balkans, the Ambassador at Budapest reported that this
year's crops were about normal, but because of the war the agricultural situation in the
Ukraine would not improve for another year or two.
The Ambassador also voiced an opinion regarding the possibility of the United States' en-
trance into the war, stating that should the allies secure bases in Scotland, the Azores and
Northern Ireland, which it undoubtedly would, Germany would counteract by invading Por-
tugal and attacking Gibralter. 9i;s
"♦IV, 783.
3M IV, 730.
" ; IV, 784.
M *IV, 785.
200
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In response to Japan's request of October 29, 1941 B2H Ambassador Oshima informed the home
government of Germany's success in governing occupied Russia. The Ambassador on Novem-
ber 10, transmitted the summary of the situation as he had been advised by a dependable
German source. Accordingly, it was reported that Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, who had been desig-
nated by the German High Command to govern occupied Russia, was already in Riga ad-
ministering the affairs of the three Baltic countries as well as portions of White Russia. Acting
director Mr. Erich Koch, had taken office at Kiev on October 31, and these two men were car-
rying out the administration.
In these areas quite a few members of the intelligentsia remained but apparently were co-
operating with the Reich in its administrative policy. These people appeared to be indigenous
and were being used to best advantage by Koch and Rosenberg. Although the two German
officials were pulling the strings, it had become the best policy to allow to the natives the actual
positions of justices of the peace, judges and minor military officials in direct contact with
the people. With the exception of the political gendarmes, the police were almost entirely
made up of Russians. It was believed that the technical skill and knowledge of agriculture of
the Germans were invaluable to them here.
In other sections, however, the so-called intelligentsia had been disposed of and the people
themselves appeared to be too helpless to act upon their own initiative and seemed to have
lost all ambition. German leaders merely directed them in the "best possible manner". This
type promised to be of no trouble whatsoever in the future. 930
Germany had quickly diverted Soviet railways to its own use, and according to a speech by
Chancellor Hitler, 5,000 of the 25,000 kilometres of captured railway had already been changed
to the German gauge. Although a conspicuous part of German supplies and troops were being
transported to the front lines by rail, trucks were also being used extensively. A supply road
from Germany to the battlefields had already been completed. After the warfare along the
Black Sea and the Baltic was successfully completed, Germany was expected to add ships to
the present methods of transportation.
In Germany's attempts to uproot the Kolhoz system and to replace it with Nazi agricultural
techniques it had become necessary to fight for the recognition of private ownership. Once this
was accomplished, German leaders presumed that their methods would produce better results, 9:11
In order to meet the shortage of labor on German farms and in its factories, Russian prison-
ers and foreign labor amounting to 2,500,000 and 3,000,000 respectively were being imported.
Nineteen different countries were supplying foreign labor for the Hermann Goering factories
while Russian prisoners were being used in the Rhine area. Although this did not fully com-
pensate for the shortage of labor, it was estimated that approximately seventy or eighty per
cent of the peacetime strength had been met. According to Ambassador Oshima, there was
not the slightest sign of impoverishment though it was true that there was some scarcity of
labor and materials. Industries in occupied Russia were being reorganized and the situation
there was well under control. 932
On November 11, 1941, the Foreign Office in Tokyo attempted to summarize the Russo-
German situation for its officials in Washington, stressing the point that although the German
march on Moscow made the possibility of its fall imminent, it would be a great mistake to con-
clude that the Stalin government would collapse immediately since so much assistance could
be secured both from Russian territory east of the Volga and from America and Great Britain.
The summary touched upon communistic uprisings and sabotage in German occupied coun-
tries and remarked that German police powers were dealing successfully with these factions.
3 "IV, 786.
™TV, 787.
"TV, 788.
201
Evidently the Japanese Foreign Office believed that although United States public opinion
still prohibited nominal participation in the war by a) designating neutrality zones and issuing
"shooting orders" for these areas, b) occupying Greenland and Iceland, c) attempting to
nullify the neutrality act, and, d) arming its merchant vessels while at the same time e) at-
tempting to secure military bases in Central and South America and abolish Axis influence
in the Western Hemisphere, it was actually engaging in anti-Axis activities. 93 a
On November 11, 1941, in what he called a summary of his six-months duty as an admin-
istrative official inspecting conditions in Germany, Kohel Muto addressed an Ode-to-Nazism
to the Home Minister extolling the virtues of the New Order and the uncontended influence
with which the Fuehrer led his German people. Any sign of discontent, he felt, was only a
natural anxiety over the speedy conclusion of the war and in no way could be interpreted as a
hint of conflict midst his unified people. Admitting that the food situation was falling short of
normal times, he said it appeared far from a critical stage. According to Mr, Muto, a German
downfall through lack of food would be impossible for several years to come. Shortage of labor,
he explained, was being met by Russian war prisoners and foreign labor. Again he pointed to
the large or small factories. 934
402. Fresh Rumors of a Combined Europe Meeting Under Hitler Arise
It was not long until rumors began to circulate again about a conference of all the European
nations which Chancellor Hitler supposedly had planned in order to give England and America
a demonstration of his leadership throughout the continent. Ambassador Oshima divulged on
November 11, 1941, that he had learned from a reliable source of Germany's plans to hold
such a meeting in Vienna late in 1941 or early in the following year and to ask all neutral na-
tions to participate in the conference. Vichy, Spain, and Finland had already signified their
acquiescence, while Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey appeared reluctant to participate.
Since England and America somehow had heard of these rumors, Ambassador Oshima was
not at all certain that the congress would be held. He believed that at present Germany would
not make any startling diplomatic moves since the Russo- German war remained undecided.
But upon the fall of Moscow, he confided that some diplomatic maneuver could be expected,
particularly in regard to German-French relations.* 35
403. Progress of the Russo-German War (November 13-14, 1941)
a. Report from Finland
On November 13, 1941, the Foreign Office in Tokyo relayed a summary of the Finnish situ-
ation as it had been reported by the Japanese Embassy in Helsinki. There, as in other sections
of Europe, sharp reductions in exports and imports, scarcity of labor and an unexpectedly
early winter had produced a critical food and clothing situation. Prices of all commodities had
risen sharply to one hundred forty-four per cent of the 1939 standard. These official quotations
could not compare to the actual market prices which, because of bootleg transactions, had
risen many times and promised to reach higher levels as the war continued.
Although anti- Soviet sentiment among the people in the front lines was very strong, the un-
usually frugal living conditions and long expected British and American pressure might cause
a breakdown in operations against the Russians. 936
931 IV, 790:
431 IV, 791.
9M IV, 792.
" 1S IV, 793.
202
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
6. Report from Berlin
With regard to the actual progress of the German array in Russia, the Foreign Office trans-
mitted a Berlin summary to Manchuria and its various headquarters in China on November
13. A primary obstacle to the German advance was, of course, the extremely cold weather.
Although the German spearhead had already reached Rostov, because of the inability of suc-
cessive detachments to advance at an equal rate, the city had not yet been taken. Along the
line to Kerch the advance had been stalemated by mud. In preparation for the final offensive,
powerful German detachments had been massed in the greatest concentration of the war along
the line extending from Kalinin to Tula, Although the Soviet government had already trans-
ferred sixteen fresh regiments from the Far East in addition to fifteen other regiments and had
added a citizens' army of 200,000, the Germans, were already superior in both number and
quality and were expected to begin a rapid advance when weather conditions improved.
According to this German source, Stalin had asked that Great Britain land troops on French
soil but it was believed that the Empire would merely promise to pound Germany from the air.
These raids were doing little if any damage and were being used merely to furnish figures for
propaganda purposes with regard to RAF activity. 937
A later report, from a German of high reliability, revealed that on November 14 favorable
weather had returned on the Russian front and major campaigns were resumed. The strategy
called for an encirclement of Moscow rather than a frontal attack. This encirclement, if the
current weather conditions prevailed for a week, should be completed in ten days. In accord-
ance with a political press claim that Germany intended to split off the main cities of Moscow
and Leningrad and follow with their destruction, such tactics would be pursued until final
victory. Although it was expected that the Russians would hold out for a certain length of time,
it did not alter the fact that the Russian campaign would be completed. This was also pointed
out by the announcement that Hitler had appointed Dr. Alfred Rosenburg to the post of Min-
ister for the eastern occupied area in preparation to setting up the political government.
In the southern section German forces were advancing southwest of Rostov toward a portion
of the Caucasus lying north of the Caucasian mountain range. Since this was an extremely
hazardous undertaking for severe winter weather, it was expected that the war would be car-
ried on into the spring. 938
The same German source which reported on November 14 advised a member of Ambassador
Oshima's staff on November 21 that fresh infantry and artillery forces had crossed the border in
the Tula area and after capturing the town, were forcing their way northeast.
Regarding the fact that the Germans had been anticipating a British counter attack in North
Africa it was not believed, even though the British outnumbered them four to one, that their
armies were as efficient as Nazi trained soldiers. Their only concern appeared to be that should
the fighting become prolonged, the supply problem might become critical. 939
Latest reports from the fighting front as relayed by Ambassador Oshima placed German
forces twenty- five kilometers north of Moscow and from the south as far as Ryazan on Novem-
ber 27. Although Russian troops were opposing vigorously, German spokesmen were confident
of an ultimate victory at Moscow.
Likewise in the north African war, the report continued, German forces had overcome the
impending crisis and, combined with Italian troops there, were well on their way to success
under the leadership of Field Marshal Rommel. 940
IV, 794.
IV, 795.
IV, 7%.
IV, 797.
203
c. Report from Alexandrovsk
An Alexandrovsk intelligence report re broadcast by Tokyo on November 13, revealed addi-
tional information concerning the Black Sea area. It appeared that armed soldiers, horses,
and vehicles were being transported from Alexandrovsk to the opposite coast of the Black Sea
while the populace was giving up clothing. Under the newly imposed bread rationing system
workmen were allowed 600 grams and other civilians merely 300 grams. 941
d. Report from Bulgaria
According to a message from Sofia, on November 14 the Germans in Serbia were being op-
posed by both the Nationalists Party, numbering around 10,000 occupying the mountains
south of Belgrade, and the Communist Party numbering 20,000 scattered throughout the towns
and cities in the interior and active on the Roumanian border. In order to combat these two
factions two divisions of Marshal Sigmund Liszt's army, a detachment of Austrians, 30,000
armed Roumanians under General Milan Neditch, as well as complements of young men's
associations and National Guards backed by German war lords, were operating. However, since
the German army had encountered little experience in the art of partisan warfare, it appeared
to be making slight progress against such opposition.
According to this dispatch, the craze for assassinating German soldiers still continued and
members of the royal family and high officials of Serbia were in danger and were taking every
precaution to avoid encountering these anti-German factions. In an attempt to retaliate, Ger-
many, on October 17, ordered the execution of 2,000 teachers, students, and others and again
on November 3, 30,000 people were arrested at one time, including the education minister.
From private sources, the originator of the message from Sofia had learned that if the
progress of its power politics continued, Germany would declare war on Serbia and enlist the
backing of Bulgaria, Roumania, and Croatia, When this suggestion was made to the Bulgarian
King, he politely refused to cooperate under such circumstances. The Serbian people, finding
German oppression unbearable, were even considering the possibility of being annexed to
Bulgaria.
With regard to the situation the Macedonia, Albania and Greece, there existed the same
critical shortage of food and unless some relief measures were taken at once, national distress
by winter would reach incomparable limits," 42
Japanese Specialists Study German Industries
In order to gain first-hand information with regard to the operation of industries within Ger-
many, Japanese specialists under the direction of Ambassador Oshima, had organized to
study and investigate the steel industry. All Japanese technicians were* prepared to assist in
the promulgation of a plan to operate in close liaison with German Officials and industrialists.
A central office, known as the Berlin Branch of the Japanese Steel Production Control Asso-
ciation, was to be set up to work in close connection with the home office. Such an organization
would require a staff of clerical and technical employees at an estimated cost of 15,000 yen,
but in the opinion of Ambassador Oshima this promised to be an exceptionally profitable un-
dertaking.** 8
In addition to a thorough Japanese study of the German steel industry, plans were continued
for the Japanese to investigate many other manufacturing techniques and, in some cases, to
' or the patent rights for the mar
IV, 798.
W. 799.
'IV, 800.
204
PEARL HARBOR
merit. Three clerks, Yoshida, Hanaoka, and Kinoshita, were reported learning the method of
manufacturing high grade lubricating oils at the RUAHEMI Company's plant on October
27. 944 Photographs of the 75 mm. powder chamber and cartridge case were received and addi-
tional plans were requested on October 28, 1941. 945
Various articles for aerial warfare were believed obtainable from Germany according to a
wire sent by a Japanese committee in Berlin on October 29. These included sighting apparatus
for firing and bombing use, automatic bombsight, precision photometer, a 20 centimeter high
angle continuous air camera, the KERUBIN flying oxygen respiratory apparatus, electrically
heated flying clothes, the Askania automatic pilot device, wave length recording apparatus
and testing devices. 946 The Japanese Air Service Headquarters replied on November 25, listing
those articles which they wished to purchase outright from Germany. In addition they ex-
pressed a desire to buy the manufacturing rights to the Rheinmetall 13 mm. machine gun
and to several other pieces of equipment. 947
On November 10 the Japanese delegation in Berlin wired the War Office in Tokyo informa-
tion concerning the ME-210 and the plane which it was to replace, the ME- 110. Because of the
ME-210's speed and maneuverability the Japanese planned to develop a similar plane in co-
operation with the Germans; this, however, would depend upon the plan's practicability after
additional tests. To fulfill Japanese requirements a new type motor was suggested, possibly
the DB 605 or the DB 611. The performance of the plane under these circumstances was esti-
mated at 640 km. speed and a cruising range similar to a regular ME-2 1 0. 948 The construction
of the plane would vary in accordance with the different purposes to be fulfilled; e.g., intercep-
tor, STUKA, or long-range reconnaissance plane. 949 The construction time was estimated from
16 to 11 hours when in mass production. 950
The Chief of the Technical Headquarters section in Germany wired its home office in Tokyo
and the Ordnance Administration Headquarters there the results of a visit to the Mozeru 95 ""
factory. He had authorized this visit to enable the Japanese to learn methods of constructing
rifle stocks from laminated materials. It was discovered that laminated stock materials con-
sisted of beech boards about 1 millimeter thick put together with a glue material and that its
weight in the finished rifle was 100 to 150 grams more than that of walnut; however, its advant-
ages over walnut included being able to be dried by hot air in eight hours and a comparatively
small degree of warping. 951
Another committee wire from Berlin advised the Vice Minister of War on November 29 that
the Japanese and Manchukuo cargo, which was to be loaded on blockade-runner number 1,
would be gradually increased to a gross tonnage of about 2700 tons. A small amount of this
would be Swiss cargo. It was estimated that by December 15 all of the freight would have been
assembled in Germany ready for transportation by special trains. 952
The lilies Company 96 * would operate the transportation of the agricultural and industrial
cargo for Germany and would assume responsibility for damage to the cargo. Only that cargo
a "IV, 801.
a "rv, 802.
S, *IV, 803-804.
MT IV, 805.
" S IV, 806.
M9 IV, 807.
950 IV, 808.
a5 °"Kana Spelling.
851 IV, 809.
si2 IV, 810.
sii °Kana Spelling.
205
which was acceptable to the German Economic Ministry was to be shipped. The lilies Com-
pany had planned to advance the fees for storehouse expense and transportation by land and
sea and would be reimbursed for this by the SHOWA Company. Only the SHOWA Commer-
cial Company and the Manchukuoan authorities were to have disposal authority. Insurance
rates, commission charges, and transportation expenses were discussed as well as the time for
payment. 953
The War Office of the Senior Adjutant in Tokyo requested that authorities in Berlin imme-
diately send the two Universal Parallel Testing Machines previously ordered. This dispatch
was dated December 7, 1941. 954
405. President Irtotiu Offers Turkey as a Mediator Between Germany and Russia
On November 1, 1941, Ismet Inonu, the President of Turkey, made a gesture toward the pro-
motion of peace between Germany and Russia in his address to the parliament of his country.
Rumors of a conference which had been planned for December 10 at Vienna followed this
speech. Some newspapers, however, considered these stories German propaganda. According
to Ambassador Pa pen, who had conferred with the Japanese representative in Ankara, Ger-
many had absolutely no intentions of making any peace proposals and such rumors were a
result of British propaganda. However, it was believed that the Turkish president was desirous
of extending his good offices.
On the other hand, rumors pointed to the fall of Moscow when Turkey would act as a media-
tor and in following such a course, find a way to change its foreign policy. 955
406. Axis Powers Bicker Over Vital Rubber Shipments
The problem of Siamese rubber shipments to Shanghai again arose while the Italian Naval
Attache in Shanghai also negotiated for a portion of the supply. But Japan, whose reserve sup-
ply of this material had been notably short, had ordered the Mitsui branch in Shanghai to
refuse the Italian request. 956
The Esso, carrying a load of rubber consigned to the German firm of Karlwitz and to the
Japanese Continental Trading Company, was scheduled to arrive in Shanghai about the
twentieth of November. Two days before that time officials in Shanghai notified the home
office that the tonnage was presumably divided up with 320 tons, valued at 2,000,000 yen, for
the German firm; approximately 203 tons, valued at 1,300,000 yen for the Japanese company;
and a balance of 70 or 80 tons, valued at 500,000 yen, Japanese officials, unsuccessful in their
attempts to have the Germans release their consignment to Japan, requested that the matter
be taken up with the German Commercial Attache in Tokyo, Dr. Helmut Wohlthat.
The question of Italy arose again, but Japan remained insistent that the third Axis party
should not share the vitally needed raw material.
Similarly, the Japanese government was faced with demands of Japanese business firms in
Shanghai that the rubber be unloaded at the wharf immediately. In opposition Japan felt that
until local authorities had established undisputed control there would be a danger that foreign
firms might acquire the supply. 95 '
407. Ambassador Oshima Says Axis Political Aim of the War is the Dismemberment of Russia
According to a dispatch transmitted from Berlin on November 21 the political aim of the war
against Russia was not as had been previously stated by the Ambassador, the destruction of
" M IV, 811.
* S, IV, 812.
3SS IV, 813.
,S6 IV,814.
B " IV. 815.
206
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Bolshevism, but rather the crushing of Russia as a nation and although Germany was forced to
resort to unprecedented cruelties if the Soviet intended to oppose, such tactics were unavoid-
able.
Ambassador Oshima also briefly touched on the statistics regarding British forces in the Near
East and Egypt and revealed that Germany was convinced that Great Britain was bluffing
and that it had not nearly these resources in men and supplies on hand as it pretended.
With regard to German -French relations, Germany was, according to the Ambassador "tak-
ing care" of its allied nations.
Apparently Hitler had been considerate of Italy's wishes with respect to Mediterranean war-
fare. However, since several German ships had been sunk in recent weeks an order had been
recently issued that twelve German submarines were to be sent into the Mediterranean, one of
which had accounted for the sinking of the Ark Royal. 958
Ambassador Oshima also expressed his opinion on the future possibilities of the Russo- Ger-
man war when he disclosed on November 21 that the possibility of peace between Germany
and the Soviet Union seemed remote, although he believed that Germany preferred a short
war so that she might transfer her fighting forces to possibly, the British front.
Regarding Japanese relations, the Ambassador believed that whatever policy Japan adopted
with regard to the United States and Great Britain would influence her greatness and for this
reason he felt that Japan should avoid violence at the present time although it was necessary
to blast the British- United States- Russian joint action. In order to accomplish this it would be
necessary to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union, and Ambassador
Oshima expressed his belief that Japan's position would be enhanced considerably should she
offer herself as a mediator for peace at the opportune time. 959
408. Japanese Officials in Ankara, Helsinki, and Vienna Report German Activities to the Home
Office
In contradiction to a London radio broadcast which quoted Ambassador Franz von Papen as
having said that Germany planned to offer Great Britain peace terms at the conclusion of the
Russo-German war, the Japanese office in Ankara informed Foreign Minister Togo that the
German Ambassador to Turkey had discussed only "miscellaneous matters" with the corre-
spondent. It was therefore presumed that the correspondent in question had based his observ-
ations on the scarcity of German bombings on England and on the speech made on the first of
November by the Turkish President, Ismet Inonu. When questioned by the Japanese, Ambas-
sador von Papen had denied the whole thing, pointing to Germany's military and economic
strength and its confidence in ultimate victory without compromise. 960
From Helsinki Minister Tadoshi Sakaya wired Tokyo a review of the Russo-German war for
the latter part of November. The number of Russian soldiers deserting to the Finnish Army in-
creased with the complete encirclement of Leningrad; some of these prisoners were interrogated
and from them it was concluded that Leningrad no longer received foodstuffs and had only a
scant supply left. Because of deaths from starvation and from freezing as well as a shortage of
ammunition, it was surmised that Leningrad could easily be taken by a rush movement. This,
however, would leave the problem of feeding the three or four million people of Leningrad to
Germany and Finland, neither of which wanted to assume the responsibility. 961
According to a dispatch sent from Veinna to Foreign Minister Togo, German strategy in-
cluded an attack on Stalingrad and Astrakhan from Rostov, cutting off the Caucasus and at the
as 'IV, 816.
1,59 IV, 817.
969 IV, 818.
961 IV, 819.
same time German forces would attack Batum on the Black Sea. Regardless of the winter,
Germany was determined to seize the Caucasus. The Japanese had received this information
from the former mayor of Vienna, Minister Neubacher, who had recently been ordered to take
charge of all German oil interests from the Baltic nations to the Caucasus. Minister Neubacher
also asserted that Germany planned to use every resource in reconstructing all oil fields even
though they had been fired. 962
409. Germany Proposes Final Draft of the German- Manchukuoan Economic Relations Pact
As a result of a talk between Mr. Otaki and Dr. Helmut Wohlthat during which the Japanese
representative presented many of the Manchukuoan opinions, a final draft for the new Ger-
man- Manchukuoan pact was proposed by Germany. The title was to be "A provisional agree-
ment for extending German -Manchukuoan Economic Relations" and it would be effective
until the last day of March, 1942.
According to the wire sent by Foreign Minister Togo to authorities in Hsingking on November
28, 1941, the pact arranged for the delivery of previously contracted soy beans and soy bean oil
and for the issuance of exchange and export permits. The agreement concerned itself princi-
pally with the rates and manner of payment of goods, specifying that this contract would be
acted on by authorized conferences of local tradesmen.
Foreign Minister Togo urged that the Manchukuoan government promptly wire him of its
adoption of the pact insomuch as the matter had been discussed with Japanese military au-
thorities and Vice Minister Miura and ail were in agreement with Germany about it. 9 " 3
410. Ambassador Oshima Interviews Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop
On November 28 Ambassador Oshima was received by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop who
came to the conference late explaining that he had just been attending a meeting of German
bigwigs including Hermann Goering, at the Fueher's official residence. At this conference the
campaigns for 1942 were discussed, in addition to Japan's future policies. When the Foreign
Minister finally arrived his first question concerned Japanese- American negotiations to which
Ambassador Oshima replied that he had no official word. The Foreign Minister then began
immediately to discuss Japan's New Order in East Asia and advised that there never would be
another time so appropriate as the present for Japan to take a forward step, and he warned that
if Japan hesitated, when Germany succeeded in establishing her New Order in Europe, all the
military might of Great Britain and the United States would be concentrated against Japan.
He then proceeded to explain that the Fuehrer had stated that very day: "There are funda-
mental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan and the United
States." Hitler had also revealed that Germany had received advice that there was practically
no hope of successful Japanese-United States negotiations. The Foreign Minister continued
that if Japan did reach a decision to fight Great Britain and the United States with Germany,
Japan would benefit. Then, the Foreign Minister stated that he considered President Roose-
velt to be a fanatic and that it was impossible to tell just what the United States' president
would do next. However, he believed that, just as in the past, the United States would try to
avoid war. In view of the tone of Hitler's recent speech and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's re-
marks, Germany's attitude toward the United States appeared considerably stiffened and
there were no indications that Germany would refuse to fight the United States if necessary.
When Ambassador Oshima inquired as to the state of the Russo- German war, the Foreign
Minister responded that Germany was now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even
greater extent than had been planned. The Fuehrer was now determined to wipe out Russia,
9 "IV, 820.
m IV, 821.
208
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
and since practically all the main military objectives had been taken, the war on the eastern
front would soon be finished and German troops would be returning. The Foreign Minister con-
tinued that Germany would advance and cross the Ural Mountains in the spring, chasing
Stalin into Siberia. When Ambassador Oshima asked when this was to be expected, he was
informed that the campaign would be launched in May of 1942 and that by summer Germany
expected Axis air connections from the Ural Mountains to Manchukuo would be possible.
Ambassador Oshima then questioned the Foreign Minister about Germany's British policy
at the present time. He learned that Germany would first dispose of Britain's influence in the
Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea before launching landing operations
against the home island itself. All preparations had been made by Germany for this campaign.
German intelligence reports indicated political splits within the English government. They
stated that Churchill's influence was waning and that Chief of the Labor Party, Rt. Hon. Ernest
Bevin, had been advocating revolutionary measures. Stating that, of course, he did not believe
all of this, the Foreign Minister said that he was convinced that conditions in England were
anything but satisfactory, a situation which might mean that England might collapse before it
was necessary to launch landing operations. In any event the Foreign Minister continued, Ger-
many would not make peace with England and he repeated the oft-quoted statement:
"We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will
have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her
other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and
Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies.
Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European
Russia."
When Ambassador Oshima suggested that Germany might be faced with subduing all of
England's possessions, the Foreign Minister pointed to the fact that although it was hoped the
war would last but a short time, there was a possibility that it might continue for another
year. He then stated that should Japan go to war against the United States, Germany would
join with its Axis partner immediately. He reassured the Japanese Ambassador that there
was no possibility of Germany forming a separate peace with the United States. 961
411. Axis Powers Arrange for Simultaneous Declarations of War on the United States
Since the Tripartite Pact had become a major obstacle to success in Japanese -Am eric an
relations in the United States was demanding its repudiation, Japan found itself in a hopeless
position. Powerless to abandon its stand as a Tripartite ally, Japan, under pressure from Ger-
many as well as the United States, trailed after its Axis partner making protestations of re-
assurance that the three power alliance remained foremost in Japanese foreign policy. When
Ambassador Oshima informed Foreign Minister Togo that he was scheduled for an interview
with Chancellor Hitler on November 27 at 2:00 p.m., 366 he was instructed to inform the Fuehrer
that regardless of the difficulties in American-Japanese relations the Tripartite Alliance
would not be abrogated. 969
On November 30 as Japanese-American relations became more strained, Foreign Minister
Togo informed Ambassador Oshima that the Empire was faced with a grave situation and told
the Berlin representative that he should immediately convey secretly to Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop that there was an extreme danger of an outbreak of war between the Anglo-Saxon
nations and Japan and that this clash might come ''quicker than anyone dreams". Bt " The For-
eign Minister continued that Ambassador Oshima was to remind Germany that the Empire's
""IV, 822.
995 IV, 823.
*"IV, 824.
,6 'IV, 825.
209
position with Russia had already been clarified on previous occasions; but the Ambassador
might say that although Japan planned a southward movement, she would not relax her pres-
sure against the Soviet. In the event that Russia joined with England and the United States,
Japan would be ready to strike against her, but for the present it was necessary to concern
herself with the southern advance. Such a message, the Foreign Minister stressed, should be
kept absolutely secret. 966
In reply to this message from the home office, Ambassador Oshima itemized the notes which
he held that had been exchanged between Japan and Germany at the signing of the Tripartite
Pact. These, the Ambassador wired, he would take with him on his next visit to Foreign Min-
ister von Ribbentrop; however, since he did not have the one from Ambassador Ott to Foreign
Minister Togo regarding what should be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an Ameri-
can-Japanese war, Ambassador Oshima requested that it be sent to him immediately. 1,89
In a second message on November 30 Foreign Minister Togo stressed Japan's alliance to the
Tripartite Pact, stating that in all its American negotiations it had remained adamant in
regard to the principles of the Tripartite Pact. Since this pact was indicative of Japan's policy
in China and French Indo-China, to which policy the American cabinet was in complete op-
position, it seemed that the two nations were in complete opposition. Japan believed that the
main motive of the United States was to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan,
Germany and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, in other words, the prevention of the com-
bination of the Tripartite Alliance. The Foreign Minister believed that the United States con-
sidered it impossible to maintain friendly relations as long as the Empire of Japan was allied
to Germany and Italy. This fact had been brought out in the most recent Hull- Nomura meet-
ing. According to the Foreign Minister it had become clear that a continuation of negotiations
would be detrimental to Japan. 9 ™
Apparently the United States' proposal at the meeting on November 26, had insulted the
Japanese government when it said:
*'. no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any
bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifi-
cally the Three -Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the
Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany or Italy."
The Foreign Minister believed that this consideration alone would invalidate Japanese- Ameri-
can negotiations and he was much perturbed that the United States had consulted with Eng-
land, Australia, the Netherlands, and China before extending this plan. Therefore, according
to Foreign Minister Togo, the United States, in collusion with these nations, regarded Japan,
along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy. 971
On December 5 Ambassador Oshima replied that he had relayed to the Germans the Foreign
Minister's outline of the current events in Japanese-United States negotiations. The Ambas-
sador believed that the United States would attempt to divorce Japan from Germany by pub-
lishing the record of the negotiations in a propaganda program. In order to combat this action
the Ambassador believed that Germany and Italy should be informed immediately by the
Japanese government the contents of the Konoye message. "
After meeting F oreign Minister von Ribbentrop at 7:00 p.m. on December 1, 1941 the Ambas-
sador explained that the Germans, according to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, understood
WS IV. 826.
™\\, 827.
S,0 IV, 828.
"'IV, 829.
""IV, 830.
210
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Japan's desire for haste and would bring Chancellor Hitler's authority to bear as soon as it was
possible to contact him. Mr. Gauss, who had been attending this conference, then expressed
his opinion that Germany and Japan should jointly declare war on the United States to which
Ambassador Oshima agreed. Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop cautioned that this message
should not be transmitted to Tokyo by Ambassador Oshima who, in turn, asked that his home
government exert care in the use of this material. 9 "
In an effort to impress Japan, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop continued at this interview
to say that despite American and British propaganda regarding the defeat at Rostov, Germany's
retreat had been merely a strategic move to prevent undue bloodshed in the face of a Russian
defense. According to the Foreign Minister, General Paul von Kleist in charge of maneuvers
there had retired voluntarily. The Foreign Minister also volunteered the information that Gen-
eral Rommel's army had completely annihilated one division of New Zealand troops at the
Tobruk garrison. He also reported that the encirclement of Moscow was progressing favor-
ably. 914
Two days after his interview with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on December I, 1941
Ambassador Oshima was again called to the German official headquarters to be informed that
Dictator Hitler was at a distant place and it was impossible to contact him immediately be-
cause of communications, security and weather conditions. Accordingly, Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop would be forced to meet with Chancellor Hitler at military headquarters upon the
latter's arrival there on the 4th or 5th. Although such a delay was regretted by the Foreign Min-
ister, it would be impossible for Germany to proceed until the Fuehrer had given his approval
and in this regard he was convinced that the desired response would be forthcoming.
Ambassador Oshima again stressed the importance of immediate action. In his wire to Tokyo
on December 3 he assured Foreign Minister Togo that there would be no objections. 975
At 3:00 p.m. on December 5, 1941, Ambassador Oshima called on Foreign Minister von Rib-
bentrop to receive Germany's approval and declaration of the alliance. 976
Minister von Ribbentrop, through his representative, attempted to impress Ambassador
Oshima with the importance of secrecy in the matter and explained that even Ambassador Ott
in Tokyo had not been notified, nor had the Italian ambassador in Tokyo. 977
By December 6, 1941, Tokyo wired that it had not received the second clause to the Germ an -
Japanese text and Foreign Minister Togo feared that it would not arrive in time for signature
on that date. He urged Ambassador Oshima to postpone in some manner Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop's departure, or to secure a proxy for the initialing. 9 ' 8
In reply Ambassador Oshima advised that at 7:00 p.m. he had sent representative Shun-ichi
Kase and Tomohiko Ushiba to conduct negotiations for initialing of the agreement with Gauss.
It resulted that only the German language would be used in the text and that the signing would
be in order: Ambassador Oshima, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and the Italian Ambassa-
dor, Ambassador Oshima then transmitted the concluding portion of the agreement in the
German language:
"We will use the letter X to represent — — . In witness whereof have the undersigned by their governments only
authorized this agreement signed and with their seals provided. Done in triple originals in German, Italian and
Japanese language in Berlin on the December, 1941, in the 20th year of the Fascists (era?), corresponding
to the day of the 12th month, the 16th year of Show a (era?)"." 9
B7a IV, 831.
974 IV, 832.
971 IV, 833.
S,, IV, 834.
9,7 IV, 835.
9I, IV,836.
979 IV, 837.
211
Two "extremely urgent" dispatches then reached Berlin from Tokyo asking that the second
clause to the agreement be sent immediately. 980
Apparently by December 7, 1941, some additional idea had been presented by Germany
with regard to the agreement, to which Tokyo authorities concurred. Since this had been ac-
cepted there would be no objection to the official signing but Foreign Minister Togo divulged
that since developments were proceeding so rapidly, the crash might occur before the official
signing had been completed. Thus, circumstances might be altered by the time the signing
could be accomplished and Ambassador Oshima also was to explain that Japan expected
Italy and Germany to declare war against Great Britain and America before the agreement
was officially signed. 981
According to Ambassador Oshima, as soon as he had received the radio report of the Japa-
nese attack at 11:00 p.m. on the 7th, he contacted Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and at-
tempted to secure Germany's immediate participation, which, although it required Chancel-
lor Hitler's final decision, was undoubtedly forthcoming. 962
The next day at 1:00 p.m. Ambassador Oshima again in an interview with the Foreign Min-
ister expressed Japan's wish that Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war at once,
but Minister von Ribbentrop merely replied that Hitler was at the time discussing matters
pertaining to publicizing such a declaration in order to make an impression on the German
people. In this interview Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop revealed that Chancellor Hitler had
issued orders of attack to the entire German navy on the morning of December 8. 983 On the
same day Germany, Italy and Japan reached an agreement regarding the war against the
United States:
"Article t. Germany, Italy and Japan will conduct the war forced on them by the United States of America and
Kngland with all means at their disposal to a victorious cone lus ion (working in common i.
"Article 2. Germany, Italy and Japan pledge themselves not to conclude an armistice or peace with either the
United States of America or with England without complete, mutual understanding.
"Article 3. Germany, Italy and Japan will collaborate most closely after the victorious conclusion of the war for
the purpose of bringing about a just New Order.
"Article 4. This agreement comes into force (becomes effective) when signed. In witness whereto the under-
signed, duly authorized by their governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals." 9 *' 1
As Ambassador Oshima pointed out in a separate message, explaining the agreement to
Tokyo, Article 3 of the text would be of great advantage to Japan since on the strength of it
Germany and Italy would assist in the establishment of a Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity
under Japanese domination. The Foreign Minister then expressed his desire that the agreement
be approved in Japan immediately so that the official signing could be arranged for December
10, During the conference in which this agreement was drawn up, Foreign Minister von Rib-
bentrop paused in order to congratulate the Japanese government upon its successful attack
at Pearl Harbor and to praise its navy. 986
Later, on December 8 Ambassador Oshima transmitted the final revised text, stating that
the German and Italian governments in all sincerity had signed the agreement. 986
Foreign Minister Togo notified Ambassador Oshima on December 9 that Ambassador Ott
bad called on him twice that day with a proposal in regard to the new agreement. Stating that
undoubtedly the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin was already aware of this proposal, the
*IV, 838-839,
"IV, 840.
n IV, 841.
la IV, 842.
TV, 843.
S IV, 844.
TV. 845.
212
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Foreign Minister instructed him in what way the Home Office desired the text to be altered
if the Germans insisted upon preserving the first part of Article III of the Tripart ite Pact . 981
In order that the German government should keep well informed upon the progress of the
Japanese- American war, Ambassador Oshima had induced German authorities to confer
daily with the press in Tokyo at 11:00 a.m. Berlin time, at which time a Japanese official
would present the latest news of the day. Ambassador Oshima was also endeavoring to extend
the present time limit in the Tokyo- Berlin telephone communications and asked that the
proper authorities in Japan investigate the possibilities of this. 988
4 12. Tripartite Powers Strengthen Their Positions in the Near East
On December 6, 1941 Tokyo had been informed that although the United States had been
cultivating Turkey's friendship and was continuing to supply Ankara with lend-lease material,
it was obvious that Turkey would be forced to collaborate with the Axis by spring; and, accord-
ingly, Germany and Italy were not especially worried over British and American activities. 5,99
Arab agitators, sponsored by Germany, were discussed by Ambassador Oshima in a mes-
sage dated November 20, 1941. The Ambassador announced the arrival in Berlin of Haj Amen
el Husseini, exiled Mufti from Jerusalem, and pointed out that although the Italians were very
concerned over Arabic underground activities, they had decided to let the Germans handle
the affair. The latter were making plans to conduct this activity with Husseini as the principal
figure; hence his transfer from Rome to Berlin.* 90
413. Japan Attempts to Pacify Germany in Regard to Japanese -Russian Relations
An intelligence report from Sofia in November had informed Foreign Minister Togo of the
possibility of a non-aggression agreement between the United States and Russia. Based on the
supposition that after German forces occupied Moscow, Japan would abrogate the Tokyo-
Moscow neutrality agreement by taking Vladivostok, it promised American aid for Siberia.
The report stated that despite American reluctance to make such an agreement, it felt that it
might be necessary to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, 9511
Ambassador Umezu at Hsingking later advised Foreign Minister Togo that, irrespective of
the possibility of the United States' constructing air fields in Siberia, Japan must preserve its
neutrality toward Russia unless it wished to sacrifice the present route for German -Japanese
supplies. 392
Foreign Minister Togo, on December 6, continued to emphasize the importance of Ambas-
sador Oshima's reassurance to Germany with regard to Japan's position with Russia so that
the German government would not insist upon an exchange of diplomatic notes on this ques-
tion. Ambassador Oshima was to explain that Japan would not allow American materials to pass
through the Japanese sphere of influence to Russia.
In the last analysis, should the German government insist upon a guarantee in this matter,
Tokyo realized that it would have no alternative but to issue a statement prohibiting Ameri-
can shipments to Russia via Japanese waters. However, Ambassador Oshima was to make it
clear that Japan could not carry this out thoroughly since in order to prevent Soviet Russia
from attacking Japan, Japan could not capture Soviet shipments. The Foreign Minister made
it clear to Ambassador Oshima that if Germany would not agree to this last clause, they would
necessarily have to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. 993
M7 IV, 846.
,e *IV,847.
'"IV, 848.
""IV, 849.
iai IV,850.
992 IV,851.
M3 IV, 852.
213
THE "MAGIC"
PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(i) Japanese- Manchukuoan Relations
414. Japan is Concerned with Mongolian Uprisings
On October 20, 1941, a retransmitted dispatch advised Tokyo that Taiyuan government
authorities wishing to expand and enlighten the Northwest and Outer Mongolian information
network, had decided to hold a round-table discussion with the chief officials. m
Apparently the many Mongolian border incidents, which Japan believed to be sponsored by
organized Mongolian Communists, were precipitating alarm in the Japanese Capital, in view
of the fact that Russian armies, on the pretext of quelling and controlling future uprisings in
Inner Mongolia very close to Japanese- controlled Manchukuo, planned to occupy the areas
under dispute. According to Japan's interpretation, this would be but a stepping-stone to
Russian machinations with the Mohammedan armies in Inner Mongolia and in the Wingsia
„_„„ 996
area.
Later, on November 28, Mr. Yoshitomi at Hsinking requested that December 30 be sched-
uled for a conference in order that an understanding might be reached with Manchukuoan
officials in regard to expenses and plans for "enlightenment." 996
415. Manchukuoan Border Incidents Cause Increasing Concern in Tokyo
Meanwhile, on October 29, the Japanese Minister in Hsinking had reported that a Japanese
border patrol had been attacked on October 23 by Russian troops "clearly within the Manchu-
kuoan border". Japanese troops returned the fire, and their Lieutenant in charge was killed.
According to the Hsinking Minister, Soviet propagandists had been publicizing the incident in
an attempt to impress Great Britain and the United States, while Japan, on the other hand,
intended to minimize the whole incident and merely lodge a formal complaint in Moscow. 997
Soon after this event, another incident involving a Japanese scout plane caused further con-
cern in Tokyo and Hsinking, for Manchukuo had taken upon itself negotiations with Russian
authorities and thereby had confused the issue. 99B
416. Japan is Concerned with Communist Activities in Manchukuo and China
Yoshihide Kiyono, arrested as a member of the Communist Party in Hsinking, submitted a
written confession to the Japanese officials. From the document, Tokyo learned, on November
4, 1941, that the representative of the Japanese Communist party, Kenzo Yamamoto, was
established at the Communist office in Khabarovsk, a Soviet city near the northeast border
of Manchukuo; and from this office, through the Communist office in Shanghai, the Comin-
tern carried out its Communist program in Japan. The "Committee for Reconstructing the
Japanese Communist Party", instigated by Mr. Yamamoto, organized the Communist Party
in Manchukuo and planned a union with the Chinese communists. From the information
gathered from the confession, the military police were able to arrest a number of persons in
Hsinking. From these suspects it was learned that the Communists were to b
the Western Division of the Kyowa Kai, including even the Leftist elements in
Central China. 999
as, IV,853.
a95 IV, 854.
'"TV, 855.
""'IV, 856.
"TV, 857.
""IV, 858.
215
417. Japan and Russia Equally Unprepared for War Against Each Other, Minister at Hsinking De-
clares
Despite the sporadic border conflicts, neither Japan nor Russia was eager to pursue any
issue involving war. From Japan's point of view, which the Minister at Hsinking conveyed
to Ambassador Kurusu on November 6, 1941, the Kwantung Army had insufficient men —
800,000 as against 1,000,000 Soviet troops— to wage a successful attack on Russia's eastern
border. In addition, the vast Far Eastern area suffered a temperature of about forty degrees
below zero for one-third of the year. Railroads were scarce, communication lines poor, and
there could be no doubt but that such a war, if undertaken, would last a long time. The Min-
ister was certain that Japan, in view of the present activities with regard to the China Incident,
was not strong enough to attempt an all-out blitz against the Soviet.
It was obvious to the Japanese Minister that Russia would not endeavor to antagonize Japan
in view of its western frontier activities, 1000 and also, according to a dispatch received by the
Vice-Chief, General Staff in Tokyo on November 6, the Red Army was transporting troops from
Leningrad to Moscow by air, which seemed to prove that Russia lacked crack reserve units. 10 " 1
418. Russia Thought to be Moving Border Troops to Western Frontier
According to a Tokyo circular intercepted in transmission November 11, 1941, Japan was
convinced that Russia was assuming a "stall policy" since no conclusion had been reached on
the Japanese request that the shipping of United States plane gas to Vladivostok be reconsid-
ered and since Russia had chosen to ignore the fact that their floating mines had been found in
the Japan Sea. It was also learned that Russia was transferring its Mongolian border troops to
the Western frontier, as various reports indicated that East Asia and Mongolian Russian troops
were fighting in Moscow. This premise coincided with the recently inaugurated Russian policy
of relaxing vigil along the Mongolian-Manchukuoan border since the Soviet Union did not
believe that Japan intended to attack them in the east. 1002
419. Japan Questions Manchukuo's Motives in Cancelling Visas
Apparently without Japan's knowledge, Mancbukuo had suspended issuing all entrance and
exit visas to Third Power nationals and was cancelling those already in existence effective
November 9, 1941. 1003
On November 17 in reply to Japan's questioning this move, the Japanese Minister in Hsin-
king revealed that the Kanto Army in Manchukuo had had a very special reason for cancelling
all visas but that this restriction would be removed by November 30, 1941, 1004
On November 19 Tokyo originated a request that the new Manchukuoan order be suspended
in the special case of three Norwegians who desired to return home aboard an American ship
leaving Shanghai in the near future. 1005 By December 5 Hsinking reported that visas had been
issued to the three men to travel by way of Shanhaikwan, on condition that they reported their
itinerary beforehand. 1006
"""IV, 860
lm IV, 861
mm IV, 862
11,04 IV, 863
'**tV, 864
""'IV, 865.
216
420. Government Authorities Agree on Manchukuo's Policy in the Event of War
On November 28, 1941, the Minister in Hsinking advised Tokyo that certain measures had
been adopted regarding the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the
event of war with England and the United States.
This policy declared that all nationals would be interned in Harbin, Mukden and Chokinshu
until arrangements could be made for their transportation home and that control of any
property left by them would be administered by the Manchukuoan government. Of those
persons to be interned in Manchukuo there were 339 British Nationals and eighty -one Ameri-
can citizens of which consular officials and Catholic Missionaries were to be given preferential
treatment. Those who were to be evacuated through Russia would be released through Man-
chuli and those leaving Shanghai would be released in Dairen."" 17
On December 4, the Japanese government in conference decided upon a policy which Man-
chukuo would follow upon the outbreak of war:
Policy
"When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not enter it because of Manchukuo's relation
to Japan and her policy. Manchukuo shall treat Great Britain, the United States and Netherlands Indies as
enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end."
Specifically, Manchukuo would not recognize diplomatic representatives of the belligerent
opponents and the use of code telegrams and short-wave radio sets would be prohibited to them.
Manchukuo was to disregard any request addressed to a Third Power for protection of their
consulate buildings and the interests of the resident Nationals.
Regarding Soviet Russia, Manchukuo was to observe the Neutrality Pact and follow Japan's
example in taking every precaution not to provoke Soviet Russia. 1Ma
A later dispatch on December 4, 1941, changed the wording of the Policy somewhat and
specified that "England, the United States, and the Netherlands" was to be substituted
whereever "England and the United States" occurred in the text. 1005
421. Japan Ponders Disposition of Its Manchukuoan Army
Reiterating his arguments for continued peace with Russia, again on December 4, Minister
Yoshijiro Umezu in Hsinking stated three problems concerning the Russo-border question
which faced the Kwantung Army Command: (a) persons with Moscow connections were urging
a direct attack on the Soviet Union to preclude the latter's giving bases to the United States;
(b) others advocated passivity and the transference of half of the Kwantung troops southward
since Russia had shown no signs of belligerence; (c) some, feeling that Russia might consent
to fight if the United States urged that it wage war against Japan, felt that it was best to keep
the present border forces intact. 1010
422. Japan Asks Renewal of Five- Year Rights to Northern Sakhalin Coal and Oil
Further negotiations with Russia were in progress in regard to mining rights in Manchukuo,
In 1936 Japan had made a five-year agreement with Russia concerning the petroleum and
coal rights in the area of Northern Sakhalin; however, because of the lack of facilities for em-
barkation and shipment, little mining work had been undertaken by the Japanese during the
period until 1941. On December 4, 1941, the Imperial Government, through Vice Minister
Nishi, requested of the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo that the agreraent be extended for an
additional five years. 1011
On December 7, the government issued a circular message requesting that instructions pre-
viously issued for the disposition of enemy people now be put into effect. 10 1S
"""IV, 866.
"""IV. 867.
'TV. 868.
'TV, 869.
'TV, 870.
'TV, 871.
217
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART
DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(j) Japanese-Italian Relations
423. Italy Urges Japan to Restrain United States from Participation in the War
Li direct opposition to the German policy of promoting aggressive action on the part of Japan
against America, various Italian organizations and publications were urging that Japan's best
course lay in the prevention of hostilities between the Axis partners and America. According
to President Aloisi of the Society of Friends of Japan, who spoke with Japanese Ambassador,
Zenbei Horikiri, on October 18, 1941, the Nipponese would be doing an outstanding service for
Italy if they could restrain the United States from participation in the war.
On the other hand, he urged that it would soon be timely for Japan to strike at Russia in
order to fulfill its Imperial dream of a co-prosperity sphere in East Asia. President Aloisi pre-
dicted that as soon as Moscow collapsed, Germany, as well as Italy, would expect Japan's
assistance in crushing the Soviet Union. 1013
424. Italy Disapproves Japan's Dissemination of British Propaganda
Nevertheless, some Italian circles were accusing Japan of disseminating camouflaged Brit-
ish propaganda within its borders. Director General Prnnas of the Transoceania Bureau, Italian
Foreign Office, when he conferred with Secretary Yoshiro Ando on October 20, 1941, com-
plained that Japan had been prohibiting tbe distribution of propaganda printed by belligerent
countries and that it had been freely disseminating British material transmitted via the Uni-
ted States. The Director General asked Mr, Yoshiro Ando to insist that Japan take immediate
action, to which Mr. Ando countered that his government already had given special consid-
eration to a program of favoring Axis propaganda. 101 *
425. Ambassador Horikiri Finds Count Ciano Uninformed on Japanese-American Negotiations
When Ambassador Horikiri talked with Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano on October
22, 1941, he must have learned something of Italy's uninformed position regarding the Japa-
nese-American negotiations. After hearing the Foreign Minister's wishes that the new October
18 Cabinet might increase Japanese-Italian solidarity, Ambassador Horikiri was advised that
the Count, having no recent knowledge of the Japanese- American negotiations, was not in a
position to judge their merit one way or the other. The Italian Foreign Minister promised that
after visiting Chancellor Hitler the following day, he would be able to discuss the situation
more intelligently. 1015
During the second week in November, rumors were afloat that Premier Mussolini had de-
parted for an interview with Hitler because of anxiety over recent Mediterranean develop-
ments. mt
426. Ambassador Horikiri Urges Japan to Publish More Italian Propaganda
Even though, as Director General Prunas had objected on October 20, l<n ' Japan was restrict-
ing Axis propaganda, it appeared that Italy, on the other hand, was giving the green light to
Japanese publicity there. Ambassador Horikiri in a dispatch on November 12, 1941. desired
"" 3 rV, 872.
m *Vf, 873.
"• ,S IV. 874.
""'IV, 875.
"" 7 IV, 873.
219
the Home Office to send as much information on Japan and East Asia as was convenient. He
conveyed a point made by the Italian Minister of Propaganda, Alessandro Pavolini, on No-
vember 3, that although Italians were prohibited from discussing the political situation with-
in Japan, they were not being allowed to lose interest in Japanese-Italian relations. 1018
427. Japan Desires Italian Reciprocity in Air Transportation lo South America
In an attempt to persuade Italy to transport Japanese diplomatic material to South America
free of charge, Tokyo had said in a previous message that currently Japan was handling all
Italian mail and parcels to South America free of charge and under Japanese seals; and had
asked for reciprocal treatment for Japanese mail from Italy to Rio de Janeiro. Rome acknowl-
edged the message on November 1. 1019
On November 17, Ambassador Horikiri again complained; he had been unable to forward his
travel record and large amounts of other correspondence. Now he wished to send these to Rio
de Janeiro by Italian air mail. He asked whether or not Tokyo had made arrangements for its
transportation from Rio de Janeiro to Japan.'" 20
428. Japanese Officials Discuss Trade Relations with Italy
Japanese-Italian trade relations were seldom mentioned in dispatches sent through diplo-
matic channels, but on October 24 Foreign Minister Togo notified Ambassador Horikiri of
details in regard to the settlement of claims between Italian subjects and the East Asia Devel-
opment Company. 1021 During the following month the completion of a Japanese order for the
210 millimetre howitzer occasioned a dispatch from Ambassador Horikiri to the Vice Minister
of War in Tokyo, in which he stated that his office was negotiating a revision in the contracts
because of a transfer of the manufacturing companies. 1022 Italian naval circles in Shanghai
requested permission to ship tin scrap to Italy via Japan on the Kobe Mam, and according to
a dispatch dated December 5, 1941, the Japanese planned to grant this request. 1023
429. Ando Rebukes Gayda for Attempting to Utilize Japan in Axis Machinations
Since Virginio Gayda, Editor of "Gionnale d'ltalia" had taken the position through his pub-
lication that Japan should be the "sole arbiter of her destiny", he had refrained from pub-
lishing any persuasive articles referring to Japan's attitude; but Mr. Ando had surmised from
a private conversation with him that Gayda personally favored Japan's adoption of a positive
military program against the Anglo-Saxon countries.
It had been generally accepted by both Gayda and Ando while conferring that:
"This present war, Japanese efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, is becoming a revolutionary war against the
old order of British and American Imperialism. The war is gradually spreading, and it is inevitable that it even-
tually will engulf the whole world. Hence, we may as well reconcile ourselves to the fact of the war's being prolonged
for several years."
"""IV, 876.
"" S IV, 877.
"™IV,878.
""IV, 879.
l ***!V, 880.
11123 IV, 881.
THE -MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Confiding that he had been considering the proposed Axis-sponsored Federation of States
to be set up after the war, Editor Gayda explained that he believed Germany would take the
leadership in the South and Balkan Peninsula and with Italy's cooperation would be able to
solve all European problems.
At this point Mr. Ando had taken the opportunity to discourage some Italians in their
belief that Japan could solve all of her problems merely by advancing southward, explaining
that Japan was not a country to move rashly, and it would be wise if the other Axis partners
realized that the Imperial Japanese government could not be utilized unconditionally for
their own private benefits. 102 *
430. Ambassador Horikiri Explains Italian Censorship of Japanese Mail
In a routine message to Tokyo on November 24, Ambassador Horikiri informed Foreign
Minister Togo of the system of Italian censorship which was applicable to Japanese mail,
explaining that ordinary Japanese mail was not receiving any preferential treatment but that
the official mail of his office was never touched. Picture postcards had been forbidden to go
out from the country and foreign newspapers and magazines had been forbidden importation.
Outgoing mail was more strictly censored than incoming. 1025
431. The Japanese Ambassador Reveals Revolutionary Plot in India
Although the first part of a message transmitted to Tokyo on November 22, 1941 is not
available, the second section reveals enough information so that the general outline of a
revolutionary plot for India can be recognized. In order to initiate the plot, which was being
undertaken in expectation of a rupture in British relations. Ambassador Horikiri explained
that secret radio propaganda, pamphlets distributed by air, and distribution of propaganda
by the Hindus themselves would be the most effective means of promulgation. Russia
had been of aid from a standpoint of propaganda technique, and Germany had assisted
financially.
The Ambassador then revealed that large numbers of Axis agents were following instruc-
tions in India as well as in North and South America. The Axis was also finding adherents from
among Hindu prisoners of war, who would be returned to India as Axis employees. 1026
One of the outstanding agents, Mr. Shiedai, a leader in the Hindustan Gaderu 1027 party,
was being utilized by the Axis in machinations toward India. This agent, who conferred with
Ambassador Horikiri in Rome on December 1, was scheduled to administer radio propaganda
activities. In his first broadcasts he said in substance that Asia stood in the "shadow of
Japan's leadership", that since freedom for India was the basis of Japan's final victory,
Japan would restore her lost freedom. He also told the Indian people that Japan was not
motivated by political ambitions toward India, but wished to work with her people in a close
economic and cultural relationship.
Shiedai was in charge of the European Area and the names and addresses of agents in
Shanghai and French Indo-China could be secured from his men in San Francisco and Buenos
Aires. 1028
Also involved in espionage activities was a Pu Ran-Lingh, a member of the Gadar Party at
Gadar Ashram, in San Francisco. In the message from Ambassador Horikiri to San Francisco
were instructions to organize "our comrades in Lithuania, Georgia, Manila, Singapore, Siam,
Indo-China, etc.".' 089
10 "IV, 852.
'™ IV, 883.
™ IV, 884.
Kana spelling.
1018 IV, 885-886,888.
'"TV. 887.
221
432. The Catholic Church at Rome Seeks to Forestall Breach in Japanese- American Relations
Among the various organizations within Italy seeking to forestall a breach in Japanese-
American relations was the Roman Catholic Church. Ambassador Horikiri had been advised
that Pope Pius XII had secretly conferred with the American envoy, Mr. Harold Tittman,
on November 20, at which time the Pontiff' had asked that President Roosevelt be urged to
consider carefully the new Japanese proposal toward a successful culmination of Japanese-
American negotiations. 1M0
Ambassador Horikiri was also garnering information from another Papal representative,
Msgr. Cicognani in Washington, who commented upon the negotiations, saying that the situa-
tion had become quite delicate since Japan so definitely stood in the way of United States-
supported British and Russian victories. In addition, many Americans apparently felt that
the Japanese had demanded concessions in direct opposition to American ideals and that,
by doing so, had encroached upon American interests and honor. Cicognani also said that
there were reports and difficulties in the negotiations of late had "constrained the Interven-
tionist faction headed by the President and strengthened the position of the Isolationists." 1031
The Catholic Church was torn by diverse sympathies. Pro-Fascist factions claimed that by
the church's support of the Tripartite Alliance, it would extensively advance Catholicism
throughout the Near and Far East. On the other hand, some leaders, among them the
United States representative to the Vatican, Harold Tittman, claimed that Japanese and
Spanish adherence to the Axis made the current Japanese-American negotiations virtually
impossible. Pope Pius XII, however, had failed to clarify his position in this matter by the
end of November.' 032
433. The Catholic Church is Unmoved by Arabic Situation
In pursuit of Catholic support for the Tripartite Alliance, German officials had notified the
Vatican by November 26, 1941, that it would be wise for Pope Pius to be represented at
conferences between Italian, German, Japanese, Turkish and Palestine officials, who were
concerned with the setup of Arabia and the Middle East in postwar European organization.
Germany and Italy intended to assist the Arabs in overthrowing English domination and in
forestalling American strategy there. 1033
The Japanese had received reports previous to this time with regard to the Arabic situation
as it effected the Christian world. According to an intelligence report from Rome on November
6, 1941 Mr. Harold Tittman, American representative to the Vatican, had held a secret inter-
view with the Pope on November 4, At that time, the representative had argued that Christiani-
ty would be endangered should the Arab race, now being encouraged by Germany and Italy,
through the Grand Mufti attain a superior position. Mr. Tittman declared that the democra-
cies should advocate a status quo for the Arab world and that the other peoples of the world
should live together in harmony and justice. Asking whether His Holiness would countenance
such a scheme as this on the part of Germany and Italy, Mr. Tittman had concluded that he
hoped His Holiness would lodge a protest. The Pope had answered that until the Arab race
actually became a menace to Christianity, he was uninterested in the matter. 1034
According to a dispatch from Rome on December 6, the Italian government had already
made representations to the Turkish government for the establishment of unnamed
organizations. No additional information was supplied at this time regarding the nature of
these agencies. 1035
rv,889.
,,3! IV, 891.
'™IV, 892.
ln "IV,893.
,( " S IV, 894.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
434. Ambassador Horikiri Complains of Weaknesses in Japanese Radio Transmissions to Rome
Ambassador Horikiri complained of weaknesses in the Japanese radio transmissions to
Rome, and on November 8 he asked that the JUP wave length be changed im mediately. 10Sb
The station JUO (P) was changed on the twentieth. Meanwhile sensitivity of JAP had
become progressively weaker, and again Ambassador Horikiri wired Tokyo saying, in view
of the present state of international affairs, he felt that Rome was not being adequately
informed and that one wave length was not sufficient. He then urged that concurrent broad-
casts in three wave lengths be initiated. 1041
By November 27, according to a Berlin-to-Tokyo transmission, JUO had been improved,
but the sensitivity of JAP remained poor; and the suggestion was made that the two broad-
cast simultaneously. 1038 However, in Rome on the twenty-seventh, sensitivity was reportedly
excellent and the complete routine message was received. However, this success had followed
two days of impossible reception. 1038
On November 29, 1941 Ambassador Horikiri reported to Tokyo that of the Japanese language
radio broadcasts to Europe in recent days, JLT was not heard at all while JVW could be heard
fairly well with some exceptions. In addition, he complained that the Japanese announcer
on these broadcasts, speaking rapidly in low tones and swallowing the ends of his words,
was interfering with good reception. Again Ambassador Horikiri cautioned that the Rome
Office might be missing some important news releases.
To correct the situation he suggested that a new announcer be selected whose enunciation
was of a high quality, and also that news be broadcast in such order that the most important
news would be given before fading out should occur and urged that the high priority releases
be repeated at the end of each broadcast. In addition, he suggested patriotic music be played
as an introduction to the broadcast. 1040
On December 5, 1941, the Ambassador reported again that the general intelligence broad-
cast had been unintelligible for December 2, 3 and 5. He then inquired as to the outcome of his
suggestion of November 20 that Japan initiate simultaneous broadcasts. 1041
435. Ambassador Horikiri Obtains Information Concerning Italian Relations with Croatia, France,
and Russia
According to a conversation reported by a member of Ambassador Horikiri's staff in Rome,
Italy had very little confidence in the Croatian government despite the apparent friendliness
between the two. The economic situation in Croatia was reportedly critical with food supplies
scarce and facilities meager for the transportation of the only plentiful product, timber.
The invading Italian troops had been beset with continual assasinations. 104a
The Japanese Ambassador informed Foreign Minister Togo that despite the difficulties
of supply, the Italians were optimistic of the final outcome of their armies in Libya. As for
their relations with the French, they expected the use of the Tunis army transportation
facilities to increase as a result of Weygand's elimination. 1043
Japan's custody of Italian property in Russia was recognized by the Soviet Union in a
memorandum sent to Lt. Gen. Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Japanese Ambassador in Moscow.
Tokyo forwarded this information to Ambassador Horikiri on December 3, 1941. 1044
1036 IV. 895.
""IV, 896.
1(188 IV, 897.
'"'IV. 898.
""TV, 899.
'•"IV, 900.
'""rv, 9oi.
'""IV, 902.
IV, 903.
223
436. Ambassador Horikiri and Secretary An do Confer with Mussolini and Count Ciano
On December 3, 1941 Ambassador Horikiri divulged that he, accompanied by Secretary
Ando, was scheduled to confer with Mussolini and Count Ciano at 10:30 a.m. of that day. 1016
Ambassador Horikiri opened the discussion by reviewing Japanese-American develop-
ments. Stating that he had been carefully watching the outcome of the negotiations,
Premier Mussolini was not surprised, "in view of the utter bullheadedness of the United
States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt", that the negotiations had dead-
locked. He believed that one of the aims of the United States was to make the Far East its
own economic sphere of influence but contended that if it sought to separate Japan and the
Axis, it would stumble on Japanese loyalty.
Italy endorsed Japan's dream of new order in East Asia, the Premier confided, and proceeded
to discuss the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, at which time he
explained that Italy would give every military aid in checking the British navy in the
Mediterranean. In order to accomplish this, Mussolini revealed that a Germ an -Italian air
force bloc had been discussed.
When asked outright what Italy would do upon Japan's declaration of war, Mussolini
replied that Italy "was obligated to participate under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since
Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on
this point." 1016
437. Ambassador Horikiri Learns of Italian Position in Regard to the War with the United States
After receiving a wire from Foreign Minister Togo on December 2 which stated that a certain
part of the treaty under discussion was to be kept secret from Italy, 1048 Ambassador
Horikiri reported to Tokyo that a confidential report from Berlin had disclosed that either
separate declarations between Germ any -Japan and Italy-Japan or a joint declaration were
desirable. 1049 Apparently the Italian government was little concerned as to its own part in
these negotiations. It was taken for granted that Italy would fall in line with German-
Japanese decisions. 1 6
Shortly before December 8, 1941 the Japanese Vice Consul Uyama consulted the Italian
Consul General in Shanghai in regard to Japanese invasion plans and Italian military
cooperation in controlling the situation. The Italian representative promised his country's
aid but specified that the Italian need for gasoline would have to be supplied. 1061
ms IV, 904.
"""IV, 905.
""'IV, 906.
'""IV, 907.
'°' 9 IV, 908.
10i °IV,909.
"""IV, 910.
224
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(k) Japanese-French Relations
438. Mr. Arttald Refuses to Make Military Expense Payment in Piastres
Attempting to procure the Japanese occupation expenses in piastres from France,
Japanese officials in Vichy conferred on October 17, 1941 with Mr. Arnald of the French
Foreign Office. In a previous dispatch transmitted from Tokyo on October 16, 1941, Foreign
Minister Toijiro Toyoda had warned that French authorities might use the lifting of the
Shanghai export embargo as an excuse for delaying negotiations for the defrayment of military
expenses. In the discussion of October 17 Mr. Arnald protested that the French used the
Chinese money or piastres to pay their officials in China and were considering buying
materials in Shanghai with it. For this reason the French official was adamant in his refusal
to pay the military expenses for September and October in piastres. Mr, Arnald said, how-
ever, that he had instructions to confer with French Ambassador Arsene Henri on the lifting
of the export embargo in Shanghai. 1052
439. Japan Instructs Ambassador to Procure Export Permit by October 24, 1941
Because of difficulty in securing permits to export 3,000 tons of goods from Saigon, the
Japanese government decided for the time being to load a vessel in the port with other pro-
ducts. It was asked in this dispatch of October 20, 1941, however, that permission be secured
to export the 3,000 tons of freight by October 24, 1941. 1053
440. Japan Protests Movement of Troops into Unfortified Zone
In a dispatch from Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Saigon on October 20, 1941, Japan
argued that Thailand's reinforcement of an area established as an unfortified zone between
French Indo-China and Thailand, violated the Joint Defense agreement, as well as the
Mekong agreement between Thailand and French Indo-China. Should French Indo-Chinese
authorities approve, since no special prohibitions were stipulated, the Japanese Minister
in Saigon was instructed to deal with the matter as he thought best. 1054
441. Tokyo Plans to Land Planes in Indo-Chinese Waters
Whether the Japanese government should obtain permission from the Vichy authorities
or whether they should confer with the Colonial government in regard to the landing of
Japanese planes in Saigon waters was discussed in a dispatch transmitted on October 20,
1941 to Vichy. Foreign Minister Togo advised that plans to land the planes were already
formulated, and for this reason an answer was requested immediately. iU5s
442. Foreign Minister Togo Applies Pressure in Shanghai by Limiting Ex porta lions
In a dispatch of October 24, 1941 from Foreign Minister Togo to Vichy and Hanoi, the origin
of the Shanghai permit system was explained, and instructions given for further procedure
in treating this subject. The permit system was described as a retaliatory measure designed
to combat higher prices set by French Indo-Chinese authorities on coal, zinc, and rice.
'""IV. 911, 912.
,0S3 IV,913.
""TV ,914.
mi IV, 915.
225
Unless the Colonial official amended their attitude in this matter, Japan could not satisfy
them on the Shanghai permit system, and would, furthermore, be forced to prohibit any
exports leaving Japan for French Indo-China. Politically, this uncooperative attitude on the
part of French Colonial authorities would make some political measures inevitable. In offer-
ing terms for negotiations, Foreign Minister Togo declared that if the French would allow the
importation of Japanese goods, Japan would cooperate in making payments for rubber. In
this way, the exportation of Japanese goods would be effected without obstructions, and the
Shanghai permit system would be managed in a way favorable to French Indo-China. 1056
443. Japan Threatens Action Unless French Agree to Payment of Military Expenses
Warning that the present French Indo-China resistance was becoming very annoying to
the Japanese, the Foreign Minister said that if authorities went one step further, an irremedi-
able situation would ensue. At the time when an agreement on the payment of military
expenses almost had been reached, French officials had advanced the question of the Shanghai
permit system, and consequently refused to pay the piastres necessary. Since the Japanese
concerned were becoming angry, Foreign Minister Togo asked that the two matters be settled
in separate negotiations. 1 ""
444. Tokyo Decrees Further Export Restrictions lo Combat Freezing of Assets
It was further pointed out at this time that twenty-nine important items destined for
shipment to French Indo-China, Burma, Hong Kong, Kwangchow- Wan, Macao and unoccupied
sections of South China had been placed on an embargo list as early as April 7, 1941 for the
purpose of stopping the flow of materials to Chiang. As a retaliatory measure after the freezing
of assets by the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, Japan had restricted business
dealings with foreigners and had instituted an export license system having to do with four-
teen items of important materials. Because this measure was aimed principally at the
United States, Britain and Netherlands, Japan had advanced the policy of issuing as many
licenses as possible for articles flowing from Japan and China to French In do- China. 1068
Dealers proceeding on the assumption that the license system would sooner or later be
applied to them began to corner the market on cotton threads and cotton goods. In view of the
sudden increase in the outflow of these articles there was danger that large quantities of
materials were reaching Chiang by way of unoccupied areas in China. Added to this danger
was the tendency on the part of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies to
purchase from Chiang the materials for which they had been depending upon Japan.
Therefore, Japan had decided to extend the embargo to apply to all shipments scheduled for
the unoccupied areas in China, and had further added cotton goods and cotton cloth to the
list of articles coming under the license system. Moreover, of late Japan had been following
the policy of minimizing the number of license-- b *-~ed to French Indo-China. 1 " 63
445. Consul Hayashi Investigates Pro- Japanese Party Members
In answer to an inquiry concerning a political party in Hanoi, Consul (?) Hayashi on
October 25, 1941 sent an explanatory wire to Tokyo. The political party, DAIETUTO, formed
in July of 1940, had about one hundred and fifty active members, chief of whom were news-
papermen. During September and October more than seventy party members had been
arrested by French Indo-Chinese authorities and this resulted in the loss of the guiding
,056 IV, 916.
""'IV, 917.
lt,5s IV, 918.
1058 IV, 919.
226
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
party elements. Since the party's objective was to join with the Japan- Manchukuo- China
bloc, its members were relying on Japanese military forces to aid in attaining this goal. Up
to this time, the Japanese army, navy and Sumida organizations had had no connection with
this party. The rumors, however, that the leader of the party was under the protection of the
Japanese military were being investigated. 11)60
446. Special Committee Receives Codes
A request for one or two simple codes and a code address book for the use of the Natural
Resources Investigating Commission was wired to Tokyo from Hanoi on October 25, 1941.
Having relied on the Consulate General for the sending and* receiving of messages, the
commission found this arrangement inconvenient since the consulate was some distance
away. 1061
On October 27, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo answered that one copy each of five Japanese
codes were being brought by Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa's party, which was leaving
Kobe on October 31, 1941. The Survey Commission, upon receiving the codes, was asked to
dispatch the one word STUZA, and the Consul in Hanoi was requested to obtain a receipt for
the codes. It goes without saying, Foreign Minister Togo added, that all wires concerning
matters of a secret nature should continue to be sent through the Consulate. 1082
447. Tokyo Instructs Kato To Request Only Plane Landing Space
Instructions that Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato in Vichy limit his requests to the demand
for landing places for hydroplanes near Saigon were sent on October 27, 1941. The matter of
another subject was not to be discussed until it was officially presented during the negotia-
tions which were scheduled to begin in January of 1942. Apart from the demand for hydro-
plane landing space, the Ambassador was to maintain silence and watch developments. 1093
448. Hanoi Consul to Negotiate for Plane Landings Independently
The Japanese Consul in Hanoi, however, was instructed to negotiate independently in
regard to air connections on the Saigon-Bangkok airline. Although Japan was negotiating
with the French government in Vichy in this respect, it was necessary to meet emergency
requirements before the settlement of formal negotiations. 10 "
449. Government Officials are Listed as Dangerous to France- Japanese Cooperation
On October 28, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo learned that a Mr. Wagner had made a detailed
report to French government circles regarding future propaganda and elements which were
endangering France-Japanese cooperation. When Colonial Minister Platon was summoned,
he concurred, and pointed out that there were DeGaullist inclinations within the Governor
Generalcy. To completely extirpate injurious elements, Minister Platon would soon send
several persons to French Indo-China to investigate. Names on the lists of injurious elements
so far were George Gautier and De LaSalle of the Governor Generalcy; the Chief of
Education and Propaganda Department, Albert Charton; Governmental Office Representative,
Montevani; and newspaperman, Samuel De Sacy. 1065
—IV, 920.
,M1 IV, 92X.
1082 iv, 922
1043 IV, 923.
,OIM IV,924.
,065 IV, 925.
227
450. Frenchman Intercedes in Behalf of Japan
It was added, in a separate dispatch to Hanoi and Vichy, that a Frenchman by the name of
Mr, Wagner, who was a contributor to L'lllustration and who was a close friend and companion
of Mr. Andre Roban and Marshall Petain, desired that the trouble over French Indo-China
be settled as soon as possible. For this reason Japan was sending him to France to discuss
the matter with influential Vichy officials. Traveling by way of Brazil, Mr. Wagner was
scheduled to stop in Hanoi by the middle of November, where he was to be met and assisted
in whatever way possible. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister asked that he be informed of
Wagner's actions whenever the occasion warranted. 1066
451. Togo Plans to Send Emissary Group Despite Visa Procurement Difficulty
Regardless of the fact that the French Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Arsene Henri, refused
on orders from Vichy to cooperate in issuing visas for the Japanese investigating commission
traveling to French Indo-China, Foreign Minister Togo was resolved to send the whole
troop according to schedule. However, since he preferred that French officials issue the
desired instructions regarding the Special Emissary and his troupe, he asked that they be
requested once again. 1067
The Vice- Minister had been informed on October 28, 1941, when he conferred with
Ambassador Henri, that if the number of personnel accompanying the Special Emissary were
too great, this fact might result in provoking ill-feelings among the French Indo-China
people. Since the agreement had already been effected regarding the dispatching of the
Special Emissary, The Vice-Minister replied that the question of the accompanying
personnel was a matter for the Japanese to decide and that it was difficult to understand why
there should be any complaint on the subject. The Vice-Minister reiterated that the com-
mission was designed to bring about cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China,
in industrial and economic matters, and would not include one single military man. In
answering, the French Ambassador repeated only that his instructions were to limit the
number of visas to approximately twenty. In case visas were not issued in time for the
sailing of Special Emissary and his troupe, it was intended that the entire party should
leave the evening of October 30, 1941 without visas, although the Japanese Ambassador was
directed to apply pressure to secure them. 1068
452. Japan Reiterates Threat to Secure Military Expenses
Retransmitting to Vichy on October 28, 1941, a dispatch from Mr. Uchiyama, Foreign
Minister Togo relayed further information concerning negotiations for the payment of
September and October occupation expenses. Since the September installment of the
military expenses had not been forthcoming and the French government continued to make
excuses, Minister Uchiyama had warned the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Hanoi on October
22, 1941, that the Japanese army would be forced to act. The Secretary of General Affairs,
however, faced with such threats of military action, had promised to answer, following
instructions from Vichy. 1069
On this same day, October 28, 1941, the Japanese Minister in Vichy wired the Japanese
Foreign Minister that Mr. Arnald had directed the November and December running
expenses to be settled in a lump sum. Vichy also ordered the French Indo-China officials
to undertake an investigation in cooperation with the French military officials. Japan,
,ne6 IV, 926.
' 06T IV,927.
1U6a IV, 928.
"""IV, 929.
228
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
therefore, must take the proper measures to explain the evident necessity of funds, thus
expediting the payment of the expense money. Since such pressure would have to be
applied through the military officials in French Indo-China, who would be working with
the French investigating committee, the Japanese Minister asked that these instructions be
communicated to Japanese officials in French Indo-China. 1070
In an incomplete message of October 28, the Japanese Minister in Vichy informed Tokyo
that France agreed to accept payment in gold, in case payment in American dollars was
impossible, and that, moreover, she had decided to reserve 25,000 tons of the French Indo-
China crop for herself, dividing between Germany and Japan the total remainder of the
payment, which was to be made either in dollars or gold. 1071
453. French Authorities Agree to Issue Visas for Entire Yoshizawa Group
In a later dispatch from Vichy on October 28, 1941, Tokyo was assured that visas would be
issued to all the members of Ambassador Kenkiji Yoshizawa's investigating committee.
The Ambassador, to ascertain that such instructions were clear, asked French officials to
wire again to Ambassador Henri in Tokyo so that he would issue visas to all the members. 1071
454. France Accedes to Japan's Military Expense Payment Demand
Referring to wild remarks pertaining to Ambassador Yoshizawa's visit, which were
contained in an Indo-Chinese publication, Foreign Minister Togo declared that as long as such
an uncooperative atmosphere existed at the scene, all efforts to adjust matters in an amicable
manner would amount to nothing. It was feared that should Japan and France fail to make
a satisfactory adjustment, the troops stationed in French Indo-China might finally become
exasperated, and an unfortunate situation might ensue. Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato
in France was to bring this situation to the attention of Vice-Premier Jean Francois Darlan,
suggesting that instructions urging cooperation be sent to the French Indo-China authori-
ties. 10 "
455. French Indo-China Remits Occupation Expenses
On October 30, 1941, Vichy released the information to its Tokyo office that French
authorities had agreed to pay the monthly occupation expenses to Japan for November and
December. Exchange of diplomatic notes had been made on October 28 regarding the
payment in a lump sum. 107 *
On the following day Tokyo reported that the Indo-China bank had placed 6,000,000 piastres
at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank. This amount included the September balance
of 1,500,000 piastres and the October allotment of 4,500,000 piastres. The Specie Bank
was continuing negotiations for the balance of 9,500,000 piastres. 1075
In regard to the 66,000,000 piastres which Japan had demanded on France in payment of
supplementary military expenses, the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau in Hanoi had
been advised that Japan had agreed to discuss the disposition of the funds. Included in the
conference would be one person from the French finance ministry, three military officers,
and two technical experts. 1076
1010 IV, 930.
IV, 931.
'""IV, 932.
IV, 933.
""'IV, 934.
'°"IV, 936.
""TV. 936.
229
45G. Japanese Officials Arrive ai Hanoi
On November 4, 1941, Minister Uchiyama wired Tokyo that he and Secretary Ito arrived
at Hanoi on November 3, whereas Vice-Consul Iida had arrived at Hanoi on November 1,
1941.' 077
Tokyo learned on this same day that Mr. Haraguchi had left Saigon for Japan and for
this reason could not continue his uncompleted discussions with Mr, Kanji Okura. 1078
457. Japan Demands Payment in Full from French Indo-China
Continuing his practice of relaying to Vichy the dispatches which were directed to him
from his Minister in Hanoi, Foreign Minister Togo on November 4, 1941 wired Ambassador
Sotomatsu Kato concerning the financial developments. Although the Secretary General
of Affairs in Hanoi had ordered the bank of Indo-China to pay 15,000, 000 piastres to Japan,
Minister Uchiyama had asked about the remaining 500,000 piastres. Replying that,
"You fellows certainly like to quibble over small amounts", the Secretary had promised to
wire for further instructions. The Secretary again pointed out, however, that France had
agreed to pay an additional 1,500 piastres if a group of experts met to discuss the disposition
of provisional expenses. He supposed, however, that since the quick payment had been
effected, this term had been eliminated. 1079
458. Tokyo Forwards New Code Machines for the Hanoi and Saigon Offices
Hanoi was notified on November 5, 1941, that new code machines were being sent to Hanoi
and Saigon by Courier Ken Harada, who was returning to his post on the Kokuryu Maru.
Printer #64 and transposer #43 were being transported for the Hanoi Office, while printer
# 80 and transposer # 50 were to be sent on to Saigon. Contained in four wooden boxes and
five suitcases, the machines were to be handled as the luggage of Ambassador Yoshizawa.
Upon receipt of the code machinery the one word ASADA in plain language was to be wired
to Tokyo. 1080
459. French Indo-China Makes Payment in Philippine Dollars
Having been informed of the transaction by the Japanese Minister in Saigon, Foreign
Minister Togo wired Vichy on November 5, 1941 to report the payment of 9,500,000 Philippine
dollars. The payment had been made to cover military expenses for November and
December as well as the unpaid balance of 500,000 Philippine dollars. 1081
460. Investigation Discredits Aid of Pro- Japanese Frenchman
Meanwhile Mr. Uchiyama, who was investigating the record of Mr. Wagner, wired on
November 6, 1941 that the Frenchman was undoubtedly mixed up in the collapse of
France. It was further learned that he was of Jewish extraction and that, in spite of the fact
that he was a contributor to L'lllustration, his local press did not enjoy the confidence of the
government and of the people. Furthermore, Mr. Wagner had been asked to leave French
Indo-Chinese suddenly and on his way to France had stopped off in Japan. In view of these
circumstances, the Japanese Minister suggested that no credence be placed in any intelli-
gence given by him. 1082
""'IV, 937-938.
10,8 IV,939.
IO,4 IV.940.
108 °1V, 941.
1081 IV, 942.
""• 5 IV. 943.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
461. Foreign Minister Togo Outlines Duties of Ambassador Yoshizawa
In answer to a dispatch from Hanoi suggesting the appointment of a liaison officer for a
province in Indo- China, the Japanese Foreign Minister replied on November 7, 1941 that
Ambassador Yoshizawa would be accompanied to that province by army and navy men who
would assume the liaison work between the Resources Corps and Japan. Consequently, there
was no need for the appointment of a separate liaison officer. iVSi
A dispatch transmitted on the same day to Vichy said that Envoy Kenkichi Yoshizawa, also
Ambassador Plenipotentiary, had been invested with full powers to conduct negotiations in
French Indo- China. Therefore, Ambassador Kato was to arrange to match this by granting
to the Governor General of French Lndo-China full powers to negotiate with the Special
Japanese Envoy. 108 *
Moreover, Ambassador Yoshizawa was informed, by separate wire, of the extent of his
responsibilities. He was directed to supervise the secretariat cooperating with the ranking
military and naval officials in carrying out the Japanese policy toward French Indo-China.
He would execute matters relating to the government in general, especially those deriving
from the functioning of the Matsuoka-Henri Agreement. In regard to the joint defense of
Indo-China he would supervise matters relating to places selected for joint defense, troop
quartering and supplying, as well as movement on maneuvers, and the use of air and naval
forces. The investigation of the economic resources in execution of the Economic Agreement
would also be his responsibility, as well as the supervision of investigating parties, the
development of enterprises, and the protection of the economic conditions of the Japanese.
He was to be responsible for intelligence, propaganda, and cultural enlightenment, for the
supervision of education and health of Japanese nationals in Indo-China, for the carrying
out of the Japanese policy regarding Chinese in Indo-China and Thailand, and for the
stopping of aid to Chiang Kai-shek. 1095
462. Ambassador Kato Asks for Schedules of Yoshizawa Party Members
According to Ambassador Sotomatsu Kato in Vichy, the party of Ambassador Yoshizawa
included more than one hundred persons. He had learned also that one group of the party,
which had now arrived in French Indo-China, did not plan to return, and he asked that he
be informed at once of those who did plan to return. 1086
In answering this query from Vichy, Foreign Minister Togo revealed that the Economic
Investigating Committee accompanying Ambassador Yoshizawa included more than two
hundred and forty-three individuals representing the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry
and the Commercial and Industrial Ministry. Thirteen parties totaling sixty- five persons
would leave French Indo-China about the middle of January, while twelve parties made up
of eighty-two persons were scheduled to leave early in February. The sailing date of the remain-
ing seventeen parties, including more than eighty-six persons, was not definite. He asked,
however, that should any of the parties find it necessary to sail at an earlier time than was
scheduled, their transportation via a mail boat be arranged. 1087
™IV, 944.
,0M IV, 945.
" a5 rV, 946,
'"" S IV, 947.
!M ?IV, 948.
231
463. Tokyo Officials Demand Release of Shipment
Learning from Saigon that the Governor General had refused permission to load 2,900
tons (rubber) on the grounds that the French home government must approve the shipment,
Minister Togo asked his Vichy representative to see that instructions were sent immediately
to the Governor General to load the 2,900 tons at once. The wire, transmitted November 9,
1941, intimated that there was some underhanded design back of the note from the Governor
General and suggested that such a delay could have serious effects on the future negotiations
for the 10,000 tons. 1088
464. Consul Ogawa to Sail on Chicago Maru
Consul General Ogawa in Hanoi learned on November 10, 1941 that the Chicago Maru,
which was scheduled to transport his party, would arrive at Canton on November 16, whence
it would proceed to Haiphong or Saigon. Since the vessel's course after leaving Canton was
not settled, Consul Ogawa was asked to get in touch with Canton for more definite informa-
tion. 10 ™
465. French Government Approves Rubber Shipment
Foreign Minister Togo, relaying the information from Saigon, informed Ambassador
Kato that the Kanju Maru had sailed with the specially marked 3,000 tons of rubber on
November 3, 1941. Although French Indo-Chinese officials had held out on the permit for the
remainder of the second contract consisting of 2,100 tons, Japan had nevertheless obtained
the permit and consequently would ship the rubber on the Seikai and the Melbourne Maru.
Although the price had become exorbitant, arrangements were being made to purchase
the 2,900 tons which was the remainder of the 15,000 tons under contract. Foreign Minister
Togo complained that the price of Indo-Chinese rubber had been greatly increased by the
German market. Between September and November Germany had been paying 3,000 piastres
a ton for rubber, but for what reason the Foreign Minister said, "Heaven only knows." He
pointed out that it was up to Japan to negotiate with Berlin in order to set a price "to keep
Germany and Vichy from robbing us." 1090
466. Expansion of Japanese Army in French Indo-China Creates Difficulties
Despite the fact that since Japan and French Indo-China had signed defense agreements
and the equipping and organizing of French Indo-China was being carried out, the French
Indo-Chinese Government had been showing anti-Japanese policies, such as a reluctance
in issuing import and export permits. Fearing that the Japanese might start agitation
between the Chinese and the Annamese, a "stall policy" had been adopted regarding
Japanese and French Indo-Chinese questions. 1091
That a crisis had arisen in the military occupation of French Indo-China was also wired to
Vichy on November 12, 1941. Endeavoring to expand military facilities, Japan wished to
move into North Indo-China, an action which would violate the Nishihara- Maru tan Agree-
ment. Since they considered the restrictions stipulated in the agreement as still valid, the
French Indo-Chinese authorities had refused to permit the Japanese army's expansion.
Japan now revealed that it had anticipated such a case as this, and had foresightedly
inserted a clause in the treaty to the affect that the restrictions stipulated in the Nishihara-
" ) * a IV,949, 950.
1088 IV, 951.
im °IV,952.
1091 IV. 861.
232
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Marutan Agreement were cancelled. The French authorities in Vichy were, therefore, to issue
definite instructions at once that the French Indo-Chinese authorities withdraw their
claim. 1092
It might be said, however, the Japan's control of French Indo-China was progressing
favorably. Mr. Yoshizawa and his company had left for their new post in Hanoi during the
latter part of October and from there, they planned to penetrate all fields. 10 * a
Having already wired Vichy asking that the Governor General in French Indo-China be
given extensive powers to negotiate with Ambassador Yoshizawa in the protectorate, Foreign
Minister Togo now asked Ambassador Yoshizawa in French Indo-China to insist upon the
granting of these powers. 1084
467. France Agrees to Provide Additional Supplies to Japan
Following a series of negotiations with French authorities Japanese Official Harada had
obtained definite promises from Mr. Arnald. France agreed to provide by the end of 1941,
10,000 tons of additional goods and would issue instructions to French officials to supply Japan
with 12,000 tons of the remaining 15,000 tons to be shipped within the year providing that
the payment was made in gold. Although the French approved of payment in gold, they were
reluctant to accept payment in yen, arguing that if this kind of payment were accepted, they
would have to permit the Germans to pay in marks. Ambassador Kato in Vichy wired that
he would continue to negotiate along these lines. 1096
468. Tokyo Releases New Broadcast Schedule for Far East
Meanwhile, a new schedule for Japanese broadcasts direct to Singapore, French Indo-China,
the South Seas, Thailand, the Dutch East Indies and Malay was relayed to Singapore.
Between 7:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. Japan would broadcast to the South Seas in Mandarin,
Cantonese, Fukienese, and Japanese. Between 10:00 p.m. and 11:40 p.m. a broadcast to
French, Indo-China and Thailand would be made in French, Thai, Cantonese and Burmese
languages. Between 9:55 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. the Dutch East Indies and Malay would hear
broadcasts from Japan in Dutch, English, Malay and Fukienese. 101 *
469. Vice-Minister Roshier Considers Movement of Japanese Troops
In answer to the Foreign Minister's telegram regarding the problem of stationing Japanese
troops in North Indo-China, Ambassador Kato wired on November 14, 1941 that Mr. Harada
had transmitted the contents of his instructions to Vice-Minister Roshier. Mr. Roshier had
replied that he would at once look into the matter. 1097
470. Secret Messages Withheld from Staff Members are to be Headed by "Gaisin"
Minister Uchiyama in Hanoi advised on November 15, 1941 that messages of a special
nature which were best not seen by staff members should be sent addressed to the Consul
General and headed by the word "Gaisin". This practice was used in messages addressed to
the Japanese Embassy in China, he pointed out. 11,38
'""IV, 953.
'""IV, 861
"""IV, 954
,0 "IV, 956.
,M6 rV,956.
1M 'IV, 957.
1M 'IV,958.
233
471. Japan Vests Negotiating Authority in Ambassador Yoshizawa in French Indo-China
Reiterating that all matters of an economical nature in French Indo-China were to be the
responsibility of Special Ambassador Yoshizawa, Foreign Minister Togo requested that
Minister Uchiyama also ask the French government to cable authority for negotiations to the
French Indo-China governor. If, however, France wished to carry on negotiations regarding
rubber in Vichy, such an arrangement would be permissible; but a full outline was to be
forwarded to the home office so that negotiations there would coincide with those carried on
in French Indo-China. 1099
472. Japan Agrees to Transport Rubber for Germany as Far as Japan
In spite of the shortage of Japanese ships, Japan had agreed to transport French Indo-
China rubber bound for Germany as far as Japan. In compliance with an arrangement made
with the German Commercial Attache, approximately 10,885 kilotons of rubber would be
transported in this manner. The Kanju Maru had carried 3,000 kilotons to Japan during
October and the Hibari Maru had already loaded 2,000 kilotons to be transported to Japan
during November. The Sidney Maru would carry 3,000 kilotons late in November, and 2,885
kilotons of rubber would be transported on an undesignated vessel early in September.
Ambassador Oshima in Berlin was asked to explain to German authorities the great lengths
to which Japan had gone, in view of her shortage of ships, to dispatch these vessels. 1100
473. German Official Says Germany and Japan Must Agree on Division of Indo-Chinese Rubber
On November 17, 1941 Ambassador Kato inquired whether the allotment of French rubber
had been taken up with the Germans yet, A German member of the Armistice Commission
had informed the Japanese Counselor of the Embassy in France, Mr. Harada, that Germany
and Japan would have to reach an agreement on the amount of French Indo-Chinese rubber
to go to Europe and the amount to go to Japan out of the 1942 production. For the information
of Japanese officials, Ambassador Kato declared that the estimated production of French Indo-
Chinese rubber for 1941 was 75,000 tons, and for 1942 would be 80,000 tons. 11 "
474. Planning Committee Draws Up Bill to Export Materials
In referring to the question of granting a permit for exportation of goods from Shanghai,
Foreign Minister Togo informed officials in that city that the planning committee had drawn
up a bill, which, under Japanese direction, contained practically the same contents as the
former one. It specified that goods to be sent to French Indo-China and Thailand would be
divided into definite categories and authorized additional permits pertaining to cotton
textiles and cotton products, as well as unconditional permits pertaining to all goods.
Declaring that Japan would like to allow permits, on the basis of past experience, for condi-
tional-permit goods even if there was nothing to import in exchange, Foreign Minister Togo
asked that the amount and value of goods to be exported from Shanghai be wired to him for
his information. 1102
On November 19, 1941 in a dispatch to Vichy the Tokyo Foreign Office wired instructions
regarding negotiations for French Indo-Chinese rubber. It was necessary that Japan have an
understanding with France regarding the minimum amount that the Imperial Government
could procure. In case the 1942 production exceed 70,000 tons Japan decided that a "suitable
formula" would be worked out for the disposition f rubber between Japan, France and
Germany.' 1113
9 IV, 959.
"IV, 960.
'IV, 961.
a IV, 962.
'IV, 963.
234
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
475. Japan Obtains Visas for Members of Yoshizawa Party
Further instructions for the procurement of passport visas for Ambassador Yoshizawa and
his party, as well as for the Border Delineation Committee, were sent to Vichy on November
20, 1941. It was necessary that representations be made to the French government so that
instructions might be sent to Ambassador Henri in Tokyo for the issuance of these passport
476. Japanese Suspect Decoux of Collaboration with Americans and English
On November 21, 1941 Tokyo learned that Governor General Jean Decoux in Hanoi had
made a trip to the west bank of the Mekong River, where a French Indo-Chinese rubber
plant was located. This trip, according to army reports, had been made under the guise of
calling on the wife of a Governor General in that area. Since it was rumored that Governor
General Decoux was in collaboration with the British and Americans there, such information
was of the utmost importance to the Japanese Imperial government." 06
477. Resignation of General Weygand is Considered to be German Victory
November 22, 1941. Although the General's position had become very delicate and he was
falling more and more into disfavor, he was, however, trusted implicitly by the colonial
forces and the hearts of the French people were with him uniformly.
Even though Marshal Petain had let General Weygand go with reluctance, this act of the
French government showed its decision to sacrifice American supplies in North Africa. That
Jean Francois Darlan and Minister of the Interior Pierre Pucheu, both advocates of stronger
relations with Germany, had won a great victory was evident, and it was believed that
France- German cooperation would be much stronger in the future. 11 ™
478. Japanese Insist on French lndo-China as Site for Negotiations
Attempting to have France empower French lndo-China officials to negotiate directly with
Japan, Japan was informed that France would not, by any means, leave these negotiations
up to its representatives in French lndo-China. Since the Colonial Minister was on a trip
to Africa, it would be impossible to settle the matter immediately. Therefore, Mr. Arnald
had suggested to Japanese Official Harada that either Tokyo or Vichy be chosen for the
negotiations. If it were decided that the rubber question had any connection with the
Armistice Commission, it would be better to hold the negotiations in Vichy. Mr. Harada
had explained that such negotiations were different from those held in the spring and were
designed primarily to elaborate in a different way on the terms of the treaty. Since the
situation in Japan was now very tense, Mr. Harada suggested that Arnald reconsider the place
of negotiations and issue the required instructions to French lndo-China. Arnald promised
to reconsider the matter and reply in two or three days. 1107
In a subsequent dispatch, however, Tokyo learned that Mr. Arnald had instructed the
Governor of French lndo-China to leave the discussion to the Japanese and French officials
in Vichy with the alternative of leaving the matter up to the military headquarters of both
armies. 1108
""IV, 964.
"° 6 IV, 965.
IV, 966.
""IV, 967.
"" IV, 968.
visas.
235
479. Tokyo Arranges Contract for Additional Rubber
On November 24 Tokyo informed its officials in Vichy that French Indo-China authorities
had had no instructions from France since last month and that no arrangement had been
made with the Yokohama Specie Bank for payment. It was suggested in this dispatch that
since only 5,000 of the 10,000 tons previously agreed upon were available, that Japanese
merchants contract for the 5,000 tons immediately. It was also advised that Japan assume
the export tax of the supplementary amount supplied, although it had been agreed when
Mr. Fujio Minoda, the Japanese representative in Saigon, had talked with the French Indo-
Chinese economic representative Mr. Martin, that Japan would assume only half of the
amount of the export tax. Because it was possible to load only 2,900 tons during November and
all available vessels were filled, it was necessary to assign the Akamine Maru to load rubber." 09
480. Specialists are En Route to Bangkok Office
On November 24 Minister Yoshizawa in Hanoi informed the Japanese Minister in Bangkok
that two specialists were en route to his office via Saigon. These two men, Toshiro Sakai and
Irakame Okuda, would be assigned to his office. 1110
481. Minister Iwaturo I chivama Complains of Lack of Information Concerning Japanese-United
States Negotiations
Since the representatives of Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China were aware of
the matters being discussed in Japanese-United States negotiations, the Japanese Minister
at Hanoi, Iwaturo Uchiyama, declared in his dispatch to Tokyo on November 25 that the
Hanoi Foreign Office had been left out of the picture since it was uninformed of its role in
case war broke out. The Foreign Office organ had been advised by the military that a reply
would be forthcoming from the United States on November 25 and that, if such a report
were true, the Japanese Cabinet would no doubt make a decision between peace and war
within the next day or two. Should the Japanese-American negotiations be brought to a
successful termination, it would be possible to launch the plans which had been laid down
in advance. However, should the negotiations not end successfully, Japanese fences in
French Indo-China would be able to move within the day since practically all preparations
for the campaign had been completed. In the event of war, the Minister was concerned as to
whether the status quo should be maintained insofar as French Indo-China 's governmental
setup was concerned. He asked that he be advised by cable or special messenger service
since it was imperative that prior arrangements be made as far in advance as possible. 1111
482. Japanese Officials Told to Disregard French Attitude
Foreign Minister Togo directed on November 26 that Japan disregard the attitude of
French authorities and act on the basis of Japanese demands in regard to the problem of the
local army in French Indo-China. This stand was taken since it was expected that the French
would not easily concede to Japanese demands. It was further directed that when similar
problems occurred in the future, a reply in accordance with this policy should be made to
French Indo-Chinese authorities. 1112
Foreign Minister Togo directed on November 26 that officials in Saigon investigate the
dynamiting of the American Consulate there and wire a reply. 1 " 3
1109 IV, 969.
'"°IV,970.
""IV, 971.
,1,S IV, 972.
" n IV, 973.
236
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
483. Japan Encounters Difficulty in Securing Roundabout Visas
Experiencing difficulty in securing roundabout travel visas for two secretaries, Mr. Kimio
Murai and Mr. Kiku Murakami of the Yoshizawa party, Foreign Minister Togo asked that
negotiations be conducted with French authorities so that instructions could be sent to
Ambassador Henri in Japan. It was pointed out that the two secretaries had visas for direct
travel only and that this fact hindered activities of the Imperial Envoy and necessitated a
wait of about a month in their travel. 1111
484. French Accede to Japanese Demands Concerning Rubber Negotiations
That the French had acceded to Japanese demands and had consented to conduct
negotiations in Hanoi regarding the rubber question and the purchase of rice was forwarded
by Ambassador Kato in Vichy on November 28, 1941. 111S
Although Tokyo made no objections to negotiating in Vichy regarding rubber, it was
pointed out that the method of making payments for rice was contained in Article 22 of the
Joint- Defense Agreement. It was emphasized that details regarding amounts and price
would be worked out on the spot in Hanoi. Tokyo asked that Vichy officials be urged to
accept this arrangement. 1118
485. Mr. Ogawa Suggested as Liaison Officer
To act as liaison official between the Japanese diplomatic staff and the army in French
Indo-China, Foreign Minister Togo suggested that Mr, Ogawa be attached to the military
forces. As long as war did not break out, there was no change in the duties of the Embassy
Office with regard to enlightenment and propaganda, but during war time, this work was the
prerogative of the military forces in French Indo-China. 1 117
486. Japan Promises Not to Increase Her Troops in Indo-China
According to a United Press report from Vichy, the Saigon radio station had broadcasted
that Japan promised no further increase of troops in French Indo-China, and that she would
not use French Indo-China as a base for attacking the Burma road. It was reported that
Ambassador Yoshizawa would make the promise to Governor General Decoux. The United
Press report had been sent to Tokyo from Vichy. 1,18
487. Mr. Yokoyamu in Hanoi Negotiates for Supplies
On December 3, 1941, Mr. Katsukiyo Yokoyamu, Japanese Representative in Hanoi,
informed the Home Office that after conferring with Captain Kakiuchi of the Navy, he had
received only a vague order from the Navy Department to ship 24,000 liters of gasoline to the
Hainan Island. Since the method of transportation or means of storage of the gasoline had not
been stated and since the Fleet had asserted that, because of the danger at hand, it would
be impossible for them to carry the gasoline, Mr, Yokoyamu requested that the Navy
Department send more complete orders on this at once.
In addition, it was suggested that in the event of the approaching emergency the Shigen
Chosa, a natural resources research group in Hanoi, complete the most urgent of the metal
problems with which they were engaged and close their affairs at once. 1119
" u rv, 974.
1,15 IV, 975.
1,16 IV, 976.
""IV, 977.
" 19 IV, 978.
""IV, 979.
On the following day Tokyo dispatched to Hanoi the information that the Navy Department
had sent instructions to the Chief of the Munitions Section on Hainan Island and desired that
Mr. Yokoyamu get in contact with the representative of the Munitions Section at Saigon in
order to obtain supplies. 11211
488. Japan Prepares to Invade French Concession in Shanghai
That Japan was also preparing its affairs in the event that complications arose between
Japan and Soviet Russia was apparent from the information contained in a dispatch from
Shanghai to Tokyo on December 4, 1941, Bearing in mind the relations existing between
Japan and France, Japanese officials were to inform the French Ambassador in advance that
Japan would take necessary military measures in the French Concession Shanghai.
If the French authorities would agree to refrain from applying their laws of protection in
the Concession, Japan would be able to exercise the suppression of enemy activities and
the disposition of enemy property in the Concession without enforcing Japanese military
orders and regulations. Should French authorities, however, not agree to this, Japan would
pour in its military police without any regard to the attitude which the local French authori-
ties might take. In discussing the action, the Japanese official was to bear in mind that an
occupation of this kind should be accomplished after the central authorities had agreed to
it. 1121
489. Tokyo Orders French to Cooperate in Efforts Against Sabotage
On December 5, 1941 Tokyo ordered that French authorities in Indo-China cooperate with
the Japanese in stopping the sabotage efforts of the Chungking sympathizers in that country, 1122
Furthermore, two days later, Tokyo asked that steps be taken by French Indo-Chinese
490. Japan Decrees Removal of British and American Consuls
On December 7, 1941 Tokyo directed that the Japanese Minister in Hanoi confer with the
French Indo-Chinese authorities about the British and American consuls, that contact then
be made on the next day with Japanese military leaders for action, and that this action be
so taken as to make the French Indo-Chinese authorities appear responsible. 1121
491 . Joint-Defense of French Indo-China Proclaimed
Ambassador Kato in Vichy learned on December 8 that Major General Akito Nakamura
had issued the joint defense agreement a few minutes past midnight on December 7. At
dawn on December 8, Allied agencies and establishments in French Indo-China were taken
over and important persons were interned. Ambassador Kato was instructed to assure the
French officials that diplomatic officials were being given particular consideration. The
Commander of the combined forces in French Indo-China had undertaken the invasion of
Thailand at 3:20 a.m. on December 8.' 126
According to a dispatch from Hanoi which was relayed by Tokyo to Vichy on December 8,
1941, the Military Attache, Col. Seiichi Ito and the Naval Attache, Mr. Horiuchi, planned to
negotiate with Governor General Decoux concerning a secret military agreement for the joint
mc lV, 980.
ml IV, 981.
"' 2 IV, 982.
""IV, 983.
""IV, 984.
""IV, 985.
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
defense of Indo-China. As representatives of the Imperial Army High Command and the
Imperial Navy Command and upon orders from the Imperial Headquarters, the representa-
tives would present the text of the cooperative scheme on the morning of December 8.
The proposal asked for general, specific and detailed cooperation with Japan by all
French Indo-Chinese agencies and demanded that French Indo-China lend its strength of arms,
if necessary, against Japan's enemies, among whom now stood England and the United
States. On presenting the proposal Military Attache Ito would demand an immediate
answer.
When the Minister at Hanoi expressed his incredulity that Governor General Decoux
could, himself, answer the demands, Military Attache Ito answered that should the French
Indo-Chinese authorities delay by attempting to wire Vichy, the Japanese army would carry
out the terms of the proposals. Should it be necessary, the Attache informed the Minister,
Japan would occupy French Indo-China militarily. 1126
492. Japan Denies Change in Troop Disposition in French Indo-China
Japan informed Hanoi that a reported last minute change in the destination of the military
forces in Indo-China was false. The Chiefs of both the Military and the Naval Affairs Bureaus
insisted that they knew nothing of the rumored change in plan, and action was to be taken
in accordance with the decisions previously reached in the joint conference. 1127
493. Darlan Declares that France Will Take a Neutral Stand
Apparently having been informed of Japan's intentions in French Indo-China and Thailand,
Defense Minister Darlan declared that after taking note of each item he would call the atten-
tion of the Colonial Minister, C. Platon, to the details. 1128
According to a later dispatch, however, Mr. Darlan promised to confirm the Japanese pro-
posal in writing and declared that the French Government would take the neutral position of
maintaining friendly relations between France and Japan. 1129
'™IV, 986.
ml rV, 987.
llas IV, 988.
,,IS IV,989.
239
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(1) Japanese- Chungking Relations
494. Tokyo is Informed of a British- American-Chinese Financial Conference
According to an intelligence dispatch from Shanghai on October 20, 1941 the financial status
of the Chungking government had reached such a point that only a foreign loan of $200,000,000
in armaments and supplies would save it from bankruptcy. Mr. T. V. Soong, after talking with
American financial authorities, had obtained a promise of $100,000,000 worth of material,
$50,000,000 of which was to be supplied by the end of the year. However, according to Tokyo
sources, Chungking's critical situation made it necessary for Mr. Soong to ask for the full
amount in November. 1180
Japanese agents in Hong Kong reported a four-day British-American-Chinese financial con-
ference (October 12-15) which resulted in Great Britain and the United States urging that dollar
currencies be withdrawn and requesting that accurate data regarding Chungking monies in
circulation be supplied. According to these intelligence sources as relayed on October 25, 1941,
the Chinese delegates at the conference had reciprocated by making several proposals;
(a) Establishment of International Trade Bureau;
(b) Revision of the United States-China Silver Agreement to strengthen the currency ex-
change market;
(c) Acceptance by Hong Kong of the Chungking currency and the prevention of its inflation
by Hong Kong officials;
(d) The accomplishment of an all Latin -American asset-freezing program against Japan;
(e) The release of Chinese properties frozen by the United States and Great Britain to the
Chungking government for investigation and fair distribution;
(f) The establishment of an orderly trade relationship between Chungking and the United
States and the floating of a new loan of $100,000,000. im
495. Rumors Reach Tokyo of Secret Chungking-Communist Agreement
From a Hong Kong message dated October 22, 1941 Tokyo on October 31 revealed that Russia
had continued its supply of military goods to Chiang Kai-shek but had warned that this service
would have to be discontinued temporarily. 1132
This intelligence was supplemented on November 7 by a Shanghai dispatch which divulged
that rumors, apparently originated at the United States Consulate in Shanghai, told of a secret
Nationalist-Communist agreement of October 21. Since the full contents of this agreement
were not to be known by various divisions of the Nationalist Army, disputes had continued
after the date of the supposed conciliation. However, after realizing the folly of continued
activity against the Communists, the Chungking government had issued orders to cease oper-
ations. 1133
Another dispatch from Shanghai on November 28, confirmed that Chiang Kai-shek was
making peace with the Central Communist Party. This intelligence also supposed that there
were 400 American planes and over 300 volunteer pilots on the Tenmen Route. na<
" :!I IV, 991.
""IV. 992.
1133 IV, 993.
" 3 'rV,994.
241
4%. Japanese Authorities Increasingly Suspicious of Chungking- American Activities
According to another intelligence report from Shanghai on November 10, 1941, a Japanese
agent had declared that Chungking was negotiating for peace with Japan in order to camou-
flage its program for increasing its military strength, in addition to slowing Japanese prog-
ress.
Japanese authorities in Tokyo were all the more suspicious on November 13, when a report
from Shanghai confided that someone (probably Owen Lattimore, representative of the United
States at Chungking) had revealed that his government would not plan to change its policy
toward the Far East and that it had only agreed to enter into negotiations with Japanese Am-
bassador Saiburo Kurusu for a brief stalling period. In addition, the report continued, rumors
that special preparations for Ambassador Kurusu's trip to America had been made by the
United States, were false and had been started only as part of Japan's propaganda. I1M
497. Hong Kong is Informed or Measures to be Taken in China in the Event of a Japanese- American
War
Meanwhile, on November 14 in a message to the Japanese Consul- General in Hong Kong,
Foreign Minister Togo declared that although the Imperial Government was making a final
effort in Japanese-American negotiations, the outlook was not optimistic. In the event that
the negotiations failed, the Cabinet Council had decided upon special measures to be taken in
regard to China. These included the expulsion of British and American military and naval
forces in China, the acquisition of enemy concessions and important interests, and the seizure
of enemy interests which were connected with the National Government . 1137
In effecting these measures and to ensure the potentiality to face a lengthy world-war, care
must be taken to avoid exhaustion of national strength and to lighten the burden on man-
power and on material resources. In order to gain popular sentiment on the basis of Japanese-
Chinese cooperation, Foreign Minister Togo urged that encouragement be given the activities
of the Chinese Leaders in occupied territories; and while making peace a reality in those areas
under Japanese power, great stress was to be laid on the acquisition of commodities, especial-
ly from unoccupied territories. Because of this, emphasis was placed upon a reasonable ad-
justment of existing limitations, and it was with this in view, the Foreign Minister said, that
the above points were decided." 38
ms IV, 995.
1,1,6 IV, 996.
'"'IV, 997.
'"'Ibid.
242
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL tt
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(m) Japanese-Nanking Relations
498. Nanking Appoints Minister Li Fang Commercial Attache to Berlin
Although it had originally been planned for Mr. Li Sheng-wu, Nanking's newly- appointed
Ambassador to Germany, to sail for Lisbon aboard the Asama Maru, ni * his position as Chief of
the Education Department made his immediate departure impossible. 1140 Two first secre-
taries, Mr. Tang and Mr. Feng, were then appointed to Ambassador Li Sheng-wu's staff, and
they were to fulfill his duties in Berlin until his arrival. 1141 Nanking officials later decided that
the secretaries were not sufficiently experienced for this mission and named Mr. Li Fang,
Minister to Rumania, to fill the post of Commercial Attache in Berlin, leaving only a Charge
in Rumania.
Ambassador Kumataro Honda in Nanking telegraphed these details to Ambassador Oshima
in Berlin on October 18, 1941, pointing out that Minister Li Fang was pro- Axis and had long
been associated with President Wang Ching-wei. It was doubted that Rumania would object
to Minister Li's transfer to Berlin insomuch as the Rumanian government did not have a full-
time minister in Nanking. 1142
499. German Diplomats Depart for Nanking
Ambassador Henrich D. Stahmer and Minister Erich Boltze, both of whom had been ap-
pointed as German representatives to Nanking on October 2, 1941, 1143 left Berlin on October 18
according to Ambassador Oshima. They expected to stop over in Tokyo for about two weeks
before taking up their new duties in Nanking, and Ambassador Oshima urged that the Japa-
nese in Nanking help them with their affairs, particularly in regard to living quarters. 1 ' 44
After Germany had officially recognized the puppet government in Nanking, arrangements
had been made for the two governments to exchange diplomats. Japan approved the appoint-
ment of Ambassador Li Sheng-wu to the Berlin post. Berlin then transferred Consul- General
Fischer in Shanghai to Nanking as the German Charge d'Affaires. 1145 and at the same time
that Ambassador Stahmer and Minister Boltze were named, Berlin designated Mr. Johannes
Borchers as a member of their staff. 1148
500. Nanking Refuses to Comment on Tojo Cabinet
The change of the home government in Japan on October 18, 1941 caused some alarm in
parts of China, according to reports from Nanking and Canton. On October 20, 1941 Ambas-
sador Kumataro Honda in Nanking reported a conversation of the Minister of Publicity of the
National Government of China, Lin Pai-sheng. Mr. Lin supposedly said that the resignation
of the Konoye Cabinet had shocked his government but that the appointment of General Tojo
who had long worked for a settlement of the China incident was reassuring. Insomuch as the
People's Government felt that any comment about the change in Cabinets might reflect dis-
advantageous^ on them, Mr. Lin remarked that they planned to make no official state-
1,38 III, 1093.
""Ill, 109jj.
IH, ru, 1103.
""IV, 998,
" ,3 ni,noo.
""IV, 999.
""Ill, 1099.
""HI, 1100.
""IV, 1000.
243
High officials of the Chiang Kai-shek government in the Canton area had expressed uneasi-
ness at the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet until they heard of General Tojo's appointment.
They seemed to feel that the new Cabinet would break the deadlock in the Japanese-American
negotiations either by reducing Japanese military operations in China or by bringing about a
war between Japan and the United States, which would give the Chungking government the
opportunity to wage a counter offensive. 1,1,8
501. Occupied China Attempts to Stabilize Its Currency
In their attempts to stabilize monetary value in the new National Government of China, the
Japanese had difficulty in coordinating the currency throughout occupied China. Foreign
Minister Togo on October 20 informed Peking officials that he planned to handle the matter of
partial revision within the law of temporary control of currency and that he wanted to do it in
such a way as to meet with the complete approval of the Chinese authorities; consequently, he
desired the opinions of the Chinese forwarded to him as soon as possible, 1 ,4a
The fall of the legal tender's value necessitated conferences in Nanking. On October 31
Ambassador Honda reported that many of the Nanking officials felt that the legal tender
should be kept at a certain rate. Although no definite arrangements had been made to put this
stabilization plan into effect, another meeting was scheduled for November 4, 1941. 1150
502. Japan Distributes Newspapers to the Chinese
The Japanese continued their efforts to propagandize the Chinese both in and out of occu-
pied China. One of the methods which they used extensively was the distribution of Japanese-
edited newspapers. On October 22 Ambassador Honda in Nanking telegraphed Tokyo that
they had begun mailing to many cities three days' issues packed together in large unsealed
envelopes. The papers thus disseminated were the Central Telegraphic News, the Central
News, the Republic Daily News, the Old Nanking Newspaper, and the Transit Daily News. He
added that copies of these papers destined for Singapore, Siam, Saigon, and Hanoi were sent
in care of Japanese military authorities and that those addressed to Manila were the only ones
which were handled through the facilities of the Nanking diplomatic staff. 1 151
503. Ambassador Honda Plans Trip to Tokyo
Ambassador Honda in Nanking advised Foreign Minister Togo on October 22 that he planned
to return to Japan about the middle of November and that he was bringing with him three men
attached to his staff. After expressing his desire to speak personally with the new head of the
Foreign Office, Ambassador Honda pointed out that one of the secretaries who was accom-
panying him would be able to reveal the details of the political intrigues which were under
way in Nanking.' 162
.504. The Vatican Reportedly Favors the Nanking Government
Papal recognition of the National Government of China was sought by the Japanese, but on
October 28 the Japanese Embassy in Rome revealed an intelligence report from the Vatican
which stated that the government at Chungking would not recognize an apostolic envoy whose
seat was at Nanking. Apostolic Delegate Zanini at Peking was credited with informing the
Vatican that the Catholic Bishop of Chungking had definitely said Chiang Kai-shek would
""rv. urn.
1002.
llM> rv, ioo3.
" 51 IV, 1004.
""IV, 1005.
244
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
permit no association with the People's Government; and therefore, it would be impossible to
have one delegate serve both governments.
According to this intelligence report, Pope Pius XII felt that Chungking's attitude was
merely a trick to force him to acknowledge it as the real government of China. But since he ex-
pected unoccupied China to surrender to the Japanese insomuch as it could not receive sup-
port from Russia, the Pope planned at present to leave Delegate Zanini with President Wang
and to have the Bishop of Chungking take care of the Catholic interests in his area. Rome
requested that the Foreign Office in Tokyo check the accuracy of this report. usa
A week later Ambassador Horikiri in Rome again telegraphed Tokyo, pointing out that the
Vatican attributed special importance to the sources of its secret information; hence it was
imperative that the Japanese know the accuracy of the October 28th report. 1154
On November 10 Foreign Minister Togo relayed this request to Peking, asking that the reli-
ability of the secret agent in that city be checked. 1156 Four days later the Foreign Minister re-
ported some verification to Rome. Professor Hosoi of an unnamed Catholic univeristy had
supposedly discovered that Catholic dignitaries headed by Apostolic Delegate Zanini had
decided in secret meetings that the Nanking government should be recognized as the seat of
their ecclesiastical administration and had forwarded that recommendation to the Pope. 1156
505. Administration Difficulties Arise in Shanghai
Arrangements to place Japanese in administrative posts in the internal government of
Shanghai were under way by October 24. Foreign Minister Togo concurred in the appointments
of Commercial Attache Watari to the Municipal Council and Major Goto to the position of
Chief of the Secret Service Department. However, he specified that a Japanese appointed to the
latter post should be accorded equal rank with the Chief of the Detective Department. 1157
Three weeks later Shanghai telegraphed the People's Government in Nanking that Major
Goto's salary and car had been arranged and that he had been listed as an unofficial employee
of the Japanese Foreign Office. 1158
Shanghai officials on October 28 complained that their city lacked money for its ordinary
activities because of the reduction of trade following the freezing of British and American
assets. To offset the rising governmental expenses, it was suggested that the taxes and customs
be adjusted by the following means: 1) a revision of tax rates, imposing a better ratio between
necessities and superfluities; 2) a return to the gold standard; and 3) taxation of items previ-
ously exempted including military goods. IlM
506. Japan Concludes Agreement with the Shansi Army
The surrender and incorporation of the Shansi army into the Nanking puppet forces had not
been completed by late October. Mr. Sakuji Hayashi in Peking revealed that General Yen
Hsi-shan, the head of the Shansi army, complained that Japan had not supplied the Septem-
ber and October quota of arms and funds and that it was impossible to complete the transfer
without Japanese cooperation. It was arranged for Mr. Iwamatsu, the Chief of the First Army,
to meet with General Yen near Kogi in an effort to solve the problems, and General Yen was
assured that Japan was assembling the funds promised to his organization. 1160 On October 30
im IV, 1006.
" M IV, 1007.
1155 IV, 1008.
n **JV, 1009.
" S 'IV, 1010. (DoD comment: Possibly refers to a Major Goshima.)
" 5 "IV, 1011.
" 5S IV. 1012.
""IV, 1013.
245
Peking announced that as a result of these negotiations a final agreement with the Shansi
army had been satisfactorily concluded. 1181
507. President Wang Desires Collaboration with Chungking
Earlier in October Tokyo had agreed to contact President Wang Ching-wei on all the details
involving occupied China that were discussed in the conversations between Secretary Hull
and Ambassador Nomura. 1162 But on October 28 President Wang again expressed to Minister
Hidaka his anxiety over these negotiations. He felt that a fusion of the Nanking and Chung-
king governments should be effected immediately and that the prolonging of the Washington
conversations might prevent Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from seeking such a concilia-
tion."* 3
Shanghai officials on November 1 notified Tokyo that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-
wei had reached an understanding over the appointment of the chairman of the North China
Affairs Board immediately after Mr. Yen Hsi-shan, the head of the Shansi army, had severed
relations with the Chungking government. It was reported that Chiang wished to use Chang
Hsueh-liang as Mr. Yen's successor. Although the Shanghai dispatch stated that this report
was probably propaganda supported by Commander Bei Tsung-chi of the 9th Route Army, it
advised that a thorough investigation be made immediately. ll8<
508. Japan Initiates New System for the China Affairs Board
The Japanese Cabinet Council in August had decided on the establishment of Japanese
administrative organs in China, and on November 1 Foreign Minister Togo telegraphed the
final plans to Shanghai and Nanking. As of that date the control of affairs by the China Af-
fairs Board was to be superseded by a new administrative system which included the following
changes: 1) local offices of the China Affairs Board would take over the functions of the former
Trade Offices; 2) the Welfare Ministry would incorporate the former employees of the China
Affairs Board into its personnel; 3) employees having important duties in relation to Japanese
trade could communicate directly with the Welfare Ministry; 4) low-salaried local employees
could be used as temporary consular clerks; and 5) overseas officials would report local sani-
tary conditions to the Welfare Ministry.' 165
On November 6 Nanking informed Foreign Minister Togo that the East Asia Development
Company wished to continue their close contact with the Japanese Foreign Office. 1I(!B
509. Japan Proposes Methods of Controlling Chinese Nationals Abroad
As had been the case in Germany, Chinese nationals in Portugal evinced a pro- Chungking
attitude. On November 4 Ambassador Horokiri in Rome advised Nanking to establish a lega-
tion in Lisbon as soon as possible, pointing out that the Chungking representative there would
create difficulties. 116 '
Japanese officials throughout eastern Asia sent their recommendations to Nanking in regard
to representatives of the People's Government. The Embassy in Bangkok suggested that some-
one who was related to the Chinese by blood and who had a wide range of acquaintances among
the Chinese population should be sent to do propaganda work. Saigon proposed that the Nan-
king delegate should organize Chinese there into pro- Wang groups.
1,61 IV, 1014.
1161 III, 1109.
,16a rv, 1015.
""TV, 1016.
" es IV, 1017.
" 66 IV, 1018.
" !T rv, ioi9.
246
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The reports from Rangoon, Batavia, Singapore and Manila were discouragingly alike, stat-
ing that any pro-Nanking work would be impeded by the stiff opposition of the Chungking
government and by the British, American, and Dutch influences. They suggested that radio
broadcasts and newspapers be used to disseminate propaganda. 1168
Tokyo on November 21 decided that Japanese agents who were to work among Chinese resi-
dents abroad should be immediately transferred to Macao, French Indo-China, Thailand,
and other Japanese occupied territories." 69
510. Japanese Apprehend Blue Shirt Terrorists
Military police in Shanghai were reported to have arrested Major General Chin Kyo-ju, nTD
the Chief of the Shanghai branch of the Blue Shirts and the head of the Chungking terrorists,
according to a Nanking dispatch dated November 6, 1941. As a result of this arrest, the Japa-
nese obtained information concerning the background and affiliations of those engaged in
terrorism in Shanghai, and they expected to use this information to prevent future activities
of the Blue Shirts. 1111
On November 21 Shanghai officials declared that the Blue Shirts' activities in Shanghai
and Nanking had been completely stopped, but that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was
still attempting to promote underground movements in those areas. 1 " 2 Apparently political
prisoners captured in northern China were to be sent to Nagasaki; for the following day Tokyo
requested information concerning the method, channels, means of transportation and time
required for shipping the prisoners. 117 ' 1
511. Ambassador Oshima Urges Mr. Li Sheng-wu to Report to Berlin Immediately
On November 10, 1941 Ambassador Oshima requested that the People's Government in
Nanking arrange in some way to have Ambassador Li Sheng-wu take office in Berlin imme-
diately. Referring to earlier messages of his which pointed out that the adverse propaganda of
Chinese residents in Germany made it advisable to have a Japanese -supported representative
from Nanking, Ambassador Oshima stated that the uncertain date of the Asama Mam's sail-
ing made it seem advisable to have Ambassador Li use a different route, perhaps via South
America on an Italian plane." 74 Although Mr. Oshima had received Nanking's dispatch of
October 18 which told of Minister Li Fang's appointment as commercial attache in Berlin, 1175
apparently he felt that the situation required the Ambassador's presence.
512. Japan, Manchuria, and China Plan Exchange Broadcasts
Foreign Minister Togo announced that the first anniversary of J aparrese-Manchurian- Chi-
nese collaboration would be celebrated by a special exchange of broadcasts between the three
countries at 7:20 p.m. on November 30. Each country was to be allowed ten minutes. 1116
513. Japan Plans to Confiscate Third Country Concessions in China
Possible Japanese occupation of the International Concession in Shanghai raised the ques-
tion of what demands were to be enforced on citizens of third countries; such as the seizing of
""IV, 1020.
""IV. 1021.
""Kana spelling.
""IV, 1022.
""IV, 1023.
""IV, 1024.
""IV, 1025.
""IV, 998.
""IV, 1026.
247
businesses held by third country nationals and the control of wireless, mail, newspapers, and
other details not under the authority of the municipal council; and the treatment of the con-
sular groups. Japanese officials in Shanghai requested clarification of the Home Office's
policy in regard to this on December 2, pointing out that the Nanking army headquarters dis-
approved of such action despite the fact that it might shortly be imperative. 1177
Foreign Minister Togo two days later replied that in the event of a sudden international
crisis it would be to Japan's advantage to occupy the joint concessions; however, he empha-
sized that Japan had hitherto respected the International Concession and that in enforcing
a military occupation of it, there should be as little destruction as possible. Mr. Togo men-
tioned that he personally favored leaving the French concessions alone. 1178
514. Japan Extends Its Control Over the Chinese
Mr. Fujishima in Shanghai outlined the Japanese policy in regard to an unidentified Chi-
nese organization, the Kumonkai, 1179 in a dispatch to Consul General Nagai dated December
1, 1941, The plan under study included the Japanese domination of the branches of the Ko-
monkai in China proper and eventually of those in Thailand and Malaya, and the means for
the accomplishment of this domination included control of the leaders of the societies, mutual
credit and banking associations, propaganda, and trade associations. 118 "
Foreign Minister Togo informed Peking officials the following day that enemy juridical per-
sons, particularly financial representatives, were to be prevented from fleeing with their docu-
ments, coins, valuable specie, gold and silver trinkets, et cetera. Buildings which belonged to
such persons and which were then deemed necessary for military use were to be occupied al-
though the Japanese could not seize personal property and should not make a general seizure
of buildings which were not needed immediately. 1 181
515. Japanese Leaders Outline Their War Policy in China
Five Japanese leaders, Commander Kitazawa of the army of North China, Vice Chief of
Staff Arisue, Mr. Nishimura of the Fourth Section of Staff Headquarters, Chief of Staff Kaza-
yama, and Liaison Officer Shiozawa of the Chinese Development Board, conferred in Peking
on December 1 and 2, 1941. They telegraphed their conclusions to the Foreign Office in Tokyo
on the day following the conference.
Insomuch as the impending war would decide the fate of the Japanese Empire, they stressed
that attention should be given to the larger aspects rather than to insignificant local matters.
The latter should be administered carefully and in accordance with international laws; for
"the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the existence of Japan and the mainte-
nance of peace in East Asia" should be emphasized to all nations in an effort to strengthen
Japan's position at the war's conclusion.
Referring to the Russo-Japanese war in which President Theodore Roosevelt acted as peace
mediator, they stated that the only possible intermediary for this war would be the Pope. There-
fore, it would be necessary to handle enemy churches with this point in mind.
The management of China should be left to the Chinese insofar as that was possible, a
policy which would enable Japan to turn its attention to the other phases of the war. The prob-
: a1
""IV, 1027.
" ,8 IV, 1028.
1,18 Kana spelling.
"TV, 1029.
"*'IV, 1030.
248
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL
Vice Chief of Staff Yadoru Arisue pointed out that in permitting China a freer hand in its
internal affairs, Japan might be thought weakened. It was essential, according to Vice Chief
Arisue, that the Chinese not be allowed to make such a mistake." 82
516. Japan Fights Espionage in Northern China
From Tsingtao on the northern coast of China came a report on December 6, 1941, saying
that many of the Jews in that sector were anti- Japanese. Included in this group were approxi-
mately forty German Jews. Naval officials had requested that they be allowed to take military
measures against this faction, but before that could be done, an understanding with the Ger-
man consuls would have to be obtained. 1183
The same day Hsingking asked for information in regard to the handling of enemy nationals.
On November 19 "an outline of emergency measures against espionage" had been submitted
which stipulated, as measures against nationals of enemy countries, that males between the
ages of nineteen and forty-five were to be taken as well as those persons having special attain-
ments or exceptional talents, and that measures could be taken against diplomatic offices
and their staffs and the property of enemy nations, including ships. Insomuch as there was a
wide divergence between this outline and the one recently approved by the Foreign Office's
Investigation Department, Hsingking officials were undecided as to which plan to follow. 1 " 4
517. Nanking Outlines Method of Handling Enemy Nationals and Property
On December 7 Nanking announced its policies for the disposition of matters pertaining to
the enemy, including diplomatic missions, enemy civilians in general, civilian enemy prop-
erty, and netural foreign countries.
In regard to the diplomatic missions, all work of the consulates of enemy nations was to be
terminated and the following steps were to be taken: 1) the use of all radio apparatus would be
prohibited; 2) the receiving and dispatching of all coded messages would be prohibited; 3) per-
mits for the dispatching and receiving of all plain text telegraph messages would be required;
4) both military and diplomatic personnel would be sent to guard the enemy consulates; 5)
the use of telephones would be prohibited; 6) the displaying of colors would be prohibited; 7)
consuls and their staffs would reside within the consulate buildings and would be required to
obtain permission to contact outside persons; 8) Chinese clerks and interpreters would be
required to obtain permits to enter or to leave the consulates; 9) identification cards would be
issued to all Chinese servants employed in consulates; 10) consuls and their staffs would be
required to comply with all official instructions regarding their evacuation; and 11) offices and
residences would be sealed after consulate personnel had been evacuated.
Civilian enemy persons would be required to swear that they would engage in no actions
harmful to Japan, but they would be permitted to keep residence and to travel outside the city
limits of Nanking if they held travel permits from Japanese military authorities. Mail would
be censored; telegrams in plain language would be sent only by special permission. All meet-
ings and speeches by such persons would be cancelled, and religious representatives in this
category would not be allowed to discuss current events.
As for civilian enemy property, the government would confiscate all property which was of
military value; however, schools, churches, and hospitals were not to be touched and their
normal activities might continue.
The third power which was to be responsible for enemy diplomatic interests would be noti-
fied of its duty orally, and nationals of foreign, non-belligerent nations were to be treated as
always unless they were proved to be of bad character. 1185
""'IV, 1031.
""IV, 1032.
'""IV, 1033.
IIS5 IV, 1034.
249
518. Japan Directs Nanking Not to Participate in the War
In a circular letter issued on December 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Togo stated that the Nation-
al Government of China was not to declare war at that time. 1 186
519. Tripartite Powers Secure Shortwave Broadcasting Unit in Shanghai
On December 8 Foreign Minister Togo directed Shanghai officials to take immediate steps
to commandeer a powerful broadcasting station belonging to the Chinese or any other enemy
power. This would be done in cooperation with the German and Italian authorities and would
be utilized as a propaganda medium both internally and externally. The Foreign Minister
suggested that a national of a neutral country, possibly a Frenchman, be used as the agent
for this. 1187
""IV, 1035.
""IV, 1036.
250
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(n> Japanese- Netherlands East Indies Relations
520. Consul General Ishizawa Arranges to Leave Batavia
As diplomatic relations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan became increas-
ingly strained, Consul General Yutaki Ishizawa in Batavia requested that his Home Office
permit him to return to Japan immediately. On October 23, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo
notified the Consul that his return would have to be postponed until Consul General Shunsuke
Asada at Bangkok arrived to take his place. Insomuch as the Foreign Minister desired a per-
sonal report on conditions at Bangkok, Consul Asada's arrival in Batavia would be delayed. 1 189
Two days later Mr. Ishizawa explained his predicament to the Foreign Minister, stating
that on October 8 he had informed Jacob E. Hoogstraten, Vice Minister of Economic Affairs,
that the Netherlands East Indies' reply to the Japanese had been so unsatisfactory that there
was no point in continuing negotiations; therefore, he planned to return to Japan. These state-
ments had been made, the Consul remarked, in an effort to bluff the Dutch into reconsidering
the matter; however, when they showed no indications of doing that, the Consul had an-
nounced that he would sail for Japan on the Takatiho Maru. After notifying the local news-
papers of his decision, he had started paying his farewell calls, and now to be forced to postpone
his departure after matters had proceeded so far would be "exceedingly embarrassing". Con-
sul Ishizawa then requested that Tanun Kotani, who had had much experience in dealing with
the Dutch authorities be appointed Acting Consul General until Consul Asada arrived. 1189
There followed an interchange of dispatches between Foreign Minister Togo and Consul
General Ishizawa; the former insisting that it was necessary for the Consul to remain in Bata-
via, 1180 the latter asking for permission to leave. 11 " In one instance he informed the Foreign
Minister that he was paying his farewell call to the Governor -General at a luncheon on October
30; and that since the sailing of ships for Japan was irregular and the British no longer issued
visas for airplane passage via Singapore, his remaining after the sailing of the Tahahito Maru
on November 8, 1132 might necessitate a considerable delay which Dutch officials would un-
doubtedly consider strange. 1193
521. Dutch Officials Become Suspicious of Japanese in the Indies
Trade relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies were deadlocked and a
diplomatic break became more and more evident. Although Consul Ishizawa had informed
Dutch officials early in October that further negotiations were futile and that he planned to
return to Japan immediately, 1191 the staff of the Japanese Consulate in Batavia continued
to be conspicuously large, thus arousing the suspicions of the Dutch.
According to the Consul's dispatch of October 27, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, A.H.J.
Rofinck, had demanded reasons for the recent increase in the Japanese diplomatic staff and
warned that if the Japanese were camouflaging military activities through their diplomatic
offices, the Dutch government would not remain silent. Although the Consul attempted to
refute Mr. Rofinck's claims by pointing out that the recent trade conferences had necessitated
the personnel, he concluded that the Dutch official was unimpressed and admitted that it
was hard to predict the future plans of the Netherlands East Indies government."* 5
""IV, 1037.
""IV, 1038.
" M 1V, 1039.
""IV, 1040.
""IV. 1041.
""IV, 1042.
""IV. 1038.
" ,S IV, 1043.
251
522. Japanese Trade and Shipping Problems (October 18-30, 1941 )
By October, 1941, trade relations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies had
reached the point where major businesses and manufacturing houses were considering closing
and returning home. In a secret departmental message to Tokyo on October 18 Consul Gen-
eral Ishizawa in Batavia urged that the Borneo Petroleum, the South Seas Development Com-
pany, the South Seas Forestry Company, the Borneo Trading Companies, and the Pearl But-
ton Company be subsidized in order that their rights and interests be preserved. He suggested
that the Finance Minister should request the Yokohama Specie Bank to release funds for
this. 1196
Two days later the Borneo Trading Company asked that telegraphic connections with its
head office in Kobe be established by the diplomatic staff. The word "oxbiz" was assigned to
the new channel. 1197
In a reply addressed to the Borneo Trading Company on October 24, Foreign Minister Togo
advised that he would apply to the Finance Ministry for 45,000 gilders in the form of a tempo-
rary loan through December. The Foreign Minister also advised that the assignment of a ship
to Shanghai was under consideration. 1198
Consul Ishizawa announced on October 22 that he was unable to hold negotiations with the
Dutch authorities because of the holidays of October 22 and 23; therefore, he asked that the
sailing of the Nissho Maru be postponed since, under the present circumstances, only miscel-
laneous goods could be loaded and it was impossible to unload any cargo. 1199
Foreign Minister Togo replied two days later that it would be impossible to postpone the
Nissho Maru's sailing; consequently further shipments of miscellaneous goods aboard this
vessel had been cancelled. It had been decided that soy sauce, fermented soy bean mash and
agar-agar would be sent. 11 "" 1
In addition to trade difficulties, Japan was finding it necessary to finance the opposition of
Chinese activities throughout the Indies. On October 23 Foreign Minister Togo informed the
Batavia office that he was forwarding 15,000 yen to cover the October- December program. 1201
Negotiations had not yet been concluded when Consul Ishizawa sent his admonition to Japa-
nese officials in Tokyo on October 23. He accused them of completely disregarding his warning
by shipping cotton textile and other goods to the Indies, thereby accumulating a credit of
80,000,000 yen which the Dutch had immediately frozen. On the other hand, the Nether-
landers had invested only a negligible amount in Japan, and Japan was now in a very dis-
advantageous position. 1202
Mr. Ishizawa threatened to discontinue his efforts if Tokyo authorities refused to take steps
to protect Japanese business and property in the Netherlands East Indies.
Continuing his complaint, the Consul explained that the Dutch had agreed at his request to
supply Japan with needed material, but that through Japan's red tape and inattentiveness,
the Tjisalak had had difficulty entering port and had been forced to sail empty. Under these
circumstances he pointed out that it was only natural that the Dutch should refuse to fulfill
Japanese wishes.
,lBa IV, 1044.
""IV, 1045.
1,s, nV, 1046.
1189 IV, 1047.
,M,, IV, 1048.
1101 IV, 1049.
lI0! IV, 1050.
252
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In addition he accused the home government of failure to keep him advised of pertinent
activities. Emphasizing his efforts to protect Japan's business enterprises in the East Indies,
he disclosed his plan to visit Vice Minister Hoogstraten who had favored an adjustment of
relations. Now, however, Mr. Hoogstraten had apparently given up; for he was departing for
Australia on October 31 leaving only the Director of Economic Affairs, Hubertus J. Van Mook,
and the newly-appointed Chief of the Trade Bureau, Suhinmeru, 1203 both of whom were un-
sympathetic to Japan. Nevertheless, the Consul promised to attempt an interview before Mr.
Hoogstraten's departure if, before that date, the Home Office would send its basic policies in
regard to the Indies. 12114
Since the time of Vice Minister Hoogstraten's departure was drawing near, Consul Ishizawa
again asked for information from Japan in a wire dated October 28. He also mentioned that
the number of Japanese nationals desiring to evacuate would overflow the Takatiho Maru
and the Nissho Maru which had been assigned for that purpose. 1205
In reply to Consul Ishizawa's remonstrances of October 23, Foreign Minister Togo advised
on October 29 that the Dutch did not realize the desperate situation of their branch banks and
firms in Japan, If Dutch bank balances in Japan were adequate, it was decided that loans
might be made to Dutch firms upon guarantee. Stating that very little cargo had been booked
for the Nissho Maru, he declared that normal shipping conditions could not be expected until
world affairs were settled. The Foreign Minister asked that Consul Ishizawa contact Mr, Hoog-
straten in an attempt to effect a trade policy. 1106
523. Japanese Agents Secure Military Information Concerning the Indies
In reply to a Tokyo War Department request for information concerning troops and planes, 1 " 07
Major Kuriya in Batavia submitted a report to the assistant Chief of Staff on October 25 reveal-
ing 1) the formation and combat methods of Netherlands East Indies pursuit planes; 2) the
organization of the air forces and the types of planes employed; 3) the location of the various
forces, and the types and number of planes recently received from the United States and Eng-
land. He estimated that the total number of planes which both the navy and army possessed
was between 700 and 1000. 1208
On October 29 Consul General Ishizawa reported to the Vice Minister and the Chief of the
General Staff in Tokyo on the general background and qualifications of the newly-appointed
commander in chief of the Netherlands East Indies Army, Lt. General H. terPoorten, stating
that the new chief was an authority on aviation and was probably the one most responsible for
mechanizing the Netherlands East Indies Army. Lt. General terPoorten was considered an
excellent strategist and had won the respect of his subordinates although a few felt that he
leaned toward Naziism. The Consul also submitted a brief resume of the career of the new
Chief of the General Staff, Colonel R Bakkers. 1209
Another message on the 29th to the same addressees divulged additional military informa-
tion concerning the induction of 1500 natives into the army. The East India Political Feder-
ation has issued the statement that the people of the East Indies realized their duty to serve
in the armed services and would build up the strength of their land through their legislative
and political parties. According to Consul Ishizawa this organization would not carry much
weight.
IM1 Kana Spelling.
'"TV, 1050.
mi rV, 1051.
,l0 'IV, 10S2.
'""IV, 1053.
'"•IV, 1054.
'-IV, 1055.
It was believed that while Vice Minister Hoogstraten, now the acting chief of economics, and
Mr. Duff-Cooper of England were both in Australia, they would confer on obtaining supplies
from there. 1210
A brief of newspaper reports was sent by Consul Ishizawa on October 31 to Tokyo. They re-
vealed that coastal defense maneuvers had been held on October 27 and 28 at unnamed land-
ing points on the south coast of Java and on Bali and Madura. Extensive maneuvers west of
Batavia in the Mawok and Tangeran regions and small ferry lands on various rivers were also
reported. 12 "
524. Dutch Governor-General Evinces No Alarm over Impending Crisis
During the course of his farewell calls in Batavia Consul General Ishizawa attended a dinner
arranged by the Govern or- General, Dr. A.W.L. Tjarda Van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer, on
October 30. On the following day the Consul made a lengthy report to the Foreign Office in
Tokyo concerning the conversation which he held with the Governor- General.
Attempting to discover the exact attitude of the Dutch toward Japan, Mr. Ishizawa had ex-
pressed his willingness to convey the Governor- General's messages to Foreign Minister Togo.
The Dutch official reportedly informed the Consul that the policies of the Netherlands East
Indies government were exactly what the Japanese had been told in their daily contacts with
Dutch authorities and that he had nothing to add to them; however, he expressed a willingness
to improve relations between the two countries should an opportunity present itself. Consul
Ishizawa inferred from the calm attitude of Dr. Van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer that the Indies
had already prepared for resistance against Japanese force and therefore did not need to effect
an understanding with Japan. 1212
525. Tokyo Plans the Evacuation of Japanese Nationals
In an effort to organize the mass evacuation of Japanese nationals scattered across the Neth-
erlands East Indies, Foreign Minister Togo on October 27 outlined plans for shipping them
aboard the Takatiho Maru and the Nissho Maru. He wired Consul General Ishizawa that the
1700 or 1800 evacuees originally scheduled for the Hawaii Maru should be accommodated in
the Takatiho Maru.
Listing the proposed routes of the two ships, the Foreign Minister said that ports of call for
the Nissho Maru would include Batavia, Makkasar, Menado, and Sandakan; for the Takatiho
Maru, Surabaya and Keelung. Passengers were expected to provide their own blankets and
were limited to one ton of baggage on the Takatiho Maru and two tons on the Nissho Maru.
Two days earlier the Consul had notified Tokyo that approximately 1700 nationals planned
to leave on those ships. He had stated that although the remaining Japanese merchants wished
to stay in the hope that the economic and commercial relations of the two countries would be
somewhat stabilized, they were preparing to evacuate at a later date should it become neces-
sary. The Japanese fishermen and farmers in Java remained unworried about the situation,
and the Consul assured the Foreign Office that their evacuation could be postponed until the
two nations had actually broken off relations. 1214
In reply to the Foreign Minister's evacuation plan, Consul General Ishizawa proposed that
the Nissho Mam's route include Sumaran even though it might necessitate canceling its
docking at Batavia. He explained that it would be an unnecessary expense and inconvenience
for the evacuees from central Java to travel to Soerabaja. 1215
1,14 IV, 1056.
111 l IV, 1057.
1Jla IV, 1058.
1)13 IV, 1059.
,m tV, 1038.
ms IV, 1060.
254
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The numbers of those who finally sailed aboard these ships was smaller than had been
anticipated, and the Foreign Minister expressed annoyance at this. He pointed out that this
made it necessary to dispatch another ship to accommodate those who had been left behind
and it was arranged, therefore, for the Fuji Maru to dock at Batavia on November 20 and to
leave Soerabaja about the 28th of that month. Foreign Minister Togo emphasized the import-
ance of having everything in readiness this time and of informing Soerabaja, Medan, and
Menado promptly. 1216
526. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Subsidy for Japanese Newspaper in Batavia
Consul General Ishizawa on November 2, 1941 suggested that the Foreign Office arrange to
cover the growing deficit of the Japanese language newspaper in Batavia. Although the issues
had been decreased and the expenses had been curtailed in order to counteract the financial
loss of subscriptions and advertisements caused by the evacuation of nationals, it would need
assistance to meet current expenses. The fact that the Chinese language papers were con-
tinuing as always increased the importance of maintaining the Japanese newspaper. Consul
Ishizawa estimated that 2,500 guilders would cover the deficit until the end of the fiscal year. 12 "
527. Communication Difficulties Arise in Batavia
The decrease in telephone communications between Japan and the Netherlands East
Indies caused Foreign Minister Togo to suggest that such calls be stopped temporarily and
resumed later if necessary. He intimated to Consul Ishizawa on November 6 that Japan
might curtail all international telephone conversations and requested the Consul's opinion
with regard to the Indies. 121 "
Two days later the Consul approved the cancellation of telephone service and reiterated that
there was little chance of securing permission from Dutch authorities to use the Japanese
language. 1219
Another communication difficulty confronted Consul Ishizawa in his exchange of telegraphic
messages with the Japanese Consul at Dilli, Tokitaro Kuroki. He requested that the Foreign
Office send Consul Kuroki code books, the abbreviated transmission code and telegraphic
addresses to facilitate the telegraphic work between the two offices. 1 "
528. Lt. Kuriya is Ordered to Return to Japan
In a telegram dated November 6 Japanese Staff Headquarters in Tokyo ordered Lieutenant
Kuriya to return to Japan by airplane after contacting the military attache at Bangkok and
the "tomi" group in Saigon.
Until the arrival of Lt. Toyoaki Yamauehi who was to continue Kuriya's work, Satoru Shimpo,
a Domei newsman in Batavia, and Yoshio Matsugaki, the Consul in Soerabaya, were directed
to take charge of his research. This provision made it unnecessary for Kuriya to delay his de-
parture for any reason. 1222
Two days after receiving his orders, Kuriya replied that he was sailing on the Takatiho
Maru on November 10 to avoid being interrupted by the British should he go via Bangkok. He
expected to arrive on November 24 or 25 but requested further instructions when he would reach
Keelung on approximately November 20. 1223
me IV, 1061.
u " IV, 1062.
,s "rV, 1063.
11 18 IV, 1064.
'™IV, 1065.
ms rV, 1067.
li!3 IV, 1068.
255
529. Dutch Authorities in Netherlands East Indies Prepare for War
On November 10 Consul Shinichi Hyasaki in Medan, having learned of Dutch preparations
to destroy oil fields and refineries on Sumatra in the event of war, wired two messages to the
Foreign Office in Tokyo relating the details of the Indies government's arrangement.
The destruction forces, divided into two groups both of which were to receive double pay,
were ready to destroy all oil fields in Susu and Brandan when advised to do so by telephone.
The refineries at Susu, Brandan, and Ran too 1 224 were fully mined, and two others were being
prepared. At Susu the wire net was reported as being very near the machinery while at Brandan
a short wire connected the machinery to the post office near the workers' barracks. tm
The Netherlands East Indies authorities were understood to have distributed sealed secret
orders which were to be opened the moment war was declared. The people had been ordered
to stop work and to stay away from crowds when the danger became imminent and swords
were being supplied for emergency use by those working in the fields. Automobile roads were
being constructed on both Sumatra and Borneo to avoid congestion on the national highways
and other preparations included the placing of cannon and the laying of mines at strategic
points. 1226
530. Supittai Denounces Japanese Foreign Policy
Vice Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, H. J. Spit, accused the Japanese
government of pursuing a policy of racial supremacy similar to Germany's stating that it had
become a threat to his country. According to a report of the conversation held between the
Vice-Governor- General and Consul General Ishizawa which was sent by the latter to Tokyo on
November 12, Mr. Spit had proclaimed that the "Dutch East Indies do not want to fight, but
they are not afraid to do so".
Consul Ishizawa had reviewed the developments between the two countries, concluding that
the Netherlanders had changed to an anti-Japanese political policy which made a reconcilia-
tion difficult. He attested that Japan had always based its aims upon justice and that he had
endeavored to convince the Netherlands East Indian authorities that the Japanese advance-
ment in southern French Indo-China offered no threat to the Dutch. After accusing Great
Britain, the United States, and Holland of selfishness in their use of the world's resources he
emphasized that the New Order in East Asia would prevent this.
Adamant in his stand, the Dutch official answered the Consul by saying, "Holland has not
been selfish. She has supplied the whole world with her resources. We understand the Japa-
nese idea so we refuse to accept it." 1 " 7
531 . Japan Orders Remaining Nationals to Return Immediately
As soon as he learned of the scheduled arrival of the Fiji Maru in Batavia, Consul General
Ishizawa pointed out to his Home Office that all Japanese merchants should be evacuated
since there was no possibility of business resuming. Local travel had become increasingly
difficult, and many nationals from outlying districts were gathering in Batavia to await the
Fuji Maru's arrival. Disclosing that he had been keeping in touch with army and navy author-
ities who agreed with him that a steamer should be made available about the end of Decem-
ber, the Consul inquired what should be done in the event that the international situation
became impossible before the complete evacuation was accomplished. 1421
m, Kana Spelling.
'™IV, 1069.
m, IV, 1070.
14 "rV, 1071.
lil8 IV, 1072.
256
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL
The same day, November 13, 1941, the Foreign Office telegraphed Batavia that the follow-
ing nationals should return to Japan: those engaged in farming and the employees of firms
as well as all those familiar with conditions in the Netherlands East Indies and with the lan-
guages. Only the officers most essential to Japanese firms should remain. The evacuees were
instructed that their departure should be made to seem a spontaneous withdrawal. 1229
The Consul replied that now that he knew the Foreign Office's policy in regard to evacuation,
he would attempt to comply with it; but indicated that it might not be possible to have as
many of the nationals as were expected aboard these ships. 1S3U
On November 16 Foreign Minister Togo amplified his directions of the 13th. The staffs of all
firms were urged to maintain business as much as possible. In the Medan district it had been
decided that three or four men of the Tozan Agricultural Products Company, two members of
the Showa Rubber Company, and one or two of the Sumatra Colonization could return to Japan
at the discretion of the appointed peoples. The South Seas Rubber Company's employees
were informed that they did not have sufficient personnel to permit anyone to leave, while the
evacuation of those connected with the Tropical Industries depended upon the completion of
a contract for management of the Mitsui New Tropical Rubber Plantation. 1231
The South Countries Company in the Batavia district was to be permitted to send anyone
whom Mr. Ogura approved. In this district the Nomura Supply Company was given instruc-
tions for the continuance of business.
Toshisuke Kondo of the Dutch East Indies Development Company in Banjermasin was told
to return to Japan on the first boat available after he had made suitable arrangements for the
management of the business. Mr. Kodama was to be allowed his own choice in staying or
leaving. 1 **
To ensure that all possible nationals would sail aboard the Fuji Maru, the Foreign Minister
expressed concern over any leakage about certain negotiations which were underway. He in-
formed the Consul that none of the nationals were to know anything about the negotiations for
fear they would become hopeful and decide not to leave the country. 1 " 3
532. Japanese Trade and Shipping Problems (November 1941 )
Mr. Imagawa, the representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Batavia, on November 5,
1941, consulted the President of the Specie Bank in Tokyo about the 5000 yen which had been
due the Dutch Consul General in Kobe since October 16. Mr. Imagawa also reported on a pro-
posal to approve the telegraphing of 100,000 yen to cover the expenses of the Dutch merchants
who were permitting the export of 4000 tons of maize loaded on the Takatiho Maru, and the
Nissho Maru. 12ii
On November 11 the Foreign Office informed Consul Ishizawa that Japan would not con-
sider the insincere proposals made by the Netherlands East Indies in regard to trade between
the two countries. The Consul was directed to conduct negotiations for the bartering of each
shipload of goods as an independent transaction. 1235
The 60,000 yen supposedly sent to the Indies for the export of the maize loaded on the Taka-
tiho Maru and the Nissho Maru had not been received by November 21 when Consul Ishizawa
informed Tokyo of the situation. Emphasizing its importance, he asked that the Finance
Ministry be immediately advised of this.' 236
""IV, 1073.
" M IV, 1074.
'"'IV. 1075.
m2 IV, 1076.
'" ] IV, 1077.
m * IV, 1078.
1211 IV, 1079.
'™IV. 1080.
257
Two dispatches from Tokyo on November 21 notified Dilli on Timor and Menado on Celebes
that Japan was sending 10,000 yen to the former and 5,000 yen to the latter. These sums were
for the "secret fund" and were to be retained by the receivers in cash, pending instructions as
to its usage. 1237
The next day Consul Ishizawa demanded that Tokyo explain why it sent a plain text mes-
sage to Mr. Imagawa, informing him that permission had been refused for the payment of the
5,000 yen by the Specie Bank in Kobe to the Dutch Consul-General there. 1258 This sum had
been promised to the Dutch official in October. 1239
Authorities in Tokyo learned from Consul Tokitaro Kuroki in Dilli that it was impossible to
withdraw the funds deposited in the bank there. On November 26 he stated that there was
approximately 140,000 to 150,000 pataka worth of redeemable notes in the possession of the
bank, and that they were virtually inaccessible. 1240 Two days later Consul Kuroki again wired
Tokyo and after giving an estimate of the exportable manganese at Dilli, he disclosed that the
Dutch desired wire netting (screening) for sifting ore in payment for the manganese. Al-
though the Dutch were prepared to supply a considerable amount of the ore, there was no way
of transporting the material unless Japan dispatched a special ship. mi
533. Nel her landers' Attitude Remains An Li -Japanese
Consul General Ishizawa, continuing to ferret out the opinions of the Netherlander whom
he visited during his farewell calls, found that they were staunchly an ti- Japanese. In a sec-
ond 1 " 11 conversation with the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, A.H.J. Rofmck, on November 17
the Dutch official manifested a desire for Consul Ishizawa to remain in Batavia, remarking
that the tense international situation demanded a Japanese diplomat who understood the
attitude of the Netherlands thoroughly, and that he did not think that Consul Asada, who was
to replace Consul Ishizawa was a good choice. Consul Ishizawa in his report to Foreign Minister
Togo on the following day stated that his reply to the Chief had been that he was leaving Batavia
because of the insincerity evinced by the Dutch government and that he had no control over
the appointment of his successor. He questioned the reasons behind Mr. Rofinck's request but
admitted that the relations between their two countries were grave. Pointing out that it was
the economic blockade which the Dutch in cooperation with England and the United States
were effecting against Japan that had caused this serious rift, it made no difference who held
the office of Japanese consul general since there was little that that official could now do, un-
less the Netherlands East Indies changed its policy.
In conclusion Consul Ishizawa revealed that this time the Dutch official had not insisted
that the Indies government was neutral and that the Dutch had no intention of compromising
but rather were preparing for war. 1243
534. Japanese Businesses Close in Preparation for Evacuation
The arrival of the Fuji Maru and the evacuation plans of the Japanese from Batavia were
explained to a group of importers, bankers, and retail and wholesale shopkeepers in a meeting
called by Consul General Ishizawa in the middle of November. The majority of the group
decided to leave two or three persons in charge of finishing up their businesses and to return the
remaining personnel to Japan. However, many of the wholesalers and shopkeepers did not
think their affairs could be closed by the sailing date of the Fuji Maru.
13S1 IV, 1081-1082.
,!3a IV, 1083.
m9 IV, 1078.
i2 ">IV, 1084.
li41 IV, 1085.
1242 IV, 1043.
""IV, 1086.
258
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Several stores needed cash in order to close their affairs, since even though they would sell
their stock, the cash for this sale would not be immediately available. The manager of the
Specie Bank in Batavia suggested that the bank float a loan for these stores, taking the stock as
collateral. Before the branch bank could do this, however, permission had to be obtained from
the Department of Finance and Consul Ishizawa wired Tokyo to arrange for this permit. 1 "*
On November 18 Foreign Minister Togo notified the Borneo Rubber Company that its per-
sonnel should be evacuated as soon as business conditions would permit. Those who would
have to remain were to return to Japan by mail steamer or mail plane as soon as possible. 1 " 5
Foreign Minister Togo had informed Toshisuke Kondo of the Dutch East Indies Develop-
ment Company in Bandjermasin that he was to return to Japan as soon as he had made ar-
rangements to transfer the management of the company. 1246 In a message on November 20 he
further stipulated that Mr. Kondo was to be sent back to Japan aboard the Fuji Maru. 1247
535. Consul General Ishizawa Complains of Minor Problems
Consul General Ishizawa mildly rebuked the Foreign Office on November 21 for sending
code messages directly to one of his translators, Mr. Aratame. Although praising the trans-
lator's work, he pointed out that the consul general, according to the existing contract, should
have cognizance of all messages and that in the future they should be sent to him. 1 " 8
The next day the Consul had occasion to complain again to the Foreign Office. The broad-
cast wave lengths had been changed on November 10 and he was unable to receive the 10:30
JAP broadcasts because of weak signals. He suggested that in the future JUO (9430) be
used. 1 " 9
536. Netherlands East Indies Government Suppresses Janapese Agents
Japanese fishing boats off the coast of the Netherlands East Indies had long aroused the
suspicions of that government; and, according to a dispatch from Consul General Ishizawa on
November 19, their surveillance over Japanese vessels had become "oppressive". Captains
of various Japanese boats in the vicinity of Caspar and Biliton had reported that Dutch, and
possibly some English, flying boats had stopped the vessels once or twice each day and sub-
jected them to intimidating inspections.
Consul Ishizawa brought the matter to the attention of the Foreign Office, including in his
report the information that although there were no warships near Baspar or Biliton, there were
always several vessels about fifty miles north of Batavia. These were presumed to be night
patrol boats. Dutch authorities were further pressing their investigations by questioning Japa-
nese about their various activities. Among those investigated was the hea"d of the Oshiro Com-
pany who had made a loan to the harbor master in Batavia. 12SC
At this time a Dutch countermeasure was divulged in a dispatch from Shanghai. A Dutch
newspaper concern was reported as negotiating for the purchase of a newspaper, The Voice of
On November 22 Consul General Ishizawa requested that the Foreign Office remit 30,000
guilders for the expenses of Koo Choo Sui 1252 who was employed by the Consul to stamp out
'"TV. 1087.
""TV, 1088.
'""IV. 1076.
1247 IV, 1089.
13 'TV, 1090.
'"'IV, 1091.
,!5( TV, 1092.
,MI IV, 1093.
12Si Kami Spelling.
259
anti -Japanese feeling. Although the Netherlander had begun to watch Koo closely, the Consul
attested that the man's familiarity with the Chinese and natives would be of aid to the Japa-
nese in case of an emergency. Koo was planning to distribute pro- Japanese pamphlets at the
suggestion of the Consul. 1253
Another Japanese agent, Mr. Takada, was so closely watched by the Dutch that his efforts
were practically useless according to the Consul on December t. It was thought that he had al-
ready departed for Japan aboard the Fuji Maru. I25<
537. Germany Requests That Its Nationals Be Evacuated by the Fuji Maru
In compliance with a request from the German authorities in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo
on November 22 suggested that Consul General Ishizawa arrange for the evacuation of German
women and children resident in the Netherlands East Indies. According to the Foreign Minis-
ter they numbered about 119. The German embassy in Tokyo had assumed the responsibility
for steamship fares aboard the Fuji Maru, and the Foreign Minister proposed that they be
accomodated on this ship, if possible. In doing this he remarked that such measures should
be taken after consulting the German and Swiss consuls in Batavia. 1256
538. Japan Prepares to Invade the East Indies
In preparation for the complete evacuation from the Netherlands East Indies Consul Gen-
eral Ishizawa on November 17 asked for instructions concerning the disposal of the furniture,
office supplies, and automobile used by the naval office in Batavia. 1256
Foreign Minister Togo directed Consul Yashio Matsugaki in Soerabaya to obtain automobile
road maps used by Motor Club members and to send them to Japan on the Fuji Maru. The
General Staff in Tokyo, anticipating invasion needs, had requested them stating that copies
would suffice. 1257
The United States Navy received on November 21 information from the Dutch Legation
which reported a Japanese expeditionary force near Palau. The Governor- General of the Neth-
erlands East Indies had divulged its presence, saying that the force was large enough to con-
stitute a threat to the Dutch East Indies or Portuguese Timor and should it move beyond a
stipulated point he would regard it as an act of aggression. 1268
Reports on military strength continued to be sent to the home government by branch diplo-
matic offices. On November 26 Consul Shinichi Hayasaki in Medan announced that approxi-
mately 150 Australian troops were stationed at Medan and that it was believed that 220 Aus-
tralian troops were on the Island of Shunbiram. 125 *
539. Consul Ishizawa Orders Consulate Classified Material Burned
In compliance with a directive from Foreign Minister Togo the Japanese consulate in Bata-
via was preparing itself for hasty evacuation. Consul Ishizawa itemized the things which had
been done by December 2: 1) expense funds were being converted into cash as rapidly as pos-
sible; 2) the files of secret diplomatic correspondence had been burned and other secret docu-
ments were to be burned immediately; 3) telegraphic documents were to be disposed of; and
4) other matters await ed the final approval of the Foreign Office. 1260
™IV, 1094.
""IV, 1095.
""IV, 10%.
""IV, 1097.
""IV 1098.
""IV, 1099.
""IV, 1100. (Kana Spelling)
I1M IV, 1101.
260
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The Consul further notified Tokyo of the burning of all copies of incoming and outgoing dis-
patches through December 1, 1941; these included the telegraphic communications. It had
been decided to burn all wires received or dispatched by the Batavian office at the end of each
day; furthermore, a complete list of everything destroyed at that office would be sent to the
Foreign Office by either a Japanese vessel or the next courier. 1861
The same day Consul Ishizawa reported to his Home Office that all charts had been burned
with the exception of the ones which he specified. Remaining were maps of New Guinea, Peru,
New Zealand, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, China, Honduras, and Columbia. 1262
540. Japanese Foreign Office Declares the Netherlands a Quasi- Enemy Nation
Japan declared the Netherlands a quasi-enemy power in a circular letter dated December
4, 1941, which the Foreign Office sent to Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, and Hsinking officials.
Explaining that the Dutch had enforced prohibitions regarding the use of codes and were ex-
ercising rigid control over Japanese officials, Foreign Minister Togo announced that the Neth-
erlands government was obviously working with enemy powers.
Whether or not the Netherlands officially declared war on Japan, the Foreign Office revealed
that Japan planned to issue a declaration to the effect that a state of war existed between the
two countries and would treat the Netherlands as an enemy nation in accordance with Inter-
national Law. 1263
""IV, UQ2.
,262 IV, 1103.
1263 IV, 1104.
261
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C— JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(o) Japanese-Thaiese Relations
541. Japanese Plan Invasion of Southern Thailand
In spite of the fact that it would be necessary to invade Southern Thailand, the Japanese
were attempting to complete the strategic preparations for the invasion of the Bangkok plain
without antagonizing the Siamese governing class which was determined to preserve the
neutrality of their country. In the ultimate establishment of Japan's goal, the East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, it was necessary to consider Siam's position as a member nation and to
pay careful attention to her wishes, especially since Siam's enmity would create difficulties
for Japanese-Burma operations for which Japan needed transit through Siamese territory
and for their use of the southern Siamese railroad lines for its army operating in Malaya.
For these reasons Japanese officials in Bangkok urged that southern Siam be sacrificed, if
unavoidable, but that the neutrality of the greater part of Thailand be preserved. 1Z " This
dispatch, transmitted to Tokyo on October 18, 1941, was not readable by United States
Communication Intelligence officers until April 30, 1945. 1266
542. Intelligence Agent Reports Thaiese Troop Movement to Border
According to the intelligence reports gathered by Consul Harada in Chiengmai, the Thaiese
were constructing roads from that province to the border. Not only were the Thaiese building
an air field twenty kilometers from the frontier, but it was further reported that soldiers were
being dispatched to the frontier area with regular camps at several points between Maun
and Faun. 1266
On October 20, 1941 Tokyo took the initiative in suggesting that the authorities report the
names of Thaiese nationals in England who wished to sail for home. Such an inquiry was
possibly made in view of returning the Thaiese nationals via Japanese ships. 1287
543. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Funds, Supplies to Open Drug Concern
Referring in a dispatch on October 20, 1941, to previously discussed plans to establish drug
concerns in Thailand, Ambassador Tsubokami requested that 5,000 baht as well as drugs
and needles be sent to him. He notched his home government at this time that all prepara-
tions were completed for the opening of the firm. 1283
On the next day Foreign Minister Togo wired 8,000 yen to be used in the scheme of operating
spy centers in Thailand which would be disguised as Chinese drug stores. 12 ' 9
544. Japanese Officials Plan to Use of Indian Troops in Malaya
From two Japanese diplomatic dispatches of October 20, 1941, from Bangkok to Tokyo, it
was learned that the Japanese were planning to use Indian troops in their Malayan operations.
A special report concerning their use was being forwarded by plane to Tokyo, where it was
suggested, that since the report was in the Punjab language and in unrevised form, that it be
I2 "IV, 1105.
""Ibid.
1Z66 rv, no6.
'"'IV, 1107.
""IV, 1108.
1J89 rv, 1109.
263
revised by officials who were familiar with this language. The Bangkok originator suggested
that the number of Indians be increased since, unfortunately, the Thaiese authorities had
interned some of them, and that the Indians be allowed to infiltrate into all parts of Malay
to begin activities among the Indian troops there, or to maintain liaison between the disturb-
ance units and the Japanese Army. 1270
545. Foreign Minister Togo Proposes Set- Up of Short Wave Radio in Bangkok
At the suggestion of Vice-consul Hachiya, Foreign Minister Togo proposed on October 21
that a short wave radio set be installed at Bangkok. If this plan were feasible the receiving set
would be used to pick up Japanese broadcasts for rebroadcasting. Foreign Minister Togo
inquired if such a set could be procured in Bangkok. 1271
The answer, was apparently made in the negative since the Foreign Minister decided on
October 22 to send a forty or fifty kilocycle apparatus with a remodelled pole screen to the
Thaiese capital. 12 ' 2
In addition the Chief of the Wireless Section in Tokyo was transmitting a list of prices of
parts used in the transmitter for the information of Chief Kojima. 1273
546. Ambassador Tsubokami Asks Permission to Remain at Post Because of Difficult Situation
On October 22, 1941. Ambassador Tsubokami wired that he would like to postpone his
return to Japan, which was planned for the end of October, because of prevailing conditions
in Thailand. He asked that his successor be chosen carefully since greater secrecy would be
necessary in dealing with Thaiese authorities at this particular time. 1274 In explaining the
difficult situation then existing in the country to which he was accredited, the Japanese
Ambassador said that the pro-English faction was creating the impression that Thailand
eventually would become "a storm center". Uncertainty and doubt arose in the minds of
the Thaiese by the treatment of the Japanese- American conversations and developments in
the Germ an- Russian war. In a talk with Prime Minister Pibul, Ambassador Tsubokami had
discussed the basic policies of the new Japanese Cabinet. He assured him that there would
be no change whatsoever in Japan's observance of Thaiese territorial integrity, sovereignty
and policy of neutrality.
When the Japanese Ambassador had mentioned, however, that rumors of England's
guarantee of Thaiese neutrality would have an unfavorable influence on the good relations
between Japan and Thailand, Prime Minister Pibul had declared that such rumors were
definitely without basis. 1275 Thailand, the Prime Minister said, was assuring the continuance
of its neutrality by the Amity Pact with Japan and the non-aggression agreement with Great
Britain. Pointing out that the people of his country would not forget the, preferential position
taken by Japan recently in the Thaiese-Indo-China dispute, Prime Minister Pibul assured
Mr. Tsubokami that the people of Asia greatly appreciated the difficult fight Japan was making
as a leader in East Asia. Thailand greatly desired that Japan would secure a foothold not
only in the Pacific but in the whole world. 1278
547. Tokyo Adds Army Man to Bangkok Legation Staff
Under the alias of "Taro Ishii", an army man, Major Kubo, would be attached to the
Bangkok Embassy as Secretary, Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Tsubokami on
'""IV, U10-1U1.
1111 rv, im.
,m IV. 1113.
' i,3 IV, 1114.
1115.
'" 5 rV, 1116, 1117.
,m IV, 1117.
264
"MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
October 24, 1941. Due to conditions in Thailand, it was thought best to have this military man
undertake his duties under an assumed name. Major Kubo was scheduled to leave the
homeland by plane on November 2, 1941. 1271
As a result of a cable from the army in French Indo- China and from Counsel Yamaguti,
Engineer Otowa of the Communication Department in Bangkok was being sent to French
Indo-China for two weeks. 1278
548. Japanese Plan Establishment of Air Wireless Section
In order to aid in their air operations, the Japanese officials in Bangkok were making
plans for the establishment of a special air wireless section, the first of which was to be
stationed at Saigon. Much of their information had been gained from the reading of the
British Navy air wireless at the army and navy attache offices at Bangkok, where they had
learned the British wireless communications system as well as the disposition and move-
ments of their air units. 1279
549. British Cabinet Member Submits Proposals to Thailand
Ambassador Tsubokami on October 25, 1941, also reported that Sir Alfred Cooper, referred to
as Duff- Cooper, Minister of Information in the British Cabinet, had stopped at Bangkok en
route to Manila at which time he talked with Prime Minister Pibul. During the discussion
the British Cabinet Member had proposed (1) The abandonment of a pro- Japanese policy,
(2) That Thailand be made a free market and, (3) The acceptance of British guarantees for
Thailand safety. When Japanese officials had investigated this matter, Nai Wanitto had
insisted that rumors of such proposals were entirely false and other investigations seemed
to substantiate his denials, Ambassador Tsubokami declared. 1280
According to impressions gained from recent public opinion in Bangkok, Japanese officials
in that city felt that the Japanese had been placed in a disadvantageous position as a result
of their regrettable and undue cowardice in the face of allied maneuvers. Not only was Japan
weakened in regard to its leadership of the Siamese and other people of East Asia, but the
allied powers were being encouraged to an even greater pitch of arrogance. 1281
550. Major Aoyama Reports on Code, Espionage Work
From an intercepted dispatch of October 29, 1941, originated by Major Aoyama, it was
learned that although the Naval Attache's office was studying the British Air Force communi-
cations system, especially the air bases and their call signs, the flying units and airplane
call signs, the army intelligence office and the Naval Attache's office were not working on the
solving of the British Air Code. Devoting their combined efforts to the collection of intelli-
gence on the Burmese Army, these offices had no personnel to spare for the code work. Major
Aoyama felt that Japan should set up immediately a new air wireless espionage agency at
551 . Tokyo Forwards Instructions for Operation of Beacon Radio Set
Meanwhile, the Chief of the Radio Section, in a dispatch to Engineer Hasimoto, said that he
would send a book of explanations for the operation of the beacon radio set by the next
mail plane. He would also cable wires for receiving transmissions as soon as such wires
could be obtained. 1Ma
m W, 1118.
131s lV, 1119.
i!,9 IV, 1120.
,i90 rv, 1121.
i»« TV, 1122.
,iK IV, 1123.
,i!3 IV,1124.
Saigon.
552. J a pan Continues Plans to Establish Navy Controlled Steamship Company
In continuing his secret plans to establish a Japanese -Thaiese steamship company, which
would be controlled by the Japanese navy, Foreign Minister Togo declared that Nai Wanitto
should have no apparent connections with the company. Instead, his trusted subordinates
should be the only Thaiese stockholders. Furthermore, the head of the Yamashita Steamship
Company with whom Japan was dealing should be guided along these lines. 1284
553. Japanese Ambassador Requests Ten Large Radios for Use in Thailand
By October 30, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami informed Tokyo that broadcast reception
was now possible, but that instruments equipped with metal tubes and loud speakers were
still needed. He disclosed that not many people save the Japanese there were interested in
receiving broadcasts from Japan, and suggested that private Thaiese citizens be furnished
sets for placement in mixed residence quarters. He explained that the broadcasts would be
much more effective if loud speakers were used. He requested that the Home Office arrange
to purchase ten large radios for use in Thailand. im
554. Japanese Ambassador Asks for Restriction on Number of Japanese Merchants Entering
Thailand
Although Secretary Nishiyama, who would soon return to Japan, would explain the matter
more thoroughly to Foreign Minister Togo, Ambassador Tsubokami suggested the limiting
or restricting of Japanese merchants who were setting up shops in Thailand. Although the
Ambassador could see no reason for having any more shops open, he noted that the number
had almost doubled since the beginning of the year. It would be far better to assist those
merchants who were already there rather than to continue the policy of sending new ones. 1386
555. Rumor Discloses that Britain Asks Exclusion of German Fifth Columnists
In an intelligence report which the Japanese Ambassador sent to Tokyo, Foreign Minister
Togo learned that the British government had requested that Thailand refuse permission to
Mr. Otto Wendler and Mr. Hoover to enter the country since they were German Fifth
Columnists. This information, the dispatch revealed, had been picked up as a rumor. lM7
55G. Japanese Government Has Difficulty in Securing Export Permit
By October 31, 1941, the Mitsubishi Company at Bangkok had secured for the Japanese
government 4,400 tons of iron manufactured goods valued at 1,300,000 bahts. However,
difficulty was being experienced in securing an export permit for this supply, and conse-
quently Foreign Minister Togo was asked to use his influence to see that the permit was
secured. 1 2Sa
The information that the Thailand Economic Minister had placed restrictions on the
future exportation of rice was the subject of inquiry from Tokyo on October 31, 1941. The
Foreign Minister had learned of this limitation through a Domei dispatch from Bangkok
on October 30, 1941. If such a report were confirmed, Ambassador Tsubokami was asked to
inquire into the reason. 1283
'""IV, 1125.
'""IV, 1126.
,ie6 IV, 1127.
,JH1 IV, 1128.
™IV, 1129.
Iii9 IV, 1130.
266
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
557. Japan to Sell Gold to Thailand
Details of a proposal concerning the gold liquidation, which had been decided between
Mr. Fukuda of the Specie Bank and representatives of the Thailand Banking Consortium,
were sent to Tokyo on November 5, 1941. According to the plan, gold bars would be sold to the
Thailand Consortium in liquidate the balance which was outstanding on the November 2,
1941, Thaiese account. The price of gold was to be fixed at thirty-five dollars per fine ounce.
Furthermore, it was to be earmarked as the property of the Consortium and kept in safe
custody on the Consortium's behalf or on the basis of any subsequent Thai transfer on the
Bank of Japan with no charge payable for such custody. It was further agreed in the proposed
plan that the Thailand Ambassador in Tokyo should appoint any official of Thai nationality
to inspect the gold at any time the Ambassador saw fit. At such time as the Consortium should
request transfer of the gold to Bangkok, the Yokohama Specie Bank would undertake the
delivery, the cost of transportation, and insurance to be borne by the Japanese Bank. 1290
558. Tokyo Attempts to Purchase Thaiese Rice
Attempting to purchase 700,000 tons of Thaiese rice, Ambassador Tsubokami disclosed
on November 5, 1941, that it would be impossible to secure outward consent to such a
purchase. However, it might be possible for Thailand to give secret consent, with Japan
cooperating by making successive small purchases and shipments as rapidly as possible,
therefore finally securing the 700,000 tons. Although Nai Wanitto believed that this was the
only possible and feasible plan and that it could be accomplished, the Ambassador asked
that Consul-General Asada, who was shortly to return to Japan, be consulted. Mr. Tsubokami
requested permission to proceed with the purchase of an additional 50,000 tons for the loading
month during which 150,000 tons had already been contracted. 1291
559. Foreign Minister Plans to Send Money for Purchase of Radio Sets
In answer to Ambassador Tsubokami's request for 2,000 bahts to purchase ten large radio
sets, Foreign Minister Togo replied on November 5, 1941, that the money was being remitted.
He directed that he be informed as soon as the instruments were procured, since he wished
to arrange for an increase in this equipment. 1232
560. Thaiese Official Considers Re-exportation of Armaments to British Possessions
In spite of the fact that the Thaiese Economic Minister had been prohibiting re-exporting of
material from Thailand, he was considering the granting of permission for the re-exportation
on the Sumatra Maru of the freight which included armaments for British posessions.
Although the case had been presented to the Premier and his approval was expected, the
Thaiese Economic Minister had disclosed to Ambassador Tsubokami that he expected to
press him again for a quick decision. Im
561. Two Japanese Officials Receive Ill-Treatment
From Consul-General Isono, by Courier, Ambassador Tsubokami released the information
on November 6, 1941, of two cases of Japanese ill-treatment in Rangoon. On November
5, 1941, a special detachment of officers composed of Chinese policemen under British
direction had invaded the home of Vice- Consul Homma, seizing his diary and some
liM IV, 1131.
""IV. 1132.
*^1V, 1133.
U34.
267
Japanese publications. On the same night a number of policemen had broken into the home
of Mr. Udaman, Chief Clerk of the Japanese consulate, and had arrested him. 129 "
Consul Isono also revealed that he suspected that Rangoon officials were tying up code
messages from and to his office. Consequently, he was checking as to whether one of his
messages bad been received. 1296
562. Tokyo Informed Concerning British Forces in Malaya
Ambassador Tsubokami, by November 4, 1941, had arrived at a plan of action to convince
the governing classes in Thailand of Japan's superiority by propagandizing various points.
These would include the facts that the English military force in Burma and Malaya was
definitely inferior to the Japanese force; that should both Japan and England send military
forces to Siam, the Japanese force would be greatly superior; that allied forces would be
isolated from their homelands at the outbreak of the war and their fate would be destruction;
that Japan's relations, with Russia were progressing favorably; and that the Imperial Army
was superior. 12 * 6 This dispatch was not translated until March 16, 1945. It was learned,
however, by a Japanese intelligence agent in Bangkok that the British Army was rushing
plans for the defense of Lashio. It had been reported in Bangkok that the British had been
piling up aeroplane gas at each air field around Lashio, 1287 Furthermore, in a conference
with the attaches of the German and Italian Legations, the Japanese Attache had inquired
as to the effectiveness of the British forces in Malaya and Burma. Considering the greatly
reenforced strength of the British troops and in view of the superiority of their flying instru-
ments, the attaches believed that should an attack be made on Malaya or Burma, it would be
impossible to avoid a pitched battle. In addition, British shipping in these waters was
reported to be no small item. 12 "
563. Foreign Minister Togo Dispatches Official to Shanghai to Speed Plans for Bangkok Drug
Dispensary
On November 6, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo informed Shanghai that he was dispatching
Mr. Yoshizumi Kuriya of the Tokyo Ooki Drug Store to Shanghai as a special agent. While in
that city he was to work out certain details in connection with Japanese plans to open a
Chinese Drug dispensary in Bangkok. The Foreign Minister requested that Vice-Consul Iwai
participate in the discussion concerning this matter. The plan included the purchasing of
such Chinese drugs as he saw fit, after which the supply would be sent immediately as pure
Chinese exports to Bangkok. The name of the Bangkok dispensary and its location were
listed as John's Dispensary, 128 Wokhumgin Hwasom phone, Bangkok, .Thailand. 129 *
564. Japan Enlarges Bangkok Staff
During the first part of November, 1941, the Legation staff in Bangkok was being enlarged.
One official was to be dispatched from Manchuria for the purpose of taking up duties as a
formal representative in Thailand. 1300
In a message from Bangkok on November 7, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami asked for the
services of Clerk Fujishima, who at that time was serving in the Philippine Islands. In addi-
lm W, U35.
mi IV, 1136.
' 39e IV, 1137.
""IV. 1138.
12 "IV, 1139.
l ™ IV, 1140.
,M<, IV, 1141.
268
OF PEARL HARBOR
tion, either Clerk Shinokawa or Clerk Kayahara were to be added to the Embassy at Bang-
kok. 1301 On November 7, 1941, Tokyo inquired whether it would be possible to add Mr.
Yokota, Ministry of Communications Secretary, and Engineer Hasimoto as Secretaries to the
Embassy; in this way the Foreign Minister said it would be possible to coordinate the various
functions under the Foreign Office as had been effected in French Indo-China. lM *
565. Ambassador to Ask Nationals to Secure Rubber, Tin
The Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok was instructed to get in touch with Japanese
nationals of that city to direct that the necessary 3,000 kilotons of rubber and 800 kilotons of
tin be purchased. Since it was very important that Japan obtain from Thailand and French
Indo-China all of the rubber and tin possible, the transactions for these goods would be
facilitated by arranging easy payment through the Yokohama Specie Bank or by direct
remittances. 1303
566. Japanese Ambassador Establishes Name, Stockholders for Shipping Concern
In connection with the establishment of a Japanese shipping concern in Thailand, the
Japanese Ambassador had, by November 10, 1941, been somewhat delayed by the suggestion
that Wanitto's subordinates rather than Wanitto himself should be stockholders for Thailand.
This suggestion had, according to instructions from Tokyo, been made to Mr. Yamashita
who was head of Thaiese shipping concern. It was further disclosed that the name of the
Japanese company had been registered as the Tai Sho Un Company, Ltd. (The Thai
Industrial and Commerical Company.) 1304
567. Japanese Officials are Disappointed in Advancement of Proposal to Establish a Commission
A strange situation had arisen according to a wire sent by the Japanese Ambassador to
Bangkok, resulting from the proposed establishment of a commission in accordance with
Article II of the Tokyo-Bangkok Treaty of Amity. Hearing from Mr. Wanitto that Mr. Derreck
wished to discuss such an establishment with him, the Ambassador had sent Minister
Futami in his place to the Foreign Office since he had been ill on that day. At the time of the
visit Mr. Derreck had not referred to the origin of the committee but had "wandered in his
talk". As a result, Minister Futami had broken off the conversation and returned. Upon
investigation of these strange proceedings, the Ambassador had learned that Prime
Minister Pibul had orginated the plan and, accordingly, the Japanese Ambassador had
immediately approved it through the military and naval attaches. As to the reason why
Mr. Derreck had not referred to this matter during the conversation of November 7, 1941, the
Japanese Ambassador said that Derreck feared such a proposal from Thailand might arouse
England and consequently considered the time not yet right. 1305
568. Bangkok Papers Print Reports of the Japanese Army Campaign in Burma
In a detailed intelligence report sent from Bangkok to Tokyo on November 10, 1941, rumors
concerning the opening of a Japanese army campaign in Burma were reported. Sensational
reports were being printed on this subject in Thaiese, English, and Chinese language news-
papers. Furthermore, reports dealing with the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations,
the increased tenseness on the part of the United States, the possibility of the European
1301 IV, 1142.
1,02 IV, 1143.
m IV, 1144.
1M, IV, 1145.
' 30i IV, 1146.
269
War spreading into the Pacific, and Japanese activities in French Indo-China were creating
considerable uneasiness among the officials as well as the people of Thailand and Chungking.
After investigating the causes for this condition created in Thailand, the report cited as causes
the stagnation of the Japanese- American negotiations, the anxiety over the wholesale pur-
chase by Japan of Thaiese materials, the American and British policies towards Thailand,
and the uncertainty of the Japanese policy toward the Southern Pacific area.
It was pointed out that the feelings of the Thaiese people had changed from friendliness to
aloofness and from aloofness to opposition. Since the people had come to believe that a
Japanese invasion of Thailand was almost certain, there were those who proclaimed loudly
that a Japanese war was inevitable and that the Thaiese should fight to the end against the
Japanese invaders. Furthermore, the Autonomy Society had been distributing handbills
exposing Japanese plans for invading Thailand, attempting to get the people interested in a
plebiscite. This secret society had been sending its members from door to door asking,
"Who should Thailand depend on in case it becomes no longer possible to maintain her
neutrality?". Quoting as a source of information a Thaiese newspaperman, it was further
reported that a secret order had been issued prohibiting the printing of articles and editorials
concerning (1) Speculations about the situation in the South Seas, (2) Sounding out the
intentions of the new Japanese Cabinet and (3) Commenting on Japanese, British, American
and Russian views on Thailand.
Further evidence that the country was gradually getting on a war basis was noted in the
issue of secret instructions by government organizations to the effect that Thaiese employees
of Japan observed and reported the actions of persons who visited Japanese residents,
as well as in the secret order issued by the Chief of Police to reward those who exposed
foreign espionage organizations. In addition a bill was being drafted to recruit 100,000 Thaiese
volunteers. 1306
5ti9. Disguised Army Experts to Be Sent to Thailand
The information that communications equipment, as well as four army communication
experts, would be sent to Thailand as non-career clerks under the Foreign Office, was trans-
mitted to Thailand in an army dispatch of November 11, 1941. The men were scheduled to
leave by air on November 13, 1941, and consequently arrangements were being made for their
visas. Assigned to Bangkok would be Mr. Kameo Okudara, Communications Clerk Third
Grade, and Mr. Hideo Yuki, an army employee, while to Singora was dispatched Mr. Toshio
Sukai, Communications Clerk First Grade, and to Chiengmai, Mr. Jitiro Taniguchi,
Communications Clerk Second Grade. 1301 When the machinery arrived, 1308 it was to be
received as official baggage from the head office to the Embassy and was to be treated as if it
had no connection with the Communications Clerks. i:m
570. Intelligence Agents Report Discussion Between Mr. Duff-Cooper and Premier Pihul
In a secret intelligence report sent to Tokyo on November 12, 1941 the discussion between
Mr. Duff-Cooper, the British Ambassador to Thailand and Premier Pibul, which took place
on October 3, 1941, was reported. At the time of Premier Pibul's secret visit to the airport to
see the two Britishers, Mr. Duff-Cooper had advised that Japan was likely to invade Thailand
and that Thailand should (1) have nothing to do with Japan, (2) close avenues through which
American and other raw materials were sent to Japan, and (3) drive the Japanese out of
,( IV, 1147.
"IV, 1148.
"IV, 1149.
'IV, 1148.
270
T BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Thailand. Pibul had replied that he would consider these things and that if his Country were
invaded by Japan it would resist vigorously cooperating meanwhile with the British forces.
Great Britain, however, should not under any circumstances militarily occupy any Thaiese
territory before a Japanese invasion. He assured Mr. Duff- Cooper that he would not in any
case be taken in by Japan and advised England not to worry. 1310
On this same day the additional intelligence was transmitted that Prime Minister
Churchill had boasted in a speech of November 10, 1941, that England was ready to fight
Japan. Since there was the possibility that this statement had given Thailand the impression
that England was very strong, Ambassador Tsubokami suggested that the Imperial Govern-
ment answer Mr. Churchill very strongly in order to avoid the danger of Thailand's turning
against Japan. In retaliation Ambassador Tsubokami suggested two alternatives, first, that
he tell Thaiese officials that Mr. Churchill's declaration was merely a pump-priming trick
to get an American fleet concentrated at Singapore, since such a statement was obviously
to be taken as a confession of England's impotence in defending her own interest in the
Orient; secondly, that he tell Thaiese authorities that cool-headed politicians of third
countries were not surprised at such statements as this which merely amounted to nothing. 13 "
571. Tokyo Sends 3,300 Yen to Purchase Radios
On November 12, 1941, Bangkok officials were advised that 3,300 yen was being remitted for
the purchase of ten large radio transmitters to disseminate Japanese propaganda in Thai-
land. 1312
572. Japan Approves Plan to Purchase Rice Unobtrusively in Small Amounts
In answering Tsubokami's suggestion of November 5, 1941, that Japan contract secretly for
700,000 tons of rice, procuring this amount unobstrusively in small purchases, Foreign
Minister Togo advised that this plan had been approved by the department of Agriculture
and Forestry, However, in reply to his application for permission to purchase 50,000 tons
immediately, the Foreign Minister said that this matter would be dealt with after Japanese
Official Shiba had arrived in Bangkok. 1913
An impediment in Japanese plans to purchase rubber was seen by Ambassador Tsubokami
in his dispatch of November 14, 1941. Reporting that the market was poorly supplied with
rubber, the Japanese Ambassador pointed out that foreign companies had been purchasing
such vast amounts that Japanese companies had found it hard to keep pace. Because it would
be difficult to get even one hundred tons per month, it might become necessary to pur-
chase rubber regardless of price. The Ambassador asked that the guild be fully informed of
this situation. 1 3 H
573. Japan Will Have Controlling Interest in New Shipping Concern
A brighter picture was seen, however, owing to Japanese plans to establish a shipping con-
cern. Although the stockholders and the directors would not use Japanese personal names,
fifty-five percent of the stock would by fixed policy be held by Japanese. The board of
directors of seven men would include two Thaiese. For the time being, however, it would be
necessary to use ships of neutral registry on a charter basis since Japanese ships could be
purchased only after the company became completely established and conditions suit-
able. 1315 In spite of this encouraging report, Foreign Minister Togo declared that as a result of
m "IV, 1150.
""IV, 1151.
im lV, H52.
il,s rv, 1153.
' SM IV, 1154.
ms rv, ii55.
271
Thailand's refusal to permit participation of foreign nationals in jointly-managed enterprises,
no action would be taken on this step at the present time. 131 *
574. Japan Fears that Chinese and British Interests Are Buying Rubber
Declaring that it was necessary for Japan to purchase 1600 tons of rubber from Thailand
by the middle of December, Foreign Minister Togo, in a wire to Shanghai on November 17,
1941, relayed the information that Chinese and British interests were buying up the rubber
so that Japan was experiencing difficulty in procuring the scheduled amount. Consequently,
the purchase of the 1400 tons of rubber aboard the Esso which had sailed from Bangkok
November 10, 1941, was to be investigated since Japan was also interested in procuring this
rubber. 1317
575. Japan Asks Investigation of Report that Prime Minister Pibul Desires to Resign
On November 17, 194" 1, the Japanese Foreign Minister requested an investigation concern-
ing the truth of a special message that Prime Minister Pibul desired to resign. The informa-
tion had been sent to the Yomiuri agency following the announcement by the Thai
government on November 16, 1941. 1318
576. Gold Negotiations Do Not Permit Optimistic Outlook, Ambassador Says
Ambassador Tsubokami admitted on November 18, 1941, in a wire to Tokyo that the
negotiations concerning the sale of gold to Thailand did not at that date permit any
optimism, and that a policy of procrastination was foreseen by the Thaiese Bank Syndicate's
application for future credit. Furthermore, the attitude of the Thaiese government regarding
the question of raising the desired amount of baht remained uncertain. Although, it was
understood that the Financial Ministry already had a plan of its own for negotiating the sale
of gold, many days would be required for the confirmation. Considering the attitude of the
Thaiese government it might become necessary, Ambassador Tsubokami declared, to
resort to political means in order to reach a solution of the question and he asked instructions
concerning the policy to be followed in such a case. 1319
577. Tokyo Advises Caution Regarding Operational Plans
Extreme caution in the use of terms which might reveal Japanese operational plans was
urged by Tokyo at this time in view of the critical situation. Bangkok officials were asked to
take care to ensure perfect secrecy regarding the proposed plans. This Japanese dispatch,
however, was not translated until March 16, 1945. 1320
578. Japanese Return Imperial Portrait to Homeland
On November 20, 1941, arrangements were being made to return the Imperial portrait to
Japan for safekeeping. Since Secretary Taniguchi would transport the portrait by airplane,
it was asked that someone meet him at the Japanese airport upon his arrival. 1322
579. Intelligence Report Informs Tokyo of Planned Chinese- Thaiese Cooperation
In a spy report of secondary importance to Tokyo, Foreign Minister Togo learned on Novem-
ber 20, 1941, that Chinese residents had, through a Chinese nationalist leader, proposed to
,s "rV. 1156.
""TV, 1157.
,3, "IV, 1158.
m9 IV, 1159.
l3i! TV, 1160,
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272
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
join hands with Thailand in case war broke out between that country and Japan. It was
requested that Thaiese natives be given full instructions and drill. On November 10, 1941, the
Cabinet had discussed this letter and on November 11, 1941, the British Minister in Bangkok
had interviewed Prime Minister Pibul on this subject. This interview was formally reported
to Tokyo at the time of its taking place. 1323
580. Prime Minister Pibul Assures Ambassador thai Thailand Desires to Cooperate Despite
Difficulties
In a conference with Prime Minister Songram Luang Pibul on the afternoon of November
20, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami discussed the critical international situation, informing
the Prime Minister of his talk with Foreign Minister Togo, During the conversation Prime
Minister Pibul declared that Thailand wished to supply, to the extent of its ability,
needed commodities to Japan and that, in regard to this question, the Anglo-American
position was very unreasonable. Although no proposal for an accord had been received from
the British, it was possible that Great Britain would freeze Thailand's funds amounting
to 160,000,000 baths in England, and forbid the exporting of oil and hemp bags.
It was Mr. Pibul's belief that the British authorities in the Far East wished to bring the
Thaiese region into the conflict in order to retain the "status quo". It was, however, the Prime
Minister's earnest desire that Japan should remain powerful until the end, and that after
the war the Imperial government should occupy a position of power in the world. 13 "
The Japanese Ambassador had explained that America was unreasonably opposing
Japanese demands and that there appeared to be no way to effect a solution. Not only would
the aftermath of the international holocaust engulf Thailand, but it might endanger the
establishment of the New Order in East Asia and the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples. 1325
581. Japan Learns of Alleged British Proposal to Supply Thailand with Arms
Ambassador Tsubokami also reported that a British Minister had called on Prime Minister
Pibul on November 18, 1941, according to a spy report. During this visit the British Minister
had observed that on October 27, 1941, Great Britain had proposed a secret treaty with Thai-
land, promising to supply Thailand with arms; and that on November 17, 1941, he had
received instructions from London that his country was now ready to furnish those arms.
582. British Minister Points to Thailand's Danger
According to the spy report the British Minister had observed that Great Britain was sorry for
the mistakes she had made concerning Thailand in the past and had volunteered the
information that there were a great many Japanese Fifth Columnists in Thailand at this time.
Moreover, it was possible for Japan to now carry out her well-laid plans for an invasion of the
Southern Pacific. Before this should happen, Thailand should join with England, the United
States, the Netherlands Indies and China in a defense camp. In this way Japan could be
weakened by a war of nerves. To this proposal, Prime Minister Pibul had replied that Thai-
land had never yet been invaded by the Japanese army, and at the present time was sticking
to strict neutrality. To the British Minister's interpolation that the Japanese could possibly
attack Burma and pass through Thailand, Pibul had answered that the British forces could
undertake the same action. If the Japanese forces did not pass through Thailand they would
have to give an account to the Axis "for having danced to England's fiddle". m *
3 IV, 1163, 1150.
!1 IV, 1164.
TV, 1165.
16 IV, 1166.
273
583. Japan to Receive Less Rubber Due to Production Decrease
To prepare Japan to expect less rubber than was previously requested from Thailand,
Ambassador Tsubokami notified the Home Office on November 22, 1941, that the actual
shipment of rubber from the plantations would be fifty per cent less than ordinary years.
From the beginning of 1941 until October, of the total 38,000 tons of rubber exported, 21,400
had gone to Japan, 7,300 had been sent to Shanghai, 1,200 to Manchukuo, 7,600 to the Malay
States. He pointed out that the amount of rubber shipped to Japan in the future would not be
equal to its requirements. 1327
584. Supplies for Japanese Owned Drug Dispensary are Sent from Shanghai
On November 22, 1941, Shanghai wired the information that the drugs for the Chinese
drug dispensary in Bangkok were being dispatched from Shanghai on the Toa Kaiun during
the latter part of November. Details of the transfer were to be communicated by Mr. Awaya
who was returning from Tokyo on the Kobe Maru on November 2 L. 1328
585. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Assistance for Five Newspapermen
Ambassador Tsubokami in a dispatch on November 22, 1941, requested that the five men
sent by the Nichi Nichi newspaper be assisted to procure visas while they were in French-
Indo China. These men were listed as Koichi Yanashita, Hiroshi Nakano, Hideo Ishibashi,
Takashichi Saruwatari, and Ryosuke Taniguchi. ua9
58fi. Thailand Consortium Makes Written Proposal Regarding Liquidation of Japanese Gold
Ambassador Tsubokami reported on November 21, 1941, that, although no concrete
proposal had been advanced by the Consortium regarding the purchase of gold, they had
made a written proposal to the Yokohama Specie Bank on November 19. According to the
understanding of August 2, 1941, the Thaiese requested a shipment of gold equivalent to
10,000,000 bahts, 500,000 bahts of which was to be sent by air. Although Mr. Fukuda had
delayed by saying that the matter would have to be referred to the Head Office, Ambassador
Tsubokami advised that Japan ship the amount requested, and suggested that negotiations
regarding the purchase of gold be begun, 1330
According to the price of gold previously set in the agreement between Thailand bank
authorities and the Yokohama Specie Bank, the price of gold upon its delivery to Bangkok
would amount to 10 baht, {80 satan). However, now at the time of delivery in Bangkok the
price appeared to be 11 baht. Since Japan assumed the cost of the delivery of the gold to
Thailand, Foreign Minister Togo directed that Ambassador Tsubokami settle the price at
10 baht, 80 satan. 1331
Foreign Minister Togo wired on November 24, 1941, that Japan would send 10,000,000
bahts by boat since it was not convenient to transport this amount by air. He asked that
Ambassador Tsubokami arrange for a suitable boat. 1332
587. Foreign Minister Togo Sends Secret Fund to Bangkok Foreign Office
On November 24, 1941, Foreign Minister Togo wired that he was sending 60,000 baht to
the Bangkok Foreign Office to be kept in cash in a special secret fund. This fund was to be spent
later as would be directed. 1333
,Si1 IV, 1167.
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m9 IV, 1169,
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rm TV. 1172.
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274
588. Bangkok Office Returns Code Machines to Japan
Since Thailand was close enough that the code machines could be transferred to Japan
in comparative safety, rather than destroying them, Ambassador Tsubokami reported on No-
vember 24, 1941, that two obsolete code machines would be en route to Japan in care of the
Captain of the Batavia Maru which would leave port on December 1, 1941. He asked that
arrangements be made so that it would not be inspected when passing through customs. 1334
589. Ambassador Tsubokami Believes that Thailand Should be Led to Cooperate Voluntarily
Ambassador Tsubokami on November 25, 1941, pointed out that should the Empire take
decisive action in a southward advance, it would be necessary to bring Thailand into the Japa-
nese camp, considering the necessity of a belligerent's rights to make clear the relations
between sovereign and subjects. He also stated that Thailand should be led voluntarily to
take an attitude of cooperation. In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malaya there
would be a necessity of temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand.
After Japan's objectives had been attained, however, restoration would be made and the
independence of Thailand would be respected. Should Thailand cooperate in a positive way
with Japan, Thailand would be given full assurance that its swamp lands could be reclaimed
in the areas concerned. Should Thailand's assets in England be frozen resulting in the
fluctuation of the value of the country's money, Japan would make available sufficient funds
to create a "bloc" money system, and should also prepare to provide petroleum and other
essential commodities. The Ambassador re-emphasized his points by saying that Thailand's
sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the limits of necessity; that its standing as a
nation should be maintained to the very last with military discipline to reassure the
Thaiese populace; and that strict control should be exercised over any attempts at pro-
fiteering. 1385
590. New Pro-Japanese Party Advocates Collaboration with Japan
Inner circles of the Thailand government were taking a serious view regarding Thailand's
foreign diplomatic policy toward the international situation. It was declared that the new
pro-Japanese party felt that one means of maintaining its government's independence was
closer collaboration between Thailand and Japan. Concrete plans had been reportedly laid
on November 23, 1941, when a secret meeting was held between Pibul, Tumaron, Min,
Purrijitto and Pananow Nai Wanitto. 1336
591. Prime Minister Pibul, Defense Minister Puromu Differ Concerning Thailand's Policy
A retransmission to Berlin on November 25, 1941, of a dispatch from Bangkok to Tokyo
explained the feeling existing between Prime Minister Pibul and National Defense Minister
Puromu over questions of policy and Nai Wanitto. While Mr. Pibul believed that the Thaiese
policy should be one of strict neutrality, Mr. Puromu, on the other hand, believed that Thai-
land would be safer by definitely tying in with one side, thereby eliminating the possibility
of being attacked by either side. When Prime Minister Pibul had questioned which side
he would join, Minister Puromu had replied that they must wait and see which side won
out in the Russo-German war. 1337
1Mi IV, 1174.
1338 IV, 1175.
ttWfy. n76 .
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275
592. Ambassador Requests Funds for Machinations
Referring to a previous dispatch in which 6,900 yen had been requested for a machinations
fund, Ambassador Tsubokami on November 25, 1941, again asked that this amount be trans-
mitted to him immediately. 1 '" 8
593. Ambassador Recommends that Crew of Fishing Vessel Escape to the Saigon District
On November 25, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok referred to a plan in which a
fishing vessel belonging to Nagafuku of Singapore figured largely. It appeared that it was
impossible for the vessel and the crew to make a getaway as first planned and that arrange-
ments would have to be made lor half of the crew to escape to the Saigon district. After consider-
ing this action and discussing it with Secretary Tahira, if the Foreign Minister thought this
plan proper, he was asked to issue orders to this effect. 1339
594. Japan Agrees to 25,000,000 Bant Exchange of Gold
Recommending on November 25, 1941, that the negotiations then underway be adjourned.
Foreign Minister Togo declared that the Finance Ministry had agreed to the gold purchase
totalling 25,000,000 bahts. Furthermore, judging from the volume of goods Japan had received
from Thailand on indent purchase, he informed Ambassador Tsubokami that it would be
necessary to have the equivalent bahts available in Japan for many months yet. 1340
Referring to Tokyo's question effecting the exchange of gold at 10 bahts, 80 satan, Ambassa-
dor Tsubokami in a dispatch on November 26, 1941 wired Tokyo concerning the difficulties
involved in the exchange. Because of the present problems he suggested that Japan should
resort to a political solution and that actual settlement of the question should be effected by
February, 1942, when the credit, agreement between the two countries should expire. 1311
595. Japan Discovers Discrimination in Thaiese Censorship
In his attempt to discover the basis on which Thailand conducted its censorship, the
Ambassador to Thailand also explained that letters passed between Japan and Thailand
frequently appeared to be censored, but letters passing through the country seemed to be
untouched. Since documents between the Foreign Minister and the Japanese Embassy in
Thailand did not go through the post office, these were not censored. ms
596. Ambassador Advises That Railway be Completed Quickly
The suggestion that the Siamese railway be completed by Japan as quickly as possible was
sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, by the Ambassador in Bangkok. Moreover, he requested
that Japanese companies and responsible authorities in Siam get in touch with his office
before handling foreign trade. 13 " 3
597. Foreign Minister Togo Asks that Additional Rubber be Secured
In a dispatch designed, primarily, to list the schedules of the Japanese Marus carrying
rubber from Thailand to Japan, Foreign Minister Togo commented on Ambassador Tsubokami's
wire concerning the general total of imports amounting to 38,000 tons. In his opinion it was
still possible to procure 10,000 tons of rubber and he requested that the Ambassador spur
' 3a 'IV, 1178.
" a 'IV,1179.
'""TV, 1180.
,S,1 IV, 1181.
m T% 1182.
I3,J IV. 1183.
,3 "IV, 1184.
276
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
598. Japan Plans to Investigate Raw Opium Market
The Foreign Minister requested that an investigation regarding the supply and demand
of raw opium in Thailand be conducted. He asked that the amount consumed, the amount
produced, the imports and the price at which the Purchasing Bureau obtained raw opium
and the price at which it retailed be listed. 1346
599. Consul General Asada Carries Important Papers to Thailand
Foreign Minister Togo declared on November 27, 1941, that Consul General Asada, return-
ing to Japan, was carrying papers regarding the secret negotiations with Prime Minister
Pibul. The Foreign Minister directed that the Ambassador should consult Consul General
Shunsuke Asada in any matter pertaining to Thailand." 16
600. High Ranking Official Says Thailand Friendly to Japanese Army
The pertinent remarks of a high ranking Thaiese which were learned through the associate
editor of the Bangkok Times, Mr. Ado, via a Japanese secret agent, were reported to Tokyo
on November 27, 1941. According to the high ranking official the Thailand government sympa-
thized with the aims of the Japanese army and declared that the recent strict observances of
neutrality were merely gestures toward Great Britain and America. The official stated, more-
over, that should the Japanese army invade Thailand that country was not prepared to repel
the invasion and that if it were tactfully carried out the people would probably settle down
peacefully in three or four months feeling safe. 13 * 7
In spite of this report, however, Japanese officials in the Thaiese capital reported on Novem-
ber 28, 1941, that Thailand had begun to draft men, although the conscription was not heavy.
As an example, it was found that of the 232 persons working for nine Japanese companies,
seven had been drafted. 13 * 8
601. Agreement Stipulates Continuance of Gold Exchange to March, 1942
The Japanese Ambassador wired Tokyo that a conference had been held between Mr.
Yoichi Fukuda of the Yokohama Specie Bank and Minister Kohei Futami, Uychiyama,
the Finance Ministry Advisers, and Prince Aitsu concerning the transfer of 25,000,000
bahts. Declaring that Japan wished to continue the exchange of gold until the end of
March, 1942, Mr. Fukuda had obtained a promise that the Finance Minister would take
up this case at a Cabinet meeting on December 3, 1941. It was hoped that the Finance
Minister would eventually request the transfer of American dollars only, with Thaiese funds
being held in reserve.' 349
602. Ambassador Requests Additional Secret Fund
On November 28, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami requested 100,000 yen for the purpose of
carrying on intelligence and enlightenment propaganda in the eventuality that remittances
from Japan might cease. Since it had been decided to enlarge upon and carry out a pro-
paganda policy which had been previously decided, the Ambassador stated that he would
send the written plan to Tokyo at a later time. l3S0
IS,S IV, 1185.
,M *IV, 1186.
'"TV, 1187.
,3 "IV, 1188.
,M, IV, 1189.
1JS "IV,1190.
277
603. Ambassador Tsubokami Explains Objectives of Prime Minister Pibul's Speech
In regard to Prime Minister Pibul's broadcast to his people on November 27, 1941, the
Japanese Ambassador declared that the speech had been made to lay the groundwork for a
diplomatic about face and to warn those who were influenced by British propaganda.
During a talk with Minister Futami, Mr. Pibul had been particular to refer to this point. 1361
During the discussion Pibul revealed that British propaganda had been fluctuating and that
not a few Thaiese had been in the employment of Great Britain, He had told Minister Futami
that in his talk to be given later in the day he would declare that it was Thailand's policy
to stick to neutrality and would advise them not to be taken in by propaganda from foreign
sources. Minister Futami replied that should Japanese forces in French Indo-China be forced
to embark on a local course of action, he would like the Prime Minister to realize that such
action would not in itself be aimed at Thailand. He promised that any military action would
be in behalf of Pibul's country and he asked for his cooperation. The Prime Minister then
revealed that because of the insecurity of his own position, he had not dared to inform the
Thaiese people of his hopes that Japan would occupy French Indo-China, considering Thai-
land's policy of neutrality. Should the country be threatened by some Japanese action
supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. Pibul would be cut off, "isolated, a lone man". 1368
604. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests that Thailand be Persuaded to Cooperate
Discussing the present situation in Thailand and laying the groundwork whereby Thailand
could be justifiably invaded by the Japanese army, Ambassador Tsubokami sent a dispatch
to Tokyo on November 29, 1941. From the standpoint of face-saving and also for material
reasons, it would be better if Thailand should abandon her neutrality policy by formally
requesting cooperative action "from the nation concerned" rather than by being compelled to
consent to considerations by pressure brought to bear.
This had been suggested to Mr. Luang Sindhu, Minister of Education, and Mr. Wanitto in a
conference with Naval Attache Yoshika at which time Mr. Luang Sindhu had volunterred to
handle the matter and to put forth every effort for its realization. Through these two
Thaiese officials the Japanese had learned that discussions in the Cabinet concerned the real
intentions of Japan or the real meaning of the East Asia co-prosperity plan, the influence of
the Japanese southward expansion policy, the extent of commodity supplying, and the
duration of time of stationing troops. Led by Nai Wanitto the pro-Japanese group in the
Cabinet in advocating the establishing of a union between Japan and Thailand had been
having better success with the result that their position had become more favorable.
Although the matter was as yet unconcluded, the opposition since about November 25,
1941, had kept silent. 1363
605. Thaiese Government Officials Still Vote for Neutrality
In spite of the discussion of joint military action by the pro- Japanese faction, Thailand
still desired to maintain strict neutrality and Ambassador Tsubokami explained that the
nation which made the first move would be regarded as Thai's enemy. Considering this, the
Japanese Ambassador suggested that Britain be forced to aggression, with Japan assuming
the position of Thai's helper. To effect this, Japan should land her troops near the British
territory of Kotaparu, forcing Britain to invade Thailand from Patanbessa. This would result
in Thailand's declaring war on Great Britain. 1364
However, should Japan use the method of presenting an ultimatum to Thailand, it might
be difficult to limit the conflict, officials in Bangkok wired on December 3, 1941. Details
'IV, 1191.
*1V, 1192.
s IV t 1193.
'TV, 1194.
278
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
concerning this subject were to be reported to the Vice-Chief of the General staff through
Staff Officer Yahara. 1365
606. Officials Originate Plan To Force Mr. Pibul to Declare His Position
Reportedly concerned over Prime Minister Pibul's "weak character" were Mr. Luang
Sindhu and Mr. Wanitto who suggested a plan whereby Mr. Pibul would be forced to declare
his position. One method would be for Japan to remove forcibly some undersirable Japanese
from Thailand, subsequently publicizing this as the forerunner of a general evacuation of
Japanese nationals. Such action would speed favorable developments, the Ambassador
said.' 356
607. Ambassador Sends List of Codes to be Destroyed
On November 30, 1941, Ambassador Tsubokami transmitted a list of the codes which the
Bangkok office planned to destroy, requesting that any objections be sent by return wire. 13 "
608. Japanese Ambassador Suggests Counter Propaganda Tactics
To counter British propaganda, the Japanese Ambassador suggested that Japan have
published in English and Thaiese newspapers editorials stressing that the colored races
in Australia and North America were suppressed, that Japan's objective was not Thailand,
and that small nations had been victimized by British propaganda and schemes in the
war between Germany and Britain. 1368
609. Foreign Minister Togo Remits Funds for Propaganda Purposes
The ¥100,000 earlier requested by Bangkok for propaganda purposes had been sent, Foreign
Minister Togo advised Ambassador Tsubokami on December 1, 1941. 19,19
610. Japanese Officials Set Up Secret Wireless Communication Facilities
In the event that communications between Bangkok and Tokyo were cut off, secret wireless
communication facilities had been set up between Bangkok and the Domei Press Office in
Saigon. 1360 Moreover, to meet any emergency situation, Japanese officials in Bangkok were
concerned with arranging the Thaiese currency problem, and requested, on December
3, 1941, that a suitable person be appointed to the Embassy staff for this purpose, and sent
as soon as possible. 1381
In view of the urgency of concealing Japanese plans, it was deemed inadvisable by the
Vice- Chief of the Japanese General Staff to withdraw Japanese fishing boats from Singapore.
For the time being, then, it was decided that this action should not be taken. 1362
611. Nai Wanitto Believes Thailand Will Cooperate with Japan in Two or Three Days
During a three-hour Cabinet speech, Prime Minister Pibul had declared that "The time had
come when Thailand must cast its fate with that of Japan," Ambassador Tsubokami reported
1356 IV, 1195.
1194.
I3S7 IV, 1196.
1318 IV, 1197.
" M IV, 1198.
138 °IV, 1199.
lM, IV, 1200.
""IV, 1201.
279
on December 4, 1941, This had been approved by a standing vote by Mr. Luang Sindhu,
Mr. Boriban, Vice-Commander Rwankurien, Minister of Defense Ruansweri and the Chief
of the General Staff Ruanbititto Songhram. Mr. Wanitto believed that Thailand would switch
over to Japan within the next two or three days."* 3
In spite of this belief, however, it was also reported on December 4 that the Siamese
government had sent two men to talk with the Commanding Officer of the British Far
Eastern Army at Singapore. These men were to observe the condition of the British forces
and to deal with the matter of purchasing material. m4
612. Thailand Sends Official Reply to Financial Proposal
On December 4, 1941, the terms of the memorandum regarding the financial negotiations
between Thailand and Japan were wired to Tokyo to be regarded as the official reply of Thai-
land. It had been handed to Minister Futami on December 4, 1941, and stipulated that the
Yokohama Specie Bank would transfer 25,000,000 baht in gold to the Treasury Department. 1365
613. Propaganda to be Disseminated in Thailand is Sent to Japan
In accordance with his previously advocated policy of disseminating propaganda, Ambassa-
dor Tsubokami forwarded communications to Japan which, if broadcast in English and
Thaiese, could be heard by the Thaiese populace. The propaganda had been originally
written by the Japanese special correspondent in Bangkok. ia66
614. British and American Residents Evacuate Bangkok
Meanwhile, on December 5, 1941, the Ambassador informed Tokyo that British and
American residents were beginning to evacuate Bangkok but that the number going to
British Malaya was not large. He reported that many were going to the vicinity of Hoanin and
South Thailand. Moreover, he informed Tokyo that a conference of delegates reporting the
evacuation had been held at the British Legation on December 3, 194 1 1367
It had been learned that approximately thirty Americans living in Chiengmai, Lampang,
Prae and other cities in that vicinity had met at a hospital in Chiengmai on November 30
to discuss the matter of their evacuation. The result of their discussion was not included in
the dispatch transmitted from Bangkok to Tokyo on December 2, 1941. 1368
615. Ambassador Informs Tokyo of Schedule of Batavia Maru
On December 6, 1941, the Ambassador transmitted the schedule of the Batavia Maru as
well as cargo which it would carry to Osaka. Scheduled to sail on December 5, 1941, it would
touch port at Saigon and Keelung. 1369
616. Japan to Issue Proclamation on December 8, 1941
Tokyo informed Ambassador Tsubokami that December 8, 1941 would be the declaration
or proclamation day as had been decided by the liaison conference of December 6, 1941.
A receipt was to be sent immediately from Bangkok as soon as this dispatch had been
received.'* 7 * 1
*IV, 1202.
'"IV, 1203.
;s IV, 1204.
15 IV. 1205.
"IV. 1206.
"IV, 1207.
S IV, 1208.
"IV, 1209.
280
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
617. Invasion of Thailand to be Announced by Separate Wire
In a message which was badly garbled in transmission from Tokyo to Bangkok on December
7, 1941, it was learned that Japan would announce its invasion of Thailand by separate wire
as soon as the Imperial government's decision became clear. Ambassador Tsubokami was
instructed to arrange to defeat Britain's plots by choosing the most appropriate statement in
the announcement as the Embassy's statement. He was urged to exercise every precaution to
insure that the Imperial forces' objectives would not. be exposed in making these announce-
ments. 1371
618. Foreign Office Provides Ambassador with Varying Explanations in Case Occupation is Peaceful
or by Force
According to separate message "A", which was to be applicable should the occupation be
accomplished peacefully, it was pointed out that the relations between Thailand and
Japan had reached the highest point of their friendship and that the two countries together
would strive toward the stabilization of the Far East and towards the creation of a co-prosperitj
sphere. The Ambassador could use any of the following phrases; Japan and Thailand had
reached an agreement on the joint defense of Thailand or had reached an agreement of a
certain kind of alliance; or Thailand had agreed to join the Tripartite Pact; or Thailand agreed
to permit the passage of Japanese troops through Thailand. 1 " 8
In the event of a forceful occupation, it was to be explained that for some time past the
British had been massing large numbers of troops on the Malayan and Burmese borders
under the pretense of defense. Since these British troops had attacked Thailand, the
Imperial government had begun to occupy Thailand as an emergency defense measure.
It was to be pointed out that Japan had absolutely no intention of conducting an invasion or of
interfering with Thailand's independence and that full cooperation was expected from the
officials and people of Thailand. 1373
619. Thailand Gives Right of Passage Through Territory to Japanese Army
An agreement signed by the Japanese Ambassador and the Thaiese Minister of Foreign
Affairs was sent to Tokyo on December 8, 1941. As representatives of their respective govern-
ments they agreed that Thailand should give to Japan the right of passage through Thaiese
territory, extending all necessary facilities for the said passage of Japanese forces and to take
every measure to avoid conflict between the Japanese and Thaiese forces. The particulars for
the execution of the agreement should be determined between the military authorities of the
two countries. Japan by this agreement guaranteed that the independence, sovereignty
and honor of Thailand would be respected. 1374
620. Tokyo Announces Armies* Advance and Occupation of Bataan Island
In a war situation report on December 9, 1941, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff announced
that as of December 8 Japanese units had landed in Thailand, Malaya, and Kota Bahru (on
the east coast of Malaya) and were making progress in setting up their bases in preparation for
further advancement.
One transport had been lost, as well as eleven unidentified units and several fighter planes.
Japanese units had succeeded in damaging forty -four and shooting down fifteen allied planes.
He announced that Thailand had been invaded at 1230 (I zone time) on December 8 and
that the units which had landed south of Bangkok were advancing toward the city.
Japanese units had also occupied Bataan Island north of the Philippines, and the army had
been bombing northern Luzon, while the navy had been bombing the central and southern
part of the Isla nd. 1375
ia * l rv, 1210.
13 "IV, 1211.
I573 IV, 1212.
'"'IV, 1213.
13,3 IV, 1214.
281
4 XT. 5. GOVERNMttn PRINTtNC OIl'lCE: 197B 0-J44-S24 Vol. IV PI. L
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